

THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER,

K. C. B.,



FROM PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS, LETTERS,
AND OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

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BY

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AUTHOR OF

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"REMINISCENCES OF SYRIA," &c.

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CHAPTER I.

BEYROUT AND DJOUNIE—AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 1840.

HAVING followed the course of events connected with the subject of this memoir up to the end of July, 1840—from which period may be dated the active part taken by England in the “Eastern Question”—and as the Lebanon and the northern coast of Syria were the scenes of the ensuing important events in Captain Napier’s life, I may perhaps be allowed to give a brief notice of this part of the country and of its native tribes, from a work published by me several years ago.*

“The range of the Lebanon, extending between the 33rd and 36th degree of north latitude from the river Assey (the ancient Orontes) to its southern limits,

* “Reminiscences of Syria,” by Lieutenant-Colonel Elers Napier, vol. i., chap. 4.

bounded by the Letani, or Leontes of old, is inhabited by a variety of different tribes, who from time immemorial have found a refuge in its fastnesses. The most northern district of the range, extending to the neighbourhood of Tripoli, is occupied by a sect of idolaters called Anzari, whose origin may or may not be derived from the ancient Persians or Guebres—the fire-worshippers of old—as one of their sects, the ‘Shamsié,’ are said to worship the sun; the remains of whose magnificent temple may still be seen amidst the ruins of Baalbec. The Anzari are the least numerous of the Lebanon tribes, their number in 1840 not exceeding 20,000 souls.

“The next race to be mentioned are the Maronites, who occupy all the most central valleys and the highest ridges, from the neighbourhood of Tripoli to the south of Beyrout. The Keshrouan, in the neighbourhood of D’jounie Bay, is exclusively occupied by this Christian sect, said to have been founded in the sixth century by a certain St. Maronius, and which in religious matters acknowledges the supremacy of Rome, though its clergy maintain the right of electing their own bishops or patriarchs, of dispensing with a state of celibacy, and of entering into the marriage state. The Maronites are the most numerous of the Lebanon tribes, numbering about 200,000, of whom 35,000 were reckoned capable of bearing arms.

“The Metualis are a Mahomedan tribe, of the Shehah sect—to which the Persians belong—recognizing the supremacy of Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, and hating the Sunnees, or followers of Omar, whose

creed is acknowledged by the Turks. The Metualis are found in the plain of the Boccah (between the Libanus and the Anti-Libanus), the sides of the Anti-Libanus and the lower part of the Southern Libanus, extending to the north-east of Sour or Tyre; but at present, they form only an inconsiderable portion of the population of this part of Syria.

“Crossing the district of Kātah, and proceeding to the southern range of hills extending parallel to the coast, from the neighbourhood of Beyrout to the heights above Sidon, we come to the country of the Druses, whose origin, belief, religious rites and ceremonies, have long been enveloped in mystery, and continue to afford food for speculation. They are, however, idolaters; one of their objects of worship is said to be the image of a calf, which might adduce some analogy, in their religion, between that of the ancient Egyptians and of the Hindoos of modern times. Be that as it may, the Druses are not only tolerant in religious matters, but some of them do not hesitate to conform outwardly to the religious observances of those with whom they may be associated. They are, generally speaking, a brave and honest race, practising the virtues of hospitality to a degree unknown amongst more civilized nations, but never forgetting an injury; and hence the constant feuds which continue to exist amongst the different tribes, and particularly between the Druses and Maronites, to the present day. These dissensions are invariably encouraged by the Turks, who thereby consolidate their power in the ‘Mountain,’ the tribes of which, if

united, might soon drive out all intruders, and become a powerful and independent state.

“Until the death of the celebrated Druse chief, Fākr-ed-Din, the whole of the Lebanon was (nominally) under a Druse sheikh or chieftain; however, on his death, an ancient and powerful Mahomedan family of the name of Shéhab, who were descended from the Prophet, and came from the Hauran, by one of those unexpected changes of fortune so common in the East, succeeded, under the title of ‘Grand Prince,’ to the supremacy of the ‘Mountain,’ as the Lebanon is called *par excellence*.

“Little mention is made of these ‘Grand Princes of Lebanon’ until the accession of Emir Milhem, the uncle of the old Emir Beschir, who, at the time we speak of (1840), was under the sway of Mehemet Ali, the nominal reigning prince. Milhem had been succeeded by his son Youssouf, who, finding his young cousin Beschir endowed with extraordinary talents, early associated him in the direction of affairs, and was repaid for his kindness with the greatest ingratitude—Beschir, by a bribe to Djazzar, the bloodthirsty Pasha of Acre, causing his kinsman to be deposed, and himself elected in his stead.

“These events happened in 1789, since which period, up to the invasion of Syria by Ibrahim Pasha, the Emir Beschir had—through various vicissitudes of fortune—from his palace of T'bdeen, ruled the Mountain with an iron hand, punishing, with the most unrelenting cruelty, those who opposed him; not sparing even his nearest relations, many of whom—to remove them out of his way, after depriving them of their sight

and causing their tongues to be cut out—he banished to remote parts of the Lebanon, whilst others he put to death. He had, however, become a convert to Christianity, which probably, in his opinion, made amends for all these crimes.”

Previous to the entrance of the Egyptians into Syria, the rule of the Emir Beschir extended over the whole of the Mountain, from Tripoli to the vicinity of Acre, including the plain of the Boccah and part of the Djebel Sheikh in the Anti-Libanus. Under his control were Ansari, Maronites, Druses, and Metualis; and had he by a mild and just government conciliated all parties, and endeavoured to unite his different subjects amongst themselves, he might have laid the foundation of an independent state, and of a power capable of withstanding the utmost efforts of either Turk or Egyptian, both of whom he could in that case have set at defiance.

The Grand Prince possessed many qualities which particularly fitted him for such a magnificent undertaking. He was endowed with energy, courage, and talent to an eminent degree; but all these brighter qualities were tarnished by his cold-blooded cruelty and insatiable avarice, which were the causes of constant insurrections; to suppress which he was obliged always to keep one class of his subjects at enmity with the other, thereby weakening the whole, and thus paving the way to that supremacy which Ibrahim Pasha failed not, shortly after his invasion of Syria, to obtain over all Mount Lebanon, and to which the Emir Beschir was forced to succumb.

Owing to our vacillation, in allowing the Egyptian

fleet to land an army of 15,000 men at Beyrout and then depart in peace, this supremacy was not likely to be brought to a close, as the insurrection of the mountaineers appeared through these means to have been entirely put down. It was at this stage of affairs that Captain Napier received orders to rejoin the flag of the Commander-in-chief, and for that purpose left the anchorage off Beyrout on the 3rd of August, 1840.

He was now entering on a course of active service, of which he subsequently published a narrative, under the title of "The War in Syria," from which I shall occasionally make extracts. I have likewise derived many interesting particulars relating to these events from the journal of Lieutenant, now Commander, Elliot of the "Powerful."

On the 10th of August the "Powerful" was off Castel Rosso, on the coast of Caramania, where she fell in with the "Ganges," bringing directions for Captain Napier to hoist a broad blue pendant, to take under his command the "Ganges," "Thunderer," "Edinburgh," "Castor," and "Gorgon," and return immediately to Beyrout. Captain Reynolds, who commanded the "Ganges," was despatched with the Treaty of the 15th of July, and orders to assist the mountaineers, under the supposition that the insurrection was still in full force. The Commodore—as we may now designate Captain Napier—received by the same opportunity the subjoined letter from the Commander-in-chief, Sir Robert Stopford, who had resumed the command of the fleet:—

“‘Princess Charlotte,’ off Mytilene, August 8, 1840.

“DEAR NAPIER,—I hope our Government are not too late in the day for taking active measures in Syria.

“Lord Ponsonby is very sanguine of our success even now, and will not give credit to what I hear from all quarters, as well as from yourself, that the insurgents have been put down. The Government instructions—extracts of which I send you—appear to have been formed upon the notion that the insurrection was still in full force.

“I send you the ‘Ganges’ and ‘Thunderer,’ keeping here ‘Asia’ and ‘Bellerophon,’ one of which will be required to convoy the Turkish troops, who are preparing for Cyprus and Syria. I am looking out for the two ships from Naples, and ‘Revenge’ and ‘Cambridge’ from home, but the very strong north winds which have prevailed for some days will retard their arrival.

“Three sail-of-the-line, with frigates and steamers (of which I have none), are ordered to be kept off the Dardanelles, at Lord Ponsonby’s summons, to go to the Bosphorus to protect the capital, in conjunction with the Russians, from any attack on the part of Ibrahim Pasha. There has been a complete failure as to the terms offered by the Pasha to the Porte, in lieu of which the Sultan is to send his ultimatum to the Pasha, backed by the four Powers (the French having quite withdrawn), consisting of terms which I fear will not be accepted, viz., the hereditary Pashalic of Egypt, a life-interest in a small part of Syria, including St. Jean d’Acre, withdrawing his troops from Arabia, and giving up the island of Candia to the Porte, also the return of the Turkish ships to Constantinople. The Pasha is to give his answer in ten days upon one point, and in twenty days upon the whole. I am very glad to find that the Admiralty have at last found it necessary to have a Commodore here, and that it has been given to you.

“Lord Ponsonby informs me that the Porte will send their envoy to Alexandria, with the ultimatum, as soon as possible. The consuls of the four allied Powers are to support these terms with all the influence in their power; and

as the Pasha's determination will be of great importance, I have directed Captain Austin in the 'Cyclops' to wait the result, and to convey it to me as soon as possible.

"As soon as I am joined by all my expected ships, I shall most probably go towards you, either off the coast of Syria or off Alexandria.

"I have directed Captain Reynolds to communicate at the island of Rhodes, and to keep one ship to the north, the other south of Cyprus, to intercept your progress, in the event of your quitting Syria in consequence of my last order. Believe me very truly yours,

"ROBERT STOPFORD.

"I have only the 'Wasp' with me: no frigates—no steamer!"

Commodore Napier must indeed have been rejoiced that he had overcome those transient feelings of anger and disgust which influenced him at Vourla Bay, and caused him to tender the resignation of his command; for he had now attained the height of his ambition—was in charge of a fine British squadron of four ships-of-the-line; and in a great measure his own master, with every chance, through the chapter of events, of being able to strike a "coup." But "the service," says Captain Napier, in his "War in Syria," "was of a delicate nature; the insurrection was over, and twenty days allowed Mehemet Ali to accept or reject the treaty of July. In the quarantine ground, two miles from Beyrout, were encamped 4000 Turks; it was known they were dissatisfied, and wished to return to Constantinople; but how to assist them, or how far to go, under the existing treaty, was a point not easy to decide; it was, however, important that some effort should be made, before they were moved out of reach. It was also desirable to prevent, if possible,

that enterprising officer, Souleyman Pasha, from removing the stores contained in the magazine, and strengthening the town.

"My position," writes the Commodore, "was not agreeable. If I commenced hostilities before the expiration of the twenty days, and Mehemet Ali accepted the terms, I should be accused of precipitation, and of causing an unnecessary sacrifice of life; on the other hand, should Mehemet Ali hold out, I might be accused of supineness. Under this embarrassment, we anchored at Beyrout on the 12th of August."

In this dilemma, the Commodore anchored two of his ships as close as he could to the forts which guard the entrance to the port of Beyrout; and placed the others so as to bring their broadsides to bear on the Egyptian camp, in the vicinity of the town. He lost no time in opening communications with the Governor of the place, the commander of the Turkish troops, the Grand Prince, the British Consul, and the inhabitants of the neighbouring mountain districts. Lieutenant Elliot was employed on one of these missions, from whose journal I give the following extracts:—


"H.M.S. 'Powerful,' Beyrout, Syria. August 20th, 1840.

"Without the slightest prospect at present of an opportunity of sending this, and to be ready against any unexpected one, I must sit down to tell you of all the interesting and important events that have occurred to us since my last, of the 20th of July. I then mentioned our having heard that the five, or rather four Powers (since France holds herself neutral), had decided that Syria was to be given up to the Pasha of Egypt: this was only a report, got up by him to deceive us; but getting letters from the Commander-in-chief, saying that we might return to him if we found nothing to be done, and as the revolt of the mountaineers had been nearly, or completely, put down, we were induced to leave the

coast, and sail for Vourla, in company with the 'Edinburgh,' much disappointed at not seeing more of the country; but after a week's contending against contrary winds, we were fortunate in meeting, off Rhodes, with the 'Ganges' and 'Thunderer,' both ships of our own class, sent expressly to intercept us, and with orders for Captain Napier to hoist his broad pendant, to take command of the squadron, repair to this part of the coast again, and do all in his power, by fair means or foul, to dispossess Mehemet Ali of Syria, and re-establish the authority of the Sultan. This was a change indeed, and old Charlie's delight, both at the promotion, and the job cut out for him, calling for a display of his gallantry and talent, was not to be described; and nothing is talked of, in our small though splendid squadron, but the capture or destruction of the Egyptian fleet, of nearly three times our force; and not a doubt exists of the result. Meanwhile, the 'Cyclops' steamer has been despatched from the Admiral to Alexandria, with this news, and a threat that if the troops are not withdrawn from Syria, and a favourable reply returned within ten days by Mehemet Ali, the Powers would use every means to compel him; and it is quite well known that he will rather die in defending what has cost him a lifetime to acquire, than submit without a blow; and by marching his army against Constantinople, he may give us all much trouble; the Turks have neither an army nor a fleet to oppose him, so we must do the work. In the meantime, we steered for Beyrout, in every way prepared for most warlike operations, and forming a close line, ran in through the roads, dropping a boat to bring off our Consul, to consult as to the best means of raising a panic, and stood out to sea for an hour or two. We also sent boats to sound as near the forts as possible, to ascertain the best positions to attack them. In order to explain to you the particulars of our nautical movements, I must have recourse to drawing a rough plan of the place to assist me.

"Having stood out for an hour or two, and got all the captains on board to arrange the plan of attack, we shortened sail, and stood in under our topsail, top-gallant sails, jib, and spanker—'Powerful' leading, followed close by the others, all our guns shotted, all clear for action, and all hands at

quarters. A few minutes of the deepest excitement prevailed throughout, as we hardly expected they would allow us to take such a threatening position without firing a gun; and that would have produced a broadside from all of us. Dropping our anchor with a spring on the cable, within a musket-shot of the two strongest but very rickety forts that defended the town, and within a few yards of the rocks, lay the 'Powerful.' The 'Edinburgh' brought her broadside to bear on the other fort, at the farther end of the town; while the 'Ganges,' 'Thunderer,' and 'Castor' frigate, which joined us that morning, took positions against the Egyptian camp, containing 11,000 men: 4000 of them are Turks, taken in the fleet when they were given up to Mehemet Ali, and would be glad to return to their allegiance, if they dared, but are strongly guarded by the Egyptians. As soon as the ships were anchored, imagine my delight when I was called on deck from my quarters on the lower-deck, and putting a letter into my hands, the Commodore said to me, 'Take that letter, containing the terms for the surrender of the town and army, on shore; take the Consul with you' (he had previously gone ashore), 'see the Governor, and demand an immediate answer. The boat will wait for you; be firm, careful, and keep your wits about you.' On landing inside the pier, I found the quays covered with troops, some of whom placed their bayonets disagreeably close to my breast, to oppose my landing. Having, however, explained, through an interpreter, my wish to see the Governor, I was allowed to land, and, calling on the Consul—



whom I found in a dreadful stew, with his wife and family around him—to accompany me, we walked towards the palace, but met the Governor, old Mahmoud Bey, riding about in great trepidation. Stopping him, and saying I had a letter for him, he dismounted and walked to the palace, where, with much state and form, and with all his officers present, he received the letter, written in Arabic and English. I wish I could make a good sketch of the group as we sat in state, the old gentleman dressed in a rich embroidered blue jacket and petticoat trowsers, red cap and slippers, an immense pair of moustachios that quite concealed his mouth and chin, but no beard. He sat on a low sofa, with his legs coiled under him, the Consul, in his uniform, on his left, and I, being thought unused to such an attitude, was given a chair on his right. The Consul's dragoman, or interpreter, in an ample loose robe and large white turban, stood facing us, and at every word addressed to him on either side, bowed almost to the ground, whilst behind him several officers stood with much attention, and about a score of attendants, in handsome but varied costume, who kept bringing us coffee, sherbet, and pipes six feet long, with splendid mouthpieces set in diamonds. From the slow and stately way in which everything was done, I had much time to admire and watch the fine mild countenance of the Governor, as he read the despatch, which he got through with calmness; but, as he ended it, the paper dropped from his hands, his eye flashed, and he was for some moments speechless. The letter demanded that the army should lay down their arms, or that he should be answerable that not a man was to go outside of their encampment until means were found of transporting them from this; that the arms, ammunition, and stores taken from the mountaineers were to be given up to our charge, as well as the fort that contained them; and that the 4,000 Turkish troops should be allowed to return to Constantinople or otherwise, as should be determined on hereafter. His non-compliance with these terms would bring down the vengeance of the Commodore, whose ships were placed in such a position that the town, forts, and encampment could be annihilated in a few minutes; but he hoped, for the sake of humanity, and to spare the lives of

brave men, he would concede to the terms. Much conversation then took place as to the answer he should give, as he could not make any without consulting Abbas Pasha, the General in command of the army, who was at some distance, and must deliberate on the subject; and he endeavoured to put me off with various excuses, only to gain time. I then said that my orders were to get an immediate answer or return without one, which would be taken as a non-compliance, and the ships would open their fire. I at last got him to write that, as his superior was in the neighbourhood, he begged to be allowed to consult him on so difficult a question, and would return his answer as soon as it was determined. Mahmoud Bey is considered a very feeling, fine fellow, and much civilised, from having been some years in the French Navy, and it is curious that I should have had a previous slight acquaintance with him. As I was one day strolling about the streets in search of a sketch, I chanced to sit down near a private dwelling of his, where he, seeing me from his window, asked me up, which invitation I accepted, and partook of his pipe and coffee; we had some conversation in French, and he was altogether very civil to me. At our conference he recognised me, and asked why I did not speak in French; but I told him I was not sufficiently master of the language to carry on so important a communication, and trusted more to the dragoman, who was responsible for an exact translation. I thought I could see in his whole manner a determination to resist; and as I left, he mounted his horse to see Abbas Pasha, and give orders to his people, I have no doubt, to prepare for the worst.

“As I expected, the Commodore was very indignant, and ordered me instantly on shore again, to take Mr. Wood (whom I mentioned to you before) with me, and to insist on an answer from either Abbas Pasha or Mahmoud Bey; so, mounting the Consul's horses, with a guard of his janisaries, we galloped out to the quarters of the General, where we found him, Mahmoud having just seen and left him again. Abbas Pasha is the nephew of Ibrahim Pasha, Mehemet Ali's adopted son and intended successor; he is only known to be an ignorant, cruel old savage, who was little likely to come to our terms;

his appearance is much against him, being immensely fat, with a most forbidding countenance, which only varied one moment from the deepest rage to a sleepy, inanimate stupor the next. All, however, we could get from him was, that he had no intention of moving the troops at present; so that part of the demand might be considered complied with, but he would bind himself by no promise; and as for the fort and arms, they were entirely under the Governor of the town, and he would not interfere. We then got him to send for Mahmoud Bey, who had previously referred it to him, and after nearly two hours' staring and yawning at each other, the latter made his appearance, but it was of little use; and they then agreed that no answer should be given, and I was compelled to return on board empty-handed.

"The Commodore would have instantly opened his fire on the town, but a feeling of humanity prevented him, and he could not think of such a wholesale slaughter of the innocent inhabitants as it would cause; and they, too, subjects of the Sultan, as we must now consider the town to belong to him. The forts would be demolished at the first broadside, but we must necessarily ruin the town in doing so; the troops would, of course, retreat behind the hill after the first shot, and there defy us; so that old Charlie seemed a little foiled, and was much puzzled how to act. I dined with him that day, with all the other captains, and heard much discussion on the subject, and they seemed much annoyed, but thought he had done everything for the best. The Consul had been desired to station a person to watch that no arms or ammunition was taken out of the fort, and about midnight he sent off to say they were hard at work doing so. I was roused out of my bed and sent on shore again, to see it with my own eyes; and, if so, to say to the officer superintending, that if he did not order the men to desist immediately, we should open our fire.

"This was rather a hazardous trip to be taken at midnight, among an infuriated and barbarous soldiery, and, on landing, we could scarcely get along, they were so crowded. The first officer I saw was Mahmoud himself, with his guard, busily stationing his men for an attack. I took no notice of him, as I was desired, unless I had reason to do so; but he, recognising me,

followed until I came to the gate of the fort, where I stopped to see what was going on. Addressing me, he demanded what I wanted. I said I was on my own private business, and hoped there was no harm in being there. He said there was none, and asked me to his house, where I should be welcome for the night, as it was scarcely safe in the streets. I, however, declined this, stood my ground, and presently saw a string of men, all loaded with arms, coming out of the fort. I then explained what were my orders, and begged him to give directions for them to desist; but he only endeavoured to keep me in conversation, to gain time, as every moment so employed was precious; and, after a long palaver, I was obliged to call in my boat, without a compliance, and felt myself fortunate in getting aboard with a whole skin.

“The Commodore, again disappointed in his threat—which he said he only made with a hope of their compliance—restrained his ire, and declared they were the most cunning diplomatists he had ever met with; and for these few days has contented himself with taking all vessels carrying troops, arms, or stores for the army; so that we have quite a fleet of prizes round us—one, a fine cutter-of-war, bringing despatches from Mehemet Ali; another with 500 stand of arms and ammunition, and one having specie to pay the troops, but they give us much more trouble than we shall ever be repaid for, as none of them will ever be adjudged lawful prizes. We are in hopes Mehemet Ali will send his fleet to oppose us when he hears of our proceedings, and our remaining here is probably the best way of drawing them out, as we cannot touch them in the port of Alexandria. We have for the last few days kept the ‘Castor’ and ‘Gorgon’ steamer cruising off the port, to look out and detain all suspicious vessels, and give timely warning of danger. We may expect the Indian mail here shortly, and the packet from Malta to take it away; if the Governor will let it pass, he will be more kind than we deserve. When we shall hear from the fleet at Vourla is quite uncertain, but it appears our squadron here is to be increased by two more ships, the ‘Asia’ and ‘Bellerophon,’ as soon as the Admiral can spare them from the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, where he is or-

dered to keep a certain force, and not to leave, himself ; so the Commodore is in high spirits, and hopes that he will have the whole of the business here to himself.

“*August 18th.*—We are all much excited to-day at seeing the ‘*Castor*,’ who is cruising outside the port, bringing in a large Egyptian frigate as prize, but only armed *en flûte*, laden with arms, ammunition, field artillery, and horses ; she struck without firing a shot, was from Alexandria to Iscanderoon, and is, in the present state of affairs, a most valuable capture. She brings us intelligence that the ‘*Bellerophon*’ is cruising off Alexandria, but is not detaining the Pasha’s vessels, as we are doing here. The time (ten days) allowed him to accede or not to the terms offered by the four Powers expires to-morrow ; and then, no doubt, we shall have to annoy him nearer home, as we feel certain he will reject all their proposals.

“I had the opportunity of paying a most interesting visit to Souleyman Pasha, the new Commander-in-chief of the army here, on taking to him a letter from the Commodore relative to landing sick prisoners. He is a celebrated character—a Frenchman, who served in the French Navy—was wounded at the battle of Trafalgar—went with Napoleon to Egypt—fought in the army there—left that service, turned Mahomedan, then joined Mehemet Ali—and has risen to be his best general, second only to Ibrahim Pasha, his adopted son. Souleyman Pasha, was all politeness, and really expressed the warmest feelings for the English ; but in conversation with another person present, not directed to me, gave an account of the formidable preparations he was making for defence, intending me to believe and, of course, repeat the whole of it. He occupied but a single room, in which was his camp bed, and the whole of his furniture consisted of only the contents of a knapsack ; he is a very lively, pleasant old fellow—so very different from his colleagues, the others whom I have had the good fortune of visiting. Of course he did not enter much on the subject of politics, but spoke most enthusiastically in praise of his master.

“*August 19th.*—It never rains but it pours ! This morning we have three arrivals : the ‘*Magicienne*,’ from the Ad-

Admiral, bringing us a mail; the steamer packet from Malta, with no news whatever; and a small sailing packet from Alexandria, with intelligence that Mehemet Ali will not accede to the terms proposed. The steamer from Malta comes for the Indian mail, and returns as soon as it arrives; but we are in doubts whether the governor will not think proper to detain it, which will be a serious misfortune—but I do think we deserve it. We regret exceedingly to learn that it is probable the Admiral will be here before long; so old Charlie will be deprived of the honour and glory of his command, as well as his guinea a-day table-money.”

Lord Ponsonby, the British Ambassador at Constantinople, wrote about this period to Captain Napier. His letter is dated August 4th, 1840. He thanked him very much for his communication, and expressed his happiness to know that the Commodore would receive intelligence in union with his own views of acting with decision. Lord Ponsonby continues that he had always urged action, and was rejoiced to see the Commodore’s skill and energy employed; adding, that he had “never despaired of a good result, which he considered to be now certain.”

While the Commodore with his squadron retained the same threatening attitude before Beyrout, some intercepted despatches from Alexandria to Souleyman Pasha showed that France promised her support to Mehemet Ali, who, in consequence, had rejected the terms of the treaty of the 15th of July; and at an audience which the Consuls of the four Powers had held with him on the subject, he gave them to understand that it would be perfectly useless to return to him at the expiration of twenty days; that what he had won with the sword he meant to retain with the sword; and that they had better leave Alexandria when

the time fixed upon had expired, as further stay after that period could neither be to their own honour nor the advantage of their respective countries. All this had much the appearance of a general outbreak, and Commodore Napier received a despatch from Lord Ponsonby, announcing that a war with France might at any moment be expected, and recommending him to be on his guard.

Souleyman Pasha had behaved with the most chivalrous generosity; although enraged at the detention of Egyptian vessels, which he considered contrary to the rules of war: he received the sick into the hospitals, with a promise to deliver them up when demanded, and allowed not only the vessels detained, but also the British squadron, to be supplied with fresh provisions and vegetables; "and," adds Commodore Napier, "did everything in his power to prevent a collision taking place."

Meanwhile, on the rumour of a probable outbreak with France, the Turkish Government, who had fitted out an expedition for the coast of Syria, hastened to countermand it. Some of the vessels had however sailed under Admiral Walker, lately promoted to that rank in the Turkish service, who pushed on towards Beyrout, and gave Commodore Napier notice of his approach. The latter immediately sent the "Hastings" to reinforce him, and supply his ship with provisions; and, removing his pendant on board the "Gorgon" steamer, he ran down the coast as far as D'Jebail, in order to ascertain the best place to land the Turkish troops conveyed by Admiral Walker, amounting to 3,500 men.

From D'Jebail the Commodore went to Cyprus, where he had a conference with Admiral Walker; thence he proceeded to reconnoitre St. Jean d'Acre and Sidon, and returned to Beyrout, after an absence of little more than forty-eight hours. His activity was unrivalled; he appeared to possess the power of ubiquity, and is said to have been so constantly engaged, both in body and mind, that he allowed himself scarcely any sleep, and ate and drank but little during this busy time. However, excitement and occupation were always better to him than meat and drink!

The following letter from Lord Minto is dated

“Admiralty, Sept. 30, 1840.

“SIR,—I have to thank you for your letters down to the 30th of August, and I need hardly assure you of the satisfaction which the activity and energy of your proceedings have afforded us.

“Although the circumstance of our having recalled the ‘Donegal’ to man the ‘Britannia,’ as well as the amount of force which Sir Robert Stopford will have under his orders, has led to the employment of a second flag officer on that station, I trust you will not imagine this can have proceeded from any want of confidence in your zeal, ability, or judgment, on which I place the utmost reliance; and I have written to Sir Robert Stopford, intimating my hope that he would have ample opportunities of employing you advantageously on detached service.

“I shall be glad to hear from you as often as any occasion may offer, and have the honour to be yours faithfully,

“MINTO.

“To Commodore Napier, C.B.”

Amidst this mass of business, by which many would have been overwhelmed, the Commodore found time to carry on an extensive private correspondence, amongst which we find the following letter to his old friend, Colonel Hodges:—

“‘Powerful,’ Beyrout, August 23, 1840.

“MY DEAR HODGES,—I have no idea that the old tiger will give way, therefore you had better prepare to leave before the expiration of the twenty days. I arrived here on the 12th, and on the 13th I prepared my different papers, which I enclose, and weighed next morning and took up a position within a few hundred yards of the town, with ‘Edinburgh,’ ‘Ganges,’ ‘Castor,’ and ‘Thunderer,’ close to the quarantine ground, where the whole of the Turkish army lay, quite separate from the rest of the troops. They had only to throw their hats up—the Egyptian camp would have been cleared, and they would have been mine in five minutes, and all Syria in arms; but the poor spiritless devils did nothing, and I of course could not begin the war without a reason. It would have been most important to have driven the Egyptians out of Beyrout, because their stores and ammunition were there; but still I could not do it unless there were an insurrection in the mountains, or a movement in the Turkish camp—because if Mehemet Ali accepted the terms, I should have been accused of killing a number of innocent people without a just cause, and before the expiration of the time. I am also quite aware that if he refuses the terms, and I had begun before, it would have passed over quietly enough: it was all I could do to keep myself quiet, but still I am glad I did. They made no answer to my demands, which I think was quite right. I lay three days in my position, to give the Turks an opportunity of rising, but without effect, and they moved them in the night and mixed them up with the Egyptians, where they now are. I have moved the ships into a safer anchorage, and am now about 600 yards from the town.

“Agreeably to my instructions, I have laid my hands on an Egyptian frigate, with some stores, going to Iscanderoon, with guns mounted, which I presume is the transport you wrote about; a cutter, with despatches, circulating all the reports you already know about the French; two merchant vessels with stores, and one with a few soldiers from Tripoli—so you see my hands are full. I am glad ‘Bellerophon’ is off Alexandria, for if the fleet sails I shall have warning, and

they must be pretty strong to hinder me making another 5th of July of it.

“The Emir Beschir’s (the Grand Prince) physician came to me yesterday—he is the brother of the Austrian Consul; the object of his visit was to say that the prince would move the moment that arms, ammunition, and troops arrived, but it was useless to do so before: to this I quite agreed. Now, if he is sincere, there can be no doubt the mountaineers will rise to a man, and an army cannot penetrate into their fastnesses; but how they are to be provisioned I do not know, for they have none. The Egyptian army here will also no doubt be starved ere long. Landing the troops in Beyrout will do no good, because Souleyman Pasha would eat them at one morsel, but I can put them on shore in the Mountain, which will be a nucleus for the mountaineers. Unfortunately there are no ports on the coast where we can lie with safety, except here, and this is quite open; but steamers can blockade the coast all winter, and there are plenty small places to feed the mountaineers from. I hear from ‘Alecto’ that arms have been sent to the Admiral from Malta. The ‘Magicienne’ joined me to-day; ‘Asia’ is off Mytilene, and has been joined by a Turkish frigate and corvette, without arms; a line-of-battle ship, another frigate, and a corvette are expected, and, Lord Ponsonby says, troops also: he also writes to the Admiral that the insurrection is not put down in Syria. Now, if the first is as true as the last, we have not much to expect. Walker comes with the ships, which I am glad of. I suppose the Admiral will be either with you or me soon.

“If the Turkish steamer waits for the envoy, it will be useless ‘Cyclops’ going too, because an officer could go in her to join the Admiral, should he still be at Mytilene or thereabouts, and I have written to that effect to ‘Bellerophon’; at all events, she must come here on her way, for I cannot part with ‘Gorgon.’

“When Alexandria is shut up, all the steam-packets will be at our disposal; and indeed when the contract vessels arrive, they will not be wanted for the mails. The Pasha of course will not let the steamers coal at Alexandria, therefore you must send me coal vessels here *at all costs*, because

steamers without coals are useless. I have written to this effect to Lewis also.

"I believe I have now written to you on all the points I can think of. There are sappers and miners coming, and a few marines: I suppose they are going to blow the old boy up, but they must put salt on his tail first. By the way, the marines come out in 'Cambridge,' and to be quick, they are to take the round of Barcelona and Genoa. It will be very difficult to keep clear of France, because Mehemet Ali will take up French vessels to bring his stores, and unless we declare the coast in a state of blockade and warn them off—which we ought to do immediately—we must search French vessels, which they will not allow: I will not do it without orders. A foolish officer searched one yesterday—the captain of the corvette complained, and I immediately wrote to say it was quite a mistake, with which he was satisfied; but any vessel can hoist French colours. I shall do all I can, but I foresee my difficulties. When you embark you will of course come here—your bed is ready.

"Believe me, yours very truly,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

The Commodore has often been accused of rashness and want of discretion; but there was always calculation and foresight before he ever took a step, however desperate that step may have appeared to those who were ignorant of the motives which prompted him. Nor was there assuredly any want of "discretion" in the conduct he now evinced towards the French; and a man with less tact and discrimination, placed in the position which he then held, might have plunged Europe into a universal turmoil. But although delighting in the excitement attendant on the operations of war, his sense of humanity—his aversion, amounting to horror, to witness, and much more to cause human sufferings

—always prompted him to adopt measures for the maintenance of peace.

Having followed the current of events up to the end of August, 1840, it will now be requisite to take a retrospective view of affairs, in order to show the reasons which actuated Commodore Napier in pursuing the line of conduct he then observed.

He was anchored before Beyrout, with a naval force that would have sufficed in a few hours to reduce the whole town to a heap of ruins; but, under existing circumstances, his position (as he remarks in his "Syrian War") was not agreeable. This situation was so embarrassing, that an officer with less determination of purpose than that possessed by the Commodore, might have vacillated and done nothing at all. We have seen how he acted on the occasion; but in order to elucidate clearly the actual position in which he was then placed, it will perhaps be more satisfactory to introduce here, that clause in the Convention relative to the Eastern question, which, on the 15th of July, 1840, had been signed in London, by the representatives of the four allied Powers, viz: England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia—France alone refusing to take any part in the measures adopted for the coercion of Mehemet Ali, with the object of compelling him to renew his allegiance to the Porte.

"If the Pasha of Egypt should refuse to accept the above-mentioned arrangements, which will be communicated to him by the Sultan, with the concurrence of the aforesaid Powers, they engage to take, at the request of the Sultan, measures concerted and settled between them, in order to carry that arrangement into effect. In the meanwhile, the Sultan having requested his said allies to unite with him, in order to assist

him to cut off the communication by sea, between Egypt and Syria, and to prevent the transport of troops, horses, arms, and warlike stores of all kinds, from the one province to the other, their Majesties, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, engage to give immediately, to that effect, the necessary orders to their naval commanders in the Mediterranean. Their said Majesties further engage that the naval commanders of their squadrons shall, according to the means at their command, afford, in the name of the alliance, all support and assistance in their power to those subjects of the Sultan who may manifest their fidelity and allegiance to their sovereign."

A separate act annexed to the convention, granted to Mehemet Ali, for himself, and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalic of Egypt, and during his life the title of Pasha of Acre, and the administration of the southern part of Syria; but on condition that *if, at the expiration of twenty days after the communication should have been made to him*, Mehemet Ali did not accede to the proposed arrangement, the Sultan would in that case consider himself at liberty to withdraw the offer, and to follow such other course as his own interests, and the counsels of the allies, might suggest.

Now, although Mehemet Ali had, on the 16th of August, at once rejected these terms, when laid before him by the European Consuls at Alexandria, the expiration of the time assigned for his decision would not take place until the 5th of September; and hence the embarrassing position in which Commodore Napier found himself placed before Beyrout—nor could he, even then, know how to act, until despatches should have arrived from Alexandria with Mehemet Ali's final decision.

Meanwhile, a small English force of artillery, sappers and miners, and engineers, arrived at Beyrout, on the 1st of September, under Colonel,* afterwards General Sir Charles Felix Smith, of the Royal Engineers; but that officer, in consequence of ill health, was unable for a considerable time to take part in the operations that ensued.

The force then at Beyrout, under Souleyman Pasha, was supposed to be 15,000 strong. Ibrahim Pasha was at Baalbec, with 10,000 men; the garrison of Sidon consisted of 3000 men; that of Tripoli, and in its neighbourhood, 5000; whilst the rest of the Egyptian army, consisting of between 40,000 to 50,000 men, were stationed in various parts of Syria. Mehemet Ali having thus, in that country, an army of probably from seventy to eighty thousand seasoned and well disciplined soldiers, it is not therefore matter of surprise that—supported by the French—with such a force at command, with the Turkish and Egyptian fleets securely moored in the harbour of Alexandria, he should have determined to maintain his ground, and to “hold with the sword what he had acquired by the sword.”

Commodore Napier continued with his squadron before Beyrout, anxiously awaiting intelligence of Mehemet Ali's decision, and meanwhile keeping a sharp look-out to seaward; as although Sir Robert Stopford was daily expected from Alexandria, and Admiral Walker, with Turkish reinforcements, from Cyprus; still, in the then unsettled state of affairs, it might have been a French squadron, with perhaps

* Having at the time the local rank of Brigadier-General.—*Author's note.*

hostile intentions, which then hove in sight. When, therefore, on the evening of the 8th of September, the "Thunderer," which had been detached to reconnoitre, signalized "Twenty-one sail in sight," quickly followed by "Extinguish lights," it caused some speculation, not unmixed perhaps with a little anxiety, in the British squadron.

"France, it was known, had nearly that number of ships assembled on a neighbouring shore; and, in the position of political affairs, it was to be presumed that the issues of peace or war had been by her committed to the casualties of a sealed enclosure. Had that contingency been realized, the force of France would have been numerically three times superior to the British squadron then before Beyrout. Such doubts were soon relieved, as the 'Phœnix' war steamer shortly communicated the approach of Sir Robert Stopford, the British Admiral, accompanied by several line-of-battle ships, and of other vessels to windward, under Turkish colours.

"Daylight discovered no less than thirty-four sail bearing up for the Bay of Beyrout. In the afternoon, when they were assembled with the others before the town, and when an interchange of salutations took place, the sight was most imposing: a fleet of twenty-three British, three Austrian, and five Turkish men-of-war, besides the other war-ships—American and French—who were there as spectators. Nearer the shore, the Turkish transports, and the numerous native vessels, their high caïque prows and lateen sails adding, by happy contrast, to the beauty of the picture. Nor was the background less striking—Lebanon's mountains rising from the water's edge, whilst above all, extended far in the distance, the loftier range which has its origin in the plain of Baalbec."

This was, doubtless, a most picturesque and magnificent sight; but "Old Charley" would perhaps

* From Hunter's "Expedition to Syria."

have preferred seeing the whole Egyptian fleet coming to the relief of Beyrout, than the arrival of the Admiral to relieve *him* in his command; and at the moment, too, when the knowledge of Mehemet Ali's resolve announced that hostilities would immediately commence. Sir Robert Stopford behaved, however, with great consideration towards his energetic second in command, and left the conduct of subsequent operations, for which he had so ably laid the foundation, entirely under his management and control.

It has been mentioned that, with a view to a landing at some future period, the Commodore had closely reconnoitered the whole coast, and deemed the fittest place for that purpose to be the Bay of D'jounie, about ten miles to the northward of Beyrout. This locality he fixed on for several reasons: the practicability of landing at that spot, the peculiar features of the ground, which facilitated the formation of an entrenched camp, and the means it presented of opening communications with the mountaineers—it being one of the chief objects of a landing to furnish them with ammunition and arms.

The following letter will show how it happened that the Commodore—instead of Sir Charles Smith—had charge of the military operations that ensued:—

“ ‘Princess Charlotte,’ Tuesday, 8th Sept., 1840.

“MY DEAR COMMODORE,—Sir Charles Smith is better, but so feeble that I have dissuaded him from going to ‘Powerful’ to-day. He is, however, very anxious to join you; and whenever you can spare a steamer, after landing her troops, I wish her sent here to convey Sir C. Smith to the scene of operations.

“By my instructions, I should be justified in stopping all

operations until Sir C. Smith was able to superintend them; but as no enemy is likely to be met with where you are going, I will let them go on.

"The ships are firing at bodies of troops, and the 'Edinburgh' will knock down the Castle after dinner.—Yours truly,

"ROBERT STOPFORD."

It being determined to effect a landing to the northward, at D'jounie Bay, the Commodore—ever fertile in expedients—had recourse to the following *ruse de guerre* to draw off the attention of the Egyptians, and to prevent Souleyman Pasha from opposing him at the place of debarkation :—All the Turkish soldiers and the British marines having been placed on board steamers immediately after dark on the evening of the 9th of September, these vessels were moved on the following morning, off Beyrout Point, to the southward of the town, and waited there until the sea breeze set in. The Egyptians, expecting that the landing would be attempted on this part of the coast, marched out in that direction, and their attention was diverted by a few shot and shell being thrown, as the heads of their columns shewed themselves above the undulations of the ground. However, when the sea breeze had fairly set in, the "Powerful" weighed anchor, accompanied by Admiral Walker, in the Turkish line-of-battle ship, a frigate and corvette; the "Pique," "Castor," "Carysford," "Daphne," and "Wasp;" and stood in towards D'jounie, where the force was landed without opposition.

The morning following the landing of the troops at D'jounie, they commenced throwing up entrenchments, which were completed on the fourth day. The Com-

modore spoke highly, on this occasion, of the exertions of both officers and men ; and, while the work was in progress, he occupied himself in riding over, and acquiring a knowledge of the adjoining country, as well as of all the roads and passes through the mountains, by which an enemy might approach. The Commodore's activity at this period is described as something truly wonderful, and only equalled by the extraordinary intuitive military knowledge which he then displayed ; he was constantly on horseback from daylight till dark, and scarcely allowed himself any sleep. In short, he proved himself a good and able general, as well as a practised campaigner, in every possible way, although in the latter capacity he failed in one respect, where the usual habits of the sailor insurmountably prevailed : he had always been accustomed, when taking rest, to "turn in" regularly on board of ship ; that is to say, after taking off his clothes—a ceremony with which an old soldier frequently dispenses when pressed for time ; but this the Commodore never could bring himself to do, even, as was frequently the case, when only able to snatch a short interval of sleep. True, his toilet was not very elaborate, and he would slip into harness as quickly as many others could pull on their boots.

At first the mountaineers came in slowly, and Sir Robert Stopford gave directions to re-embark the troops, but as the establishment of the camp at D'jounie gave confidence to the inhabitants, the Commodore prevailed on the Admiral to rescind this order, and to allow him to remain in his command ashore—Brigadier-General Smith being still too unwell to take

any part in what was going on. The Commodore received every assistance from the officers of artillery and engineers; and Major, now Major-General Higgins, of the Royal Artillery, their senior officer, setting aside all feeling of jealousy at being under the orders of a naval man, most ably seconded him in the defensive measures which he took for the safety of the camp, lest Ibrahim Pasha, who was known to be at hand in the mountains, should make any attempt on it by a sudden *coup de main*.

The mountaineers were, however, now thronging into the camp. At their head was the Emir Abdallah, one of the nephews of the Grand Prince, his followers being well mounted and tolerably armed; and nothing was further from the Commodore's intention than to return to Beyrout, in battering down which he saw that little credit could be gained. He had far different plans in view. Having established his headquarters—over which floated his blue broad pendant—in a Maronite chapel commanding the Bay of D'jounie, an embrasure made in the walls, through which peered a 32-pounder, served him as window, a few boards were his table, he wrote his despatches on the gun, and in a corner lay the mattress on which he sometimes managed to catch a couple of hours' rest. Here he describes himself as having passed some of the happiest moments of his life—receiving and entertaining mountain Princes and Turkish Pashas, Emirs and Sheikhs, Maronites and Druses, having always plenty to do, and planning, meanwhile, a little mountain campaign of his own!

From Sir Robert Stopford :—

"MY DEAR COMMODORE,—What you say about the country people and Sheikhs coming in in good numbers sufficiently justifies us in maintaining a post suitable for this purpose, and it must be kept as long as the country people wish to avail themselves of it. I did hear that the country people came in slowly, and appeared indifferent to the cause. Had this been the case, I thought it would have been better to try something else, being very sure that a retreat, if necessary, under your orders, would not have been dishonourable. I shall go down to you to-morrow in this ship. There are very few soldiers left in the town; I cannot find out how many are in the neighbourhood. I shall send an Austrian frigate down to you, commanded by a son of the Archduke Charles, who is longing for employment. He will take down with him about 150 Austrians for landing, with some good rockets, which would astonish the Egyptians. As the season is drawing towards winter, I hope these gentry from the hills will make the most of the present weather. I hear so many various reports of the state of the Egyptian armies, that I cannot place much confidence in any, but have reason to suppose that much disaffection prevails. Believe me, very truly yours,

"ROBERT STOPFORD."

"'Princess Charlotte,' Sunday, 13th Sept., 1840.

"Walker Bey arranged yesterday for the horses to be sent down to you. I will hurry them down."

These horses had been captured in an Egyptian vessel; they were very handsome Arabs, and were subsequently presented to me by the Commodore. The one he always rode—his favourite charger—was a grey, a beautiful animal, but occasionally very troublesome. This circumstance is sufficient to refute the ridiculous report which found its way into the public prints, of his appearing in the field "mounted on a donkey, and fighting in his shirt sleeves."

I now resume my extracts from the journal on board the "Powerful":—

“Beyrout, 27th August, 1840.

“The plot thickens fast here, and we must ere long come to more active warfare, as we hear that the Pasha still determines to hold out. The 26th was the day he was to give his definitive answer, but he has been again allowed ten days more to reconsider, after which all negotiation ceases. The ‘Benbow’ arrived here lately with 3000 stand of arms, proportional ammunition, &c.; and we hear that the ‘Pique’ frigate is bringing out a large detachment of marines to be landed, and is laden with all kinds of munitions; among others, no less than 300,000 bags for sand to form batteries with, a quantity that one would suppose would lay the desert here under considerable contribution to fill them. We hear that the Admiral is, after all, off Alexandria, with the rest of the fleet, except the ‘Asia’ and ‘Hastings,’ which are left to hasten and convoy the Turkish expedition that is fitting out at Constantinople, as soon as they pass the Dardanelles; it is said it will consist of 10,000 troops, but that number we think doubtful. We are quite ignorant what is to be the plan or principal object of attack, but the Commodore has been very active for several days past in running up and down the coast in a steamer, examining all the available places. Having had the command of a land force while in the service of Portugal, where he distinguished himself as a General, he has some pretensions to knowledge of military affairs, and will, I think, make a second Sir Sidney Smith, if opportunity offers.

“*September 1st.*—The ‘Pique’ has arrived to-day from England, as full as she can hold, with arms, engineers, artillery, &c. The ‘Revenge’ came yesterday, and ‘Wasp,’ from Alexandria, with despatches the day before: by the latter we hear that Sir Robert Stopford gives the Commodore great credit for the way he has acted, and is quite pleased. There seems to be no doubt but the Pasha still determines to hold out against us; the 4th will decide, and we look forward with great anxiety, but will probably not hear the result for two or three days later. A Turkish corvette from Constantinople has also arrived, announcing that their expedition, consisting of a ship-of-the-line and several frigates, under the command

of Captain Walker, of our Navy, with 6,000 Turkish troops, are waiting at Cyprus for the order to join us. I am acquainted with Captain, now Admiral, Walker, and dined at his house when at Constantinople. He is a fine fellow, and just the man to command them; but his being a Christian is apt to excite jealousy among his subordinates.

“One of our boats, in attempting to land a couple of mountaineer chiefs whom we have had on board some time, was fired at in the night from several places she tried to land at along the coast, and was obliged to return unsuccessful. All communication with the town is cut off, with the exception of an occasional letter to our Consul, who still, with his half-dozen English merchants, remains to the very last moment to protect their property. They will, of course, come on board the different ships as soon as we give them notice of more open hostilities. We find our detained prizes a great annoyance to us, as they are consuming our water and provisions, which are getting low, and I fancy there is none of the latter within our reach nearer than Cyprus; which island, although claimed by Mehemet Ali, seems to stand neutral at present. It is a fine island, but from bad government has neither towns, trade, nor produce of any importance. We have declared the whole coast of Syria and Egypt under a strict blockade, much to the annoyance of the French and Americans, who have each a corvette here, looking on. The French are, I fancy, sadly averse to our politics here; we did hear at one time that a war with her was inevitable, but the odds would fall heavy against her. We suspect they will be assisting the Egyptians underhand with arms and, no doubt, advice; but they had better not let us catch them at it! How I wish I could lead you round our decks in the morning, to see the extraordinary mixture of human beings assembled in little squads between the guns: some feeding, some at prayers, others smoking, some noisy, while others seem hardly even able to open their mouths. We victual at present 132 above our complement, chiefly Turkish refugees, with a sprinkling of Samaritan and Lebanon Christians.

“*September 4th.*—The ‘Hastings’ arrived off the port to-day, but we did not allow her to anchor, and sent her off to

Cyprus, to add to the apparent size of the Turkish expedition.

* * * * *

"The town is, we understand, in a dreadful state of confusion. Four of the English merchants, including the Messrs. B——, are come on board for protection; they have left all their property to the mercy of the combatants, and will probably suffer immense loss. * Mr. B—— tells me he has not less than £40,000 in goods and outstanding debts in the place, probably not quite all his own, but he is answerable for the whole. It is a fearful risk, but he must trust to chance. Almost all the inhabitants have left the town, except those who intend to join our side when we land, and my friend Souleyman Pasha has been very busy pulling down the houses to barricade the streets in all directions, and is straining every nerve to make a stout resistance. All, however, will be of no use against our guns, as we can batter the town till not one stone stands on another, without his doing us comparatively any damage. I fear, however, we shall have a small enough force to oppose him when out of reach of the ships; but we know little of the plans of our chief, who, of course, is very close on that subject. We only regret that the Admiral will be here, bringing the Pasha's final answer himself, and will take the command out of Old Charlie's hands, who, you may be sure, is disappointed. Only think of his energy and activity the other day: he went on board the 'Gorgon' steamer, as we thought, only to look along the coast for a mile or two, and was missing for two days. On his return, we found he had run over to Cyprus, reviewed the expedition there, to see what he had to trust to, hurried their motions, and set all the troops a-drilling; then started off to St. Jean d'Acre, examined its fortifications and weak points, and returned without almost anyone but ourselves knowing he was out of the ship. What opinion he formed on both subjects we know not, but we shall soon see: scaling ladders are constructing, pickaxes and shovels mustering, and all is excitement and bustle.

* * * * *

"On the 7th the 'Cyclops' arrived from Alexandria, with our Consul there on board, with news that open war was de-

clared, and that the Admiral and the rest of our ships, together with the whole Turkish expedition, were only a few miles out of sight of the port, all hastening here; and next morning they all came in—our squadron now consisting of the ‘Princess Charlotte,’ ‘Powerful,’ ‘Thunderer,’ ‘Ganges,’ ‘Revenge,’ ‘Edinburgh,’ ‘Benbow,’ and ‘Hastings’ of the line; ‘Pique,’ ‘Castor,’ and ‘Carysford,’ frigates; ‘Magicienne’ and ‘Dido,’ corvettes; ‘Wasp’ and ‘Zebra,’ 18-gun brigs; and the ‘Cyclops,’ ‘Gorgon,’ ‘Hydra,’ and ‘Phoenix,’ large steamers, each capable of carrying 500 men.

“It was a beautiful sight to see them take up their positions off the town; while the Turks, consisting of one line-of-battle ship, six frigates and corvettes, with about twenty transports, full of troops, anchored outside of us. As the transports rounded the point of land coming in, two regiments of Egyptians assembled as near them as possible, to give them a shot if they came within range; on which the ‘Cyclops’ was ordered to pitch a few shells among them, which was done most effectually, and dispersed them with a vengeance, for in two minutes there was not a soldier to be seen. This was the first shot fired in a war that will probably never cause very much bloodshed, but may last a long time, and cost the nation many millions—for as yet we hear of no friendly assistance from our co-partners, the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians. I forgot, however, to enumerate, in the strength of our fleet, two Austrian frigates and two smaller ships. The remainder of that day, after they had all anchored, was employed in consultation and arrangements for landing the troops, consisting of 6,000 Turks, 1,500 marines of the fleet, and about 200 artillerymen, engineers, sappers and miners. Colonel Walker, of the marines, was appointed to command them when landed, a Turkish Pasha commanded the Turks, and Commodore Napier was entrusted with the landing, as well as the protection of them while doing so. All that night, after dark, we were hard at work with the boats, conveying the troops on board the four steamers, which we crammed till there was not room for another man upon their deck, and what were left we took on board here. Not a soul but the Admiral and Commodore had any idea where we

should land, and all was kept a strict secret. The Admiral, it appears, has so much confidence in the judgment and discretion of his gallant second in command, that he allowed him to make his own arrangements with regard to the when and where, or how, the attack was to be made; and well has his confidence been placed, for no one on earth could have managed better. At daylight the steamers, with all the boats of the fleet in tow, the 'Powerful,' 'Revenge,' and 'Thunderer,' and all the smaller ships, were under sail, but a dead calm obliged us to anchor again; a breeze, however, sprung up in the forenoon, when we all stood away to the southward of the town, in which direction we soon saw many of the Egyptians marching in double quick time. This was only intended as a feint, to draw the enemy away, and answered admirably—for, as soon as the breeze freshened, we all bore up, and ran helter-skelter to the northward, leaving the Egyptians in a few minutes many miles astern, who, in turning about after us, got well peppered by the ships at anchor, who all opened their fire upon them as they passed; and the shells they threw must have done some execution, and were splendidly thrown. The 'Powerful,' with her flock, soon ran down to the little bay and village of D'jounie, about ten or twelve miles to the northward; and, ordering the small ships to anchor at certain distances along the shore, we pushed right in, till we all but touched the ground, with the steamers alongside of us. The 'Revenge' and 'Thunderer' kept a little out, to act when required. In three hours every man of the troops was landed without a casualty, or a shot fired, and, ere night, had taken up, for safety, commanding positions; the few of the enemy's troops making a precipitate retreat before us. All that night we were hard at work, forming entrenchments, and arranging our field-pieces, twelve in number, on some of the all but inaccessible heights; and ere we had them half up, we saw the night-signal from the distant ships, that the enemy were in motion, and soon after, from the nearest ship, that they had intelligence that the enemy was close at hand. A firing commenced by the ships along shore, although I fancy, from the darkness, they saw nothing, and caused us, as you may sup-

pose, to double our exertions. It was neck or nothing with us, for if we had really been attacked in force at that time, the issue might have been doubtful; it proved, however, that the enemy had either retreated, or it was altogether a false alarm; it served, however, to hasten our work, and morning found us pretty well prepared, and all fit to drop with the fatigue of two nights of the heaviest exertion I ever underwent. All, however, seemed in excellent spirits, working like tigers, and longing to have a shot; even our brother Turks, who are by no means given to breaking their backs at work, assisted cheerfully in carrying stones and sandbags; and the activity of our Commodore was beyond belief—working, bellowing, and running about everywhere; one moment rapping a lazy fellow over the head with a big stick, and the next working away himself. The Lebanon mountains, which are very steep and rugged, and only accessible by a few paths, rise almost immediately from the beach, along which the road runs that communicates to the north and south—there being no other road, without going far in the interior, and making a tremendous circuit round the mountains, so that our position cuts off the intercourse between the army at Beyrout and the others stationed at Tripoli, to the northward; and, most fortunately for us, about two miles from us, on the way to Beyrout, the road turns round a high projecting point of land, having only breadth enough at its foot for the road, while to go over it is impossible. This pass is enfiladed by the guns of the ‘Revenge,’ anchored close off it—so that from that quarter we have little to fear; and the ‘Carysford’ and ‘Dido’ have sailed to-day, with a strong division, to take the village of Djebel, where there is a small castle to the northward; and then we shall have the whole of the intervening country open for the mountaineers to come down and receive arms, which is the grand object, as we hear we are not to advance far; but, by arming the mountaineers against the enemy, and stopping their supplies by sea, starve the enemy out of the country. We have already given away 600 muskets, and they are flocking to us in crowds, and are fine-looking fellows.

“*September 13th.*—Last night the ships at Beyrout opened

their broadsides, and kept up a tremendous fire nearly all night, and to-day we understand it was in consequence of the Admiral sending on shore a flag of truce, to desire them to evacuate the town; this was not only refused, but it was fired at on leaving; and, to punish such a breach of the laws of war, the ships fired, and I fancy have given them an awful chastisement, as the forts and walls are completely demolished, and scarcely a house in the town left whole. 250 deserters came over to us in the night, bringing their arms, which is a great reinforcement; they say that when opportunity offers we shall have half the army. The news from the northward, I regret to say, is not so good. The two vessels, with the 'Cyclops,' anchored off Djebel, and commenced a heavy fire on the castle, when the garrison of 300 men shut themselves up, having demolished the upper part of it; 100 men of the marines, and as many mountaineers, landed to take the place; the latter, with prudent caution, refused to march direct up against it, preferring to go round and take it in flank; but our poor fellows, with their usual bravery, went boldly up, and the besieged, reserving their fire till they were close, opened it with murderous effect, killing five, and wounding eighteen, and immediately made their escape by the rear of the place, with, I fancy, very small loss; we, however, took possession, and retain it. A friend of mine, second lieutenant of the 'Cyclops,' is, I regret, one of the wounded; this will be a lesson to us, I hope, to be more prudent in future. On taking the place, thousands of mountaineers flocked to the beach to beg arms, and a supply is going down to them.

"September 15th.—Affairs continue very prosperous to our cause; not less than 2700 muskets have been distributed since we landed, a few prisoners have been taken by the mountaineers, and our garrison has, by incessant hard work, been made capable of resisting all the force the enemy can bring against us. The Commodore has established himself on shore, and occupies a small chapel within the lines, on the top of which flies his broad pendant. The Admiral has come here from Beyrout, but interferes very little with the Commodore. One of the Emirs of the mountains, a person

of very great importance, joined us yesterday, with 200 followers; and an expedition has been sent to the southward to take Tyre and Sidon. For some days past I have been mostly on board, and generally in command of the ship, Toby having charge of a signal-staff on shore, and the Commodore attending to distribution of arms, while the two juniors command the fatigue parties we send on shore by turns, to work day and night at the entrenchments. Fortunately the weather is fine, though too warm in the day-time to be agreeable; and our marines have never yet slept under cover, or known the luxury of anything but their great-coats to lie upon. Some few huts are beginning to be formed for the officers, and they complain much of the want of their accustomed comforts of the mess-table; they are nearly all young men, who have never seen service, and I think will be much the better for the campaign. We have great difficulty in getting any information of the enemy, and hardly know where they are; the deserters seem so ignorant, and their movements so rapid, we can make little of them. If they had intended attacking us, they would have done so before now. Scarcely an hour passes without some firing from the ships on the unhappy town of Beyrout, whenever any troops make their appearance; and the place not being tenable now from the land side, it would be only a risk of life to take possession of it, and serve us little. We hear continually of an intended attack upon us by Ibrahim Pasha from the interior, with a considerable force; I wish he would—our fellows are getting impatient of such delay, hard work, and harder accommodations.

“September 17th.—The aspect of affairs continues much the same; a few prisoners are occasionally brought in by our armed mountaineers, and several spies have been detected about our little garrison; one fellow, on being discovered, turned round quickly and fired into the Pasha’s tent—in half an hour his head was off, as well as his friend’s, and two others have been taken out and shot by the Turks. We have also heard of many awful barbarities committed by the mountaineers on their prisoners, but such retribution must be expected after what they have suffered from the enemy.

"The 'Hastings' and 'Edinburgh,' the only two ships at Beyrout, now continue to exercise their guns occasionally on the town, whenever a few troops make their appearance. All the other ships are here, or dispersed along the coast; the 'Benbow' is gone to attack Tripoli, but can do little there, it is so far from the sea. I forgot to mention before, that the Admiral left the 'Implacable' and 'Asia' blockading the port of Alexandria, from whence the Pasha's fleet seems afraid to make a start. .

* * * * *

"It is singular enough that although the 'Powerful' has been by far the most active ship in everything since the business began, she is the only one that has not yet fired a shot at the enemy; and, except in the case of Djebel, with the exception of a couple of cannon shot from the town, nothing but a little musketry has been used against us.

"We wonder much what you will all think in England about this business: a good many here are very much opposed to the steps we have taken, but all has been done with specific orders from Government. We hear it is so arranged that the war will not interrupt our communication with India, and we are now beginning to look for the Malta packet, which, after going to Alexandria, will probably be sent on here for the Admiral's despatches, and so far his being with us is a comfort, and we hope to get our letters now pretty regularly.

* * * * *

"By the accounts to-day from Alexandria we hear that our ships, notwithstanding the blockade, are allowed to go in and out of the port as they please, and receive refreshments, &c.—this surely appears an odd kind of warfare! On the steamer's arrival at Beyrout, Souleyman Pasha sent off a flag of truce, requesting that some wine and brandy sent from thence in her to him might be delivered, which was done accordingly. Personal civility seems at all events to prevail, and the officers of the packet, while there, could not fancy that anything like war existed. The present system is, at all events, an improvement on the olden times.

"I cannot help thinking that the Pasha expects yet that this business will be settled without more bloodshed—but we understand we are to be reinforced by troops from England. The 'Britannia,' we hear, is to be the new flagship, though the Admiral is not yet named. We have also heard the pleasing intelligence that the order for our increased pay has been received, and will be acted upon on the first of October. . "The mountaineers had, it is said, a sharp brush with a party of the enemy yesterday, and drove them back a considerable distance. A reinforcement of 1,000 Turks arrived to-day, and a number of deserters came this afternoon. Even stationary as we are, our cause must prosper if we can only stand out the winter, which is severe, without shelter of any kind, and our ships are not safe on the coast in that season."

At the time of the landing at D'jounie I was in England, where I received the following letter from the Commodore; and, acting on the advice it contained, I applied for, and obtained leave of absence to join him in Syria; and after serving there during the remainder of the campaign, I was subsequently employed on two missions into Egypt relative to the Eastern question.

"Camp D'jounie, in the Lebanon, Sept., 1840.

"MY DEAR EDWARD,—I have hoisted my flag on the Lebanon, and am in command of a large body of troops. Show this letter to Macdonald, and ask him to get leave for you to join me here, where you may be of use. Your affectionate father,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

The Commodore determined not to await the attack of Ibrahim Pasha on his camp, but to take the initiative himself; he therefore ordered Ghazir, the capital of the province, to be occupied, and the road leading to Merouba to be reconnoitered, as the enemy were said to have collected there a considerable force.

A detachment was also sent, under Captain Latlé, a Prussian officer attached to the Turkish army, to the neighbourhood of the convent of Harissa, with orders to retire on the camp should the enemy advance, as the latter seemed undecided whether to move on Ghazir, Harissa, or Argentoun—their position giving them the choice of these three roads. Meanwhile, French intrigue was busy against us in the Lebanon, where their agents endeavoured, through the means of the Maronite clergy, to set the people of that sect against the English heretics, as they represented us to be.

The Castle of Djebel, a few miles to the north of D'jounie, being still occupied by a body of Albanians, who did not seem disposed to evacuate the place, Commodore Napier sent thither the "Carysford," the "Dido," and the "Cyclops," under Captain Martin, with 220 marines and 150 armed mountaineers, to dislodge them. The officer in command advanced incautiously towards the castle, and met with so severe a loss that the party were obliged to retire; but they did so in good order, Captain Austin, of the "Cyclops," remaining with them all the time. It was on this occasion that Lieutenant—now Captain—Sidney Grenfell, of the "Cyclops," and a seaman of the name of Macdonald, greatly distinguished themselves by recovering, under a most heavy fire, a flag which had been left behind by mistake. The castle walls were of such solid materials that no impression could be made on them by the guns of the ships. The Albanians, however, evacuated the place during the night, when it was occupied by the mountaineers, and the

people from the surrounding districts flocked in to obtain the arms which had been forwarded for their use, and which were so eagerly received that the "Cyclops" was sent for another supply.

It may, much to the Commodore's credit, be added, that, on this occasion, as on others whilst in command of the squadron (before Sir Robert Stopford's arrival at Beyrout), whenever he detached vessels along the coast, his concluding written instructions always were to prevent, by all possible means, any cruelty towards the prisoners, either on the part of the mountaineers or of the Egyptian troops—a very requisite precaution, considering the semi-barbarous habits of the opponents, exasperated against each other by former feuds. The Commodore, though ever foremost in danger, shuddered at the possible results of such a war; for his nature was naturally mild and humane.

As Commodore Napier was not engaged in the operations conducted at this time against Beyrout, they need not be here detailed, but an account of them will be found in his "History of the Syrian War."* These operations resulted in the temporary withdrawal of part of the fleet from before the town—a step which the Commodore considered highly impolitic, "as it gave Souleyman Pasha the opportunity of telling the mountaineers that he had beaten off the British squadron."

From D'jounie he thus wrote home to Mrs. Napier:—

"D'jounie, Head-quarters of the Army of Lebanon,
September 20th, 1840.

"Wonders will never cease! Just fancy me commanding an army of 7,000 men in the mountains of Lebanon.

* Chapter v., vol. i.

"The Admiral and the Turkish troops arrived at Beyrout on the 10th. Sir Charles Smith, who was sent out to command the engineers and tell the Turks what to do, fell ill, and the Admiral gave me the command. The night the troops arrived, we put them into steamboats, and next morning we made a feint to land in one place, and drew out the Egyptian troops; we then bore up and ran as fast as we could to this port, put all the troops on shore, and occupied the heights; next morning we began to fortify ourselves, and in three days, after working day and night, we were tolerably secure. I expected to be attacked immediately; but now I don't care if they send 20,000 men against me. The whole country are flocking in for arms, and I hope ere long to be able to drive the Egyptians out of Lebanon, and from the coast. Sir Charles Smith, who is very ill, goes to Constantinople to-day.

"I have received no letters from you for a long while. Let them all now be directed to Malta, *viâ* Marseilles, and also by packet. I have had no papers either for many a day. Tell Edward I have received his letters, but have no time to answer them. I wish he could get leave to come to me here; I could employ him in forming the mountaineers. I never saw such a beautiful mountainous country as this; it is cultivated nearly to the top of the highest hills. I visit all the posts every morning; am up at four o'clock, and on horseback, and go through an enormous deal of fatigue.

"When I am sure what my opponent, with his 20,000 men, intends doing, or if he intends nothing, I shall take 1,000 marines and a couple of steamboats, and attack every place on the coast, and arm the mountaineers. At the moment I am writing a chief has brought in 300 men for arms. I have got two very good horses, and two colts, out of the Egyptian frigate we detained. If the colts turn out well, I will bring them home—one for you and one for ———; they will be a curiosity. I have had a letter from Lord Minto, very much approving of my plan to have acted without orders in attacking the Turkish fleet, which Louis would not do.

"God bless you all. My quarters are in a church, with a

gun in it, and a magazine of powder alongside of me. I am in excellent health.

"P.S.—We all drank your health on the 18th, on board the Admiral."*

He informed Lord Minto of his proceedings in the following letter :—

"D'jounie, Head-quarters of the Army of Lebanon,
September 20th, 1840.

"MY LORD,—Sir Robert Stopford's public letter, and my report, will acquaint you of our operations here. Since that date nothing of any great consequence has occurred. Ibrahim Pasha has been reconnoitering my flanks and front, but he cannot get at me with any hope of success, and I think it is probable he will fall back. The peasantry are coming in from all quarters for arms, and I think they will make the mountain too hot for him. Sir Charles Smith is very unwell, and gone to Constantinople, and I am on shore directing the movements of the troops, and get on wonderfully well with the Turks, who are really very slow coaches; but I think we shall improve. I wish your lordship, however, to be quite aware that it is not with 6,000 Turks, though occasionally assisted by the marines, that Syria is to be conquered. I wish you would send out as many marines as could be spared—they are worth an army of Turks; and if Sir Charles Smith does not return, I trust an Engineer officer of lower rank may be sent out, who will not interfere with me. I have begun this business successfully, and I feel myself quite equal to go on with it; for it is nothing new to me. I am glad your lordship is reinforcing the fleet, and I should feel very much obliged to your lordship if you would give my son a ship and send him here.—I have the honour to remain, your lordship's most obedient servant,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

Pursuant to his intention to make a forward movement when a favourable opportunity should occur, the Commodore induced Sir Robert Stopford to delay

* This was Mrs. Napier's birthday, which he had not forgotten.

breaking up the camp, and on the 22nd of September headed a reconnoissance on the enemy, of which he sent to the Admiral the following account:—

“SIR,—I last night reconnoitered the enemy’s position at Merouba, a long march from here; they seemed more afraid of us than we were of them, as they had fortified their position. Very few men showed themselves, which inclines me to believe that a great part have retired; it is certain the Druses are gone to their homes. This morning I reconnoitered the enemy’s position on our right. We have had a communication with their chief, who promises to come over; if he does not, I shall beat up his quarters to-morrow, open the province between the Nahr-el-Kelb (Dog River) and Beyrout, and arm it; that done, we ought to make a reconnoissance on Beyrout, our left covered by the mountaineers, and our right by the steamers, gun-boats, and small craft. The proposal of Selim Pasha to advance on Ibrahim is out of the question: we have no means of transport, nor have the troops shoes. I am satisfied, were the Turks left to themselves, in one week they would be prisoners. I am glad the Emir Hanjar is come; he is a host in himself. I should have come off to you this afternoon, but I was on horseback yesterday from daylight till half-past six, and again to-day from daylight till sunset, with the exception of an hour and a half. Believe me yours very truly,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

Selim Pasha had been appointed by the Porte Seraskier or Generalissimo of the Turkish forces in Syria, and he was always mentioned by the Commodore in high terms of approbation—for the whole of the allied forces on shore were in reality under the Commodore’s command. Another Turkish officer who was then under his orders, and who has since attained great eminence in the Turkish service, was Omer Bey, a Dalmatian by birth. With the turban—or rather the “fez”—Omer Bey had adopted Mahomedanism

as his creed; he then commanded a Turkish regiment, and subsequently a brigade; and, by his great intelligence and military talents, his acquaintance with European habits, and knowledge of the French and Italian languages, proved himself most useful to the Commodore. His "Chief of the Staff" was General Jochmus, a native of Hamburgh, whose military propensities had led him to witness much active service, and to the attainment of considerable proficiency in the art of war. He had actively assisted in the war of liberation in Greece, subsequently held a high position in the Spanish Legion, was promoted to the rank of General officer in that country; had lately proffered his services to the Sultan, and found himself—pending further advancement and honours—installed, as we have seen, "Chief of the Commodore's Staff," on which, as Aide-de-Camp, was likewise Lieutenant Bradley, a young officer of the "Powerful."

"Having ascertained," writes the Commodore, "that Ibrahim had no immediate intention of attacking our position, it became necessary to undertake something bold, directly after the rally I intended to give the troops in our actual front, should they not come over; I therefore proposed to the Admiral to make an attack upon Sidon."

This proposal caused a good deal of correspondence between the Admiral and Commodore Napier, which will be found in the "Syrian War;"* the expedition was, however, at last decided on, but to be placed under the command of Captain Berkeley—Sir Robert Stopford, strange to say, wishing the Commodore to accompany it, saying, that his "suggestions would be attended to." At this arrangement he naturally de-

* Vol. i., chapter vi.

murred, and thus expressed himself to the Admiral on the subject:—"As you were good enough to allow me to plan all things, I do think it hard I am not allowed to execute them; as yet I have had nothing but fag, and it is natural I should wish to reap the fruits I have been fagging for."

The Admiral, seeing the reasonableness of this request, acceded to it; and it was settled that when the attack on Sidon *did* take place, it should be directed by the Commodore, who, in the meantime, gave his motley force a little amusement, by crossing the Nahr-el-Kelb, and driving off a strongly posted body of Albanians, of whom some 400 were made prisoners. This was accomplished with the loss of only one officer wounded, and two men killed. In his report of the affair, the Commodore complained of the difficulty the marines experienced in keeping up with the much lighter equipped Turkish soldiers. Since then, many useful changes have been introduced into our military arms, equipment, and dress; but many more reforms are still requisite in these respects, in order that the British soldier may be rendered as effective as possible in all the different climates where he is called upon to serve.

During Commodore Napier's absence on this reconnoissance, other plans had been formed on board the flag-ship. The attack on Sidon had been abandoned, and it was talked of occupying Tyre (which was already in possession of the Allies), with a body of Turkish troops. This project was, however, happily laid aside; and the Commodore, after dining with the Admiral on the 25th of September, took his leave

to make his long projected attack upon Sidon ; promising to be back within forty-eight hours of that time.

The ships employed on this expedition were the "Thunderer," Captain M. F. F. Berkeley; the "Guerriera," Austrian frigate, H.R.H. Prince Frederick of Austria; "Gorgon," Captain Henderson; "Cyclops," Captain Austin; "Wasp," Commander Mansel; "Hydra," Commander Robinson; "Stromboli," Commander Williams; and the "Gul Sufide," a Turkish corvette. The land force for this undertaking consisted of 750 British Marines, under Captains Harrison and Whylock, 100 Austrians, and a battalion of 500 Turks. The result was most brilliant; but as the Commodore does not render justice to his personal share in the matter, either in his official despatches, or the account he published in his "War in Syria," the following narrative is subjoined, as given by an eye-witness, in Mr. Pattison Hunter's "Syrian Expedition."*

"While the sailors were engaged in their perilous task of landing the troops, Commodore Napier, in one of the 'Gorgon's' boats, had got under the breach. When my attention was first called to this point, he was nearly up to his armpits in water, making a scaling-ladder of the shoulders of his boat's crew. He succeeded in mounting, but had scarcely time to look in, before a discharge of musketry from an opposite building obliged him to abandon the attempt."

Nothing daunted, however, and bearing apparently a charmed life, he next, amidst a storm of missiles, led the party of assailants, of which he had taken the immediate command, to another point of attack,

* "Hunter's Expedition to Syria," vol. i., p. 153.

and with his seamen and marines succeeded in breaking into a spacious barrack from the outer side. Thence he rapidly proceeded, skirting the eastern wall, to the upper gate of the town, and, having burst it open, seized the citadel.

It was here that the Commodore, carried on by the excitement of the moment, rushed to the summit of one of the turrets, raising—in token of conquest—his cap aloft on the point of his sword; and the signal being witnessed from the ships, the gallant deed was applauded by three hearty British cheers from all their crews! It must have been a proud moment when he thus looked down in triumph, on the successful result of what he had so ably planned and so daringly carried into effect.

“In five hours,” says the author from whom I have already quoted, “from the commencement of the bombardment (and which ceased immediately the last two columns landed), Sidon was in entire possession of the Sultan’s troops. This achievement of storming, with 900 allies and 500 Turks, a town protected by a fort and citadel, and a line of wall defended by 2,700 men (who were all taken prisoners), must ever be regarded as of no small merit. It places Commodore Napier in a highly favourable point of view, when we consider how comprehensive and correct were the views which actuated his conduct. The energy, too, with which he carried out the enterprise was of a stamp rarely equalled.”

Ibrahim Pasha had evidently made this town the depôt for the southern division of his army; for every building is represented as being filled with stores, provisions, clothing, arms and ammunition; and, as might have been expected in a place taken by storm, many excesses occurred after its capture, though not to such an extent as would have been anticipated,

considering that a number of mountaineers had penetrated into the town. To add, however, to the horror of the scene, a conflagration shortly afterwards broke out, by which many of the wounded must have suffered a miserable death.

"In taking a town by storm," says Commodore Napier, in his "Syrian War," "much confusion necessarily arises, accompanied by plunder and other barbarities; but to the honour of the Marines, the Austrians, and the Turks, I believe there never was an occasion where less blood was spilt, or disorder easier put an end to."

The generous conduct of Souleyman Pasha has been previously adverted to; every facility had been given to his family, who resided at Sidon, to embark on board a French steamer, before the bombardment commenced; and Commodore Napier regretted much that his house—situated in one of the quarters first assailed—suffered much, and was plundered of many valuables, in spite of all the efforts which were taken to protect it.

The Commodore more than fulfilled his pledge to Sir Robert Stopford, for, immediately after the capture of the town, half the garrison were embarked, and arrived at Beyrout the same evening. "Thus," says he, "keeping our word to the Admiral twenty-four hours sooner than we had promised."

He thus laconically sent home an account of his success:—

"September 29th, 1840.

"I have just time to say, I have gained two victories—one on the 24th, when we took between four and five hundred prisoners; and another on the 26th, when I stormed and took the town of Sidon, and made between two and three thousand prisoners."

CHAPTER II.

BATTLE OF BOHARSEF, OCTOBER, 1840.

COMMODORE NAPIER was not the man to slumber, even on a couch of laurels—in forty-eight hours after he had left the Admiral to make the attack on Sidon, he was again at his post at D'jounie. Next morning at daylight, mounting his horse, he reconnoitered all his advanced positions, and found that the enemy had, during his brief absence, again established themselves on the heights of Boharsef, set fire to the habitations of the mountaineers of that district, and driven their wives and families across the Dog River to Antoum, Argentoun, and the adjacent villages.

“War,” writes the Commodore, “at all times is the parent of misery and destitution, and in this instance I found none of its horrors alleviated; it was heart-rending to see the unfortunate women and children encamped under trees in the mountain, without the means of subsistence, and on our part without being able to afford them much relief.”

“The effect,” continues he, “of taking Sidon soon began to shew itself. Hitherto the chiefs of the mountain had not much confidence in our operations. Beyrout was still in possession of the enemy, and they could not understand how

a defenceless town could hold out against a powerful squadron; but when they heard of the capture of Sidon their eyes began to open."

The first result in the mountains, of that successful operation, was the arrival in camp of the Emir Beschir Cassim,* the nephew, and next in succession to old Beschir, the actual "Grand Prince." The latter had also opened negotiations with the Commodore, who, however, would not trust him, as he—the Prince—had deceived him once before, and Cassim, his nephew, received the firman of the Porte to occupy his place. The latter, after remaining a few days with the Commodore, at D'jounie, proceeded to take the command of the mountaineers, who were watching the movements of Ibrahim and of Osman Pasha, at Merouba. When Ibrahim heard of the capture of Sidon he was confounded, and after marching part of his forces to T'bdeen, the residence of the Grand Prince, in order to secure him in his allegiance, he set out for Beyrout, for the purpose of concerting measures with Souleyman Pasha.

Between the latter and the Commodore a friendly feeling had been established, and many civilities exchanged. The Commodore was much annoyed at the plunder and devastation committed in Souleyman's residence at Sidon, and wrote to him from D'jounie a letter on the subject, of which the following is a translation :—

"Head-quarters, D'jounie, 2 a.m., October 1st, 1840.

"GENERAL,—I assure you I beheld with great regret that your house at Sidon had suffered so much in the late attack.

* He was, in contradistinction to his uncle, the "Grand Prince," called the "Little Prince," although nearly seventy years of age. The Grand Prince was upwards of eighty.

A detachment of Egyptian soldiers had opened fire from your house, which rendered its occupation necessary; and I am to this moment ignorant whether your furniture was broken, without the least necessity, by Egyptian, Austrian, or English soldiers. I think I owe you this explanation, because I often told our Consul, Mr. Moore, that it was my intention to protect your family in case of need.

"I am sorry, General, to behold the conflagrations ordered by Ibrahim Pasha in the province of Kata. The inhabitants of the Lebanon are subjects of the Sultan; they have a right to take up arms in his favour. Ibrahim Pasha—like themselves, a subject of the Sultan—may fight against men if he likes, but it is barbarous to fight against women and children. I would feel happy, in conjunction with your Excellency, to terminate this war, or at least to render it more humane. Ibrahim Pasha may burn houses, but it is impossible for him permanently to occupy a mountainous country, when the inhabitants are in arms against him. We have already distributed 20,000 muskets, and the distribution of them still continues. Personally, I am an admirer of Mehemet Ali Pasha, as well as of your Excellency.

"I have, &c.,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

It is pleasing to find the sad realities of war thus softened by the friendly intercourse of two brave men, both of whom endeavoured, by every means in their power, to mitigate its attendant horrors; for at best it was a cruel war—a war in which revenge, instigated by old though not forgotten feuds, took every opportunity of being fully satiated—a war in which the relentless Ibrahim Pasha indulged his cruel nature to the utmost; whilst slipping, like bloodhounds, his savage Albanians into every mountain recess, where they burnt, murdered, plundered, and violated, to their hearts' content; and the Commodore's kind and humane disposition was equally moved by pity and

by anger at the desolation and misery he then so often beheld, and which he did everything in his power to mitigate and allay. This circumstance, together with the fame, which now, with many exaggerated reports, rang through the Lebanon, of his daring and gallant deeds, made him adored by the mountaineers, by whom he was always called the "Komodor el Keebeer," the "Great Commodore;" and was by many considered as the son of Sir Sydney Smith—the former "great Commodore" in Syria—of Acre's renown, at the time of its siege by Bonaparte.*

The correspondence at this period between Sir Robert Stopford and the Commodore (which is given in his "War in Syria") shows that the former was much annoyed by the conflicting opinions of those who had access to him, and who furnished him with the most absurd and contradictory reports, and hence he was induced to make a variety of plans. By one person he was advised to hold Tyre as a permanent winter station, instead of Sidon; by another, to withdraw the force from D'jounie, and give up all further attempts on Beyrout; whilst Izzet Pasha—an ignorant and fanatic Turk of the old school, who had lately been appointed governor of Syria—wished to make an attack from the camp, on the Egyptian General, Osman Pasha, "not considering," says the Commodore, "that by so doing we exposed ourselves to be attacked by Souleyman, who was within four hours' march of our position; and I was urged to undertake this Quixotic expedition, merely to please the old Pasha. This I peremptorily

* When I went out to Syria, to join the Commodore, I was often questioned on this subject by the mountaineers, who considered the title of Commodore as a family name.

refused." He wrote as follows on this subject to the Commander-in-chief:—

"October 1st, 1840.

"MY DEAR ADMIRAL,—I would certainly not allow our marines to go out with Turks; when they go, I go; and I quite agree with you that we ought to pause a day or two. I am turning over things in my mind, and I shall shortly prepare you a 'coup.' To cross the Dog River cannot be done with safety; I have been all over the ground to-day. I send you a letter to Souleyman Pasha—if you approve of it, you can send it; if not, you had better keep it. I have not had time to see you to-day, but will to-morrow in the course of the day. Believe me, yours, &c.,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

Izzet Pasha's proposed attack on the Egyptian position at Merouba was consequently given up; the Commodore, who had already formed his combinations, did not consider that events were yet ripe for such an attempt. His plan was, the capture of Beyrout, with a view to the more important future attack on St. Jean d'Acre, the fall of which he foresaw would prove the death-warrant to Mehemet Ali's dominion in Syria. With this object in contemplation, leaving his command at D'jounie, he proceeded in the "Hydra" to the southward, along the coast; visited Sidon and Tyre, where it was proposed to winter the Turkish troops, but which he found unadapted for such a purpose, owing chiefly to its proximity to Acre, where there was a strong garrison, with every material requisite to drive them out, should the squadron, through stress of weather, be obliged to leave the coast.

Having concluded his visit to Tyre, he next proceeded on a reconnoissance to St. Jean d'Acre, and, run-

ning within range along its sea-wall, a heavy fire was opened on the "Hydra" as she passed, one of the shots striking her under the counter. "The Commodore was sitting in an arm-chair by the wheel, and although several gallant officers on board began to look a little astonished at the thickly coming missiles, the sturdy Commodore did not so much as turn his head; but in a calm voice, and motioning with his hand, said to the steersman, 'Port a little—port—that will do!' and thus, the ship's head being slightly altered, the enemy's range was so far confounded."*

Having finished his reconnoissance, the Commodore returned the same evening to D'jounie, to resume his duties in the camp, "perfectly satisfied," says he, "that Acre presented no difficulties that could not be overcome, when the proper time arrived for attacking it."

On his return to D'jounie he was much pleased to find that Emir Beschir Cassim—the "Little Prince"—taking advantage of Ibrahim Pasha's having weakened his forces before Merouba, had attacked Osman Pasha, defeated him, taken between 400 and 500 prisoners, and obliged him to retire on Basquinta, at the head of the Nahr-el-Kelb.

"It now became absolutely necessary to act with vigour, and I again brought the attack on Beyrout under the Admiral's consideration. I was glad to find he approved of it."

An opportunity offering to send home letters, he wrote to Lord Palmerston, giving him an account of what had been done, and adds:—

"I hope, in the final settlement of this question, some

* From Hunter's "Expedition to Syria," vol. i., p. 131.

attention will be paid to the mountaineers of Lebanon; they ought to have added to their territory the seaports of Sidon, Beyrout, and Tripoli. This would be most advantageous to them, and most beneficial to the interests of England. They would pay a tribute to the Porte, and have the sea open to the export of their produce, without the vexatious exactions of the 'Turks.'

He also, by the same opportunity, wrote to Lord Minto :—

“Head-quarters of the Army of Lebanon, D'jounie,
October 7th, 1840.

“MY LORD,—The Admiral's despatches will inform your lordship what is passing here. The Little Prince—the Emir Beschir—destroyed Osman Pasha's army on the 4th with his mountaineers, and crossed over Dog River this morning. I have now formed the Turkish troops, and am preparing to move forward the whole army by land and water, preparatory to attacking Souleyman Pasha, who is still at Beyrout and in the neighbourhood. The town is strongly barricaded, and as yet we have not attempted it. If we succeed in moving him, we have little more to do in Lebanon, and I do not think the enemy will ever enter these provinces again. We expect every day 4,000 more Turks. I hear Sir Charles Smith is better. If he is able to work, my functions cease, which I regret. However, I have had a glorious time of it, and all my plans have completely succeeded.—I have the honour to remain your lordship's obedient servant,

“CHARLES NAPIER.

“P.S.—The ‘Cambridge’ is not yet arrived. She has arms on board, and the poor mountaineers in the province we are now advancing into are crying out for them. They burn all their houses by small parties, which would be prevented had they arms. There is hardly a ship here with less than 100 sick. Add to them the marines disembarked, and the boats' crews when absent; your lordship will then judge what a state we are in with our weak complements.

“C. N.”

In due course of time he received the following reply :—

“Admiralty, 12th Nov., 1840.

“SIR,—I am just starting for the country, and have little more than time to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th October. Sir Robert Stopford's despatches have not yet reached us, but I have received his private letters down to the 23d, and intelligence from other sources of the successful progress of your operations; and I cannot allow an opportunity to pass without assuring you of the very high sense I entertain of the signal services you have rendered, of the energy, activity, skill, and gallantry you have displayed, and of the indefatigable zeal and exertion which have enabled you to triumph over difficulties such as many might have been unwilling to encounter.

“I still continue to look with much anxiety to the coast of Syria, and not without a hope that your triumphs may be crowned by the reduction of St. Jean d'Acre.

“I have, &c.,

“MINTO.”

“I shall have a long ride,” he wrote to the Admiral, previous to his departure to obtain a conference and concert measures with the Emir Beschir Cassim. On that occasion, after his interview with the Prince, who was encamped in a northern part of the mountain, he returned the same night to Argentoun, after having been on horseback eleven or twelve hours at the very least; and it is only astonishing how he stood the overpowering heat and excessive fatigue to which he was then so frequently exposed; but his iron frame, together with a constant state of excitement, carried him through what had already stricken with sickness and death many a younger man.

On returning from his interview with the Prince, he passed over the ground that had been the scene of some of the late skirmishes between the Egyptians and the mountaineers, and was horrified at beholding

the state in which some of the wounded had been left on the ground where they had fallen.

"The road," he says, in his "War in Syria," "was strewed with dead and dying Egyptians, some of them stark-naked; and it was with the utmost difficulty I could persuade the mountaineers to assist in getting the poor wretches crammed into a small cottage on the roadside. They did not put the prisoners to death, but they stripped them, and left the poor creatures to die of cold and want."

Many, under such circumstances, would have passed on, with mere expressions of sympathy and regret; but it was not in the nature of the kind-hearted old sailor, to view human misery under any circumstances, or in any shape, without taking active measures for its relief; he caused the sufferers to be placed under shelter, but, delayed by this act of humanity, was unable to reach the camp that night, and, with his party, was forced to sleep at the small mountain hamlet of Argentoun, and gives the following description of the unpleasant way in which they spent the night:—

"At Argentoun we did not find our quarters at all improved since our last visit; in addition to the bed-fellows we had to encounter, we were obliged to turn in supperless. Having calculated on getting back to the camp the same night, we brought no provisions with us, and not even an egg was to be had for love or money. Next morning, at daylight, we were on horse, and by noon arrived at D'jounie."

After returning to the camp, further preparations were instantly made for a simultaneous move on Beyrout, both by sea and by land; and he wrote to his family as follows:—

"Army of Lebanon, D'jounie, October 8th, 1840.

"Everything continues to prosper. The 'Little Prince'

of the mountains has destroyed Osman Pasha's army, who have retired on Baalbec, and I am preparing to advance on Beyrout, which I hope to finish before Sir Charles Smith arrives from Constantinople. He has been very ill, and is now better. If he is able, my command ceases, and we shall see what more will be done. I have succeeded in all my undertakings.

"Everybody is astonished at the fatigue I go through. I have been eleven hours on horseback, over most dreadful roads, but through a beautiful country. We expect four thousand Turkish troops every day, and then I think we shall be all safe; but we must look sharp, as we have a clever General against us. I have five horses; three of them very fine. I took them all. You would be surprised to see me starting out with my whole Staff.

"We have all been very sickly, but I never was in better health or better fit for work in my life than I am now. I am just going to reconnoitre a new position in advance, which I shall take up to-morrow, and by next account I hope I shall send you news of a victory.

"I shall finish this in the morning."

He was no doubt prevented from carrying out this intention by the active preparations which were making for a simultaneous attack upon Beyrout, both by sea and land; the former by the Admiral in person, the latter by the Commodore, who from D'jounie was to lead a Turkish force across the mountains, descend in rear of Beyrout, threaten the town in that quarter, or intercept Souleyman's retreat, should he deem it more prudent to evacuate the place on its being attacked by the fleet. Although these measures had been well concerted, and the result was attended with success, the unforeseen chances of war prevented their execution in the manner that they had been planned; for, instead of intercepting the movements of Souleyman

Pasha, it was the redoubtable Ibrahim whom Commodore Napier was destined most unexpectedly to encounter and defeat.

I proceed to give an abridgement of the Commodore's own narrative, illustrating it by some extracts from a description of the ground, which I drew up a few weeks subsequently, after visiting it with the Commodore, when the accompanying military sketch of the battlefield of Boharsef was likewise made (see p. 65) :—

“On the 8th of October General Jochmus marched out of his position with four Turkish battalions, and occupied Ormagacuan (Kornet Sherouan), pushing his advanced posts as far as Boharsef, opposite to which, on the hills above, commanding a winding road, were observed a few of the enemy's light troops. In the evening the Admiral became alarmed at the intended movement, and wrote to the Commodore, wishing it to be given up.”

“But I felt so confident,” says the Commodore, in his “War in Syria,” “that the arrangements I had made must succeed, and had received from Souleyman Pasha's aide-de-camp, who came over to us, such information about the position of the enemy's army, who were much disheartened, that I did not at all enter into the Admiral's apprehensions, and wrote to him that I had received most satisfactory information, and that he might rely upon it I should do nothing rash, or move, till assured all was right; that two hours would bring us all back, and Ibrahim must march very quick if he could beat steam.

“At daylight on the 9th, I sent an Arab battalion, composed of Egyptian deserters, to join General Jochmus, and shortly after, I left my head-quarters at D'jounie, and arrived on the heights of Ormagacuan at nine. The ‘Princess Charlotte’ proceeded, in tow of a steamer, to Beyrout, and two others, with a marine and Turkish battalion, to St. George's Bay, to keep Souleyman in check. In our lines were left four battalions, and the sick and convalescents took charge of the camp at D'jounie. In the event of disaster, or meeting a

very superior force in front, it would have been impossible to have repassed the Dog River. I therefore sent directions to Captain Austin, of the 'Bellerophon,' who flanked its mouth, to fill up the road that had been broken up, leading from Beyrout; and I made my arrangements to retire to the convent and heights above the river, gain the road, and cross at its mouth, under cover of the 'Bellerophon.' This could have been effected with little loss.

"Before leaving D'jounie I wrote to the Prince Cassim as follows:—

"October 9th.

"PRINCE,—The Emir Beschir is not come: if at twelve o'clock to-day he is not here, you are Grand Prince. I cross over the Dog River this morning, and will occupy Ornagacuan. I wish you to cross over immediately, and join me on the heights of Boharsef to-morrow morning. We shall then march on Beyrout. I have the honour to remain, yours, &c.,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

"So far all appeared right. There had been a little skirmishing with the mountaineers, but we had no idea that an enemy of any force was at hand, and were very comfortably seated in the convent at Ornagacuan, enjoying a tolerable breakfast after our long ride. During our repast the firing became brisker and nearer, and, before we had quite finished, a picket came in with the intelligence that the enemy were in our position. General Jochmus, who had been out in the morning, was incredulous; but I thought it high time to beat to arms, get on horse, and see what was going forward. By this time the firing was very sharp, and when I got near the advanced posts I found, sure enough, they had been driven in, and the enemy's skirmishers were actually in our position. No time was to be lost. Two Turkish battalions advanced *en tirailleur*, and another in column, supported by two others, and the Egyptian battalion; and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance, we succeeded in driving them back. Our position was along a high mountain, with a deep ravine on each side. Towards the end of the position there was a considerable descent; another mountain rose at nearly right angles, the ravine to the left went round it, but to the

right it finished, and a circuitous road led from the foot of the mountain, and conducted to its summit, where we discovered a strong body of Egyptians covering another column, who were retiring along the road I have mentioned. This first position was commanded by another, and it again by a third, the approach to them nearly perpendicular; another road led from the first position to Beckfaïa. The appearance of this unexpected force, and the strength of the ground, rather staggered me, and after examining it with great attention, and consulting Colonel Hodges, an old Peninsular warrior, and the other officers under my command, I decided that nothing could be done by an attack in front, unless assisted by the Emir Beschir, who had not yet made his appearance; and I felt satisfied that, as the enemy had not pushed forward when they had actually got into our position, I had nothing to fear now we were aware of their force, and prepared to meet them."

I shall proceed to describe the scene of operations of the following day* :—

"From below, the village of Kornet Sherouan† appears to constitute the very summit of the crest on which it stands; but on surmounting this latter, it is found to be merely the commencement of a long, narrow neck of land, serving as a communication with successive ranges of much loftier hills beyond.

"This ridge, called the heights of Ardahley, partly covered with straggling pine trees, is bounded on the north by a precipitous valley, named the Wad-é-Sléfe; whilst its southern base is skirted by a deep ravine, called the Wad-é-Shawee, or Valley of Drought.


"The road from Kornet Sherouan leads, for upwards of two miles, along the summit of this 'hog's back,' and then, after a slight declivity, surmounts, by a rugged zig-zag path, the steep ascent, broken into a succession of terraces, known by the name of Kalet Meidan, where, under cover of nume-

* From Lieut.-Col. Elers Napier's "Reminiscences of Syria," vol. i., p. 237.

† This is the correct appellation. In the Commodore's account it is called "Ornacaguan."

**SKETCH OF THE EGYPTIAN POSITION
ON THE HEIGHTS OF BOHARSEF,
ON MOUNT LEBANON,
FROM WHICH COMMODORE NAPIER DROVE IBRAHIM PASHA, ON THE
10TH OF OCTOBER, 1840.**

Taken from the Ground by Lieut.-Col. E. Napier, 46th Regiment, Assist.-Adj.-General.



REFERENCES

- A A. Position occupied by Commodore Napier previous to the attack.
- B Two field-pieces brought into the mountains on camels
- C Breast works of loose stone walls
- D Commodore Napier's advanced post at the foot of the Heights of Calet-Meldan.
- I First and most advanced position of the Egyptians
- F Camp of Ibrahim Pasha
- G Camp of the Arnaouts.
- H Principal position of the Egyptians on the highest crest of the hills of Boharsef, amidst some straggling pine-trees, and protected by breast-works of loose stone walls.
- K Two Battalions under Omer Bey
- L All this part thickly planted with mulberry trees and vines, on a succession of walled terraces
- M M. Track of the Turkish forces which crossed the Dog River on the 8th of Oct., 1840, during the night, and threatened the flank of the Egyptian position
- O. Omer Bey's force at the close of the action.

Note.—The hills are rendered impassable to any forces except light troops, by being everywhere broken into a succession of walled terraces, generally planted with vines or mulberry trees, the terraces vary in height from four to six feet. Numerous goat tracks, known only to the mountaineers, cross the hills in every direction.

rous ledges of large upright rocks thickly strewn on the crest of the hill, was the first position of the Egyptians. About 600 yards to the southward, along the same line of heights—but separated in the first instance by a level plateau, of probably one hundred yards in extent, and the remainder of the ground, of a most precipitous nature, broken into high stone-walled terraces—was the second position of the enemy; whilst Ibrahim in person, with his principal force, occupied the commanding eminence of Boharsef, about a thousand paces further to the rear. The latter, although separated from the second position by ground of a very steep and nearly impracticable nature, presented a sufficiently level surface; and though here and there dotted with pine trees, was tolerably well adapted for cavalry movements.”

On the morning of the 10th of October, from the elevated position he occupied, overlooking St. George's Bay and the town of Beyrout, the Commodore witnessed the evacuation of that place by the Egyptians, and shortly afterwards received notes from Sir Robert Stopford, dated the day before, apprising him of the arrival of Colonel Sir Charles Smith to take the command of the forces, and ordering him to retire. To this he replied, that under existing circumstances it would be impossible to obey without compromising both Omer Bey and the Prince, who, by his—the Commodore's—retreat, would be exposed to certain destruction. The Emir, however, had been delayed, and was looked for from hour to hour in vain. Affairs were assuming a serious aspect, when at last a firing was heard, which announced his approach.

“My trusty interpreter Misk,” writes the Commodore, “rushed into the room with the welcome news that the Emir had arrived. This intelligence set all orders that had arrived, or that might arrive, at naught. The drums beat merrily to arms, the troops were put in motion, we mounted our steeds,

and in a few minutes were at the advanced posts. The battalion that had been sent across the ravine to turn the enemy's left—notwithstanding the delay—had made considerable progress, as yet unopposed; and the two battalions that had been ordered up from the lines, much against the wish of Izzet Pasha, were advancing rapidly on Ornacaguan.

"The enemy's position was very strong, and perhaps might have been considered unassailable. I knew little of the troops I commanded; many of them were Albanians; and both parties had been endeavouring to persuade each other to come over. Our friends advised them to bring over Ibrahim (whom I had seen sitting, the day before, under a green flag in the second position, and saluted him); and the enemy, on the other hand, recommended that the old Commodore should be brought over to them. All this was distinctly heard at the outposts."

On the advance of the Commodore along the ridge of Ardahley, he detached the mountaineers, under Lieutenant Duncan of the "Powerful," and directed them to turn the right of the Egyptian position; whilst three Turkish battalions, formed into column, and, covered by a fourth corps, extended as light infantry along the face of the mountain—the whole led by Mr. Pearn (his former companion of arms in Portugal)—were to advance in succession, for the purpose of attacking it in front. The first column, in a short time—not liking the galling fire which was kept up from behind the rocks by the enemy—broke, and, extending itself *en tirailleur*, took shelter under the stone walls which supported the terraces, and which, although affording capital cover for this species of warfare, tended rather to retard than to forward the main object of the attack. The second and third battalions were ordered to storm the position, but with the same result; and the whole side of

the hill now presented a mass of stragglers, firing from behind their terraced breastworks, but not attempting either to crown the summit or make the Egyptians feel the point of their bayonets.

"The two battalions which had been left at Kornet Sherouan were now ordered to the front, but the officers despatched for this reinforcement came back without them, owing to the unwillingness of Izzet Pasha to allow them to advance. This untimely delay—to any chief not possessed of extraordinary decision and presence of mind—might have occasioned the loss of the day, but so unexpected a *contre-temps* did not disconcert the Commodore. At a glance he perceived that nothing but a stroke of the boldest venture could save him from utter defeat. Setting aside the 'Commander-in-chief,' he and his staff took upon themselves the active duties of a forlorn hope. He threw himself amongst the Turks, whom he not only—as he expressed it—'stirred up with his stick,' but observing one Turkish soldier particularly reluctant to advance, he seized a musket, and, in the anger of the moment, would have blown out his brains, had not the piece fortunately missed fire, when it was taken out of his hands by his friend Colonel Hodges—then on a visit to him from Alexandria—and who had attended the fight as an amateur.

"The Commodore at last succeeded in getting his troops up to the summit of the first position, which was then abandoned by the Egyptians, by whom a galling fire was kept up from the second rocky height, if possible of a more inaccessible nature than the first.

"On reaching this point, the Turks, thinking, no doubt, that they had earned for themselves good shelter behind the tall upright rocks thickly scattered around, showed no disposition for another sally. They were, however, soon driven out of their snug quarters by an enemy they little expected; for the Commodore, finding commands and entreaties of no avail, had recourse to persuasion of another kind. The ground was covered with large stones and fragments of rock, and with these he pelted his brave soldiers

so effectively in the rear, that he succeeded in dislodging them from cover; when, next placing himself at their head, and accompanied by General Jochmus, Captain Laiüé, and his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Bradley, he made a rush across the level plateau between the first and second position, which was thus carried in less than half an hour. Ibrahim Pasha then fled, and the battle of Boharsef was won."*

Such was the mountain battle of Boharsef, won by Commodore Napier, at the head of a body of Turkish soldiers, over the redoubted and hitherto invincible Ibrahim Pasha and his disciplined troops, who had till then always defeated and looked down with contempt on their Osmanli opponents. Many an engagement may have been more brilliant, and gained against greater odds, yet few, unless on a much larger scale, have been attended with more important results; and the manner in which that action was won is allowed, by all who are acquainted with the circumstances attending it, to have not only reflected credit on the Commodore's gallantry and decision of conduct, but also proved him to possess that foresight and accuracy of calculation, for masterly and well-combined measures, so requisite in a general; together with those ready resources and that presence of mind which enabled him instantly to provide a remedy, and substitute another plan of operations, when unexpected events had prevented those already fixed on from being carried into effect.

Had the Commodore failed, he could only have expected to have been brought to a court-martial; but having succeeded, he received a most complimentary letter from Sir Robert Stopford, in which

* From Lieut.-Colonel Elers Napier's "Reminiscences of Syria."

the Admiral told him that no words of his could do justice to the splendid operations at Boharsef :—

“I do most heartily assure you,” continues this letter, the entire contents of which are given in the “War in Syria,” “of being fully sensible of the benefit which I, and the whole expedition, have received from your indefatigable services; and on rejoining the ‘Powerful’ your conscience may be perfectly satisfied of your having accomplished all that could be done.”

The Commodore now resigned his military command to Sir Charles Smith, after having held it a month, which had not, as we have seen, been inactive employed.

The following is from Lieut. Elliot’s journal :—

“D’jounie Bay, Syria, Sept. 27, 1840.

“We have received to-day by the ‘Stromboli,’ from Malta and England, a parcel of our Anglo-French papers (but no English mail), from which we learn some of the different opinions of the English press, regarding the affairs and politics of this part of the world, and are sorry to find the Tories exclaim so much against the policy pursued, as well as the conduct of our gallant chief. In all he has done he has been entirely borne out by his instructions, and in the cases unprovided for, it is admitted by Sir Robert Stopford that none could have acted more in the true spirit of the policy adopted by the Government, or throughout with greater foresight and discretion.

“We have lately had several affairs with the enemy, that have added much benefit to the cause, as well as laurels to the Commodore, and the opinion is general that, if he goes on as he does, a baronetcy or peerage will be his reward. The Admiral, though still here, takes no part in the warlike operations, which he leaves entirely to the Commodore, and seems to act only in a diplomatic point of view; indeed, his experience and clear-headedness on one side, and his great age on the other, render that office most suitable to him.

“Our little garrison on shore having been reinforced by a

thousand more Turkish troops from Cyprus, and a considerable number of deserters from the enemy, has begun to act more on the offensive, making incursions on the Egyptian posts, since they have lost the opportunity of making any impression on ours, which have become very strong. A few days ago the Commodore ordered 1,500 men under arms, with two days' provisions, and without telling anyone what his intentions were, marched in the night, attacked the enemy's position, from which he drove them after a little fighting, pursued them to another, from which they were again put to flight, and took 200 prisoners, with the loss of only two Turks killed and an officer wounded. The marines, about 400, that formed a part of the force, got so knocked up with the march over a country that they are quite unaccustomed to—there being no roads, and nothing but one continued jumping from rock to rock, or clambering up and down deep ravines—that they did not get up in time to fire a single shot; while the active and lightly accoutred Turks pushed on famously, and got great credit from the Commodore.

"It seems strange that the Pasha commanding his troops seems to give up all charge to the Commodore, to act with his men as he pleases; and it is well that he does so, as he has shewn great ignorance already in military affairs, while Old Charlie seems to understand everything. — has shown some jealousy and dissatisfaction, in having to act so much under the Commodore; but as the marines are always considered a part of the Navy, he had better take care what he is about.

"The 'Stromboli' and 'Gorgon' steamers, just arrived, bring us accounts of a very splendid and victorious attack made upon Sidon yesterday. The Commodore sailed with the 'Cyclops' and 'Gorgon' the day before, containing 1,500 men, on a destination then unknown to us, but proved to be Sidon, where the 'Thunderer' and 'Wasp' were also ordered to meet him. On their way, they fell in with the 'Stromboli,' coming here, with 300 marines on board; and having ordered her to accompany him, they anchored off Sidon and summoned the place to surrender, giving them

half an hour to consider—but were told that they were very strong in the garrison, and ready to receive him; so after battering the town with the ‘Thunderer’ and steamers for an hour, they landed the troops, and were sharply opposed—in doing so, many men being wounded in the boats before they reached the shore: nothing, however, could resist the firm attack of our party. The Turks, of about 1,000 men, landed abreast of the town, which is close to the beach, while the English and Austrian marines were divided into two parties, to take the enemy in flank; and between the two allies there was great emulation who should plant their flag on the Governor’s palace first, in which the Austrians succeeded, after a show of more valour than discretion. The Commodore headed the marines himself, and was always to be found where the fight was thickest, with his hat stuck on the point of his sword, hurrahing the men on to the charge. They were soon in possession of the town, and took the whole garrison, amounting to 3,000 men, prisoners, with six months’ store of bread for them, and an immense quantity of arms and ammunition. The Governor showed much bravery, but was taken by two of our marines; he got away, however, and, collecting a few Egyptians round him, declared he would fight as long as a man would stand by him. A well-directed shot, however, from one of the marines, brought him down, and the rest laid down their arms. The loss on our side is inconsiderable, considering the fire they were exposed to, and the work done. A very fine young man, a marine officer, who came out in the ‘Stromboli,’ and left England only that day three weeks, had not been landed five minutes ere he was killed; a very gallant mate, in command of one of the boats, who joined the charge of the marines, met the same fate, and another was badly wounded in the head. The two bowmen in one of the boats were killed, and about twelve or fifteen marines wounded; while the Turks have about as many in killed and wounded—but we have not got the returns yet. The steamers are bringing here the prisoners, to be taken in transports to Cyprus. A letter from Souleyman Pasha to the Governor was taken, in which he entreated the latter, for the love of Allah and the

Prophet, in case of an attack, to stand up and drive those English into the sea, as an idea had got among his troops that they were invincible. Although strictly forbidden, it was impossible to prevent a good deal of plundering of swords, pistols, and accoutrements from the prisoners; and I have bought a handsome Damascus blade for a trifle, that was taken by one of the marines. Of course we are all here much annoyed at never getting a chance of sharing in the honour of these affairs, but it cannot be helped, and we yet look forward to having something to do before the war is quite over.

“Bradley, our junior Lieutenant, is the only one in luck, and had the good fortune of being taken, after much opportunity, as the Commodore’s aide-de-camp on that occasion. There are proportionably more casualties among the officers than the men, owing to their greater desire to distinguish themselves in these times, when opportunities so seldom occur. I got a note to-day from Henry Worth, who is still off Beyrout, firing away every day, whenever they see any troops in that poor devoted place—he complains much of the dulness of the times, as they never receive a shot in return.

* * * * *

“There is a talk of Rear-Admiral Ommanney coming out here, which will be a blow to our Commodore; but it is only a report. We are more in hopes, from certain signs, that he is to hoist his red broad pendant as Commodore of the first class, as he ordered one to be made the other day and kept ready. He will, in that case, have a Flag-Captain and Lieutenant appointed to the ship. The weather continues here most delightful, only rather warm, and not a shower have we had for months. The people on shore are getting sickly, from constant exposure to sun by day and dew at night; but afloat we are generally healthy. Our messmates, the Beyrout merchants, are getting very tired of living aboard such an idle life; but I see no help for it, unless we take possession of Beyrout, which would hardly be worth the sacrifice of life it would cost us in doing so; and now having Sidon, it will afford us winter quarters at least for the troops. But much

is now talked of taking St. Jean d'Acre, although nothing is positively known of our real intentions. The whole of the inhabitants of the mountains seem on our side now, and we have distributed no less than 12,000 muskets among them; so that they can now not only take their own part, but be a thorn in the sides of the Egyptians, whom they hate most cordially. The Emir Beschir, a very powerful chief, is the only one against us, and is too sharply looked after by Ibrahim Pasha to permit his coming over. I should not wonder if our doings here will be the means eventually of this country declaring its independence, under its own government. It is very populous, and being nearly all Christians, have little love for their Mahomedan rulers.

"October 11th.—Beyrout has fallen, and is now in our possession, without the loss of a man. The day before yesterday, it being determined to attack the town both by sea and land at the same moment, there was a grand clear out in the camp. The Commodore took the command of about 1,800 Turks to march there, taking a circuit in the mountains to collect all the mountaineers that could be got far or near, and expected to make up nearly 1,000 men, with whom he was to attack Souleyman Pasha in the rear; while the whole of the rest of our force, being taken up to Beyrout in the 'Princess Charlotte' and the steamers, backed by the ships, was to make a grand attack in front. One of the steamers was to have landed a strong brigade of marines, Austrians, and artillery half-way between this and Beyrout, to reinforce the Commodore as he advanced. The 'Powerful,' much to our chagrin and discontent, was not allowed to share the expected honours of the attack, but left here, with only the assistance of fifty marines on shore (chiefly sick), to guard the position and take charge of 1,000 prisoners, all of whom would rather stay than run away from us. The Commodore had not left us long, ere he fell in with Ibrahim Pasha himself, leading on the advance of his division of Egyptians to reinforce Souleyman at Beyrout, who, we knew, had written to say, he was so reduced by desertion and sickness that he would be obliged to surrender. Although Ibrahim's force amounted to 3,000, who occupied a very commanding position, Old Charlie determined to attack

him; and, with the assistance of Colonel Hodges, two or three Polish and German officers in the Turkish service, Bradley (my messmate, who is acting aide-de-camp), and Pearn, our Master—who went on shore for amusement, and stole away and joined him—showed the Turks the efficacy of a bayonet charge, which dislodged the enemy; and, following up the advantage, commenced a battle on pretty even ground, which continued the remainder of the day and part of yesterday, ending in the total dispersion of the enemy's force, and the capture of 700 prisoners. The invincible Ibrahim—as he is considered here—the son of Mehemet Ali and Generalissimo of the Egyptian army, was seen galloping off the field, with only nine or ten followers. The loss on our side amounts to about forty killed and wounded, all Turks, and a few mountaineers, who are not enumerated. The Turks shewed themselves most gallant fellows when properly led on; but they have not an officer worth a straw, or one who seems to know any more than the meanest in the ranks. Several times, when in the thickest of the fight, and whilst the balls were flying about as thick as hail, the Commodore looked round to his little staff and exclaimed, 'Can it be possible that none of us are yet hit?' And, in God's mercy, none were. Pearn's horse was twice wounded, but that was all. The action took place within hearing of the musketry, from the ship; and from a hill not far from our camp I saw a part of the firing, but had given my word to the Commodore not to go farther from the ship, which was very tantalizing. Sir Robert Stopford, in the meantime, had gone up to Beyrout with his ship, the steamers, and all his force, and was waiting the appearance of the Commodore, who, he thought, was very long coming; and looking out yesterday morning, thinking the town seemed very quiet, sent a force on shore to reconnoitre, and was, no doubt, greatly surprised not to find a soldier in the place. Souleyman Pasha, hearing of the Commodore's victory, evacuated the town in the night, and retired, it is supposed, to the southward, on his way to Acre, the only stronghold in Syria.

"Had the Commodore had a few hundred more men, he would have followed up Ibrahim Pasha, and probably fought

his whole division with the same success; for it is sadly dwindled down, from such continual skirmishes with the mountaineers, as well as by desertion, starvation, and sickness: so that there is now little to fear to the northward, and the country is all up in arms on our side. The whole of the prisoners we take, immediately offer to serve the Sultan, but are never accepted; although, if they come only five minutes before, they are gladly received, all their arrears of pay paid up, and fed and clothed besides. They tell us that nothing but the fear of instant death deters them all from coming over, and that Ibrahim Pasha shoots more of his own deserters than of his opponents.

“October 13th.—The Commodore has returned from Beyrout, and we are busy breaking up the encampment, and taking all on board, preparatory to going there. The ‘Cambridge’ has arrived to increase our force, and it is said the ‘Hastings’ goes home. Some of the merchants who have been with us so long have been up to Beyrout, and give a most deplorable account of the state of the town from the effects of shot and shell. Black’s house is burnt to the ground, and there is scarcely one in the town that is not completely riddled. It is said we go to Beyrout as soon as we can get all on board. The weather is still oppressively hot, and the sick list large; but how can it be otherwise? The Commodore is the toughest old fellow in the world—never takes above four or five hours’ sleep; scarcely eats or drinks anything; and has been frequently fifteen hours on horseback at a sitting—not so bad for a man of his age!”

The period when Commodore Napier was superseded in his military command by Sir Charles Smith, is the proper time to review what the former achieved whilst occupying a position which would have been novel and embarrassing to most naval men, but which he filled with all the tact, confidence, and self-possession of one who had been trained to the soldier’s profession from his youth, and who had had opportunities of bringing both the theory and practice of that most

difficult profession into play. The origin, perhaps—though a remote one—of the brilliant results of this, his first essay at Generalship in a rugged and mountainous region—that most difficult of all stages on which a General may be called upon to perform a part—one of the causes of Commodore Napier's successes in the Lebanon, may perchance be indirectly traced to what, in his younger days, he had observed and learnt on the mountain sierras of Busaco, and the steep lines of Torres Vedras, when following the British army as an amateur, in company with his namesake, the "Great Conqueror of Scinde."

Commodore Napier—as I have before had occasion to observe—had the strongest predilection for military warfare; this was shown in his Portuguese campaigns; but his talents as a General had never been fully developed, until the mountain warfare in the Lebanon had, by the success which attended his operations, brought them forward in the light they deserved. Nor does history often record such unexampled successes—accomplished also by a nautical man, and a mere novice in the technicalities of military affairs—as those which marked the brief and glorious career of the "Komodor-el-Keebeer," whilst waving his broad pendant among the mountain chivalry of Lebanon.

In the short period of little more than four weeks—from the 10th of September, when with 7,000 men he landed at D'jounie, till the 10th of the following month, when he gave up his command—the list of his brilliant successes was undimmed by a single reverse. In that brief space of time he had stormed and taken Sidon, signally defeated the Egyptians at Kornet Sherouan

—vanquished Ibrahim Pasha at Boharsef—secured, including prisoners and deserters, fully 10,000 of the enemy—distributed between twenty and thirty thousand stand of arms amongst the mountaineers, who rose nearly to a man at his call—showed them and the Turks how to face the Egyptians, how to conquer their former conquerors and oppressors, and by the new “*morale*” he instilled into their breasts, taught them to cast off a hated and oppressive yoke. It was the new feeling which he thus inspired, together with his successful, chivalrous, and gallant deeds, that mainly effected the liberation of the “Mountain”—as the district of Lebanon is generally called—whilst his humanity, kindness, and urbanity, and the cordial manner in which he fraternized with their chiefs, won the hearts of all the mountaineers—Druses and Maronites—men, women, and children, who venerated his name, and would gladly have elected the “Komodor-el-Keebeer” for their liege sovereign and acknowledged chief. No European, since the days of Godfrey de Bouillon, or of Richard Cœur de Lion, ever had such power in this far region of the East. They governed by the fear they inspired, whilst it was through love and veneration that the Commodore obtained and held his influence over the Syrian mountaineers. Never was attachment formed in a shorter time—never was one more sincere or more lasting than that which bound this hardy race to the brave man who then, and subsequently, endeavoured to free them from an odious tyranny, whether of the Egyptian or the Turk. This attachment continued undiminished for years, and even after Sir Charles Napier’s death, letters of condolence

were received from his mountain friends, lamenting, in Eastern phraseology, that sad event. *

The day after the action at Boharsef, the Commadore had an interview with the Admiral and Sir Charles Smith, in which he strongly urged the expediency of following up Ibrahim Pasha in his retreat to Zachklé. As this measure was not approved of, he suggested an attack upon Acre,† but apparently with as little success; upon which he returned to his ship in disgust, fully determined, as he said, “not to mix further in military affairs.” He thus wrote to Mrs. Napier on the 15th of October:—

“I totally defeated Ibrahim Pasha on the 10th, on the heights of Boharsef; took from him nearly 700 prisoners, and dispersed his army, as you will see by my public letter. The attack was beautiful. The Egyptians were very strongly posted, but my plans were so good, I did not lose fifty men killed or wounded, and ought to have lost five hundred. Next morning the whole of Souleyman Pasha’s army before Beyrout surrendered, with all their artillery, and he went off with 300 horse: so I out-manœuvred him as well as Ibrahim. I trust my successes will be the means of getting Charlie a ship. Sir Charles Smith has returned from Constantinople much better, and has taken command of the army.”

Though superseded in his separate command—and despite the resolution “not to mix further in military affairs”—he continued to take an interest in shore operations, and thus freely expressed his opinion of what ought to be done, in a letter to Lord Minto:—

* *Vide* Appendix to this volume.

† This—although many years afterwards denied by those who sought to ruin his professional reputation—was a measure always most strongly urged by the Commadore; in corroboration of which, see the opinions he expressed on the subject in the following letters to Lord Minto, Lord Palmerston, and Sir William Parker.

“ ‘Powerful,’ D’jounie, October 15th, 1840.

“MY LORD,—I hope you will think that the small force landed in Syria have not been idle. We have succeeded in all our undertakings, beyond our most sanguine expectations; and if we go on, the whole coast, and Lebanon, may be free before the end of the month—but if we pause, the enemy may collect again. My command has ceased since the last affair, by the arrival of Sir Charles Smith, but I shall do all I can to push on matters, though my notions are very different from most people’s in these operations. With few troops, aided by steamboats, you may do wonders on a coast. Tripoli and Acre both ought to be attacked before the bad weather comes on. Then your operations in the interior should commence. The Turks are bad hands for provisioning an army. As yet we have no money to pay the arrears due to the deserters; if faith is not kept with them we shall have no men. The old Emir Beschir, who has behaved so ill all along, came in the other day, and is gone to Malta. He is rich enough to buy back his government, and most probably will, unless prevented. The Pasha we have here is not a fit man, and if he remains, the Christians will not be a bit better off than they were under the Egyptians. The whole sea coast from Sidon to Tripoli should be added to the Lebanon, and they ought to be ruled by their own prince, paying tribute to the Porte; but no Turk ought to have anything to do with them. They are a fine industrious race, and such an arrangement, if obtained by us, would increase our influence and commerce, and destroy that of France. I trust your lordship will not forget my son, in the ships you are commissioning. I ask no more. I have the honour, &c.,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

On the same day he also wrote to Lord Palmerston :—

“ ‘Powerful,’ D’jounie, Oct. 15th, 1840.

“MY LORD,—I hope you will be satisfied with what I have done during the month I commanded the army of Lebanon. My public letter will inform your lordship of what has passed. Sir Charles Smith has now taken command of

the troops, and I have returned to the 'Powerful.' What is meant to be done I know not, but Tripoli should be seized, and afterwards Acre; both can be taken by shewing a bold front. We then ought to collect animals and march on Damascus, and raise all Syria. The Pasha they have sent here is just the worst man they could have picked out. I have constant complaints of the manner the Turks treat the Christians, which will soon alienate them from the Sultan, unless they change their habits.

"In the settlement of this question something ought to be done for the mountaineers. Beyrout, Sidon, and Tripoli should be added to Lebanon, and governed by their own prince, paying a tribute to the Porte. This would satisfy them, and greatly improve our influence, and extend our commerce. I have written on this subject to Lord Ponsonby.

"There is no fear of my friends Ibrahim and Souleyman marching on Constantinople. If things are followed up, they are much more likely to march into Egypt; and I believe, after all, the best thing would be to confirm Mehemet Ali in Egypt—it is too far off from the capital to be governed by a Pasha, particularly if they send such a vagabond as Izzet Pasha is known to be. His pistol went off the other day and wounded him in the leg—it is a great pity it did not go through his head. Selim Pasha, who commands the Turkish troops, is a very good man, and does what he is bid. Believe me, &c.,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

It will be observed that, in the following letter to Sir William Parker, he again expresses his opinion that Acre ought to be attacked:—

"'Powerful,' D'jounie, Oct. 15th, 1840.

"MY DEAR ADMIRAL,—You will see that I have been carrying on the affair in Syria in the Portuguese style. I have been, however, stopped in my career by the arrival of Sir Charles Smith, who is now better. I fear they will not go on so fast as we ought. Tripoli ought to be taken immediately, which should be followed by an attack on Acre, both of which would fall, but if they are allowed breathing time it

will be more difficult. After their fall we ought to march on Damascus, and raise a flame all over Syria. We had a splendid affair on the 10th. I never saw a stronger position. I managed to attack in front, both flanks and rear, all of which succeeded; that settled both Ibrahim and Souleyman's armies (the latter of whom had been watching me like a cat after a mouse); both became disorganized. I hope Lord Minto will now give Charles a ship; if he does not, he ought to be ashamed of himself. Two mates have been severely wounded, and another much distinguished himself, as did my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Bradley. I trust they will be promoted. We are all very sickly; if you saw this with your own eyes, we should hear no more of peace complements in time of war. Believe me, &c.,

“CHARLES NAPIER.

“Rear-Admiral Sir Wm. Parker.

“P.S.—It is a pity the Commission had not been in Syria, they would then have seen whether the old captains of marines were fit for a march.—C. N.”

After all the hardships and exposure to heat and fatigue which Commodore Napier had undergone during the previous month, it is not matter of surprise that, when the excitement produced by constant activity had ceased, a re-action should have taken place, and that sickness should have assailed him after he gave up his military occupations. The natural strength of his constitution, however, soon enabled him to shake off this temporary indisposition; on which he resumed the command of the “Powerful,” at anchor in D’jounie Bay; and after embarking the remainder of the troops and stores, he rejoined the rest of the squadron, which still continued off Beyrout.

“The weather,” he writes, “had been threatening for some days, and after a few heavy squalls and a slight gale, which proved to us the insecurity of our anchorage, it again became fine. The troops were now stationed at Beyrout, Sidon, and

Tyre, and everything indicated a cessation of active measures for the present; but Acre was still within reach of the British fleet, and every officer looked forward with great anxiety for an attack on that celebrated fortress. Tripoli was also in the hands of the Egyptians, and I repeatedly urged the Admiral to allow me to proceed there, which was declined."

The Commodore, impatient of this state of inactivity, obtained leave to make several incursions into the Lebanon, where his popularity amongst the mountaineers established in these wild regions the influence of England, and respect of the British name. During these expeditions, he not only inspected the mountain roads and passes, but also visited the different tribes, became acquainted with the principal Sheikhs and Emirs of the mountain, and was introduced (an uncommon privilege) to their families; and being anxious to see Ibrahim's position at Zachklé, he obtained, in order to effect this purpose, an escort of a few horsemen from the Emir Beschir Cassim, who had lately received his firman of "Grand Prince."

At the head of this small party, he made a reconnoissance across the Lebanon, and viewed Ibrahim's camp; on which he sent in a report to the Admiral of what he had observed, and of the information he had collected as to the strength and movements of the enemy, against whom he still urged that active measures should be taken without further delay; adding, that by following such a course "everything would be finished in a month." This letter, together with the narrative containing an account of the interesting excursions he took at this period into the Lebanon, will be found in his "History of the Syrian War."

An incident occurred after his visit to Dhair-el-Khamar—the residence of the former Emir Beschir—which is worthy of being recorded in his own words:—

“After breakfast we took leave of our friends, and proceeded to Beyrout; but a sad accident clouded our otherwise pleasant journey. The mountaineers are good horsemen, and fond of shewing off, whenever a little flat ground allows them to exhibit their dexterity in firing off their muskets and pistols, and throwing the d’jerreed at full gallop, reloading in an incredibly short time. The young Prince, Abbas Kény Shehab, and several of his attendants, seeing an opportunity for a display, set off at full gallop; one of his men, close behind him, amused himself by throwing his musket into the air, to show his dexterity in catching it; it unexpectedly went off, and shot out both the Prince’s eyes. The poor lad fell instantly from his horse, and when we came up he was indeed in a most pitiable condition—his eyes hanging out of their sockets, and streaming with blood; he himself, unconscious of what had happened, was pulling them out with his fingers, and it was with the greatest difficulty I could persuade him to desist, and allow them to be bandaged. What an awful visitation was this! A few minutes before, this youth, full of life and spirits, and heir to the ruling Prince, was thus in one moment plunged into eternal darkness. It was a cruel sight. His poor attendant, who had accidentally done the deed, hung over him more dead than alive; the poor fellow seemed to suffer more than the Prince himself, who was nearly unconscious. We were three leagues from the first village, and with great difficulty succeeded in getting him there, carried in one of our cloaks. I rode on to Beyrout, and despatched an English surgeon to his assistance. His sight, as I expected, proved to be gone for ever; but youth, and the strength of his constitution, in a few months healed his wounds, and otherwise restored him to perfect health.”

The Commodore, whilst remaining at Beyrout, frequently paid visits to the sightless young Emir during his convalescence; and such was the gratitude

of the Prince for all the attention shown him by the kind-hearted Commodore, that he frequently wrote to him in after years, and, on the death of Sir Charles Napier, was amongst those who addressed to the family those letters of condolence adverted to in a former portion of this work.

On returning from the mountains to Beyrout, the Commodore found that a steamer had arrived from England, with orders to attack Acre.

The following letters from Lord Palmerston and Lord Minto, though written before his victory of Boharsef, shew the benefits that were expected from his energy and decisive measures on shore :—

“ Carlton Terrace, October 5th, 1840.

“ MY DEAR SIR,—We have just had, by the correspondents of the newspapers, accounts from Syria up to the 20th of September. I congratulate you upon the successful commencement of operations; and thank you much for the ability and enterprise with which you have been acting. I am glad to find that the Syrians were making good their promises, and were coming down to join the Sultan's standard; and if things have continued to go on as they began, you will by this time have made a large hole in Mehemet's coat. If Acre could be got hold of, that would settle the whole matter; but I daresay that if the means which are available for attacking it were sufficient to make it prudent to do so, you will already have set to work upon it. But we send by this messenger an Admiralty instruction upon that subject . . .

“The French, in their intercourse with official men (in England, at least), and in their official correspondence, have always said that they should not interfere with our operations, unless they led to a prolonged occupation of Turkish territory by an army of European troops; that they would never make themselves the armed champions of Mehemet Ali, or sacrifice, for his interests, peace and the interests of France.

"But the best security for the maintenance of peace is a speedy termination of the contest with Mehemet Ali; for if it were to linger out till the spring without taking any decisive turn, many questions might arise which would lead to embarrassing discussions between us and the French, and France might then be better prepared for war by land than she now is; for, in spite of her boasted armaments, her military force is not in a good condition. By sea she would, as compared with us, be less well prepared in the spring than now, because she cannot add more than five sail-of-the-line to her seventeen or eighteen, whereas we could add as many more as Parliament would give us money to pay for.

"But war in earnest, and on a great scale, would not be liked by the country, unless it were absolutely necessary. My dear sir, yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON.

"To Commodore Napier."

From Lord Minto:—

"Admiralty, 7th Oct., 1840.

"SIR,—I congratulate you upon the success of your operations on the coast of Syria, in which your zeal, judgment, and ability have been conspicuous.

"I do not think the French will interfere with us at present; and if Mehemet Ali's early expulsion from Syria can be effected, we shall have no war. If the strife be protracted to another season, I don't know that France would continue passive. I have but time for these few lines; and remain yours faithfully,

"MINTO."

It has been stated that, in consequence of a communication from the Commodore, I had obtained leave to proceed to Syria, and early in October I was on the way to join my gallant relative, to whom my mother wrote thus from Merchiston Hall, on the 14th of October:—

"I have this moment sent off Edward to join you; he will, I trust, be of service. Charles, I hope, will soon follow. I

think Government ought to reward me for sending out my two sons; and I know you will give them something to do. I pray for you all; and may they, at your age, have done as good service."

Ten days later she again wrote:—

"I this morning received your letter of the 29th September. You may suppose how anxiously I look out for news from Beyrout, and how delighted to read all that you have achieved. When you receive this, Edward will have joined you, and given the English and home news. I most sincerely trust that he will come in for his share of service, and follow your example. You will be glad to hear that I yesterday received a letter from Sir William Parker, to say that Lord Minto had it in contemplation to give an early appointment to Charles. Charles had got one year's leave to join the Turkish service, and was to have sailed on Saturday in the 'Britannia.' Sir William desired he would not now do so. I trust Sir Charles Smith will not cut you out of the command of the marines.

"The farm is getting on as usual.

"Admiral Ommanney wanted me to go out with him in the 'Britannia' to Malta. His two daughters and Mrs. B—— are going out with him. I send you this, and a large packet of newspapers, by Colonel Rose, late of the 92nd Highlanders. He is sent out to Syria by Government, and is an old friend of Charles's. He is in hopes of being placed under your command. May God protect you!"

Shortly after the date of this last letter, Mrs. Napier had the gratification of receiving a note from Lord Minto, announcing that he had appointed her son Charles to the command of the "Pelican" brig, which was to be commissioned at Chatham, adding, that he "was glad of this occasion to evince his sense of the valuable services rendered by Commodore Napier upon the coast of Syria."

I again take up Lieutenant Elliot's journal:—

"October 3d.—We have seen the 'Hastings' and 'Edin-

burgh' keeping up a constant and heavy fire on Beyrout all day, and I have just got a note from Henry Worth with the cause of it. They had observed from the ship that the enemy's troops were carrying a quantity of gunpowder barrels into one of the old ruined castles, which is built on a rock communicating with the town only by a bridge, and were informed by a deserter that, anticipating this would be the spot where we were likely to land, if we attacked the place, they had carried a train along the bridge to the town, to blow us all up. Henry Worth volunteered to head a party to go and cut it off—an enterprise of no small risk; and pulling in, in his gig, under cover of the fire of the other boats and the two ships, very gallantly climbed on to the bridge, destroyed the train, and was in his boat in a moment again, showers of balls from the troops in the houses pelting him all the time, and, I am sorry to say, killing a very fine young midshipman in the boat with him. He then landed with the other boats at the castle, and threw overboard about sixty barrels of powder, and brought away twenty, when the fire from the enemy became so hot they were obliged to leave, with one man killed and three wounded. He made a second attempt to bring off the remaining powder in the evening, and succeeded in getting forty more barrels, and was again obliged to retreat, still leaving a few; which the enemy, either by accident or design, set fire to, and blew up a part of the castle.

"October 4th.—To-day we have accounts of a very disastrous business by the 'Benbow's' people, that has shed a gloom over us all. She, with the 'Carystord' and 'Zebra,' were sent along the coast to the north, to subjugate any of the small towns they could get at, and land arms for the mountaineers wherever they could. They were unable to make any impression on Tripoli, it is such shoal water, and the town far inland, but landed a good many arms in the neighbourhood, and went on to Tortosa, a town, they were informed, strongly in our favour, and with only a very small garrison. Not being able to get nearer than very long gun-shot distance from the town with his ships, Captain Stewart resolved to attack it with the boats alone, and, manning them

with upwards of 200 men, pulled boldly in, scarcely expecting any resistance. Most unfortunately, not knowing the place, the boats—at least all the large ones—ran upon a reef of rocks not far from the shore, but with quite deep water inside, where they stuck fast; and not till then did the enemy shew themselves, who, opening a heavy fire from the windows of the town, dealt awful havoc on the poor boats, and, I mourn to say, killed eight and wounded eighteen, before they could get them off, or hurt a single man of the enemy. Strange to say, not an officer was touched. But it is a sad job, losing so many fine fellows and accomplishing nothing.

“The Commodore has again been down to Acre in one of the steamers, to sound around it, and no doubt arrange his plan of attack, which must be done by all the ships, on a larger scale than anything yet accomplished. It is very strong towards the sea, mounts 130 guns and 14 mortars, but is garrisoned, we are told, with only 1200 men. They fired a good many shot at the Commodore while there, but only struck the steamer once, which scarcely injured her. I don't know what we should do in this kind of warfare without the steamers, which are quite a host of themselves: their movements are so rapid, and convey the troops about so easily, when it would be almost impossible to march them, that they are worth ten times the number; and the enemy never know where to look for them next. A very pretty attack was made by the ‘Pique’ and ‘Castor’ frigates, with a steamer, on the town of Caïaffa, a little to the southward, which was captured after a good deal of firing on both sides, but with little or no damage on ours, and no one even wounded, except a solitary case of a lieutenant, an old messmate of mine, who, in the act of spiking one of the guns of the fort they had taken, which went off, was bruised severely, and had a rather handsome countenance completely disfigured.

“*October 7th.*—It is just published that the ‘Cyclops’ sails for Malta in an hour, and I hasten to finish this long list of fights and skirmishes; but I have, in truth, little else to write upon, and while these things are going on, can as little think of other subjects. We have partly expected a mail from Malta for two or three days past, but none has arrived. We

are much in want of news from England, as well as many other necessities, as clothes, shoes, crockery, &c.—not having been in a Christian place for sixteen months. As for washing, I have not known the luxury of a decently-washed shirt for many weeks; a rinse out in salt water, and afterwards rolled upon by a cold shot, forming the extent of my laundry operations. . . .

“Our force amounts to about 10,000 men—soldiers, besides deserters. Souleyman has about 7,000 men near Beyrout, Ibrahim, it is said, 10,000 near Damascus and Aleppo, and 3,000 at Acre and in the neighbourhood. The whole of their forces are dissolving fast from desertion, we having no less than nearly 5,000 Egyptians in our camp, and having sent 2,000 prisoners to Constantinople.”

“‘Powerful,’ Beyrout, Oct. 22nd, 1840.

“Since sending off my last letter, little has been done in our warlike operations. We have evacuated the old position at D’jounie, a place that has afforded us many hours’ and days’ hard work, but is of no use now; and we are—much to the displeasure of the ‘tough old Commodore’ and us all—resting on our oars, and allowing the enemy to recruit and concentrate his force. All that he has at present, north of Acre, amounts, we are told, to only 15,000 men, who are about 20 miles inland from this. The command of our military operations has been taken out of the hands of the Commodore by Sir Charles Smith, a General of Engineers, sent out some time ago to take the command, but who was then in such ill-health as to be quite unfit for it, and, indeed, is little better now, so not much activity can be expected from him. He is quite broken down. He has, however, seen much service, and was highly thought of. He fills the situation of Governor of Beyrout at present. We are all wondering that we do not make an attempt upon Acre ere the weather makes it much more hazardous; but the Admiral seems very averse to order it, and we can’t tell what are his plans.

“We hear that Admiral Ommanney is coming out second in command, which will displease the Commodore, but have not heard his views on the subject yet.

“I have been on shore to see the sad work of our guns

on the poor devoted town—a melancholy picture indeed! Scarcely a yard of building on the sea front of any house is without a shot-hole through it; and, owing to the softness of the stone, the shot passes, only making a hole as large as itself. The inhabitants are fast gathering in from the mountains, and trade is going on wonderfully after such a panic. Two thousand Egyptians deserted to us the day after they evacuated the place, and the mountaineers managed to cut off the whole of the enemy's artillery, consisting of twenty-four pieces. Tortosa and Tripoli have both fallen, so that we have the whole coast to the north, and the rest will soon fall, if we will only use active measures; but our idleness here is deplorable. There is not or cannot be a man here who does not give the highest praise to our Commodore for his tact, discretion, and valour: not a thing has he attempted without success, and, compared with others, no loss. The Turks have taken a great fancy for him, and almost adore him. Proud as they are towards Christians, the soldiers flock round him, kiss his hands, or even the tails of his coat; and the war-cry among them at the last battle was, 'For God, the Prophet, and the "Giaour" Commodore!'—whom they say they would follow to the world's end! Such is the effect of true bravery, conducted with discretion and ultimate victory, among even such barbarians as these are.

"I am sorry to say our crew have been rather sickly—I fancy from the effects of the work on shore. You may perhaps see exaggerated accounts in the papers. The climate is abominable, certainly beyond anything I ever experienced. Last night we had a gale of wind from the S.E., with the thermometer at 90° at midnight, and I could scarcely open my eyes or mouth for the disagreeable hot sand drift that covered us, even on the lower deck. The effect of these hot winds is truly distressing, by the languor and debility it leaves, and must be prejudicial to health."

CHAPTER III.

CAPTURE OF ACRE—CONVENTION OF ALEXANDRIA.
NOVEMBER, 1840.

THE Admiralty instructions referred to by Lord Palmerston were for the attack on Acre, which was accordingly made, and, it is well known, was attended with complete success. The Commodore has given a narrative of this event in his "War in Syria," and it is also recounted in the official despatches of that time; but the reader will probably prefer the subjoined graphic account in the words of Lieutenant Elliot:—

"4th November, off Acre.

"You will, I am sure, be rejoiced to hear that we have last night completed a splendid victory in the capture of Acre, which I trust will be considered a fine event in the history of the British Navy. On the 31st ult. we were rather surprised, when at Beyrout, at the order to embark 300 Turkish troops, and prepare for sea. After having filled each of our largest five steamers with as many English and Turkish soldiers as they could carry, we sailed that evening—our destination still unknown, but of course conjectured it to be Acre—the force consisting, with the Turkish Admiral (Walker), of eight sail-of-the-line, five frigates,

Austrian and English, five steamers, and two brigs. The steamers soon left us, and, as I have since understood, went on and summoned Acre to surrender, which not being complied with, they were to anchor off that place, clear of range of its shot, but it within scope of theirs. Light winds detained the rest of the fleet till late on the evening of the 2nd, when we all anchored a little out of gunshot of the famed fortress of St. Jean d'Acre, which, by its strong walls and bristling cannon, promised us a warm reception. The town is low, standing on an angle presenting two faces to the sea, both walled and covered with cannon—in one place a double tier. It was intended that the ships should form a breach, in which we were then to land our Turkish troops and marines, amounting to about 5,000 men. Our boats, under cover of the darkness of the night, found, however, by sounding, that the ships could hardly get near enough to form a breach under a long time; and arrangements were then made for an awful bombardment, with every ship and gun we could present, from as close a distance as the depth would allow them. That night was one of intense anxiety to us all, many thinking that it was highly probable we should fail, and perhaps get a drubbing, which would be a severe one indeed—little thinking, then, how much fortune would favour us, by one of the most fearful catastrophes that can occur in war. For my own part, I felt confident of success; and, making out a few hasty lines as a will, bequeathing all my little in this world to where only I could leave it, and with a fervent prayer to the Throne of Grace for protection, I resigned myself to the care of a merciful Providence, to whose hands alone we must look for aid, as well in the lesser scenes of life as in the day of battle. I have many interruptions, as you may suppose, so excuse a faulty and disconnected scrawl.

"Nov. 4th.—Daylight in the morning found all the ships under sail, but with too light a breeze to attempt anything—nor did a stronger one spring up till ten o'clock, when we weighed anchor and stood towards the ill-fated town. The Admiral went on board the 'Phoenix' steamer, the better to superintend the manœuvres, though still keeping his flag

flying in the 'Princess Charlotte.' To the 'Powerful' was assigned the task of leading in the fleet,* and of beginning and bearing the first of the fight; closely following her came the flag-ship; then the 'Thunderer,' 'Bellerophon,' and 'Revenge.' Meanwhile the second division, led by the Turkish Admiral, branched off from us, and were to attack the south-east face; we taking the west. Admiral Walker's division consisted of his own ship, the 'Benbow,' 'Edinburgh,' 'Pique,' 'Castor,' 'Hazard,' 'Carysford,' 'Talbot,' and 'Wasp,' with three Austrian and two Turkish frigates. Provoking calms or light airs made it hazardous to advance so slowly in the face of such opponents, and not till two o'clock could we take up our positions.

"As we advanced, a few shot were thrown at us, but not returned till close to our position, when we began in right earnest, and such a roar of cannon has seldom been heard. After the first broadside, all were enveloped in smoke, which the wind was too light to carry speedily off; but anchoring by the stern, with another anchor ahead, we took up as pretty a position, within half a mile of the heaviest battery, as any fire-eater could desire: the other ships took their stations close astern, except the 'Revenge,' which got ahead of us, but in an equally good position. We soon found that the enemy's fire, though heavy, was doing us no injury—all their shot passing over us, and only cutting up our masts and rigging; for the fools—fancying we should have anchored outside of a shoal, that would have kept us at a

* The following characteristic anecdote has been communicated to me by an officer who was on board the "Powerful" at the time:—Mr. Pearn, Master of the "Powerful" (who, it will be remembered, laid the "Rainha" alongside the Miguelite line-of-battle ship off Cape St. Vincent), had been employed the whole of the previous night in sounding and buoying the channel; on going into action, Captain Napier, coming up to him, said, "Pearn, you will take care to anchor the ship so close that no one will have water inside of us." The reply was, "Did I place your ship close enough, sir, on the fifth of July?" His only answer was a laugh. A most accurate representation of the bombardment of Acre, taken by Lieutenant Warre, R.N., who then belonged to the "Princess Charlotte," gives the position of the fleet, and shews how well Pearn followed the instructions he had received.

good distance—had elevated all their guns too much, and built up the lower part of the embrasures with stones and sand-bags for protection; so that they could not depress them again, and were so enveloped in their own smoke, as well as ours blowing right in their faces, that they scarcely ever got a sight of us, and never knew where they fired. We were obliged frequently to desist, to let the smoke clear away, and were much directed by midshipmen at our masts, seeing over the smoke and pointing out where to direct our fire. It was, however, impossible to miss, and after three hours of as heavy firing as was ever begun, the enemy's batteries began to slacken, and some totally ceased; when, lo! a catastrophe occurred that paralyzed us all for a moment—the grand magazine on shore blew up with an explosion that carried up a large portion of the town and batteries, and shook every ship to the keel. I was sitting at the moment, looking out at one of the spare posts at my station, in command of the lower deck, and was literally knocked in by the concussion. Not less than 1,200 men are said to have been blown up or killed in the fall of the ruins. The firing on their side became now but weak—still one or two guns continued to annoy us, and it was not before several broadsides from all our line directed at them, that they entirely ceased, and darkness prevented all vision but the flashes of the guns. We then proceeded to get our anchor up, and hove off out of gun-shot, to rest our worn-out men, and be ready to renew hostilities in the morning; but this ship being more crippled than any, we called a steamer to us, which towed us out, and we anchored in safety.

“I must now tell you of the small loss sustained by the fleet—as far as the reports have yet reached us—but which is still uncertain; and it is hardly to be credited that we have all got off so well. Can it be believed that although we in the ‘Powerful’ have lost our main-topmast, mizen-topsail-yard, fore-stay, all the mizen-topmast-rigging, our sails almost riddled (they were clewed up and not furled), and almost all our running-rigging cut away, with only three shots in the hull, one knocking away part of the bits on the quarter-deck, not a man is killed or wounded. Some of the other division have

not fared so well : the 'Talbot' had a Lieutenant killed ; the 'Castor,' four men killed and six wounded ; the 'Wasp,' seven wounded ; the 'Edinburgh,' two killed, and five wounded—four of them, including her commander, were officers ; 'Princess Charlotte,' one killed and one wounded ; 'Revenge,' two killed and two wounded ; the Turkish Admiral's ship, one killed,—amounting, I believe, in all to fourteen or fifteen killed and twenty-four wounded. The enemy's loss, by all accounts, is about 1,200 blown up, and 300 killed at their guns, with scarcely a gun on the sea-wall not disabled. Soon after midnight the Turkish Admiral sent to us to say that the enemy had evacuated the town ; when the troops were soon landed, took possession, and, united with 5,000, that marched from Beyrout when we sailed, to meet us, are pursuing them to the southward. The garrison is said to have consisted of 7,000 men ; they had provisions and supplies for a year, and were confident that the Navy of England never could have driven them out. The town and walls present a mass of ruins beyond conception ; but what place could withstand the fire of more than 400 heavy cannons, directed against it for four hours, with a precision and rapidity unknown in any former warfare. Every line-of-battle ship has four or six 8-inch shell guns on each broadside, which did dreadful havoc, and no doubt blew up the magazine, which decided the fate of the day—not only, I fancy, by the explosion itself, but the loss of all their powder. I believe, and it is pleasing to think, that there were few or no inhabitants in the town, the place being nothing but an immense garrison, even more strongly fortified towards the land than the sea. Bonaparte besieged it for several months unsuccessfully, and it has been almost rebuilt, and doubly strengthened, since his time. I have not yet been able to learn the name of the General who commanded, but my old friend Mahmoud Bey held a high station here ; and report says that nearly 2000 Egyptians, chiefly cavalry, have come over to us to-day.

"During the battle the Turkish troops on board proved a great nuisance, being perfectly useless ; and I had charge of most of them on the lower deck, it being too suffocatingly hot to send them farther below, more out of danger. I had full

employment, keeping them in order with a large broom-stick, finding no other language intelligible to them, or half so persuasive. Poor wretches, they were quite out of their element. In a case like this there was of course no opportunity for any personal bravery, nor could anyone show anything to the contrary—all seemed to set about the work in a truly business-like manner, and kept it up as British sailors have always done. The Commodore came down to my quarters several times, and complimented me on the steady and well-directed fire of the lower-deck guns; but who could miss? Had it not been for the truly happy miscalculation of the enemy in the position we were to take up, we must in this ship have been almost annihilated; but they could not, I fancy, see the ships, after their first broadside, for smoke. The steamers kept out of range of the guns, but occasionally sent a few of their shells into the town. What will be said in England to all this? Syria may now be said to be conquered, in a far shorter time than people had any idea of. We surely ought to get a promotion for this, but I have no hopes for myself. Can any interest be made for me at this time?—it may assist. We are in hopes now of getting to Malta to refit—we need it much. Our idea at present is that we shall let Mehemet Ali keep Egypt, which he ought to be glad now to accept. But I must conclude my yarn, from inability to sit up longer, having been already two nights without a bed or almost sleep, and am so unwell with a violent cold, that I must bear up for the sick-lines in the morning, if not better. A steamer takes the despatches early in the morning, so I must now close this and go to bed.

“We have got the order to draw our increased pay at last, from 1st July, and surely ought to have some prize-money granted us. The Sultan must do something for us in the way of honours or medals, or I never will fight for him again.” *

A change of wind having necessitated an alteration in the original plan of attack upon Acfe, the different position taken up in consequence by the “Powerful” gave rise to an unpleasant discussion between the

Commander-in-chief and the Commodore, the latter of whom demanded a court-martial. This was refused, and a correspondence ensued, which ended as follows :—

“To Commodore Napier.

“November 6th.

“MY DEAR SIR,—I do not apprehend that a difference of opinion implies a censure upon either party, as I cannot allow infallibility to anybody.

“That I differed in opinion with you is true, but that therefore censure was intended is without foundation. Believe me, my dear sir, yours truly,

“ROBERT STOPFORD.”

“To Admiral Stopford.

“MY DEAR SIR,—I am glad to find by your note, which I received last night, that you had no intention to censure me. I placed my ship to the best of my judgment—I could do no more. Believe me, &c.,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

Thus ended this unpleasant affair; but, with the most ungenerous feeling and bad taste, it was, after a lapse of many years, brought again before the public by Sir Charles Napier's enemies, with the view to damage his professional reputation. The result, however, redounded entirely to his credit, as will be shewn in a subsequent portion of this work.

On the day after the action, Commodore Napier wrote as follows to Lord Minto, whose reply, announcing the honourable distinction intended for him, I subjoin :—

“‘Powerful,’ Acre, Nov. 5th, 1840.

“MY LORD,—Permit me to congratulate your lordship on the fall of Acre, after a bombardment of three hours, and the blowing up of the great magazine. This, if followed up, will settle the Eastern question, and put an end to the chance of war with France. I shall, however, not be sorry to see the two three-deckers here; they will then be cautious what they do. This place is very strong, but in an unfinished state, and

I suppose will remain so ; the Turks will never have energy enough to finish it. Ibrahim Pasha has collected a large force at Zachkle, and I hope he will not come into Lebanon again ; but there is nobody except the mountaineers to keep him out, which I do not think right:—I have the honour to remain, your lordship's obedient servant,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

From Lord Minto :—

“Minto, 2nd Dec., 1840.

“When I last wrote, I had only learned the fact of the surrender of Acre, without knowing whether this had been voluntary or under attack. We have now the satisfaction of finding that it had fallen under the bombardment of our fleet, and that your operations on the coast have been nobly crowned, as I had ventured to anticipate, by the reduction of this celebrated fortress, the last stronghold of Mehemet Ali's usurped authority.

“I have so frequently of late had occasion to express my sense of your merit and exertions in the whole course of operations upon that coast, that I will not now trouble you with a repetition ; but I feel much pleasure in being able to congratulate you upon Her Majesty's gracious intention of conferring on you the honour of the Knight Commandership of the order of the Bath.—I have the honour to be, sir, yours faithfully,

“MINTO.

“P.S.—Since writing this, I have received your letter of the 5th Nov., for which I thank you. “M.”

It was decided that Commodore Napier should now take command of the squadron off Alexandria, which was to be increased to six sail-of-the-line. He was instructed to proceed, in the first instance, to Beyrout, to complete watering the ships, where he remained until the 15th of November. I joined him there, but was unfortunately too late to participate in the operations which had marked his brief but brilliant military career. The Commodore, however, with kind consideration, pre-

sented me to his successor, Sir Charles Smith ; to the Turkish authorities at Beyrout ; and to the different Sheikhs and Emirs of Lebanon ; and while there, we made several pleasant excursions into the mountains, visiting, among other places, the scene of his victories at Ornacaguan (or Kornet Sherouan) and Boharsef.

On this occasion we rested at the house of the old bishop, where the Commodore and his staff had slept after defeating Ibrahim Pasha on the 10th of October. The bishop—a venerable-looking old man—although he produced, on our arrival, the usual pipes and narghilis, gave us anything but a cordial reception. It appears that on their former visit, when, after a hard day of fighting and fasting, the Commodore had claimed his hospitality and requested supper for himself and his companions in arms, the holy man stated, with the most solemn asseverations, that, having been plundered by the Egyptian soldiers, he had nothing to offer to his guests ; and the hungry Commodore would have retired supperless to bed, but for his aide-de-camp, who, not relishing such a proceeding, went prowling about, and heard the cackling of hens within what appeared to be a cellar. He communicated the discovery to another famished warrior, upon which they proceeded in search of the bishop's "major-domo," and, under threats of immediate destruction, obliged him forthwith to open the door, where they found concealed a great number of fowls, to which they helped themselves *à discrétion*, desiring the holy man's accomplice to inform his master of the valuable discovery they had made ; but that since he knew nothing of the existence of the fowls, and they

therefore could not possibly be his, he might have the remainder at a piastre a-head ! The story, however, got wind, and the bishop's hen-roost was soon invaded by a host of hungry Turks, who left not the vestige of a feather to tell the tale ! Hence the prelate's cool reception of his guests.

Before the Commodore left Beyrout for Alexandria, he wrote to Colonel Hodges, who had then repaired to the British Embassy at Constantinople:—

“ ‘Powerful,’ under weigh off Beyrout, Nov. 15th, 1840.

“MY DEAR HODGES,—I am ordered to Alexandria, and, with Mehemet Ali's leave, will occupy your house till you come back, which (if it is true we have accepted French mediation) will not be long. There is nothing doing here, but there is some talk of moving. The weather is yet fine, but the first change will bring the rain, and then all operations must cease here. Ibrahim has collected all his force at Zachkle, a little way up the other side of Lebanon ; he is watched by the mountaineers, who are most irregularly fed and paid, but I hope Smith will be able to make the Pasha do better ; he is a great rogue, and is jealous of the mountaineers. I understand he said openly, the other day, that, when Ibrahim was put down, he would disarm them ; I should advise him not to try that ; the Turks treat them very ill, and if Izzet Pasha is not removed there will be a reaction. He receives no petitions, and attends to nothing ; his appointments are all bad, and I believe are sold ; the grain and rice of the vessels that were detained, have been kept, and not a farthing paid for them—in fact, there is general discontent ; and if all Syria is to be treated as they are here, the Sultan will not keep it with all his army. I have written all this to Lord Ponsonby, and recommended what might be done with Lebanon ; if that is settled to their satisfaction, the Sultan will bind the mountains to him, which will insure the tranquillity of Syria ; if it is not done, he will only have a nominal authority in them, for I know they are determined that the Turkish soldiers shall never come among

them. I hope when I come to Marmorice to get leave to visit you at Constantinople. By my last letter from England they only know of our landing. I have had very handsome letters from Lords Minto and Palmerston, and Charley is to have a ship. I went over the field of battle with my son the other day (the soldier). Lord Hill was most kind in sending Major Napier out to me; Smith will employ him, and I have written to Lord Ponsonby to get him Turkish rank. Let me hear from you particularly if you have found out anything about Ibrahim's standard. Believe me, yours very faithfully,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

The standard here alluded to had reference to one that had been captured from the Egyptians at Boharsef, and which ought properly to have been handed over by the Commodore to Sir Robert Stopford; this standard, however, disappeared very strangely, and it was supposed to have been either lost or concealed after the action by some person, greatly to the annoyance of both the Commander-in-chief and the Commodore, the subject occasioning much correspondence. About this time Lord Ponsonby presented a standard to the Sultan, which gave rise to the supposition that it was the missing flag captured at Boharsef. This, however, proved to be a mistake, as it was one that had been left behind by the Egyptians in their hurried departure from Beyrout.

On the 15th of November, Commodore Napier left Beyrout in the “Powerful,” to assume the command of the squadron off Alexandria, which, in addition to his own ship, consisted of the “Rodney,” “Revenge,” “Ganges,” “Vanguard,” and “Cambridge,” of the line, besides the “Carysford,” and the steamer “Medea.” He joined them on the 21st of November,

having previously reconnoitered all the sea defences of the place, and come to the conclusion that, with the exception of the Castle of Pharos, there existed nothing which could oppose the attack of a sufficient naval force; but that, even if such an attack were successful, it would be attended with no result, unless seconded by a considerable body of troops.

Under these circumstances, the Commodore had been placed in anything but an enviable command. He was stationed with a squadron, for the purpose of blockading a port, at a period of the year when bad weather might be daily expected; and having but little sea room, there was every probability of his being driven ashore with all the ships under his command, in the event of a severe gale of wind blowing from any other quarter save the south or the east. The Commodore was not, however, the man likely to remain long in such a position, if any means existed of creditably extricating himself from it, with honour to his country, and with advantage to the cause which the British Government had embraced. In this emergency, it will be seen what line of conduct he determined to pursue.

On joining the squadron he was put in possession of a letter from Lord Palmerston to Lord Ponsonby, clearly pointing out what were the intentions of the British Government towards Mehemet Ali and the Porte. This letter* distinctly recommended that, in the event of Mehemet Ali making at an early period his submission to the Sultan, agreeing also to restore the Turkish fleet, and to withdraw his troops from

* *Vide* Sir Charles Napier's "War in Syria," vol. i., p. 249.

Syria, Adana, Candia, and the Holy Cities, he, Mehemet Ali, should not only be recognised as Pasha of Egypt, but should also be allowed a tenure of the hereditary Pashalic of that country (according to the conditions specified in the treaty of July), though liable to forfeiture by the infraction of any of those conditions, on his own part or the part of his successors.

“Her Majesty’s Government,” continues the despatch, “have reason to hope that this suggestion will meet the concurrence of the governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia; and your Excellency will accordingly take the steps pointed out in this despatch, as soon as your colleagues shall have received corresponding instructions.

“If the Sultan should consent to act upon this advice, tendered to him by his four allies, it would be expedient that he should take immediate steps for making his gracious intentions, in this respect, known to Mehemet Ali; and your Excellency and Sir Robert Stopford should afford every facility which they may require for this purpose.”

This letter was dated London, October 15th, 1840, evidently showing that the British Government was not satisfied with the contemplated deposition of Mehemet Ali; and Commodore Napier instantly determined, on his own responsibility, to act according to these instructions. The success which had hitherto attended his undertakings, throughout a long and active career, may, in a great measure, be attributed to the clear and comprehensive view he invariably took of passing events, the correctness of the conclusions he then usually arrived at, and to the rapidity and decision with which, when once formed, they were always carried into effect.

In this instance, he did not for a moment hesitate

what course to pursue. The instructions which applied to Sir Robert Stopford he considered as applying equally to himself in the position which he then occupied ; and in the same manner as he had promptly and fearlessly assumed the responsibility of attacking Ibrahim Pasha in the mountains of Syria, so at Alexandria he took on himself that of entering into negotiations with Mehemet Ali, although not officially empowered to do so ; and in carrying those instructions into effect, he proved himself as good a diplomatist as he had shewn himself an able and successful general.

Having duly weighed every circumstance, the Commodore sent for Captain Maunsell, of the "Rodney"—an old acquaintance of Mehemet Ali ; invested him with the office of negotiator ; and on the 22d of November—the morning after his arrival—sent him under a flag of truce to Alexandria, with a letter to Boghos Bey, the Minister and chief adviser of Mehemet Ali. In this communication he strongly advised the latter to set at liberty the Syrian Emirs and Sheikhs, to evacuate Syria, and to restore the Turkish fleet ; pointing out, at the same time, the hopelessness of his preserving his dominions unless he came to an arrangement with the Sultan ; supported, as the latter was, by the allies, who, in case of the Pasha's submission, were well disposed to secure to him the hereditary government of Egypt.

Commodore Napier received a favourable reply : to the purport, that the intention to leave him the hereditary government of Egypt had already come to the knowledge of the Pasha ; that he only awaited an official communication to this effect ; and whilst de-

precating all idea of placing himself in opposition to the will of the Great Powers of Europe, he expressed the conviction that they would do him every justice. This communication further stated that it had never been Mehemet Ali's intention to retain the fleet of his sovereign, and that he was ready to evacuate Syria.

"I hope," concludes Boghos Bey's letter—"I hope, Commodore, that you will be satisfied with the explanations which the Viceroy has ordered me to transmit to you, and that you will perceive, in the eagerness which I have shewn to reply with frankness to your friendly communication, a fresh proof of the pacific and conciliatory feelings which have never ceased to animate the Viceroy, my master."

Commodore Napier was so satisfied with this answer, that, to save time, he resolved on a personal interview with Mehemet Ali; Captain Maunsell being, meanwhile, the bearer of another letter, urging the immediate surrender of the Turkish fleet, as the first step in the proposed arrangement, which, for many reasons, it was desirable to bring speedily to a close.

The reply was to the effect that the Ottoman fleet should be restored, and Syria evacuated, as soon as Mehemet Ali received the official and positive guarantee of the advantages that were promised him in return for these concessions; and on the morning of the 25th of November Commodore Napier entered the harbour of Alexandria in the "Medea" steamer, landed and proceeded to the house of the British Consul, pending his proposed interview with Mehemet Ali, which was fixed for the following day.

The Commodore thus describes his interview:—

"On entering the reception-room of Mehemet Ali, which is in the old palace, we were most graciously received. The

Pasha, in a short dress, was standing surrounded by his officers; and free admission seemed to have been given to Franks of all descriptions. After a few compliments on both sides, the Pasha walked to a corner of the room and seated himself on his divan. Pipes and coffee were called for, and we smoked away for a considerable time, as if we had been the best friends in the world. The palace was too crowded to enter into business, and it was arranged I should again see the Pasha in the evening, after communicating with Boghos Bey, and give him, in writing, the terms he wished me to comply with.

"The Pasha is a man of low stature, a good deal marked with the small-pox, his complexion sallow, his eyes quick and penetrating. He wears a fine white beard, and, when in good humour, has a most fascinating manner; but when out of temper his eyes sparkle, he raises himself up in his corner, and soon convinces you he is much easier led than driven. He is easy of access, and indeed fond of gossiping; and seems to be informed of everything that is either said or done in Alexandria. He has many friends amongst the Franks; and when he takes a liking, the man's fortune is made. He has built a very handsome palace, and furnished it with taste. Opposite the palace is the harem, where his wives reside; but the old gentleman has given up his visits to that establishment.

"After leaving the Pasha, I had an interview with the Bey, and settled with him the terms of the Convention, which was submitted to the Pasha in the evening, and, after some discussion, was agreed upon. I was anxious that the Egyptian troops should be embarked, and return by sea, because I foresaw their retiring by land would disorganize the whole of Syria, and stir up the evil passions of the inhabitants, which would not easily subside. Besides, I was afraid some untoward event might bring the Turks and Egyptians into contact, and upset all I had been doing. Mehemet Ali, on the other hand, afraid of foul play (and the sequel has proved he had reason), was anxious they should retire by land; and it is singular enough that there was a greater outcry against that article, which he did not like, than against all the other

articles of the Convention; and I feel quite satisfied that the hold of Turkey on Syria has been more weakened by that retreat than by any other follies they have since committed. The different sects know their strength, and the day is not far distant when the Turks will be driven out of the country, with a severer loss than Ibrahim Pasha met with."

Lieutenant Elliot's journal gives some additional particulars of the interview between the Pasha and the Commodore, which may perhaps be read with interest.

"The meeting between the two great characters was interesting, as it is described by our messmate, Bradley, who attended as aide-de-camp and secretary to the Commodore.

"The Pasha asked the Commodore for his credentials to act on such an affair; to which the other replied, that the double-shotted guns of the 'Powerful,' with the squadron under his command to back him, his honour as an Englishman, and the knowledge he had of the desire of the four great Powers for peace, were all the credentials he possessed. This answer so pleased the old fellow, that he was delighted with him, said that he had many times heard of the Commodore, and was always the more anxious for his acquaintance, and would at any time prefer being the friend than the foe of such a man. They were from that moment friends; and the Commodore, with much ingenuity, induced him to comply with the terms he proposed. Most of the foreign consuls were present; and the French one, who is an intriguing fellow, and a great adviser of the Pasha, attempted to give a false interpretation to some of the demands. On this being discovered, he was ordered to leave the presence; the Pasha adding, that he had already been deceived enough, and wished to have nothing further to do with him."

After a little more diplomatic skirmishing between Boghos Bey and the Commodore, the following compact was entered into and signed by both:—

"Convention between Commodore Napier, commanding Her Britannic Majesty's naval forces before Alexandria, on

the one part, and His Excellency Boghos Joussouf Bey, specially authorised by His Highness the Viceroy of Egypt, on the other part—signed at Alexandria, the 27th of November, 1840:—

“ART. I.—Commodore Napier, in his above-mentioned capacity, having brought to the knowledge of His Highness, Mehemet Ali, that the allied Powers had recommended the Sublime Porte to reinstate him in the hereditary government of Egypt, and His Highness seeing in this communication a favourable occasion for putting an end to the calamities of war, he engages to order his son, Ibrahim Pasha, to proceed immediately to the evacuation of Syria. His Highness engages, moreover, to restore the Ottoman fleet, as soon as he shall have received the official notification that the Sublime Porte grants to him the hereditary government of Egypt, which concession is, and remains, guaranteed by the Powers.

“ART. II.—Commodore Napier will place a steamer at the disposal of the Egyptian Government, which will convey to Syria the officer charged by His Highness to carry to the Commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army the order to evacuate Syria. The Commander-in-chief of the British forces, Sir Robert Stopford, will on his side appoint an officer to watch over the execution of this measure.

“ART. III.—In consideration of what precedes, Commodore Napier engages to suspend hostilities on the part of the British forces against Alexandria, or any other portion of the Egyptian territory. He will, at the same time, authorize the free passage of the vessels appointed for the transport of the wounded, the invalids, or of any other portion of the Egyptian army which the Government of Egypt might wish to return to that country by sea.

“ART. IV.—It is well understood that the Egyptian army shall have the liberty of retiring from Syria with its artillery, arms, horses, ammunition, baggage, and in general everything that constitutes the stores of an army.

“Done in duplicate, each contracting party to have an original.

“(Signed) CH. NAPIER, *Commodore*.

“BOGHOS JOUSSOUF.”

“Venturing on so important a measure as this Convention, without authority,” says the Commodore, “would only be justified by the result; but it is not without precedent. Sir Sydney Smith had entered into a convention with the French for the evacuation of Egypt; and Captain Foote had also, when serving under Lord Nelson, entered into one for the evacuation of Naples. Both were rejected by their superior officers. The rejection of the first led to the expedition to Egypt, which cost some millions, and the loss of much life; the rejection of the last, to scenes that are better buried in oblivion.”

He thus communicates to the Admiralty the fact of having made this convention with Mehemet Ali:—

“H.M. Steamer ‘Medea,’ Alexandria, November 26th, 1840.

“To Lord Minto.

“My LORD,—I do not know whether I have done right or not in settling the Eastern question. I have observed, both by your Lordship’s and Lord Palmerston’s correspondence, the anxious desire of the British Government to put an end to the war in the East, and six sail-of-the-line has proved no bad negotiator. The season is so far advanced, and the Turkish army in Syria so little prepared for a march, that I thought it best to make sure work, and not trust to the chapter of accidents. I knew what a Turkish army is, and it would have been impossible to have got them in a fit state to have followed up Ibrahim, had he been allowed time to concentrate. Had he been attacked at Zachkle, it would have been another thing; but he is now at Damascus, and cannot have less than 20,000 men, including 8000 cavalry and horse artillery. The Turks have neither the one nor the other, and no commissariat. . . .

“I was obliged to break off, having received a message from the Pasha to come to him. I am happy to tell your Lordship that everything is arranged to my satisfaction. Syria is to be evacuated *immediately*; the whole is to be arranged and signed to-night, agreeable to the demand in my last letter, but as the ‘Oriental’ has already been detained three days, I did not like to detain her another. I shall

probably send a steamer hence with the Convention. If I have done wrong, I must bear the whole blame. The French are in a rage, and Boghos Bey quite delighted that everything is settled without their intervention. I have the honour to remain, your Lordship's obedient servant,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

He also wrote as follows to Mrs. Napier :—

“ ‘Medea’ steamer, Alexandria, Nov. 26th, 1840.

“ You have seen me a Lord High Admiral, a Commodore, and a General—I have now turned a ‘Negotiator,’ and have made peace with Mehemet Ali. Heaven knows whether the Government will approve or not of what I have done—but I know I am right. He has agreed to evacuate Syria *immediately*, and give up the fleet, the moment he is guaranteed in the hereditary government of Egypt. The French have done all they could to prevent Mehemet Ali agreeing to my terms, but I have beat them all. I left Edward at Beyrout. I gave him two horses, but my treaty will put an end to the war, and they will all curse me thoroughly. I got a letter from him yesterday : all well. He had been to see the Emir Beschir (Grand Prince), and was well received by him. When everything is settled, we shall all go into the mountains and pay them a visit next summer, if we are alive. I am just going to see the Pasha, and will finish this when I come back. I have received a letter from Sir William Parker, informing me that Charley is appointed to the ‘Pelican.’ He is now sure of being posted, either before or at the expiration of the three years.

“ I am just come from the Pasha and his Minister. I was most graciously received, and I am to see him this evening, when everything will be signed. I shall either be hung by the Government or made a Bishop. God bless you all ! I have not time for another word.”

Whilst the “Powerful” lay at Beyrout—during her passage to Alexandria, and subsequent stay there—Lieutenant Elliot continued his journal, some extracts from which follow :—

“ ‘Powerful,’ Beyrout, Nov. 13th, 1840.

“We sail to-morrow morning for Alexandria. . . . I went on shore at Acre to see the havoc we have occasioned, and witnessed a sight that never can be effaced from my memory, and makes me at this time even almost shudder to think of. Hundreds of the dead and dying were not even then (the fifth day after the action) collected, or likely to be got from the ruins for weeks. So tremendous was the destruction from the explosion, and so few men could be spared to attend to it, that burial was out of the question, and the beach for half a mile on each side was strewed with bodies, which the sea, it was hoped, would wash away ere long; but at that time they infected the air with an effluvium that was truly horrid.

“Among the ruins there was, of course, a great quantity of wood and combustible matter, which caught fire from the explosion, and continued to smoulder unseen; and I regret to say that on the fourth day another explosion took place, which is supposed to have killed upwards of a hundred persons, chiefly Turks; and eight or nine English marines are missing. Captain Collier, of the ‘Castor,’ had a leg broken, and the chaplain of the ‘Princess Charlotte’ was badly wounded in the head. They were only looking about them, and it is merciful there were not many more near at the time. It is supposed that there may be still a great many soldiers and people alive, who took shelter from our shot in the bomb-proofs and cellars underground, where the entrances have been closed up under a mass of ruin too deep to get at, and they, poor wretches! dying the worst of deaths. The pit caused by the explosion was large enough to form a dock (which it resembled in shape) for the ‘Powerful.’ The damage done by our shot was enormous; and, out of 129 heavy guns opposed to us along the sea walls, besides a number of mortars, a great proportion are disabled. Three millions of money is calculated as the value of the military stores, arms, and provisions taken and destroyed by us on the occasion. Surely we shall be allowed a grant in the way of prize-money. They had one both at Algiers and Navarino. But people here think we shall not be so fortunate in these

more economical times. We left Acre on the sixth day, with all the fleet, and got here the following. We have been watering since, and, with one or two other ships, go to Alexandria to continue the blockade; and I fancy the Admiral and the rest go to Marmorice Bay. It is expected Sir John Ommanney will relieve us at Alexandria in a few days, and we then may get to Malta—but all is secret.

“We hardly expect there will be anything done at Alexandria. We cannot attempt to go in without great loss, and they have not the bravery to come out. Major Elers Napier, the Commodore’s son, arrived here from England the other day. He was with us before, and was a great friend of mine. I have been for the last two days in the mountains with him, assisting him to take a military survey of the positions held by the combatants when the Commodore drove Ibrahim Pasha off the field. We had a delightful trip, and enjoyed ourselves much among the kind-hearted but rude peasantry.”

“‘Powerful,’ on her passage to Alexandria, Nov. 17th, 1840.

“I have still much to tell you about the ever-to-be-remembered bombardment of Acre. That splendid system of gun exercise adopted in the ‘Excellent,’ and which so much pains is taken to bring the men up to, fully shewed its superiority. On this occasion it was said by many officers that, in real action, much of that nicety required in exercise would be neglected; but such is the manner the men have been drilled into it, that they had no idea of departing from it, and, of course, found it the easiest and quickest; and, as a proof, although unusual to fire so much without some accident among so many, I have not heard of a single casualty of any kind; not a gun in the ship ever missed fire or burnt priming; I only feared the guns getting too hot to load—some were so much so that I could not bear my hand on them for a moment. There was some difficulty in getting the men to desist long enough to let the smoke clear away, so as to see from whence came the thickest fire, and after dark, we were well guided by the flash of their guns. The very small loss in the fleet we can only look upon as a miraculous interposition of Providence. Can it be credited that the

'Benbow' had sixteen shot in her hull, one passing in on one side and out at the other, without a man being even scratched? The Admiral, in order to make the requisite signals, was on board a steamer. None, however, were required, the only one he made being near the end of the business, to desire the Commodore to leave off action; which the latter, with the example of the gallant Nelson before him on a similar occasion, would not see.

"Old Charlie, if a breach had been made in the walls, would have been the first man in it. He is in great spirits, and his speech to the crew the day after the battle was short, pithy, and characteristic. After reading the Admiral's public letter of thanks to all hands assembled on deck, he said,

"'Now, my boys, I have to thank you all for myself, and in doing so most gratefully, I have only to say that in the annals of war there never was so admirable and tremendous a fire kept up, as you did on that occasion, united with a degree of order and regularity that I have hitherto thought impossible. I only found fault with your firing too quick; but, mind me, should we have a French war, which now appears far from improbable, when I hope to take you alongside of the 'Montebello' (the French Admiral's ship, of 120 guns), I will not quarrel with you on that score, and I rest satisfied you would render as good an account of her as you have done with the batteries of Acre, a place hitherto considered impregnable.'

"A whisper ran through the crowd: 'Shall we give the old boy a cheer?'—but a look from some of the senior officers forbade it on such an occasion, and they went down immoderately proud and happy. As a treat we allowed the captains of guns to go on shore to witness the havoc they had committed, and, strange to say, not a man got drunk (I question if there was a bottle of anything left whole in the place). They almost all brought off trophies—swords, pistols, or any gimcrack they could catch, to display to 'Poll' or 'Bess.'

"By the bye, I got a piece of one of the flags, of which there were several—red or green, with the crescent and star

—on the walls; mine is of the Prophet's sacred green, and enough to make a neck handkerchief, which I must wear on the anniversary of Acre, if you will hem it and give it a bit of a darn for me. I was lucky in finding it among the ruins, after so many had visited them before me.

“*Nov. 20th.*—The attack on the fortress of Acre was boldly planned and most skilfully executed, but we are much indebted to circumstances of chance in taking the place so easily. The truth is, we quite misled the enemy as to the position we should take up, which was far within the distance they expected or thought it possible for us to approach; they had elevated their guns for a larger range, and as soon as the work began we were so enveloped in smoke, with a light air of wind blowing ours as well as their own right in their faces, that they hardly knew where we were; and the number of shot cutting our rigging to pieces from high firing and falling beyond us, plainly shewed, if we had been a little farther off, we should have caught it precious. But throughout there appears to have been an almost miraculous interposition of Providence in saving our men; for it is scarcely to be credited that the ‘Benbow’ received no less than sixteen shot in her hull—all heavy ones, one passing in on one side and out at the other—and not a man got even a scratch. Some of the ships were not so fortunate, the ‘Edinburgh’ having four killed and nine wounded, and the ‘Castor’ was so much cut up as to be obliged to go to Malta to repair. The Turkish Admiral’s ship, I am sorry to say, suffered a little from the fire of our line of ships; but it was impossible to avoid it, from the opposite positions and splendid cross fire we kept up with tremendous effect, and in four hours silenced every gun on their sea-line of batteries, amounting to 129, all of very heavy metal, besides thirty or forty mortars; and to give an idea with what coolness the rascals fought, only fancy our finding, in more than one instance where the carriages of the guns were disabled by our shot, they had dismounted them and replaced them with spare ones—a work of no small labour in the face of such a fire. But the awful explosion that took place from one of our shells penetrating their magazine beggars all description,

and sent 1,200 poor wretches to eternity at one fell swoop, reducing the already riddled town to a mass of rubbish. The effect of the shock on us was awful, though receiving thereby no damage: I was all but driven in from a port I was looking out at, while a person standing by me had his cap blown off his head. The moment the truth of the event was known—for of course in the tumult we did not know what had happened—three hearty cheers ran through our decks, and the fellows set to work again, and with redoubled exertion followed up the blow. The explosion fortunately caused an immense breach in the wall on the land side, which made the place untenable, and through which the garrison retreated in the night, leaving stores and provisions enough, with a most ample supply of everything, for 10,000 men to withstand a siege of a twelvemonth, and valued at three millions sterling.

“We are now on our way to Alexandria, where the Commodore will command the blockading squadron off that port. We fancy nothing will be done there, and conclude that a reconciliation will be gladly accepted by the Pasha ere long, with conditions to give up the Turkish fleet and resign all claim in Syria—the allied Powers granting him the Pashalic of Egypt in perpetuity to his family.”

“November 21st, off Alexandria.

“We have taken command of the squadron blockading this place, consisting of six sail-of-the-line, the ‘Carysford’ and the ‘Medea,’ and continue under sail, never going out of sight of the port, where we can count about twenty sail-of-the-line and as many frigates. The war seems carried on in a queer sort of a way, as our ships have frequently run in, far within gun-shot, without being fired at; nor is our blockade so strict as to detain merchant vessels of any nation, and the Indian mail is now allowed to pass as when at peace. Mehemet Ali says he is not at war with the English, but only with Lord Ponsonby, and, pretending not to believe a word of the downfall of Acre, strictly prohibits any information from that part of the country among his subjects, and had grand festivities and rejoicings under the pretence of the great victory he obtained there over the English. Poor old man!—let him enjoy the idea if he can,

but from his character I am sure the truth must have inflicted a wound in his breast that will contribute to shorten his days. I understand he complains of having been deceived by the French.

"*Nov. 22nd.*—The 'Medea' has been sent in to-day, bearing a flag of truce, and with Captain Maunsell of the 'Rodney'—who is an old friend of Mehemet Ali—carrying propositions from the Commodore, the exact nature of which we are not acquainted with, but believe them to be of an amicable nature, as he said he would not be surprised if we are snugly at anchor in Alexandria to-morrow. We are undoubtedly suspending hostilities for the present and negotiating a peace, the conditions of which will, we think, be the surrender of the Turkish fleet, the giving up of all claim to Syria and Candia, and indemnification, as we hope, for expenses of the war to the British Government; while on our part we must ensure him the hereditary Pashalic of Egypt.

"We hope to have the job of taking back the Turkish fleet to Constantinople, which will be a grand finish to a war that has contributed to keep up the name of our Navy, and show the world that it is not so degenerated as some wish to represent it."

CHAPTER IV.

THE CONVENTION RATIFIED—VISIT TO MEHEMET ALI—
DECEMBER, 1840; FEBRUARY, 1841.

THE bad weather anticipated by the Commodore—and which was one of his reasons for the immediate conclusion of the Convention with Mehemet Ali—set in on the 28th of November with a gale of wind, which dispersed the blockading squadron before Alexandria, forcing nearly all the ships on the coast of Syria to stand out to sea, and eventually to seek refuge in Marmorice Bay. Here the “Powerful” and some of her disabled consorts arrived on the 8th of December, followed next day by the “Princess Charlotte” (with the Admiral’s flag) and the “Bellerophon” from Beyrout. Both had had a very narrow escape of being lost, and the “Bellerophon” was providentially saved by a sudden and almost miraculous change of wind; the “Pique” was obliged to cut away her masts to avoid going on shore in the bay of Acre, where the “Zebra” was stranded, with the loss of some of her crew. The Austrian squadron likewise quitted the coast of Syria, where all the places

we had captured were left entirely unprotected, and might have been re-occupied by the Egyptians, had they only made the attempt.

Violent, however, as was this strife of the elements, it scarcely equalled the storm raised in every quarter by the Convention of the Commodore. All those concerned in the downfall of Mehemet Ali thought, after the capture of Acre, that his hour was at hand, and all appeared anxious to have a parting kick at the prostrate old lion, who, until the Commodore took him in hand, had so long kept them *in terrorem* of his teeth and claws!

The Sublime Porte refused to acknowledge such an unauthorized proceeding. Lord Ponsonby was furious, and wrote on the subject an ill-judged and intemperate letter to the Commodore, who gave him his mind pretty freely in reply.* Sir Charles Smith, who had returned from Constantinople with the firman of Commander-in-chief of the Sultan's land forces in Syria, but who had taken so little part in what had been effected during the war—he also and Izzet Pasha raised their voices against the Commodore; and even Sir Robert Stopford, from being at first rather favourably inclined, was carried along with the stream, and joined in the general disapprobation of this “untoward event.”

It is only justice, however, to Lord Ponsonby to insert here the unofficial letter to the Commodore which accompanied his public despatch:—

“Dec. 7, 1840.

“MY DEAR SIR,—Immediately upon receipt of your letter, I applied to the Ottoman Minister for the appoint-

* *Vide* “War in Syria,” vol. ii., pp. 7—10.

ment of your son, Major Napier, of the 46th Regiment, to the rank in the Turkish army you desired he should obtain, and I have the highest gratification in being able to acquaint you that the Minister proposed the appointment to the Sultan, and that His Imperial Majesty was pleased to order that it should be granted,* His Majesty being pleased to express his satisfaction at being able to comply with the wishes of a person of your high merit, &c. The question of giving the sea-ports to the mountaineers is not one to be decided hastily. Your opinion on the subject will assuredly have great weight with those who are to consider it.

"You will receive from me, with this, a public letter, in which I express my entire dissent from your proceeding in the affair of the Convention, and deny your authority to meddle with that matter. I feel great pain in doing this, but I cannot, on account of personal esteem for any man, and admiration for his great qualities, fail to do my duty. I do wish it had fallen to my lot to differ so entirely upon this point from any other man than from yourself. I have the honour to be, my dear sir, yours most faithfully,

"PONSONBY."

The Convention raised an unprecedented commotion everywhere except in England, where it was generally approved; and its effect on the Corps Diplomatique at Vienna is thus amusingly described in a letter from Lord Napier, then an attaché of the British embassy there, and now ambassador at St. Petersburg:—●

"Vienna, Jan. 4, 1841.

"MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—I cannot deny myself the pleasure of writing to congratulate you upon the victories and honours which you have won in Syria. I assure you I am quite proud to bear your name. I shine here in a kind of reflected glory, and enjoy a lofty reputation for ability

* Although the rank of Major-General in the Turkish army was thus granted, his lordship forgot to stipulate that this distinction should be accompanied by the appropriate pay and allowances, large arrears of which must be now due, and are likely to remain so!

and valour because I am your cousin. I cannot, however, disguise from you that the creeping, cautious formalists, the solemn men of business, who tread the beaten track, look upon you as rather a desperate diplomatist, and cannot sufficiently admire at your carrying a negotiation by a *coup de main*. But I think their astonishment is not unmixed with envy. They meant to sit down before the Pasha, like a strong place in the Low Countries, to work up to him by elaborate approaches, and when you scaled his defences at once, they grieved that all their well-laid plans should go for nought. I am most glad to hear that you will be backed up at home in this business. You can't think what a quandary your nimble movements threw them into here. They cried out that you were the most valuable madman—a very useful, but a terrible person, who ought to be handcuffed as soon as his enemy cried out *peccavi*. As I am a diplomatist of only four months old, I have not yet fallen in love with procrastination. I humbly hold that you put the stitch in in time, and may have saved much mischief. Your faithful cousin,

“NAPIER.”

It happened rather awkwardly for the dissatisfied parties, that, at the very time Commodore Napier's Convention was so loudly condemned by them, a communication was received by the British Admiral, containing the decision of the four Powers, dated the 14th of November, 1840, the pith of which was the recommendation to the Sultan, that, “in case Mehemet Ali should submit without delay, and would consent to restore the Ottoman fleet, to withdraw his troops from the whole of Syria, from Adana, Candia, Arabia, and the Holy Cities, His Highness should be pleased not only to reinstate Mehemet Ali in his functions as Pasha of Egypt, but at the same time to grant him the hereditary investiture of the said Pashalic, according to the conditions laid down in the Convention of

July the 15th; it being well understood that this hereditary title should be liable to revocation, if Mehemet Ali, or one of his successors, should infringe the aforesaid conditions." All of which was much to the same purport as the terms entered into by the Commodore. He also about the same time received the appointment of Commodore of the first class, with the broad red pendant, which, though conferred for his services in Syria, was but the precursor of the formal approval of his proceedings at Alexandria. The following gratifying letter from Lord Palmerston also came to hand:—

"F. O., November 14th, 1840.

"MY DEAR SIR,—I cannot let these despatches go without writing two lines to thank you most cordially for your brilliant exploits, which have produced the most important results. I wish you had been allowed to attack Acre; I have no doubt that you would have taken it; but perhaps our instructions upon that subject, received since the date of our last accounts from Syria, may have arrived in time to allow of the attempt being made. The late debates in the committees of the French Chambers, and especially the speech of M. Remusat, a member of Mons. Thiers' government, shew very plainly what the French meant, and that they intended to make Mehemet Ali into an independent sovereign, possessing a considerable naval power, and in connection with, or dependent upon, France. Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON.

"Commodore Napier."

Whilst these matters were still pending, he wrote to Mrs. Napier, as also to his friend, Colonel Hodges, explaining to the latter the considerations that had guided him in his dealings with the Pasha:—

" 'Powerful,' December 10th, 1840—Marmarice.

To Mrs. Napier.

"We had a terrible gale off Alexandria, and had we not

had a good offing, we should all have been lost. We were struck with a heavy sea, which started our channels, and I expected every moment to lose our fore-mast; the main-mast was also in much danger. I expected we should all have been dismasted. The Admiral has not confirmed my Convention, and we are all adrift again. Captain Fanshawe is gone to try and persuade Mehemet Ali to be satisfied without the hereditary title, which he will not accept, and he will probably throw himself again into the arms of France, out of which I extricated him. I hope, however, the Government at home will be more reasonable. Lord Ponsonby has a personal hatred to Mehemet Ali, and will destroy him if he can. He is a fine fellow, and ought not to be run too hard. I suppose we shall remain here for the winter; it is a fine anchorage, but a miserable place. I wish you had come out with Admiral Ommanney, but I by no means like your coming in so uncomfortable a vessel as the 'Pelican' must be at this season of the year. If affairs are definitively settled, the squadron will be reduced, and I shall probably come home, for I do not suppose the promotion will take me in, though I think they ought to stretch a point."

" 'Powerful,' Marmorice Bay, December 14th, 1840.

"MY DEAR HODGES,—I was quite prepared for a commotion amongst the Corps Diplomatique at Constantinople, because, as far as Mehemet Ali is concerned, the hatred entertained against him by Lord Ponsonby is so great, that nothing but his total destruction will content him, which I do think is most impolitic. In the anger against me, you seem quite to have lost sight of one very material fact, viz., that the Convention only bound Mehemet Ali. I agreed to suspend hostilities (which, by the bye, was impracticable, though Lord Ponsonby writes to me that if I fire a few shot he will lose Alexandria), provided he evacuates Syria, and gives up the fleet on being acknowledged. The Admiral and the Porte had the power of confirming this Convention or not, as they pleased, which they have not done, and things remain *in statu quo*. I think Mehemet Ali is very ill treated. Lord Palmerston writes to Lord Ponsonby, evidently disapproving

of his pressing the destruction of Mehemet Ali, and recommending him to be reinstated if he submits.

"I take the opportunity of his dissatisfaction with France, and obtain his submission at once; and the Porte had only to send Walker Bey, with his confirmation, and to take command of the fleet. After Lord Palmerston writes his letter, he hears of more successes, Thiers' ministry falls, he assumes a higher tone, retracts what he has written, and proposes, as I understood, that Mehemet Ali is only to retain Egypt during life. Is Mehemet Ali a man to accept this? I think not. The question remains undecided all winter, and if Thiers comes back, Europe is inevitably plunged into a war, to gratify Lord Ponsonby's hatred against Mehemet Ali.

"I have received a fiery letter from Lord Ponsonby, and have written him an answer which I don't think he will like, but that I care little about. What turn this affair will take in England, I don't know: I did what I thought was advantageous for the country, and even advantageous to the Porte; for I can tell you, unless they conduct themselves very differently in Syria to what they have done—far from getting possession of Egypt, which now seems to be the insane project—they will lose Syria. What view Lord Palmerston will take of my attempt to put an end to this, I don't know, but I feel quite certain I shall be supported by the country, who are not yet quite gone mad about Mehemet Ali, who will yet finish in having the hereditary government of Egypt, and which you wrote to me some time ago would be the case, whether the Porte liked it or not.

"Fanshawe has returned, and is going to Stamboul, but I do not hear that he has taken the unconditional submission of the old gentleman to the Sultan; if he makes it, he is not the man I take him for. I hope to hear from you by every opportunity; and though I suppose the ambassador and his staff are ready to eat me up without salt, I do not see any necessity for your having a slice; but if you must have it, you are entitled to the first cut. Believe me, my dear Hodges, yours very truly,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

Another short extract from Lieutenant Elliot's journal gives an amusing picture of the Commodore. It is rather highly coloured, but its conclusion affords such a true representation of the feeling entertained towards him throughout the service, that his warmest friends will hardly object to its insertion in these pages:—

“*December 11th.*—I was much pleased with the paragraph in the *Kelso Mail* about the Commodore, and shewed it to him. He laughed much, and modestly said it was not all true; but it was, in fact, very much so—the account of the peculiarities of his figure quite so. The idea you must have formed of his stoutness, from G. Morrell saying he was too heavy to ride a steeplechase, must be erroneous, for he is by no means a great weight, perhaps fourteen stone, about my own weight, but stouter and broader built; stoops from a wound in his neck, walks lame from another in his leg, turns out one of his feet, and has a most slouching, slovenly gait, a large round face, with black, bushy eyebrows, a double chin, scraggy, grey, uncurled whiskers and thin hair; wears a superfluity of shirt collar, and small neck-handkerchief, always bedaubed with snuff, which he takes in immense quantities; usually has his trousers far too short, and wears the ugliest pair of old shoes he can find; and altogether takes so little pride in his dress, that I believe you might substitute a green or black coat for his uniform one, without his being a bit the wiser; still he makes all of us conform to strict uniform. This is a correct portrait of him, but, mind, you are not to laugh at him, for I do think he is one of the greatest characters of the day, and many is the person that has come on board just to have a sight of such a rum old fellow. He is by no means a pleasant officer to serve under, but one must forgive much for the honor of being commanded by such a character. His high, honourable principles and gentlemanly feelings are beyond dispute; yet he is snappish and irritable at times; but shines particularly at the head of his own table, which is always well found, and no want of wine.

We hear that Mrs. Napier and her two daughters are coming out in the 'Pelican' brig, just commissioned by his son Charles, which he says is a mad freak, but that she may do as she pleases.

"You know, of course, better than I do, by the newspapers, of Sir Charles Napier's being sent down to Alexandria to see the conditions of his own treaty ratified: that treaty for which some of his enemies would have it that he should be at least hanged, drawn, and quartered for ever attempting to meddle with. What a complete victory he has gained over them! Lord Ponsonby to boot! with whom he had some angry correspondence about it; but he cares not a straw for any superior as long as he conceives he is doing the best for his country—and no one knows better than himself when he is right or wrong. He is a fine fellow, and I will stick up for him against all the world."

On the 17th of December despatches were received at Marmorice Bay, announcing the appointment of Sir Robert Stopford to the governorship of Greenwich Hospital. The same conveyance brought the intimation that the Commodore—now Sir Charles Napier—had been made a Commander of the Bath; and the Emperor of Austria also conferred upon him the high distinction of the order of Maria Theresa. The captains commanding ships at Acre were made Companions of the Bath, and a large promotion went through all classes of officers who had been present at the bombardment.

Next day, the Commodore addressed himself to Lord Minto, not merely to return thanks for the distinction bestowed upon himself, but likewise to urge the claims of his officers, which he never neglected to represent.

"'Powerful,' Marmorice, Dec. 18th, 1840.

"MY LORD,—I am much obliged to your lordship and the Board for the very flattering letter they have written to

Sir Robert Stopford, thanking me for my services, as also for giving me a red pendant, and promoting the officers I recommended for Sidon. Your lordship will observe that the mates at Sidon did not belong to the 'Powerful;' they were all hard at work at D'jounie, expecting to be attacked, and I could not spare my boats; therefore the 'Revenge' and 'Edinburgh' were sent. I suppose some promotion will be made for Acre; if so, if your lordship can do anything for one or two mates who really were thrown out from my being employed on shore, I shall be obliged.

"I am glad to see by the papers that Mehemet Ali is not to be driven into a corner, and the Admiral has allowed him to send two steamboats for the sick and wounded, and 'Carysford' is in Alexandria—so that, after all, my Convention is in progress. I cannot see what possible advantage there can be in sacrificing the remnants of Ibrahim's army when no longer resisting; it would be all very well to destroy them if we intended turning him out of Egypt; and nothing less will content Lord Ponsonby, who, as far as Mehemet Ali is concerned, is certainly inane. His lordship thought proper to write me a most indecorous letter, which I suppose is before the Board, and my answer will be received by the packet, which (whether I was right or wrong in the Convention) I hope the Admiralty will approve. I believe, if Lord Ponsonby advise the Porte to concede nothing to Mehemet Ali, he will be left alone. I have, &c.,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

Justice and humanity always found an advocate in the good "old Commodore," and the well-deserved promotion of the junior officers of his ship occupied his thoughts no less than the safety of the unfortunate Egyptians in their miserable winter retreat from Damascus, harassed as they were on all sides by the Arab tribes of the desert; whilst the Turkish army, under General Jochmus, was concentrating in the plains of Gaza, to give them—as the latter imagined—their *coup de grace*.

The next mail packet was of course anxiously looked for, and the excitement was great when, on the 5th of January, 1841, the "Megara" steamer arrived with despatches from England at Marmorice Bay.

"I was aware," writes Sir Charles Napier, "she must either bring my sentence of acquittal or condemnation; and having been already denounced by the wise men of the East, I felt it was not impossible that their opinion might have influenced the judgment of the ministers of the West, if, unfortunately, their protests had arrived in London before my despatches from Alexandria. I had, however, taken precautions to prevent this, which fortunately succeeded, and they were left to their own calm judgment, which decided in my favour.

"I had a party dining with me that day, when numerous letters, public and private, were put into my hand by the officer of the watch. I laid them on the table, determined not to run the risk of spoiling my dinner by bad news, and not requiring good to give me an appetite. After the inward man had been well fortified, I ventured to open a letter from Lord Minto, which, to my great satisfaction, announced to me that the Government were satisfied with what I had done, with the exception of the guarantee."

The Commodore received also by the "Megara" an official communication from the Board of Admiralty, conveying the approval of Government for having "taken steps to carry into execution the arrangements contemplated by the Treaty of the 15th of July (though without any instructions to that effect, and upon his own responsibility)," and likewise the following letter from his long-trying friend, H.R.H. the Duke of Sussex, who, it will be remembered, had presided at the public meeting held in 1833, to express admiration of Captain Napier's services in Portugal:—

"MY DEAR OLD FRIEND, CHARLEY NAPIER,^{*}—I have this day, as acting Great Master of the most honourable Military Order of the Bath, signed by Her Majesty's commands the order for your being invested a Knight Commander of that Order, as a mark of the Queen's approval of your gallant conduct, and zeal in her service. No duty has ever been performed with greater pleasure on my part, and I am delighted to communicate to you this proof of the Royal favour, accompanied with my sincerest wishes and prayers for your health and happiness. I have followed you with intense interest in all your expeditions, and truly gratified am I in learning not only of your success on every occasion, but likewise that you had come out of the fray with increased honours, and without a scratch. Indeed, the last circumstance was what interested me the most, as, from my long acquaintance, I felt fully certain of the former event. Since then, I perceive you have been employed as a Negotiator, in which character you have done yourself equal credit. The scene must have been a busy one; and although the business has not lasted long, yet it appears to have been pretty sharp work. When we meet, I trust we may talk the business over, with a cigar and some toddy, when no doubt you will have much to tell me, and I shall have much to learn. As soon as the Porte agrees to the condition which you have signed with Mehemet Ali—and of which I can have little doubt, unless some new intrigue is started—you will have little to do; then perhaps you will give me a line, and some description of what has taken place. Should you, in the course of your expedition, be able to pick up a scimitar for me, and a Turkish long pipe, with some Turkish tubes, I will thank you to recollect an old friend.

"Here we are going on much in the same way as when you left us, and Parliament is to meet on the 26th of January; but, from the complexion and nature of men and things, I do not feel much inclined to mix in them. The death of our poor friend, Lord J. Churchill, will, I am sure, have caused you as much concern as it has done to me. He was a fine, open-hearted, excellent fellow, and it is doubly distressing that he

should have dropt off just at a moment when a field was opening for him to distinguish himself.

"I am not well informed of what is passing in China, neither am I acquainted with Admiral Elliott's instructions, so as to form a correct opinion of what is going on; but comparing one thing with another, it strikes me that there is too much talking, while greater activity, and some powder, would settle matters more speedily, as well as satisfactorily. These sort of fellows, who are both proud and ignorant, as they are self-sufficient, ought to be taught a lesson; and that can only be done by giving them a good thrashing in the first instance, and afterwards make them kiss the rod, and feel obliged to us for the lecture we have administered to them. If such a system be not adopted, with their usual cunning they will outwit us, and we shall in the end cut a sorry figure. This is my own private opinion, and which I believe experience will show to be well founded. Another Napier is wanted there, when I think the business would be as speedily settled as in Syria.

"The Duchess of Inverness desires to be most kindly remembered to you; and I remain always, my dear old Charley, affectionately and sincerely yours,

"AUGUSTUS."

"Wimbledon Park, December 17th, 1840.

"I hear Admiral Onmanney has written home from Gibraltar, applying for his recall, in consequence of the death of his brother, the Navy Agent. The Spaniards and Portuguese appear to be very angry with each other about the navigation of the Douro. Is this fomented by their neighbours?"

Admiral Sir Charles Adams—then one of the Board—also wrote in a very friendly tone:—

"Admiralty, 4th December, 1840.

"MY DEAR SIR,—I take the opportunity of the mail *via* Marseilles to repeat to you my sincere congratulations on the brilliant services performed by you on the coast of Syria being crowned by the fall of so important a place as Acre, by the attack of the squadron. I conclude it will put an end

to Mehemet Ali's hopes, and that he will readily accept the terms to be offered to him.

"I am most happy also to express to you the pleasure I feel at your receiving the Commandership of the Bath.

"I shall hope to hear from you, whether you will wish that Captain Maunsell should remain as Captain of the 'Powerful,' or whether Captain Wilkinson, or some other officer, shall be sent to command her? Very faithfully yours,

"CHARLES ADAM."

In a letter from Lady Napier to her husband, dated December 13th, 1840, we find that she had also had the gratification of receiving numerous letters of congratulation on the occasion of Sir Charles Napier being invested with the Commandership of the Bath; an honour he had well earned by the great services which had so recently been performed by him during the Syrian campaign, and also for the success of his diplomatic negotiations with Mehemet Ali, in the settlement of the Eastern question. Lady Napier, in conclusion, writes, with reference to her son, Captain Charles Elers Napier:—"The Duke of Sussex sent a message by Captain Gore to Charles, to say how happy he should be to see him in town, and that he had written to you to wish you joy of all your great achievements."

On the 6th of January, 1841—in consequence of orders received by the Admiral from England, the day before—Sir Charles Napier was instructed to proceed to Alexandria, for the purpose of carrying out his Convention, more particularly the terms that related to the restoration of the Turkish fleet, and the evacuation of Syria. He arrived on the 8th of January, when he was well received by Mehemet Ali; they shortly be-

came great friends, and he experienced every civility and attention from the Pasha. Whilst the Turkish fleet was preparing for sea, the Commodore took the opportunity of visiting everything worth seeing at Alexandria, informing himself minutely of the trade, agricultural produce, and commercial resources of Egypt; relative to which he obtained a promise from Mehemet Ali that the commercial treaty concluded with England, in August, 1839, should be immediately carried into effect, which had hitherto, it appears, been left in abeyance. In short, his mind seemed capable of mastering with equal facility all that came within its reach. Sir Charles Napier had long been unsurpassed in his own profession; he had also proved himself a good General and a successful Diplomatist, and was now—apparently with the same happy results—“trying his hand” at commercial and financial affairs; for the management of which he gave the arbitrary Pasha much good and salutary advice. It is not, however, recorded whether this was ever followed or not.

Some part of the Commodore's correspondence, during his stay at Alexandria, is subjoined, as it enters into various details which may be read with some interest. He usually resided in the town, but he dated his letters from the “Carysford,” which he considered as head-quarters, and where his broad pendant was flying at the time :—

“‘Carysford,’ Alexandria, January 11th, 1841.

“To William Grant, Esq., Portsmouth.

“MY DEAR GRANT,—I have been here, carrying out my Convention, these last ten days; the Pasha has behaved most nobly, and complied with all my demands. He puts up his crop of cotton for sale on the 20th of next month, and the

first of each succeeding month, without fixing the price. The merchants represented to me that if they imported money he might put the price up too high, and either force them to buy at a loss, or re-export their coin, and requested it might be put up at public sale, or the price fixed; he immediately complied with the latter request, and fixed the price at 13 dollars the kintar. He has also promised me to carry out the commercial convention of 1838, to abolish all monopolies, and do all he can to ameliorate the condition of the people. He says he is most anxious to cultivate the good-will of England, and has always tried to do it, without success; we must be sad blunderers if we do not see that our interest is identified with his. I have recommended him to give the liberty of the press, and then he will hear the truth; and if they went too far, he had only to serve the editors in the same way the King of Prussia did Voltaire. The old gentleman was much tickled at this. He has done wonders in this country, and if he had fortunately confined himself to Egypt, this would have been a splendid town, and I have no doubt will be so in ten years. Much money is made here; the merchants told me they get sometimes 18 per cent. for their money, and good security. Very tempting, you will say. You had better bring your bank out here, and teach them how to pay the tradesmen with paper. I can fancy an Egyptian butcher's face if you gave him a bit of dirty paper, with some scribbling on it, and told him it was worth five of their gold pieces, which are equal to five pounds in his coinage. I am going to Cairo, the Pasha having lent me his steamer; and yesterday, when the 'Oriental' arrived, he gave me liberty to take the passengers up to Cairo. I wonder how the Admiralty would look if a parcel of Egyptians arrived at Portsmouth, and asked for a steamer to take them to London.

"The Turkish fleet are all ready for sea, and are going out as fast as the wind and weather will allow them; the army is on its march from Syria, and if not harassed by us (which they are *positively* ordered not to be), they ought to have now arrived at Gaza; but there are a host of adventurers with the Turks, who will get up a fight if they can—and if they do, I hope they will be well licked. I hope Edward, who is now a

Major-General in the Turkish service, will have nothing to do with it, but I will not trust him.

"If things are certainly quiet in France, I shall ask leave to come home, and go to Merchiston, and plant cabbages for the rest of my life; playing the third fiddle here, in time of peace, is no go for me. I beg you will remember me most kindly to all my friends in Portsmouth. I think I could get ——— a good berth here from the Pasha; he would be a good hand in teaching him how to divide Egypt into boroughs, and carry the elections. The old boy says, as the greater part of Egypt belongs to him, a representative government would suit very well, as he has only to follow the Tory plan, and make all his government vote for him.

"*January 22nd.*—The weather has been fine, and all the fleet are gone. This finishes a question that has well nigh set Europe in a blaze. Begun by me on the 10th of September, at D'jounie—and finished by me on the 22nd of January, at Alexandria."

The war was now concluded, but Commodore Napier had no desire to rest on his laurels while there was a chance of active service elsewhere. This spirit he had often evinced before, and it now again prompted him to address the following brief note to Lord Minto:—

"Jan. 23, 1841.

"Ibrahim Pasha has arrived at Gaza, and Souleyman at Suez. The sick, the women and children, are the only Egyptians now in Syria.

"Lord Jocelyn tells me Admiral Elliott is ill, and has applied to come home. If *active* war is to go on with China, and no war with France, I am ready to go there, should my services be wanted."

Things were going on smoothly at Alexandria; and anticipating no further difficulty in Syria, the Commodore resolved on a trip to Cairo, "to gain," he says, "as much information as I could relative to the interior of

the country," of which he gives a most graphic account in his "History of the War in Syria." Mehemet Ali immediately placed a steamer at his disposal, and, during his stay at Cairo, courteously assigned to him, for a residence, one of his palaces in the neighbourhood. He was a great admirer of the old Pasha, and of the wonderful improvements the latter had accomplished; but could not refrain from expressing abhorrence at the cruel measures through which those improvements had been carried into effect, and at the tyranny and oppression under which this beautiful and fertile region still groaned in hopeless misery. Egypt, from the time of the Pharaohs, has ever been rightly designated as the "land of bondage"—an unenviable distinction, which it may justly claim to the present day!

After a pleasant voyage up the Nile, Sir Charles Napier, and the officers who accompanied him, arrived at Cairo, "where," he writes, "during the short period of our stay, time did not hang heavily on our hands. The crowded and covered bāzaars, the mosques, the tombs of the Caliphs and of the Mamelukes, together with the numerous manufactories and institutions established by the Pasha, successively occupied much of our time, and fully engaged our attention."

After describing his visit to the Pyramids, he thus continues in his "History of the Syrian War":—

"On my return to Cairo, I learned by telegraph that intelligence of importance had arrived at Alexandria, which required my immediate presence; this put an end to all the projects we had formed of exploring further this interesting country. Next morning we bade adieu to Cairo and its wonders, and were soon steaming down the broad Nile. Half-way down the river, I met Colonel E. Napier, with a letter

from Captain Stewart, who had come to Gaza, to prevent, if possible, a collision between the Turks and Egyptians."

The despatch here alluded to—of which I was the bearer—after stating the difficulty that the British officers at Gaza had experienced in preventing the Turks from attacking the Egyptians, demanded instructions relative to the Syrian soldiers composing part of the army of Ibrahim Pasha, and whom the latter wished to take with him to Egypt. This desire was opposed by the Turks—hence the increased danger of a collision between the two armies; and, being then at Gaza, I volunteered to proceed to Alexandria in quest of the Commodore, who was now considered as the "peace-maker-general" of the East. On arriving at Alexandria, and ascertaining that Sir Charles Napier was absent, I had an interview with Mehemet Ali, who instantly gave me every facility for going to Cairo, telegraphing at the same time the purport of the intelligence he had received; and on my way to that place, I met the Commodore in the manner he has described. He hastened to Alexandria, and instantly conferred with Mehemet Ali on the subject, who expressed great unwillingness to leave the Syrians behind, stating that doing so would completely disorganise Ibrahim Pasha's army. There being no way of obliging Ibrahim Pasha to take this step, except by force—and as the Turks were very likely to be worsted in the attempt—the Commodore wrote to Captain Stewart, to General Jochmus, and Colonel Bridgeman (the senior British military officer), enclosing copies of the Convention; he protested, at the same time, against any attack being made by the Turks on the Egyptian force,

and in his instructions to Captain Stewart he thus concludes :—

“The Syrian troops are not to be embarked against their own free will; but if you have any suspicion that General Jochmus will use them against the Egyptians, they had better be disarmed, or even be allowed to go into Egypt—in fact, do anything to avoid a collision.”

This was all that could be done in the emergency: a collision was avoided, but thousands of the unhappy Syrians were taken, by way of the desert, into Egypt. The kind-hearted Commodore did not, however, forget these unfortunate people; he represented their case to the British Government, and in consequence I was subsequently despatched on a mission to Mehemet Ali, in order to effect their liberation, and succeeded in taking many thousands of them back to Beyrout.

About this time the Commodore received a letter from Lord Palmerston, of which the following are extracts :—

“Foreign Office, Jan. 12, 1841.

“MY DEAR SIR,—I have received your letter of the 12th December. After the great and important services which you have performed for us in Syria, it would require a very strong case indeed to create in us dissatisfaction towards you; and certainly no such feeling was excited here by your Convention with Mehemet Ali; on the contrary, we were glad you had taken the step, because it had produced an act of submission on the part of Mehemet Ali, which was, at all events, something gained.

“Thanks to your victories, the power of Mehemet is broken; and in future the Porte will be strong enough to keep him in proper subjection.

“My dear sir, yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

The following letters may be said to close the

narrative of Sir Charles Napier's proceedings in Egypt:—

To Lady Napier.

“Alexandria, ‘Stromboli,’ Feb. 6, 1841.

“Everything is now quite settled here. The Egyptian army are rapidly evacuating Syria, and in a few days they will all be in Egypt, which sets the Eastern question at rest. Lord Ponsonby and the whole *corps diplomatique* are quite furious at my having taken the business out of their hands; but as everything has been approved of at home, it is of very little consequence to me what they think.

“I went to Cairo the other day, and to the Pyramids—they are quite wonderful. I went into the interior of one of them, and about a third way up the outside, but it was tiresome work to go to the top; there is no great difficulty in it, as it is like going up stairs, though the steps are rather steep. It is quite wonderful the improvements Mehemet Ali is making in Egypt; but he pays more attention to building palaces, and other public works, than to ameliorating the condition of the poor. I have had much conversation with him on these points, but it is difficult to make him understand that freeing trade and protecting property is the best way of enriching the treasury. All he does is by force, and he says without that the Arabs will not work—and I daresay there is some truth in it. The Nile has now returned within its usual banks. The whole country, when it rises, is laid under water; the villages, composed of mud-huts, stand a little higher, and the inhabitants go about in boats. Their dwellings are very miserable, but the people appear happy enough. Alexandria promises to be a very fine town, and it is a most delightful winter residence. The weather has been like what we have in England in May. In summer, I am told, it is very hot and damp at Alexandria, but better in Cairo; but as it is inclosed by mountains of sand, when the wind blows, it is very disagreeable. After getting a little way up the Nile, Egypt is not above fifteen miles wide. Edward joined me from Syria a few days ago. He is gone up to Cairo. He brought me despatches from Syria, and meeting me as I was coming down the river, which he was going up, he returned with me here, staid a few days, and is now gone back. I shall remain here till the

17th, the day the 'Oriental' arrives, and, if I have no orders to the contrary, will join the 'Powerful' in Marmorice Bay, and there wait for orders to go either to China or home, for there is no great amusement in remaining in the Mediterranean in peace. The Admiral and part of the squadron are gone to Malta. Ommanney remains at Marimorice with the new ships. I believe I am to go to the Dardanelles with the Turkish ships, but it is only report. There is also another rumour, that I am to have the Lisbon command—but it is likewise only report. I see the Emperor of Russia has given me the third class of the order of St. George.

* * * * *

"Mehemet Ali gave me a grand dinner the other day, and I reviewed the troops yesterday. I hope this will find you all well. You will hear from Sir William Parker what is to become of me."

"Stromboli,' Alexandria, Feb. 6th, 1841.

"MY DEAR HODGES,—I am glad you are satisfied that all is over here, and it is to be regretted that Lord Ponsonby is not also satisfied. I suspect he has been urging — and — to do all they can against Ibrahim, for they have had all the desire to stir up the Turks to attack him; and, indeed, Jochmus did make a movement on Gaza, but got alarmed and retired. Had I been there I should have sent Mr. — to Constantinople *sans cérémonie*, and perhaps the other. I have written in the strongest terms to Jochmus; and by the last accounts I have from Stewart, Ibrahim had arrived on the 31st ult., and immediately commenced his retreat; and I have allowed vessels to go for his troops.

"I cannot think Lord Ponsonby's policy good: setting the Egyptians and Turks at loggerheads may be the policy of the Emperor of Russia to weaken them both, but it is neither the policy of the Porte nor of England.

"He ought to be strong, to assist the Porte, and we ought to protect him—and I trust we shall; and were I in his place I would not cede another point. As we cannot hope to possess Egypt, we ought to make him our vassal. He has promised me, and I have it in writing from Boghos Bey, that he will carry out the commercial convention of August, 1838,

and do all he can to ameliorate the condition of the people ; and I hope, before I leave this, to induce him to abolish the slave-trade. I shall not go till after the arrival of the 'Liverpool.' I have offered to go to China, as Elliott has applied to come home, and if I do not go there I shall return to England. I do not anticipate war at present ; if it comes, I shall always have a broad pendant, and can hoist it in any ship. There is a report that I am to go to Lisbon. I should not dislike that for a few months. If you leave Constantinople, take Marmorice on your way. I hear the 'Powerful' is to escort the Turkish fleet to the Dardanelles. If so, I shall probably see the Great Mogul, and I hope we shall be very good friends.

"Larking is getting better slowly. He talks of going home in the 'Liverpool,' if not better. He is a very good fellow. I am very comfortable in your house, and never saw such a climate ; all the rich in England would pass the winter here if they knew it. I have been to Cairo, and admired the works of this great Oriental character ; but I wish he would build fewer palaces, and more cottages for the poor people, and make their lot a little better than that of your countrymen. I do not like Cairo near so well as Alexandria. The old gentleman gave me a dinner the other day—well served, and good claret, a bottle and a half of which I tucked under my belt without any difficulty. Yesterday he turned out a battalion of infantry and a regiment of cavalry, with a brigade of guns. They were very respectable, particularly the cavalry and artillery. Had we landed here, they would have beaten all the Turkish army. He has about 5,000 cavalry here, and when all his troops are collected he will laugh at Turkey ; therefore, if they are wise, they will let him alone. I am quite certain he will not touch them. He is now too old, and will cultivate the arts of peace."

Whilst Sir Charles Napier waited at Alexandria, until the entire evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians should have been carried into effect, the firman arrived from the Porte, confirming Mehemet Ali in the government of Egypt ; but with such restrictions, and

the question of the hereditary succession so hampered with impracticable conditions, that the old Pasha rejected it. Sir Charles Napier gives these and other particulars in the following letter to Lord Minto:—

“ ‘Stromboli,’ Alexandria, Feb. 23, 1841.

“MY LORD,—A Turkish Commissioner arrived here on the 20th, with the firman conferring on the Pasha the hereditary Pashalic, but with such hard conditions, that the Pasha, in a civil way, has refused to accept two of them. The Porte, at his death, wish to appoint whichever of his sons or grandsons they think proper. Such an arrangement, your lordship will at once see, would cause discord, if not civil war, in the country, and I do not at all wonder at his objecting to them. Sir Robert Stopford will forward to the Admiralty my public letter on the subject, with the translation of the firman. •

“Lieutenant Loring has returned from Gaza, having seen the evacuation of Syria completed; he has performed the duty much to my satisfaction, and I beg to recommend him to your lordship’s consideration. There has been much misery and great loss of life in the retreat, which might have been avoided had the Convention been carried into execution at first. The Emirs have arrived at Cairo, and on their arrival here will be sent to Beyrout. Our influence here at present is great, and we ought not to neglect it. I have dined three times with the Pasha, and he took me on board the flag-ship to see her exercise; it is quite astonishing to what perfection he has brought his fleet—they cleared for quarters in two minutes. I think of returning to Marmorice Bay in a few days, where the ‘Powerful’ is, and I shall then be ready for any order I may receive. The Consuls are not yet arrived, but I have recommended Captain Lyons to keep a good look-out on the Pasha, and keep him out of the hands of the French Consul, who is very low at present. I have, &c.

“CHARLES NAPIER.

“Feb. 24th.—I saw the Pasha last night; he has communicated his final answer to the Commissioner, who remains,

but has sent the steamer to Constantinople. I do hope they will be reasonable; for if ever a plan was formed to throw discord and confusion into a thriving country, the Porte have hit upon it. I have written on the subject to Colonel Hodges; he will no doubt show my letter to Lord Ponsonby. There are many Syrians come into Egypt with the Egyptian army. I have demanded their immediate release, as was agreed, but the Pasha is at present so irritated, that he would not comply until he heard from Constantinople. I regret this, because it will only furnish weapons against him; but I cannot at all wonder at it, for he has certainly been ill treated.—C. N.

“P.S.—I have this moment received a letter from Boghos Bey, promising to send back the Syrians.—C. N.”

“‘Stromboli,’ Alexandria,

“Feb. 24, 1841.

To Lady Napier.

“The last packet brought me no letters of any description, I therefore conclude they are at Marmorice Bay. I am turned quite a diplomatist, and am consulted by the Pasha on everything. He wants to make me some great present, but I have given them to understand that I can receive nothing—it would appear like bribery. The firman granting him the hereditary Pashalic is arrived, but hampered with such conditions that he has refused to comply with them. By the first condition the Porte claim the right of appointing any one of his family they please, which you can easily see would cause discord amongst them, if not civil war. Another article forbids him to appoint any officer above a captain, which would disorganise all the army; that he has also refused. I don’t know whether I have done right or not, but hitherto I have been very successful. It is quite ridiculous to talk of an hereditary Pasha if the Sultan is to choose whom he pleases of his family, and appoint him.

“Syria is now entirely evacuated, and many unfortunate creatures have lost their lives in the retreat—men, women, and children, and for which those who rejected the treaty have to answer. Edward is just arrived from Cairo; he will go back to Syria the first opportunity. He saw a great deal of Souleyman Pasha, who was extremely kind to him, and has a

great opinion of me. I am very tired of this place now, and shall be glad to go back to the 'Powerful,' which is still at Marmorice. You will know by this time whether I am to go to China or to England. Admiral Elliott has resigned the command, and is gone home. Sir Colin Campbell passed through here the other day, on his way to Ceylon. The Pasha gave him his steamboat to go to Cairo, and he took me on board the Admiral's ship, and showed me all her exercises; it is wonderful to what perfection he has brought them. He wants me to be his Admiral, but that won't answer; if I were thirty years younger I should like it very well, but now I would sooner be looking after the sheep at Merchiston."

Up to this period Mehemet Ali and the Commodore had been excellent friends, but a coolness now arose, owing to the non-fulfilment by the wily Pasha of his promise to send back all the Syrian soldiers to their own country. Allowance must, however, in this instance be made, if he did not religiously keep his word, considering the example of bad faith set by the Porte, in the unworthy endeavour to defraud him of the government of Egypt. The four Powers would not, however, countenance such an act, and Mehemet Ali was eventually confirmed, without any quibbles, in the *hereditary* Pashalic. Thus, with the exception of the guarantee, Commodore Napier's Convention was completely carried out.

CHAPTER V.

RETURN TO ENGLAND, APRIL, 1841—IN PARLIAMENT,
1841-1846.

SEEING that he could be of no further use at Alexandria, Sir Charles Napier left Egypt on the 1st of March, and shortly afterwards rejoined the "Powerful," at Marmorice Bay, where he found orders to proceed to Malta, and many letters awaiting him—amongst others, the following one from his friend, Lord Lyndoch, then in extreme old age, and who had passed the winter at Malta, on account of his health :—

"Malta, Sunday, February 4th.

"MY DEAR COMMODORE,—I have very anxiously looked for an opportunity of thanking you for your kind letter received some time ago. You may believe that I took great interest in following, as closely as I could, your glorious and most successful career in Syria ; but I trust you will give it to the public in a connected history, as from the detached extracts in which the details appeared in the public papers, it was not easy to trace on a map the rapid progress of events that seemed to be accomplished without adequate means. You certainly showed an intuitive knowledge of the art of war ashore, and as if you had had many opportunities of practising it on the most approved principles ; for mountain warfare is the

most hazardous of all, and what is least understood by the best generals. Your judgment and decision were most conspicuous in the attack of Ibrahim's almost impregnable position. I most sincerely and heartily congratulate you on the achievement; and I am very happy to find that you were employed at the conclusion, as it showed a proper feeling of your merit on the part of the Admiral.

"I learnt with sincere concern of the death of my excellent friend, Michell, whom I had the good fortune to have had under my command on various occasions in the Peninsula, and afterwards in Holland and Belgium. He never spared himself in any way, and his constitution must have suffered from the severity of his wounds. I had written to him some time before we heard anything of his illness. Adieu! I hope you will come here to make some stay, before I leave Malta, which I shall not do till the end of April, as I am a great sufferer from chronic rheumatism. Ever most faithfully yours,
"LYNDOKH."

"P.S.—I suppose Syria is pretty well swept of all the best Arab horses, otherwise I should like you to try to find a low but strong horse, of the best blood, with good action, and good temper."

This letter, written by the venerable old soldier with the tremulous hand of age (Lord Lyndoch was upwards of eighty at the time), caused much gratification to the Commodore, feeling assured, as he did, that it emanated from the heart; and the almost unintelligibly written letter has been carefully preserved, as a valuable relic of a sincere friend.

Having obtained leave of absence for a month, for the purpose of proceeding to England on private affairs, the Commodore hauled down his broad pendant on the 31st of March, took a passage in the "Oriental," steamer, and arrived at Falmouth on the 11th of April, from whence he writes home :—

"To Lady Napier.

" 'Oriental,' Falmouth, April 11th, 1841.

"We are this moment arrived here, and they will not let me land. We sail to-morrow for Liverpool, to ride out our quarantine; how long it will be, I know not. I have twenty-eight days leave of absence; write to me to Liverpool immediately, and let me know how you all are. I hope 'Pelican' has not sailed, and that my dear Fanny is well. God bless you all!"

His next letter announced that he had arrived in Liverpool, and also the unpleasant circumstance of being in quarantine:—

"To Lady Napier.

"Liverpool, April 14th, 1841.

"Here I am, my dearest Eliza, safely arrived at Liverpool, and in quarantine for four or five days: but it is not yet decided, nor shall we know till we are released. I saw the *Naval and Military Gazette*, and I am glad to find 'Pelican' is still at Spithead, and I suppose will remain there for the present. I hope I shall have good accounts of Fanny; I expect a letter this evening. I have sent you one, and Georgie one from Edward. I left him at Alexandria, but he is now returned to Beyrout; he went there with the Emirs and Skeikhs whom I got released. He was in high health and spirits. I applied for an extension of his leave, and I hope to get it when I see Macdonald. I am glad to find the papers are on my side with respect to Mehemet Ali.

"I have twenty-eight days leave of absence, but my future movements will depend upon how things turn out in America; if we have war, I shall probably have the command of a steam squadron, and the 'Powerful' will in all probability be ordered to America. As soon as we are out of quarantine, I will let you know what day you may expect me. I long to see you all, but I shall arrive too soon for the green fields and the trees, which are not yet, I should think, beginning to bud. Sir William Parker, I see, goes to India: I offered to go, but as the China business is settled, I am glad I did not. God bless you all! I forgot to say that I have received decorations from Russia, Austria, and Prussia—all humbug!"

The Duke of Sussex was amongst the first to congratulate him on his return to England, and wrote thus:—

“Wimbledon Park, April 14, 1841.

“DEAR CHARLEY,—The papers mention your arrival at Falmouth, and as I think it likely you will call upon me, I write these lines to say that I am at Wimbledon Park for a week, to recruit myself, after a severe attack of the influenza, which has confined me to my bed for sixteen days. I have mentioned the circumstance to the Duke and Duchess of Somerset, at whose mansion I am residing, and who have desired me to say how happy they would be to receive you any day—the first that you may like to come out and dine with us will be most welcome, in particular to myself and to the noble Duke and Duchess: there will be a bed likewise at your disposal. We dine at a quarter past seven, and the distance from London is somewhere about eight miles. So I hope we shall see you. I return to Kensington next Tuesday. The Duchess of Inverness desires her best regards, and I remain, dear Charley, yours very sincerely,

“AUGUSTUS.”

The following letters to Lady Napier afford additional proofs—if any were wanted—of the strength of his home attachments:—

“Liverpool, April 16, 1841.

“I received your welcome letter this morning, and I am almost glad you did not start for Liverpool, it would have been so uncomfortable; and you would have found us in quarantine, and no comfortable place on board. Yesterday the Mayor and Corporation came alongside, with an address congratulating me on my arrival, and brought an invitation to dine at the Town Hall, when we are released, which we hope will be Sunday—in fact, they are going to make a great deal of me; but nevertheless I shall be more delighted to return home than at all the welcome I shall get at Liverpool or anywhere else. The welcome of the villagers of Horndean will be far more pleasant than anything I may find here. I shall leave this by the night train immediately after dinner.

I shall be obliged to stay a day or two in London: a trip there will be a change to you all, and do my dear Fanny much good.

“Whether I return to the Mediterranean or not, will depend entirely upon what turn affairs take in America and France. The affairs of the East are still unsettled.”

“‘Oriental,’ Liverpool, April 18, 1841.

“I have this moment received your letter of the 15th, and am delighted to hear such good accounts of Fanny—I wrote to her yesterday. We go on shore to-morrow, and I dine with the inhabitants—a grand dinner—and I shall start by the first train, and hope to be in London on Tuesday in time to write to you. All the officers, both naval and military, who came home in the packet, are invited to dinner. I hear there is a great deal of excitement in the town, so that I shall be shown about like a wild beast. I wish it were over, I am getting too old for these fooleries; but they must be attended to—such is the way of the world. It will be a nine days’ wonder, and I shall be then thought no more of, either by the Government or anybody else. It, however, is pleasing to know that what little a man has done is appreciated by his countrymen; and I assure you I feel a great deal prouder of my diplomacy than of my feats of arms, which, after all, were nothing to be compared to what I did in Portugal; but in this case all parties are on my side—in the other, only the Liberal party, and the Ministers were afraid to take any notice of me. I shall now hope to have Charley posted, and get Edward an ‘unattached.’ I wrote some time ago about it, and I think Government ought to do it.”

“Liverpool, April 19, 1841.

“I send you two newspapers. No words of mine can tell the reception I have met with here, or my sorrow that you all were not with me; I had not the least idea that I should have been so fêted. The dinner was given in the amphitheatre, the boxes crowded with ladies; there were 650 who sat down to dinner. My speech is well reported in the *Liverpool Times*. The Mayor of Manchester came over here yesterday, and fairly forced me to accept a public dinner at Manchester to-morrow—there was no possibility of refusing it.

I shall leave Manchester at three in the morning of Thursday, and be in town by twelve o'clock. I have received a letter from London, informing me that a public meeting is to be called in Marylebone, to invite me to stand, as Lord Teignmouth is to vacate his seat on the 26th. If returned, I shall be at the very height of my ambition. It delights me to hear Fanny is so much better. I am inundated with letters every day, visits, addresses, and the devil knows what besides."

"Stevens' Hotel, April 24, 1841.

"I was so much occupied all day yesterday that I had only time to write you a short note from Sir William Parker's room. I received your letter dated Sunday, and another Thursday. I observe the Tories are doing all they can to set the Navy against me. I came to Stevens' Hotel, in Bond Street. I have not taken a house, because I wish to see you first. It is very difficult to get one for a short time, and I do not know what is to become of me. I shall, of course, write for an extension of leave, to give me time to consider what I am to do. — was not particularly civil, but Lord Palmerston was everything I could wish. I was with the Duke of Sussex last night till twelve, and was received by him more than kindly. I was told there, by an influential member of Parliament, that I was to be offered a seat at the Admiralty—I cannot believe it, but we shall see. . . . I have seen Lord Hill, Macdonald, and Fitzroy Somerset. I find Edward's name is quite up at the Horse Guards, and Lord Hill, without my asking, said he should take care of him; I think that most kind—but the soldiers are always kind to me.

"The Manchester dinner went off well; I will bring the account with me—I have not got it yet. I have only received one letter from Charley and Georgy yesterday, and he says nothing about having written two—I have answered them to day. I am most anxious to get home. I am invited to dine with the Shipwreck Society on the 5th of May; the Club are also to give me a dinner."

That the Board of Admiralty had no particular desire to see Sir Charles Napier in Parliament, is

sufficiently evident from the following brief correspondence, which ensued shortly after his arrival in town :—

“Stevens’ Hotel, Sunday, April 26, 1841.

“To Earl Minto.

“MY LORD,—As my leave expires on the 28th, I shall be much obliged to your lordship if you could inform me what prolongation of leave I am likely to obtain if I write to the Admiralty. I have a good deal to do of my own, and I have been asked if I am disposed to stand for Marylebone or Falmouth, and it takes time to make inquiries before pledging one’s self.

“I have the honour to remain, your lordship’s obedient servant,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

He received in reply the following note :—

“Admiralty, April 26, 1841.

“SIR,—If you can state any extremely urgent private business imperatively requiring your longer presence in England, I presume the Board might be induced to grant a short extension of your leave. But I do not think we should be justified in retaining an officer on full pay, on the ground of any political views that may be open to him.

“Believe me, yours faithfully,

“MINTO.

“Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B.”

This answer was not of a nature to please its recipient, who applied for, and was placed on half-pay in the month of June, 1841.

It would be superfluous to make any comment on the actions performed by Commodore Sir Charles Napier during the Syrian campaign—the facts speak sufficiently for themselves, and posterity will judge and decide whether he was adequately rewarded or not for the services he then performed. True, he received honorary decorations from the sovereigns of the three Powers who had united with England

supporting and maintaining the "integrity" of the Ottoman empire, which Sir Charles Napier, by his combined gallantry and wisdom, so materially assisted to effect; but—with the exception of a "sword of honour," and the Turkish "nishan," or decoration—no further mark of approval did he ever receive from the Porte, whose soldiers he had led to victory against the redoubted Ibrahim Pasha, whom they had hitherto never encountered without signal defeat. All thanks or acknowledgment of any kind, for the great services he had performed, were unjustly withheld from the man who had done so much for Abdul Medjid, but who had refused to sanction an act of injustice which Abdul Medjid's ministers and advisers urged him to commit. On these evil counsellors must, however, rest all the blame, for the Sultan was then a mere youth, and could have entertained no opinion of his own.

Thus was Sir Charles Napier rewarded by the Ottoman Porte; but ere censuring too harshly this ingratitude and remissness, let us turn our eyes towards home. From the documents produced, it will be seen how highly his conduct had been approved of, and appreciated by, the authorities of Downing-street and Whitehall. The greatest and noblest in the land, even—as has been shown—Royalty itself, applauded his brilliant deeds; but what recompense did they obtain?

The reply is easy: "Nothing at all." Because the Commandership of the Bath—which could not possibly be withheld—he had long previously well earned. • But although Sir Charles Napier was not indebted to our

Government for any distinction in return for what he had done, he felt himself amply repaid by the approbation and applause of his countrymen, and of the British nation at large. Public dinners were given to him; large meetings were held; addresses were tendered; he was presented with the freedom of the city of London, and invited to stand as member for Marylebone. All this was gratifying in the extreme; and it must be observed that, whilst receiving honours himself, he never forgot what was due to his brave companions-in-arms: to those who had assisted in raising him to such a pinnacle of fame; and in concluding his "History of the Syrian War," he thus expresses to them what he felt:—

"I cannot close this work without returning my best thanks to all the officers and men who served in the squadron that Sir Robert Stopford did me the honour of putting under my command. The very laborious services they performed in D'jounie Bay are above all praise. This was no question of sending a lieutenant and a working party on shore—the whole of the ships' companies were constantly employed, headed by their captains. Captain Reynolds was my second in the landing at D'jounie, and continued his unremitted exertions till he was sent off Alexandria. Captain Berkeley was my second in the attack at Sidon, and both of us regretted that I could not employ him in the assault on shore; but it was absolutely necessary that he should remain on board the 'Thunderer,' to regulate the firing as we advanced, and to cover our retreat if necessary. Nor am I less obliged to Captain Maunsell, of the 'Rodney,' who was my ambassador to Mehemet Ali, and who, with great decision, landed at once at the palace, and opened the negotiations. Indeed, all the officers, both of the navy and marines, as well as Selim Pasha, General Jochmus, Omer Bey, and the whole of the Turkish officers, did their duty to my entire satisfaction, and

I should be but too proud to command such a force on another occasion. The merits of Admiral Walker are too well known to make it necessary for me to say one word in his praise.

“I must also take this opportunity of thanking the Commander-in-chief for having placed the allied force under my direction, when the ill-health of Sir Charles Smith obliged him to proceed to Constantinople.”

Sir Charles Napier, having now attained the object for which—as we have seen—he had so often expressed the wish, might have enjoyed the retirement of Merchiston during the rest of his life. Such was not, however, to be his fate ; for, having successfully trodden the rugged path of war, both by sea and land, and obtained, by straightforward dealing—a rather unusual course in diplomacy—the object in view : namely, the pacification of the East, he now plunged into the arena of politics, and became the representative of the important Metropolitan borough of Marylebone.

A seat in Parliament had always been the height of his ambition, as the means of forwarding both the interests of the Naval profession, and of the country at large. His political sentiments remained the same as they were when he first presented himself, in 1832, as a candidate for Portsmouth. He took his seat as an independent member, tied down to no party, but determined to take a line of his own : to advocate what he considered right, to oppose what he considered wrong—an extremely difficult political course to pursue, but one which Sir Charles Napier never deviated from, during the whole of his Parliamentary career. It is foreign to my purpose to follow

him closely in this new position, and the limits of my work will only admit of occasional reference to his speeches and the motions he brought before the House ; but the account of his initiation into the mysteries of St. Stephens is best told in his own words :—

"To Lady Napier.

"London, August 19th, 1841.

"Well, my dearest Eliza, Sir Charles Napier walked into the House of Commons, and took his seat. Shortly after, the Usher of the Black Rod marched in, and summoned us to the House of Peers ; we then went, and after opening the Parliament, we came back, and unanimously chose Lefevre as Speaker. Lord Worsley proposed, and Edward Butler seconded it. Peel spoke in his favour, and so did Russell. We then adjourned ; and the swearing-in begins to-morrow. The Queen's speech comes off on Tuesday, the debate will last till Saturday, the ministers will resign on Monday, we shall then be adjourned for a fortnight, and I shall come home. When we meet, the ministers will take their places. Money will be voted, the Poor Law Bill continued, and we shall not meet again till February. I believe Lord Minto is going to make Charles, when his time is up ; and Lord Palmerston has written to the Horse Guards, to give Edward his Brevet Lieutenant-Colonelcy, which I believe will be done. So you see I have not been idle. Remember me to Fanny, and believe me, your own

"NAPIER."

In another letter to Lady Napier he says that he has "seriously begun with his History of the Syrian War, and shall be occupied with it all day, and all night with the House of Commons." The account of his *début* there, and of his maiden speech, is too characteristic and amusing to be omitted:—

"278, Regent Street, Aug. 25, 1841.

"I have made my maiden speech, not either so good or so long as I wished, but still it was very well received. I had it all prepared in my mind, but when I got up, I forgot the

second part of it, and was, as you may suppose, in a funk, and I passed over to the second sentence, which threw out the best part of it; and the thread gone, I was discouraged, and left out a great part I intended to say; but still it went off very well, and I was very much cheered. When I got up, nobody expected it, and they all looked at me so much, that it was quite enough to put me out of countenance; however, the ice is broken, and I am glad I had courage to speak the first night, which few people ever attempt; but I felt satisfied, if I did not at once go at it, every day would be worse. I suppose we shall divide to-night, and the Ministers will be out to-morrow."

In his veteran Parliamentary days, Sir Charles Napier would, no doubt, have smiled at reading the following "confessions" of what he felt on first standing up in the House; he, however, always adhered to the resolution expressed in the letter subjoined, "of never speaking on what he did not thoroughly understand." The subjects he chose were generally of a professional nature; no man could handle them better or more effectively than himself; and in advocating what he deemed most to the advantage of the Navy, he never forgot the claims and rights of the British sailor, whose staunch friend he always proved himself to be till the last moment of his life.

"To Lady Napier.

"278, Regent Street, Aug. 27, 1841.

"I am glad you like my speech. I did not feel nervous when I first got up, but after I began I forgot what I was to say next, and I was in a sad fright. What I forgot, was telling the Opposition they ought to acquaint the Queen that they had got their majority by bribery and intimidation. However, I fortunately got hold of my second sentence, and then got on very well; but all the Ministers were looking at me; I mistook their cheers for disapprobation; and Berkeley, who was patting me on the back, I thought was pulling me down, otherwise I should have made a longer and a much better speech.

When I sat down, I thought I had failed, and was quite out of spirits; and though Berkeley told me I had done remarkably well, I thought it was only to comfort me; and it was not till next morning, when I read my speech and was very much complimented, that I became satisfied with myself. Since then, I hear so many ridiculous speeches, so little to the purpose, that I shall soon acquire confidence. I shall, however, take care never to speak on what I do not thoroughly understand. You will see in to-day's paper that I last night asked a question of Lord Palmerston about the Syrians, and his answer. We expect the division this morning."

The "question about the Syrians" related to numerous applications he had from that quarter, respecting the tyranny and oppression already exercised on them by the Turks. In their distress, it was not only the sturdy mountaineers of the Lebanon who applied to their beloved "Komodor-el-Keebeer," but he received likewise various petitions from Sidon and the inhabitants along the coast, and also one from the Christians of Nazareth, appealing to him as the only friend on whom they could rely in the hour of need; and during many a subsequent debate in the House of Commons, he warmly advocated their cause.

One of the charges brought against Sir Charles Napier by his enemies—and who is entirely free from such?—was, that he constantly urged his own claims, in right of services performed—but which, it might have been added, were too often overlooked. True, he was not the man to bear in silence either contumely or undeserved neglect; but although ever "ready, aye ready," to stand up for his own rights, he was never found less ready to support the just claims of others, particularly of those brave men who had fol-

lowed him in his adventurous career; and in his official papers frequent mention is made to the Admiralty respecting the services of such men as Sandilands, Wilkinson, Charles Elers Napier, and Pearn. The following letter, addressed to the First Lord of the Admiralty, is an instance in point:—

“ Merchiston Hall, Sept. 4, 1841.

“ MY LORD,—The Assistant-Surgeon of the ‘ Powerful ’ has passed his examination; I stated his case to the Board, and they have refused to promote him. Midshipmen were made Lieutenants after they had passed; for their services in Syria; Lieutenants were made Commanders when they had served their time; and Commanders were made Post Captains. It appears hard that the Assistant-Surgeons are not put on the same footing; and it is a bad compliment to the second in command at Acre that my Assistant-Surgeon should not be promoted; he is also a very clever man, and well deserves it.

“ I have also been trying, ever since I came home from Portugal, to get my Secretary, Mr. Robinson, made a Purser—he is a very old clerk—but I have tried in vain. May I beg your lordship, before you leave office, to do something for them?

“ I have, &c.

“ CHARLES NAPIER.”

Those much-neglected branches of the service, the Marines, and the Medical Officers of the Navy, always attracted Sir Charles Napier’s attention; both in and out of Parliament he frequently and warmly advocated their cause; and throughout his whole career, it will be observed how he ever lent his arm to support the weak and the powerless against the overbearing and the strong, and how he ever fearlessly bared that stalwart arm against the oppressor, in behalf of the oppressed: a chivalrous feeling, but ill-appreciated in

this age, which was the cause of his breaking many a lance and getting many a fall in the long course of his hardly-contested and prolonged "battle of life," throughout which his gallant spirit never quailed, or was ever turned aside from the goal of honour and of his country's good!

Sir Charles Napier was always averse to the system of having a civilian at the head of the Admiralty, the inexpediency of which he took every opportunity of exposing; and the following letter, from so high an authority as the late Sir George Cockburn, proves that he was not singular in his opinion on this important subject:—

"Admiralty, Friday night, Sept. 17, 1841.

"MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—Although, when you spoke to me on the subject, I felt no hesitation in candidly stating to you that I fully concurred in opinion that a naval officer ought to be always at the head of the Navy, as a general officer is at the head of the Army, eminent lawyers at the head of the Law, clergymen at the head of the Church, and so on—the Navy being, I believe, the only extraordinary exception, very little, as I think, to its honour or advantage—yet, having consented to take the station I now hold in connexion with the present Government, I do not consider that I can (consistently with what I deem right and proper) take any steps, especially private ones, to endeavour to oblige the Government to adopt a measure of which they disapprove. If, therefore, you decide on going further with the measure in question at present, you must do so without looking for personal assistance from me.

"Believe me, my dear Sir Charles, always truly yours,

"G. COCKBURN.

"I shall attend to the case of your surgeon's assistant, with every disposition to meet your wishes regarding him, if I find I can do so consistently."

The following amusing letter, written a short time

subsequently to the late Sir Robert Peel (then Premier), though on quite a different subject, may perhaps not be considered out of place :—

“Merchiston Hall, Horndean, Nov. 26, 1841.

“SIR,—It appears to me a considerable revenue might be raised by altering the postage, without giving cause of complaint to anyone. I propose to stamp the coarsest paper that can be written upon, with a penny stamp; on a better sort of paper I would apply a twopenny stamp, and so on, till I got to rose-coloured paper, which might perhaps bear a sixpence. This would be a tax upon vanity, and I think productive. No gentleman would write to a lady on whitey-brown, and no lady would soil her delicate fingers by touching it; nor do I believe tradespeople would use it to their customers—it would be confined entirely to the poor.

“I can only see one objection: it would do away with the envelopes. I recommended this to Mr. Baring when I was in Syria, I now throw it out for your consideration. It would go a good way in paying for the Brevet.

“I have the honour to remain, your most obedient servant,
“CHARLES NAPIER.”

He was, at the close of this year, appointed one of Her Majesty's naval aides-de-camp, and received on the subject the following letter from Lord Haddington, then First Lord of the Admiralty :—

“Admiralty, Nov. 30, 1841.

“MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—Had I known where you were, I should have written to you yesterday, to say that I had recommended you to Her Majesty as one of the naval aides-de-camp—four in number had been named—and that the Queen had been pleased most graciously to receive and approve the recommendation. I beg to congratulate you on this distinction, barren though, I am sorry to say, it is, until some vacancy shall occur in the list of those entitled to pay.

“I did not answer your letter on the subject of our conversation some time since, as you told me you were going, or

gone out of town, but would come to me on your return, or communicate with me again on that matter. After a few days—during which I shall be much occupied with the results of the late promotion—I shall be happy to see you.

“Ever, my dear Sir Charles, very truly yours,

“HADDINGTON.

“Captain Sir C. Napier.”

He continued during the winter of 1841 engaged in country pursuits, in the composition of his “Syrian War”—to which I have frequently referred—and in keeping up an extended correspondence, chiefly on political and naval affairs. The subject of steam also again occupied his thoughts, and he applied for permission to build a war-steamer, which was subsequently granted, and the “Sidon” was in consequence • laid on the stocks.

It is not—as I have already observed—my purpose to follow Sir Charles Napier in his political career through the intervening period until he obtained command of the Channel fleet, which circumstance forms a new era in his professional life, but shall confine myself to giving such of his correspondence as may perchance interest, without wearying, the general reader of these memoirs.

He resumed his duties in Parliament at the opening of the session of 1842, and thus wrote home to Lady Napier:—

“Saturday, March 5, 1842.

“The Estimates came on last night. I send you the *Times*, where my speech is best reported.

“My first volume of the ‘Syrian War’ is finished; the second is getting on, and will be out before Parliament meets

“March 9, 1842.

“ Lord Minto had a flare-up against me and

Berkeley, in the House of Lords, but he made a bad business of it. I shall be down upon him to-night, if the Estimates come on again. I get letters from all quarters, thanking me for supporting the Navy, and it takes me an hour or two every morning, and often more, to answer all I get. Sir Benjamin Hall is trying to bring me in for half the expense of the election, but I do not think he will succeed. The Corn Law will be read a second time to-night, and will be carried, no doubt, by a large majority. On Friday, Peel brings forward his financial scheme—we shall then see what taxes we shall have to pay. I shall endeavour to get away some time next week; I want a little quiet in the country after these late sittings—I attend very regularly.”

I find amongst other documents relating to 1842 a communication to Sir Charles Napier from Her Most Faithful Majesty the Queen of Portugal, bearing date the 7th December, of that year, authorizing him to assume the title of “Count Napier St. Vincent,” instead of that which he had heretofore borne in Portugal, of Count Cape St. Vincent.

Besides his Parliamentary duties—to which Sir Charles Napier always attended most sedulously—he was much engaged, during the course of 1843, on the important subject of steam, and the construction of war steamers. The following is a letter from the Earl of Haddington on this subject:—

“September 30th, 1843.

“DEAR SIR,—I have this day received your letter about the ‘Penelope,’ and am very much obliged to you for it. I send it by this post to Sir W. Gage, for his consideration, and that of Seymour—the only two naval lords now in town.

“I am very sorry that Sir Geo. Cockburn is not yet come back, as the subject of your letter is a most important one. I wish extremely that I were at this moment in town, for I have taken a great interest in the ‘Penelope,’ and had hoped that we had produced a most formidable steam man-of-war, and

secured having a great many more (by the alteration of similar frigates) at a comparatively small cost to the country. You will not be surprised at my declining, at this distance, to do more than urge the consideration of the matter on those I have mentioned.

"I should think that Sir Geo. Cockburn will be back in about three weeks. I have, &c.,

"HADDINGTON."

In 1843, Sir Charles Napier's daughter, Fanny Eloise, was married to the Reverend Henry Jodrell, second son of Edward Jodrell, Esq., and nephew of Sir Richard Jodrell, Bart. At the Admiral's solicitation, Lord Lyndhurst very obligingly promised a living to his son-in-law, whenever an opportunity should present itself; and we find, by the following complimentary letter to Sir Charles, that this promise was shortly afterwards fulfilled:—

"Turville, October 2nd, 1844.

"MY DEAR SIR,—It will give me very great pleasure to redeem my promise to you. I shall be most happy to present your son-in-law, Mr. Jodrell, to the living of Gisleham, on the resignation of Mr. Collier.

"It is true, you are a violent party politician; but your claims on every well-wisher of his country, and on every admirer of gallantry and talent, are irresistible. Very faithfully yours,

"LYNDBURST."

The following letter, in reply to one from Captain Pearn, R.N., his old shipmate and companion-in-arms,—probably congratulating him on being appointed one of Her Majesty's aides-de-camp—gives a slight sketch of what he was endeavouring to get effected for the "Masters" of the Navy, together with other ameliorations and reforms he was then trying to introduce into his profession. Such was the patriotic motive that had

always rendered him anxious to be in Parliament. Whilst there, he certainly turned his time in this manner to the best account; and, although unsuccessful at that period in many of his attempted reforms and plans for ameliorating the condition of the sailor, not a few of his suggestions have since been carried into effect, though without the credit which he so well deserved being awarded to him.

“March 14th, 1844.

“MY DEAR PEARN,—Many thanks for your congratulations. I am glad you and your brother officers are satisfied with my exertions in your favour, and I suppose ultimately some good will be done. I have got them to order men to be received into the dockyards, as artisans, &c., when ships are paid off; which will be some encouragement; and to full-man the guard-ships, and discipline the men, and then send a portion, with their officers, to form the ground-work of a ship's company, when a ship is put in commission—so that you will begin with order and regularity from the first day, and go on board at once, without the use of a beastly hulk: if this is properly followed up, it will do much good. I will drive once more at a retired list before the session is out. With best regards to Mrs. Pearn, believe me to remain, yours very truly,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

The state of the steam navy of our neighbours had attracted the serious attention of Sir Charles Napier so long ago as the year 1844, and he wrote thus to his friend, Mr. Grant, on the subject:—

“October 24th, 1844.

“MY DEAR GRANT,—I thank you for your letter and the papers. I go to town for the opening of the Royal Exchange, and on my return I shall be happy to meet your brother. I look upon our condition to be so serious, that I intend calling on Sir Robert Peel, and giving him my opinion on the state of things; and unless I see some change, I shall bring the whole business before Parliament, and do all I can

to alarm the country, as the only means of saving us from disaster. It is scandalous that the French should possess such splendid steamers, and we have not one to meet them. The Admiralty seem to think little of the 'Gomer,' but what would become of us if their twenty steamers should throw 40,000 men into Ireland?—which they could do. I had at one time on board of the 'Gorgon' 1600 marines; for a short passage the 'Gomer' could easily carry 2000; and we must remember that all our vigilance could not prevent a steam fleet from putting to sea, if they watched their opportunity. It is very well to say we have a mercantile steam navy, but they would not be armed and fitted in a day, and all the work would be done the first month."

The same topic is treated on in the following letter from Sir George Cockburn:—

"Bath, Nov. 6, 1844.

"MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—I was glad to learn by your letter of the 31st that you consider Sir Robert Peel to be disposed to allow us, at last, our retired list. It would be a great relief to us, and I have no doubt of its rapidly filling, to the number of 150, with sufficiently aged *volunteers*.

"The other suggestions you have mentioned were brought under discussion before the Naval and Military Commission—that is to say, it was proposed that the whole list of admirals, though retaining their present grades of nominal rank, should be entitled to only one rate of half-pay, namely, that now granted to rear-admirals; and that the amount saved from such reduction of the admirals' and vice-admirals' present half-pay should be appropriated to give additional allowance or pension to such as had distinguished themselves, or had had good and long sea service. This, after being much canvassed, was at last negatived, and it was strongly opposed by our chairman, the Duke of Wellington. It was afterwards proposed that, out of every three or every five admirals to be promoted, one should be selected by the Government: this was also negatived after much discussion; and it would certainly be difficult to guard such a power against favouritism and political influence, especially under a

weak Government. I think, however, that either of the foregoing proposals might have produced advantages to more than counterbalance the objections to them; but after the decision come to by the commission, it would be difficult to carry either of them, or any similar proposal, just now, against such authority.

"I will endeavour to have some talk on these subjects with Peel on my return to town. *I quite agree with you . . .* . . and that none of our large steam-ships have been sufficiently flat-floored. Fincham has, however, just furnished the lines for one to be built at Deptford, to be called the 'Odin,' that will, I think, be flat enough to satisfy even you. We shall, I have no doubt, get right at last. I did not admire the 'Gomer' so much as you seem to have done; she looked very well as she lay in Portsmouth Harbour, but if she had had all guns and ammunition on board, instead of being fitted as a yacht, she would have been too deep in the water, and much under-powered with her 450 horses. I think the inclination of the French to overload their steam-ships of war with many guns will render them less efficient for real service at sea than our own. As soon as we shall have decided on the best shape and the best propeller, we can certainly advance our number of steam war-ships as fast, if not faster, than they can; and we have already many plans for keeping the machinery below the water, as much out of shot range as possible. I am always, however, very glad to receive, and very much obliged to you for, any hints or suggestions you send to me on such very interesting and important professional matters, appreciating as I do your opinion on such points.

"I hope you are in excellent health, and with every good wish, believe me, &c.,

"G. COCKBURN."

Sir Charles Napier, whilst member for Marylebone, gave up, during the session, the greater part of his time to the business of the House—the only recreation he allowed himself being an occasional visit to Merchiston, superintending the arrangements of his

farm, in which he continued to take the greatest pleasure. On the adjournment of Parliament, writing on professional subjects, together with agricultural pursuits, constituted his principal amusement and occupation. His farming, which he now carried on with the appliances of the steam-engine, stall-feeding, and other modern improvements, was always to him—as is generally the case with “amateur” farmers—a source of more pleasure than profit.

CHAPTER VI.

IN COMMAND OF THE CHANNEL FLEET, 1847-1848—THE
NAVAL DEFENCES QUESTION, 1848-1853.

ON the 9th of November, 1846, Sir Charles Napier attained the rank of Rear-Admiral, and in the following spring he entered on a new career of active service, being then appointed Commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet—a force ostensibly assembled for experimental purposes, but whose formation was probably owing to that gloomy aspect of the political horizon throughout Europe, foreboding those disturbances so shortly to be realized in the ensuing stormy year of 1848.

As in the former periods of his life, the Admiral appears to have kept no journal or private record of the events which occurred whilst holding this important command; but from his voluminous correspondence, both of a public and private nature, I have been able to glean the following particulars.

Sir Charles Napier hoisted his flag on board the "St. Vincent" on the 20th of May, 1847, when he assumed the command of the Channel fleet, which it

was decided should then consist of six sail-of-the-line, with a proportionate number of steamers to be attached. The fleet, at the period of his appointment, comprised the following vessels, but it varied frequently in number and strength during the two years he held this command.

LIST OF SHIPS UNDER REAR-ADMIRAL SIR C. NAPIER'S ORDERS, WHEN SENT TO SEA ON JULY 16, 1847.

"Howe"	120	guns,	850	men.
"Caledonia"	120	"	850	"
"St. Vincent"	120	"	850	" (flag-ship.)
"Queen"	110	"	800	"
"Vengeance"	84	"	645	"
"Odin" (steam-vessel)	12	"	270	"
"Avenger"	6	"	250	"
"Dragon"	6	"	195	"
"Vixen"	6	"	160	"
"Stromboli"	6	"	160	"

The Channel fleet, as was anticipated, did not remain long on the home station, but in August, 1847, was ordered out to Lisbon. On going to sea, Her Majesty Queen Victoria honoured Sir Charles Napier with her presence, and I believe it is the first instance on record, of a Queen of England conducting a fleet to sea. Her Majesty proceeded as far as the Nab Light, and was graciously pleased to go over the "St. Vincent," requesting explanations of the different parts of the vessel. It was a most unexpected honor, and consequently no preparations had been made for Her Majesty's reception.

The disturbed state of Portugal required the presence of a strong British naval force, and Sir Charles Napier, from his former connexion and relations with that country, was considered the officer best adapted

for such a command ; which required not only considerable tact, but also a knowledge of the political questions, and a personal acquaintance with the heads of the different parties whose dissensions had plunged that unfortunate kingdom into the horrors of civil war.

Sir William Parker, then Commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean fleet, was at Lisbon, but his presence was required at Malta ; and on the intimation of the expected arrival of the Channel fleet, under the command of Sir Charles Napier, to relieve him in the Tagus, Sir William Parker wrote the following letter, shewing the state of affairs in Portugal at the period to which it alludes :—

“ ‘ Hibernia,’ Lisbon, 25th July, 1847.

“ MY DEAR ADMIRAL,—I should long since have answered your note of the 31st of May, if I had not been from the moment of its receipt overwhelmed with the double duties of attending to the turmoil in this unfortunate country, and regulating the details of the Mediterranean squadron. We have, however, now a lull, which, if properly taken advantage of, may enable the Government to adopt wholesome measures for retrieving some of the difficulties of the country, and lay the foundation for the reunion of parties. The civil war for the present is over in Continental Portugal, and I hope we shall soon hear that Madeira and the Azores have also submitted to the Queen’s authority ; for we sent an allied force to both points eight days ago, and the ‘ Terrible ’ is to go on to Angola, to bring home the exiles from thence, who were made prisoners at Torres Vedras. There is, however, much bitter feeling extant, and I cannot contemplate the future without serious misgivings as to the continuance of tranquillity.

“ I hope we shall soon meet, and that I shall now get back to Malta, from whence we have been absent nearly sixteen months. With sincere good wishes, believe me, dear Napier, faithfully yours,
“ W. PARKER.”

Lord Auckland was at this period head of the Admiralty, in which capacity he was in constant official correspondence with the Commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet; but besides these public letters, I have now before me a large mass of interesting private correspondence between that amiable nobleman and Sir Charles Napier, carried on in the most unreserved and friendly tone, from whence I shall make occasional extracts whilst recording this portion of the Admiral's life.

Sir Charles Napier's Portuguese title of Count Cape St. Vincent had never been assumed in England, nor had he ever applied for it to be recognised there; but deeming it of importance—in the position he was about to occupy at Lisbon—that this should now be allowed, he consequently made an application to that effect. Our Government, however, thought differently, as appears from the following note addressed to him by Lord Palmerston:—

“C. G., August 24th, 1847.

“MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—I beg your pardon for not having sooner answered your letter about the Portuguese title; I have, however, communicated upon the subject with Lord John Russell and Lord Auckland, and we all agree that we cannot afford to lose the British Admiral, Sir Charles Napier, and to have him converted into a Portuguese Count; we cannot be parties to denationalizing one of the brightest ornaments of the British Navy.

The case of a foreign title is different from that of foreign orders. Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.

“Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Napier.”

Sir Charles, on his arrival in the Tagus, found the following letter awaiting him from Admiral Sir William Parker:—

“ ‘Hibernia,’ Lisbon, August 19th, 1847—5 A.M.

“ MY DEAR ADMIRAL,—I was in hopes that I should have had the pleasure of shaking you by the hand on the Tagus before my departure, but as they are disappointed, I take this mode of wishing you health and a pleasant period of service.

“ You will find the public affairs in a sad state—the spirit of party in the various sections running high, bitter animosity prevailing, with an empty treasury, and very few men of character disposed to undertake the responsibility and embarrassment of office. There is a cessation of war, but I fear peace is far from being restored. It will indeed require able, firm, and honest men to renovate the country ; it will, I trust, improve, for it can scarcely be worse.

“ I have left with Moyses all the documents which are likely to be useful ; I am sorry they are so numerous, but he is well acquainted with what is passing, and you will find in Sir Hamilton Seymour a most honourable and gentlemanly minister.

“ Pray send on the ‘Thetis’ and ‘Amazon’ to me as soon as you can, and ‘Sidon,’ when you have tested her qualities, according to the Admiralty arrangement. Captain Henderson is an excellent officer, and she cannot be in better hands.

“ I have been writing all night, and am now so completely knocked up, that I will only add my sincere good wishes, and remain, my dear Napier, faithfully yours,

“ W. PARKER.

“ Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Napier.”

Whilst engaged, in conjunction with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British minister at Lisbon, in his semi-diplomatic duty of endeavouring to conciliate contending parties at Lisbon, the Admiral took every opportunity of exercising his squadron, so as to make it as efficient as possible in case of need. He constantly practised the embarkation and disembarkation of the seamen and marines ; frequently indulged in his “soldiering” propensities, by having sham-fights

on shore; and was indefatigable in his attention to the gunnery practice, of the inefficiency of which in the squadron he had much reason to complain. In a letter from Lord Auckland to him, dated Sept. 17th, 1847, great satisfaction is expressed at the "admirable manner in which he had conducted the squadron, and the great advantage he foresees, in consequence, to the service;" as likewise at the information he was collecting about the capabilities of the different steamers under his command, which Sir Charles Napier was constantly testing by trials of every kind.

About this time he lost the valuable assistance of his flag-captain, now Admiral Sir Alexander Milne, who was shortly afterwards appointed to the Board of Admiralty, of which he soon became one of the most efficient members. The Secretary of that Board, Mr. H. G. Ward (afterwards Sir Henry George Ward, late Governor of Madras), wrote on the 16th of October in the following terms to the Admiral:—

"MY DEAR NAPIER,—You know very well that I *do* read your letters, or I should be very unfit to be where I am; but I can tell you more—I have seldom read any letters since I have been here with half as much pleasure, for you are giving a life and reality to all that you are about, and consequently to all about you, that cannot fail to be most beneficial to the service—which, with all due respect for it, was greatly in want of such a shaking up as you have given to it. It must be satisfactory to you to hear and feel how cordially everyone here approves of what you are doing. From Lord Auckland downwards, I hear nothing but expressions of entire satisfaction; and, though my opinion is not worth having, I have not the least doubt that if the chapter of accidents in Spain, or elsewhere, should force on a collision, for which many of our neighbours are longing, you will give

as good an account of the Prince de Joinville as you did of Don Miguel's fleet—though it will take a good deal more trouble. They are very strong in steam in the Mediterranean just now: ten steam frigates of 450 horse-power, and seven corvettes, besides small craft.

"We have written to you to-day about recommendations for an improved 'Sidon,' with all the good qualities, but somewhat smaller. How well she seems to have answered!

"Let me know more in detail what you propose with regard to improving the condition of petty officers and seamen with good service and long standing. C. Wood, who is very liberal, in spite of the disastrous state of the exchequer, will not, I believe, object to our redeeming the pledge given last year, with reference to the report of Berkeley's committee. I wish, myself, I could see my way to the restoration of the pensions of warrant-officers' widows, which were most iniquitously done away with by — and —, at a time when nobody thought of proposing anything of the kind. By far the most distressing cases that I have had to deal with here are of this class—the best men being always the first to go; and the claims of their families upon the country are so irresistible, that I should have no difficulty in reinstating them upon the pension list, if it were not for the arrears with them: I confess I do not see my way. Our Board is working well, and our new man, —, has a natural genius for stores and the details of Somerset House, which was much wanted, in order to bring the great men there to their bearings. How will Dundas's tea and sugar scheme work? You must have been amused with the *Morning Herald*, which certainly has adopted Lord Chesterfield's maxim: 'When you do flatter a man, lay it on with a trowel, and some of it is sure to stick.'

"Believe me, dear Napier, with every good wish, yours very faithfully,

"H. G. WARD."

On the 22nd of October Her Majesty Queen Adelaide—the queen-dowager—arrived in the Tagus, on her way to spend the winter at Madeira. Her Ma-

jesty was received with royal honours by the British squadron; and Sir Charles Napier was invited to dine with Her Majesty, who remained a few days at Lisbon, and then proceeded to her destination.

We have now to advert to an unpleasant occurrence which happened at this time. Sir Charles Napier was entitled, by a grant from the Cortes, to an annual pension from the Portuguese Government for the services he had rendered during the war of succession. The payment of this pension was then considerably in arrears—as it had frequently been before—and some anonymous charges were made against him (and taken up by an adverse party of the English press), to the effect that, availing himself of his position as Commander-in-chief of a British squadron in the Tagus, he was in that capacity exerting a certain pressure on the Portuguese Government, to make good the money due to him on account of these arrears, whilst other claimants received no payment whatever. Sir Charles Napier indignantly repudiated this calumny, and, in consequence of a letter from Admiral Dundas on the subject, he published the following contradiction in the *Times*:—

“I have read an article in the *Times* of the 19th ultimo, to which I have had my attention drawn. It is a most false and unjustifiable attack on me. So far from my profiting by my position to obtain the arrears of my pension, I never even mentioned the subject, and when the Minister of Finance expressed his regret at it being in arrear, I begged that no favour might be shewn me, and that I should be treated just as the Portuguese were.

“My agent has received this year four months’ pension, and there are now thirteen due.”

The affair was brought before the House of Com-

mons; an inquiry into the matter and a long correspondence ensued, which resulted in completely clearing Sir Charles Napier of this false and malignant charge.

Lord Palmerston thus writes to him on the subject :

“ Carlton Gardens, Nov. 28, 1847.

“ MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—I have received your letter of the 15th, and nothing can be more explicit or more completely satisfactory. I am sorry that my letter should have given you uneasiness, but seeing in the papers the statement which I mentioned, I thought the best thing was to write to you about it at once—for in such cases it is always best to be frank and unreserved. I see clearly, from what you say, that the paragraph was an entire misrepresentation of the fact. As to Sir Hamilton Seymour, I can assure you he does you full justice, and has repeatedly, both in his despatches and in his private letters, expressed his obligation to you for the valuable assistance which you have afforded him, especially in persuading Sa da Bandeira to go to the King.

“ We hear that nothing ever was more brilliant than the state of your squadron, and that it is animated with a spirit which makes it worthy of its commander. While our ships are in such good order, and we have enough of them at sea, our neighbours across the Channel will take care to keep quiet. Diplomats and protocols are very good things, but there are no better peace-keepers than well-appointed three-deckers. Yours sincerely,

“ PALMERSTON.”

The following letter from Lord Auckland is equally satisfactory :—

“ Admiralty, Nov. 26, 1847.

“ MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—You will see by the newspapers that a question with regard to the receipt of your pension has been asked in the House of Commons; that the letter of Sir Hamilton Seymour has been read upon it; and that there is probably an end to this exaggerated and misrepresented affair. I believe that all are satisfied; and I need not tell you that I am greatly pleased to think that you are not injured in the

opinion of your countrymen at home, and that your position at Lisbon will not be impaired by the malignity of the attack which has been made upon you. And so no more of this.

"I found, upon inquiry, that Captain Charles Napier had successfully studied steam, and that the command of the 'Avenger' might well be given to him. I have, therefore, named him to the 'Avenger.' I would not, however, have him, for the reasons at which you hint, remain in the Tagus, and would have him go off at once to the Mediterranean. The 'Terrible' shall take the place of the 'Avenger' with you, and you will not be the loser.

"My views with regard to your squadron, for the winter, are as follows:—You will have 'St. Vincent,' 'Howe,' 'Queen,' and 'Canopus;' you will send home 'Caledonia,' and she will be paid off, and 'Prince Regent' shall be commissioned, under Captain Milne, in her stead, and sent out to you. In the meantime, 'Albion' will join you, and, after a short trial, she will also be sent home and paid off; and in the beginning of the summer 'Bellerophon,' now employed in the conveyance of troops, shall be filled up, and make up your complement of six sail-of-the-line, and, with a good set of steamers, you will be as strong as ever again; and I may then perhaps enter upon a practice of frequently sending to you ships as they shall be newly commissioned, for a short time of exercise and manœuvre, before they proceed to their stations. I know that there are considerable inconvenience and annoyance in the frequent change of ships and men, and the longer the men can be cheerfully held together in one ship, and the same ships exercised together in the same squadron, the better; but the changes are inherent to our present system, and their evil is perhaps more than compensated by the constant bringing forward of new men and new officers.—Most truly yours,
"AUCKLAND."

On this "Pension Question" Sir Charles Napier thus wrote to a friend at home:—

"I am very sorry you did not publish the whole of my letter. When I am in the right I do not care a d— for the Press. The *Times* has not even published what you sent to

me. I should have thought my disclaimer—the disclaimer of the Government, and of Sir Hamilton Seymour—would have satisfied the public. I will not admit that paying my pension is a favour. It was voted to me by the Parliament of Portugal for placing the Queen on her throne and restoring the Constitution; and I wish you would say at once whether the Government expect me to give it up or not.”

The allusion in Lord Auckland’s letter to Captain Napier refers to an application made by the Admiral to have his adopted son Charles appointed to a ship. Captain Charles Elmers Napier, whilst in command of the “Pelican,” was engaged in the Chinese war of 1841, and distinguished himself under Sir William Parker. On being promoted to the rank of Post-Captain, he was placed on half-pay, when he applied himself diligently to the study of steam, and was now appointed by Lord Auckland to the steam-frigate “Avenger”—Captain Dacres, who had previously commanded her, being transferred to the “St. Vincent,” as flag-captain to the Commander-in-chief.

The enemies of Sir Charles Napier, defeated in their late malignant attack, turned again upon him with a fresh charge, and now accused him of interfering, with a party spirit, in the political differences at Lisbon. This accusation was founded on the accidental circumstance of Costa Cabral having been on board the “St. Vincent” when Sir Charles was honoured by the visit of Her Majesty the Queen Dowager. The Admiral, far from identifying himself with any particular party, was friendly with all; he endeavoured to bring them together by every means he could devise, and his efforts were sometimes attended with success.

In a letter, dated November 27th, 1847, Lord Auckland writes on this subject to the following effect:—

"I beg you to forget what is passed; to hold the natural tenor of your way; to bear in mind—as you have done—your instructions; and to be on terms of hospitality and good fellowship with all parties.

"I can only assure you," adds his lordship, "that I look with pride and satisfaction at the manner in which you have fulfilled the objects of your command."

Lord Auckland likewise wrote to Lord Palmerston relative to this fresh attack upon Sir Charles. Annexed is a copy of the reply from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:—

"Carlton Gardens, 28th Nov., 1847.

"MY DEAR AUCKLAND,—Thank you for the enclosed. Napier's explanation as to the political matter seems to be entirely satisfactory; and Seymour's despatches and letters shew that Napier has been co-operating most cordially and successfully with him.—Yours sincerely,

"PALMERSTON."

These annoyances did not prevent Sir Charles Napier from following up, with his usual energy, the duties with regard to the squadron under his command, which had been brought, by constant practice, into the most efficient state.

Towards the close of this year, his private feelings received a blow from domestic affliction which caused him to stagger under its weight. This was the loss of his adopted son Charles, whose untimely fate occasioned him the deepest sorrow. He had recently—as we have seen—obtained for him the command of the "Avenger," which Captain Napier joined at Lisbon in December, 1847, and shortly after was ordered to

proceed to Malta, where Sir William Parker's Mediterranean squadron was at that time. In the night of the 20th of December, during a terrific gale of wind, the "Avenger" ran on the Sorelle Rocks, near the island of Galita, and was lost, with all on board, except an officer and two or three men, who succeeded in reaching the African coast near Tunis.

Sir Charles Napier was overwhelmed with grief when he received the sad intelligence of the total wreck of the "Avenger." It reached him when he was entertaining a large party at dinner; he immediately retired, and kept his room for a week, when public business obliged him to resume his duties.

He thus wrote to his daughter on this afflicting occasion, knowing how deeply she would lament the loss of a beloved brother:—

"July 30th, 1848.

"MY DEAREST CHILD,—I hope this letter will find you a little reconciled to the dreadful misfortune that has happened to you and all of us. If you can write to me at all composedly, do it by next packet; but I dread to hear from you unless you can compose yourself. I heard from Jodrell and Lizzy by the last packet, and I can conceive the affliction they are all in. I am glad your mother is with Edward. I am sure he will do all he can to console her in her dreadful misfortune. My friends here have all expressed their great grief, and have all called on me. I am now beginning to go about a little, but I have no spirits for anything."

Sir Charles Napier received many kind letters of condolence from all quarters; and he felt greatly gratified at the following assurances of sympathy from that most amiable and Royal person, Queen Adelaide, as also from the King and Queen of Portugal:—

“ ‘Quinta das Augustias,’ Madeira, Feb. 14, 1848.

“DEAR SIR CHARLES,—I take up my pen, by command of my Royal Mistress, to convey to you the expression of Her Majesty’s deep sympathy in the sad bereavement you have been called upon to sustain by the melancholy loss of the ‘Avenger.’ In such a moment of affliction, I am sure it will be some consolation to you to receive the condolence of so excellent a person as Queen Adelaide, and I feel grateful that Her Majesty has deputed me to be the channel of this communication. Yours very respectfully,

“R. T. BEDFORD.”

“7th January, 1848.

“MY DEAR ADMIRAL,—Their Majesties the Queen and the King, receiving yesterday a very sad report concerning your son, felt extremely sensible for so unhappy an occurrence, and charged me to let you know their feelings for such unexpected misfortune, which must indeed be most sensible to your heart. Their Majesties would feel much pleased if you could give them better and farther information upon the sad affair. Permit me, my dear Admiral, that I may take the liberty to join my sentiments to those of their most faithful Majesties. I am, dear Admiral,

“BARON DO FOR.”

I subjoin the following portion of a letter lately received from Admiral Sir William Parker (under whom Captain Charles Elers Napier served in the China war of 1840-41), to show how universally my brother was esteemed, and how much his loss must have been felt by all who knew him:—

“Your poor brother Charles was with us in China, and conducted his ship most satisfactorily on all occasions, proving himself a very agreeable messmate and volunteer Aide-de-Camp of mine; and I must observe, with much pleasure, that, after his promotion, although embarked for some weeks with me as an ‘amateur,’ his course was so smooth and his judgment so good, that not a single instance of jealousy was excited in the mind of any one of the officers of the squadron,

who sometimes become a little sensitive when an officer unattached to the expedition becomes a claimant for participation in promotion and honours; *he*, however, had the good wishes of all."

Never, indeed, had any man fewer enemies and more friends; and—although at the risk of criticism—as it may afford some satisfaction to those amongst the latter who have survived him, I trust the general reader will pardon the insertion, in these pages, of the following notice of this gallant young officer, which was published shortly after his death:—*.

"CHARLES GEORGE ELMERS NAPIER, second son of Lieutenant Elers, R.N., was born the 22nd May, 1812. In 1815, Captain, now Rear-Admiral, Sir Charles Napier married the widow of Lieutenant Elers, and adopted the subject of the present memoir, who at the early age of twelve years entered the Royal Navy, and, under the parental auspices of his kind and gallant step-father, rose rapidly in his profession.

"His first ship was the 'Ganges,' on the South American station; we next find him a Mate, in the 'Galatea,' under the command of his step-father. When the 'Galatea' was paid off, he was appointed to the 'Excellent,' where he remained engaged in the study of gunnery, after his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant in 1832; and he continued thus occupied, in learning this important branch of his profession, until the summer of 1833, when his step-father, Captain Napier, succeeded Admiral Sartorius in the command of the Portuguese fleet, during the War of Succession in that country.

"Regardless of consequences, as they might affect him in a professional point of view, and determined to follow the fortunes of his adopted father and benefactor, Lieutenant Napier unhesitatingly threw up his appointment on board the 'Excellent,' engaged heart and soul in the hazardous undertaking, and on the memorable day of the capture of Don Miguel's squadron,—the 5th of July, 1833,—acted, with the rank of Captain, as aide-de-camp to Admiral Napier, and,

* In the *United Service Magazine* for February, 1848.

by* the brilliant valour he then displayed, was not a little instrumental in the success of the day.

"The great disparity of force between the rival fleets on that occasion is too well known to require comment; however, nothing daunted by the overwhelming numbers and superior weight of metal of his opponent, Admiral Napier, with his flag on board a small frigate, called the 'Rainha,' steadily bore down on the foe.

" 'The enemy,' writes Admiral Napier, in his 'History of the War of Succession in Portugal,' 'kept their line close, and reserved their fire till well within musket-shot; the frigate then threw out a signal, which we concluded was for permission to fire: the moment was critical, and we all felt it.

" 'The Commodore's answer was hardly at the mast-head ere the frigate opened her broadside, which was instantaneously followed by the whole squadron, with the exception of the "Don John," whose stern and quarter guns could only bear. Poor "Rainha!" I looked up, and expected to see every mast tottering; but the cherub was sitting aloft, and notwithstanding the most tremendous fire I ever witnessed, which made the sea bubble like a boiling caldron around her, the smoke clearing away, discovered to the astonished Miguelites the "Rainha" proudly floating on the waters of Nelson and St. Vincent, with her masts erect, her rigging and sails only shewing the fiery ordeal she had gone through.'

"The 'waters of Nelson, of St. Vincent,' and, it may now be added, of 'Napier,' then witnessed a feat seldom or never equalled in the annals of naval warfare: the capture single-handed, by boarding, of a fully-manned line-of-battle ship by a frigate. Admiral Napier, sweeping the little 'Rainha' under the stern of her gigantic namesake, ran, through a murderous fire, alongside of the latter. 'The ships,' says he, 'were lashed with the mainsheet, and Commodore Wilkinson and Captain Charles Napier, heading the boarders, passed from the bower-anchor to her bulwark, driving the men across the forecastle, along the larboard gangway.'

"At this critical moment, a slight check apparently ensued, when the ships yawing for an instant asunder, Captain Napier—in this his maiden combat—was left alone

and unsupported on the deck of the enemy's line-of-battle ship; but young, active, and resolute, his athletic arm wielding a ponderous cavalry sabre; he hewed down the foremost foes, and thus carved out a wide circle around him. This unequal combat continued till his sword becoming entangled between the ramrod and barrel of an opposing musket, was suddenly wrenched from his grasp. Disarmed, covered with wounds, his strength nearly exhausted, the gallant fellow still fought on to the last; closing with and grappling by the throat his nearest opponent, they both, in this deadly struggle, fell over a gun, and were next borne down by the surrounding multitude on the slippery and blood-stained deck. At this moment of apparently inevitable destruction, Admiral Napier, boarding in person with another party, rescued him from death, took possession of the 'Rainha,' and thereby decided the fate of the day.

"This was the first time Captain Charles Napier had ever been under fire; *fourteen* sabre and bayonet wounds bore evidence to the nature of the conflict, and in deep crimson characters stamped on him those ineffaceable marks of bravery which he carried with him through life.

"When the 'Rainha' hauled down her colours, Captain Charles Napier was carried back to his own ship in a state of insensibility; but notwithstanding his sufferings—in order to relieve the apprehensions of a fond mother—he the next day sent home assurances of his safety, in a letter which the author of this memoir has seen, and which, written under such circumstances, is a model of filial attachment and affection.

"Captain Charles Napier was shortly afterwards invested, by Don Pedro, with the order of knighthood of the Tower and Sword, in token of the gallantry he had displayed, and, on recovering from his wounds, was placed in command of the 'Eliza,' a fine corvette, in which he was chiefly engaged in blockading the coast. On the termination of the war, and the establishment of Donna Maria on the throne of Portugal, he resigned his command, and, returning to England, was shortly after appointed Lieutenant to the 'Vernon,' on the Mediterranean station.

"In 1838, Lieutenant Napier obtained the rank of Com-

mander, when, weary of the inactivity of a shore life, and deeming he had little chance of employment, he was on the point of embarking to join Commodore Napier, as a volunteer, on the coast of Syria, when he was unexpectedly appointed to the command of the 'Pelican,' and sailed for China. He had, during the operations carried on there, his full share of service, but not of reward, for being posted before the conclusion of the war, and consequently superseded in his command, he obtained neither the medal nor C.B., which, on the ratification of peace, was awarded to many others, who, strictly speaking, had no more right to these distinctions than himself.

"Though now turned adrift in an enemy's country, as a private individual, Captain Napier—determined to see the end of the game—immediately joined the land forces as a volunteer, and subsequently acted as aide-de-camp to Sir William Parker. But whether on his own element, or on shore, Charles Elers Napier was ever foremost in danger, ever ready at the call of honour or duty: as aide-de-camp to Admiral Napier, we find him, with his father, boarding a line-of-battle ship; as aide-de-camp to Admiral Parker, he, in company with the latter gallant veteran, scaled the walls of Ching-Kang-foo, at the storming of that place.

"On his return from China, Captain Elers Napier strenuously applied himself to the study of steam, and having become duly qualified in that science, was, in 1846, offered the command of a fine steam-frigate; but at that moment he had other duties which he considered as paramount, and laying aside the brightest prospects of professional advancement, he, with noble filial devotion, gave up his whole existence to the care of an aged mother, and long proved himself the solace and comfort of her declining years. Thus, and in acts of benevolence and charity—for his heart and hand were ever open to the call of misfortune—did he spend the two last years of his life; till, urged by his friends not thus early to relinquish his profession, Admiral Sir Charles Napier obtained for him that command in which, alas! he was doomed to close his brief and gallant career.

"He always felt deeply indebted to Sir Charles Napier,

who acted towards him as the kindest of fathers; and this debt of gratitude he endeavoured to discharge, by bearing unsullied through life the proud name of his adoption, whose mottoes had invariably been his guide; for never was 'sans tâche' more aptly applied to that name, and he was always found 'ready' at the call of honour or duty. A brave sailor, a true Christian, a dutiful and affectionate son, a kind brother, and real friend, he, on the 20th December, 1847, at the early age of thirty-five years—whilst at his post, and in the execution of his duty—was suddenly cut off from this life of care and sorrow. Peace be with his noble spirit! And as future happiness is reserved for the kind, the good, and the generous, surely such will be awarded to CAPTAIN CHARLES ELMERS NAPIER, late of H.M.S. 'Avenger.'"

A tablet in the parish church of the village of Catherington, in Hampshire, bears the following inscription:—

TO THE MEMORY
OF
CAPTAIN CHARLES GEORGE ELMERS NAPIER, R.N.,
KNIGHT OF THE MILITARY ORDER OF THE TOWER AND SWORD;
BORN 22ND MAY, 1812.
AFTER A SHORT BUT HONOURABLE CAREER,
HE WAS CUT OFF AT THE AGE OF THIRTY-FIVE YEARS,
WHILST IN COMMAND OF
H.M. STEAM-FRIGATE "AVENGER,"
WRECKED OFF THE COAST OF AFRICA, ON THE
20TH DECEMBER, 1847.

True to his motto, he was ever "ready" at the call of honour and duty, and his memory was "sans tâche."

* * * * *

The political aspect of 1848 dawned with still darker forebodings than that of the preceding year. Even England was no exception to the general rule, for the Chartist movement now carried universal apprehension and alarm throughout this country; whilst Ireland—threatened with even a more serious insurrection—was encouraged from without by powers with whom

England was nominally at peace, but who apparently watched for a favourable moment to assail her, and whose agents not only fomented the general spirit of discontent, but surreptitiously supplied the embryo insurgents with money, ammunition, and arms.

It was in this state of affairs that the presence of the Channel fleet was considered necessary at home; and Lord Auckland, on the 4th of January, wrote to Sir Charles Napier, informing him that he would probably shortly receive orders to return, and “parade his squadron” near the scene of apprehended disturbance, “where,” he adds, “your presence would be a comfort to this country, which is now labouring under a panic on the state of the national defences.”

On the 16th of February, Lord Auckland again writes :—

“I hope before long to have a pretty good squadron for you at Spithead; I shall have really pleasure in seeing you again, and in thanking you for all that you have done for us, and I have no doubt we shall derive much advantage from seeing you.”

Sir Charles Napier left Lisbon, with his squadron, early in March, and, after a fortnight's passage, arrived in the Cove of Cork.

In a letter to Lord Auckland, dated 23rd March, 1848, written on board the “St. Vincent,” in the Cove of Cork, he thus announces his return :—

“We arrived here this morning, having made an excellent landfall yesterday, in thick weather. We have had a very stormy passage, and a dead beat as far as the latitude of Cape Finisterre, and three days calm to boot. I found your letters of the 18th and 20th. ‘Morning Herald’ is a clever fellow to have found us off Cork on the 18th. I shall not fail in taking your hint, after a day or two, on going to

Dublin, in 'Dragon,' and paying my respects to the Lord-Lieutenant, and will think about my leave after the arrival of the 'Prince Regent.' I am glad 'Howe' is to come back; her captain* is a most valuable officer, and carries out my views entirely."

The remainder of this letter consists of details relating to the squadron under his command, and of recommendations for promotion of such of the officers as had particularly attracted his attention by their energy and zeal; amongst these he made especial mention of Captain Stirling's son, whom he considered a first-rate midshipman, and a most promising young officer.

The alarming position in which Ireland was then placed may be inferred from Lord Auckland's letters here subjoined:—

"Admiralty, April 3rd, 1848.

"MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—I sincerely hope that this may find you and 'Dragon' at Dublin, for Lord Clarendon is impatient to have you, and I am a little disappointed at the interval which will have occurred since the sailing of the 'Stromboli.' I wish much to strengthen you with steamers, and have directed that two of the Liverpool packets proceed at once to Kingstown; inquire whether the Lord-Lieutenant wishes to detain them, and if not, to proceed to Cork, where they would be ready for any service, with such guns and marine, and draught of officers and men, as you may put in them for temporary service. Possibly you may have another handy steamer from Milford, and you shall have also 'Dee' or 'Pluto' at the end of the week. Upon any pressing emergency, you must take it upon yourself to hire steamers at Cork. We think that your ships are better where they are than higher up the harbour. You may presently have also 'Howe' and 'Bellerophon,' and they would be too many without moorings for the narrow channel. You must not take 'Dragon' away so long, as Lord Clarendon wishes to

* The present Admiral Sir James Stirling.

have her in the Bay of Dublin. I have not time for other things. Most truly yours,

"AUCKLAND."

"Admiralty, April 9th, 1848.

"MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—Your letter of the 7th has reached me too late to be answered by return of post. I enclose a letter which was written by Lord Clare to Sir George Grey; he is right in his estimation of the value of steamers, and it might be well perhaps if 'Pluto' or 'Dragon' could be spared for the Shannon, but I never like to give precise orders to any commander in whom I have confidence, from a distance.

"I will give you what force I can, and, in consultation with the authorities at Dublin, you must use it to the best advantage.

* * * * *

"You have nearly enough steamers to do all that Lord Clare suggests, after [*name of vessel illegible*] and 'Pluto' shall have joined you; and I hope that 'Medina,' 'Medusa,' and 'Advice' will have been furnished with some armaments. I think that any equipment of gun-boats must be made matter of local arrangement. I am glad that you are to have a field-day of marines at Kingston, and I was not aware that I had ever expressed myself against the exercise of the seamen with small arms; on the contrary, I think it an excellent thing, though I have heard some officers object to its being carried very far; and if I had additional muskets to give to you at once, you should have them; but the detonating gun is not yet plentifully in store. I will take care that by to-morrow's post you shall have an official letter, approving of all that you have done and propose to do, and giving you full powers. I will not write to you on other parts of your letter; these are not times for the discussion of small things. I only feel glad that you are where you are, and would rather have you there than anyone else in the service. I will write to Lord Clarendon to-morrow; I have not time to-night, and this is but a scrawl. We are anxious about what may happen to-morrow,* but are well prepared. Most truly yours,

"AUCKLAND."

* The day of the Chartist meeting on Kennington Common.

In another communication from Lord Auckland, dated the 12th of April, we find recorded the official approval of all Sir Charles Napier's proceedings, authorizing him to use the force under his command, in conjunction with the Lord-Lieutenant, in the manner he deems best, and advising another steamer to be sent to Limerick, where the "Bloodhound" was already stationed, to co-operate with Major-General Thomas Erskine Napier (Sir Charles's brother), who held that command.

The following letter is from His Royal Highness Prince George—now Duke of Cambridge—who then commanded the Dublin district :—

"Royal Barracks, April 17th, 1848.

"MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—I was exceedingly sorry to miss you when you were kind enough to call upon me on Sunday, and not less sorry to find, on calling at Gilbert's Hotel this day, that you had already started for Kingston. I am very sorry that you have determined upon leaving us, as, in case of anything going wrong, and it really coming to an outbreak, we should have benefited greatly by your kind advice and assistance. Would you kindly leave orders to the senior officer remaining on this station, which I presume will be Captain Williams, to put himself in communication with me, in order that we may give one another mutual support and assistance. I should also be greatly indebted to you, if you would kindly let me know whether you have given directions for a steamer to continue stationed in the river Liffey, with some marines on board, who are to keep up our communication with the Pigeon House. Hoping that we may perhaps have the pleasure of seeing you here again ere long, I beg to remain, my dear Sir Charles, yours most sincerely,

"GEORGE."

The capture of the leaders of the Irish disturbance of 1848, and the manner in which the "rebellion"

was crushed, are now matters of history, and need not be recorded here ; it was, however, decided that, until the trials were over, the Channel squadron should remain in the Cove of Cork, where Sir Charles Napier usefully turned the time to account by landing the seamen and marines, and in having numerous field-days and sham-fights on the shores of that beautiful bay. One of these operations was witnessed by some of the members of the Admiralty Board, who had come to visit the fleet, and who, as Lord Auckland says in one of his letters to Sir Charles, gave a "flourishing account of the Admiral's field-day."

Tranquillity having to a certain degree been re-established in Ireland, the Channel fleet was ordered to Spithead, where it arrived towards the end of May. Amongst various other correspondence of Sir Charles Napier at this period, we find a long and interesting letter from Lord Auckland, enumerating individually, replying to, and generally approving of a great many useful suggestions for the amelioration of the Navy, and some of these have since been carried into effect. Amongst these proposals is one to the effect that able seamen should be divided into two classes—the first, to be exempt from corporal punishment, which was always repugnant to the feelings of Sir Charles Napier ; although he admitted that, constituted as the Navy is at present, this could not possibly be entirely dispensed with ; but he always, when practicable, endeavoured—as we have seen—to substitute other punishments in its stead ; he also suggested in this letter an increase of pay to the petty officers and ships' carpenters. Indeed, the good of his profession, and

the comfort and welfare of the British seamen and marines, were subjects that continually occupied his thoughts, and which he always had at heart. Lord Auckland, who duly appreciated his honest purposes, begged him (in a letter dated June 9th, 1848) to write to him "freely, and without reserve;" in short, all the private correspondence carried on between him and the Admiral was on a footing of the most unreserved confidence and friendship, as I have had elsewhere occasion to remark.

The apparent calm in the affairs of Ireland was soon discovered to be deceptive; and, in consequence of fresh disturbances being anticipated in that quarter, the Channel fleet was in the month of July again required to take up a position in the Cove of Cork. Sir Charles Napier appears now to have had the following ships under his command:—"St. Vincent," "Prince Regent," "Bellerophon," "Blenheim," "Amphion," "Helena," "Frolic," "Tweed," and "Pilot;" with the addition of the steamers, "Dragon," "Sharpshooter," "Reynard," and several others that subsequently joined the squadron, and were mostly sent on detached service to various parts of the Irish coast.

The squadron arrived at Cork on the 25th of July; its presence being urgently required in Ireland, which is testified by the following communication from Mr. Ward, the Secretary of the Admiralty:—

"July 27th, 1848.

"MY DEAR NAPIER,—Though no sailor, I have read your account of the performances of the squadron, on its way to Cork, with the greatest pleasure. You deserve all possible credit for having got there at all, in the teeth of such a gale, and I hope you will convince Lord Clarendon of this, when

you see him, as he seemed to fancy that there had been unnecessary delay. We are all indignant with the stock-jobbing scoundrels who have kept the town in hot water to-day by daring fabrications about the outbreak and the insurrection, and the defeat or disaffection of the troops. The object must have been either to make money, or to hamper the action of the Government by the fear of disturbances here. If so, they have failed in both, for the funds rallied after falling one and a-half, and the troops and steamers ordered off to-day will just reach you in the nick of time. If, as I apprehend, the movement is only anticipated by the report, I cannot believe that O'Brien and Meagher will be such contemptible bullies as to strike without a blow; and though sure to be put down, I do not expect that it will be an easy task. Ever yours, most sincerely,

“H. G. WARD.”

It would, for various reasons, be inexpedient to give at present, in detail, the private correspondence of the authorities with the Commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet; but from documents I find amongst his papers, it appears that there was good reason for the alarm which then prevailed. Sir Charles Napier had due notice from the most reliable authority that foreign vessels had conveyed to the coast of Ireland large supplies of arms and ammunition, with scientific engineers, and that infernal machines had likewise been prepared to use against the fleet when at anchor in the Cove of Cork and Dublin Bay. He likewise received instructions from Lord Auckland (dated August 1st, 1848) to hoist his flag on board one of the fourteen steamers of a flying squadron with which he was instantly to proceed to Dublin; whilst Captain, the present Admiral Sir Henry Chads (of whom Lord Auckland speaks as “having no superior in the best qualities of an officer and seaman”)

was to go up the Shannon; the "Blenheim" being stationed at Limerick, "the good people of which," observes his lordship, "if it is not necessary to frighten, it will be well to amuse."

The gathering storm, however, passed away, and in the beginning of November we find Sir Charles Napier, with his squadron again anchored at Spithead, where Lord Auckland writes to him that he proposes giving him a winter cruise to Gibraltar, Madeira, and Lisbon, "from whence, after a short stay among the geraniums, to return to Spithead."

An incident, however, occurred on the coast of Barbary, which changed this proposed destination of the Channel fleet. The mountainous district of this part of Northern Africa is inhabited by piratical hordes, whose chief occupation consists in plundering such merchant vessels as may be becalmed off their inhospitable shores, known under the denomination of the "Reef." The usual process of these pirates, after murdering the crew of a captured ship, and transferring the cargo to their boats, was—and perhaps still is—to sink her on the spot, obliterating thus all trace of their cruel deed; and many a vessel reported to have foundered at sea is supposed to have met with this unhappy fate.

These outrages have been perpetrated from time immemorial on the flags of all nations by this piratical tribe, who, from the impracticable nature of the coast, are secured from the punishment they so well deserve. The Sultan of Morocco always pleads inability to control this lawless portion of his subjects, and whenever an appeal is made to him, he usually authorizes the

complainants to perform the impossibility of taking the law into their own hands; it follows that a declaration of war against the Sultan, as the responsible party, is the only manner of obtaining redress for the repeated outrages committed by the pirates of this part of the Barbary coast; and the recent hostilities of Spain against Morocco sufficiently shew the difficulties, the expense, and profitless results of such a step.

True, Tangiers and one or two small seaport towns along the shores of Barbary might be destroyed (as in the instance of the French attack, under the Prince de Joinville, on the former place in 1844); but the only result thus obtained is the punishment of the innocent for the guilty; and the indifference of the Emperor of Morocco to such a proceeding is exemplified by his having observed, on hearing the cost of the French expedition against Tangiers, "that had the French only offered him half that sum, he would have saved them much trouble, by destroying the town himself!"

The part of North Western Barbary occupied by these "Reefian" tribes—extending from the Straits of Gibraltar to Cape Tres Forcas—is of a most inaccessible and precipitous nature, being formed by mountain ramifications of the Atlas; whilst in a few rocky creeks along this dangerous and ironbound coast, the pirates draw up their boats, and await the opportunity of attacking any defenceless vessel that may come within their reach. Under these circumstances, the punishment of such outrages is attended with so many difficulties, that they have before now been allowed to pass by without redress. Such was the case rela-

tive to the capture by these people of the British merchant brig "Ruth," in 1846; and it was the repetition in 1848 of a similar outrage on an English ship called the "Three Sisters," that caused a change in the proposed destination of the Channel fleet, whilst lying at Spithead towards the close of the latter year. There was, moreover, another reason of complaint against the Moorish Government, from the infraction of the commercial treaty with England, and the consequent losses some English merchants had sustained to a considerable amount. For this, reparation was also to be sought, and Lord Auckland thus writes to Sir Charles Napier on the subject:—

"Admiralty, Nov. 25th, 1848.

"MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—I find that the wind still keeps you. I am glad to hear that Captain Dacres is better. I have written to the Foreign Office, and said that you will be ready to do to the Emperor of Morocco whatever may be desired. 1st. You must endeavour to sweep the coast with light craft from Tetuan to Melilla, and destroy all boats. I fear, however, that from the nature of the coast this would be a very difficult and hazardous operation, and it would be probably very unprofitable. 2nd. You might attempt the blockade of the ports on the Western Coast. I fear at this season of the year it would be impossible to do this effectually. 3rd. You might knock Tangiers or Mogador to pieces; but this would be violent, and not to be thought of for a first proceeding.

"My recommendation is, that you be instructed to send a steamer to Mogador, with such just demands as may be determined upon, and with an intimation that you have a strong force to insist upon a compliance with these demands, in such manner as may be necessary; and to see what comes of this. Very truly yours,

"AUCKLAND."

official instructions, dated Nov. 28, 1848,

received by Sir Charles Napier from the Foreign Office, through the Admiralty, amounted to no instructions at all. He was "to take the measures he deemed best for chastising the pirates, but not to undertake it unless he considered the means at his disposal sufficient for the same." In short, he was left to act according to circumstances; and these vague instructions only shewed the impossibility of attempting anything without a formal declaration of war—a measure it was not, for many reasons, then deemed expedient to adopt.

The fleet was delayed for a considerable time, by bad weather and contrary winds, at Spithead, where the Admiral received the following letter from Lord Palmerston, characterised, as are most of his lordship's communications, by great clearness and decision of purpose:—

"Foreign Office. Dec. 5, 1848.

"MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—I will forward the letters you have sent me.

"With regard to the work which has been cut out for you, I know very well that we may say of it what the old French minister said to a lady about a job which she asked him to do: '*Si c'est difficile c'est fait; si c'est impossible cela se fera!*' But we feel full confidence not only that you will accomplish whatever the force under your command may be equal to, but also that you will not undertake more than that force can fairly be expected to do. I am aware that this season of the year is very unfavourable for either of the services and operations pointed out to you, and therefore I have written to the Admiralty to say that any political inconvenience which might result from postponing any of these operations till the spring, would be infinitely less than that which would arise from any mishap to any of the vessels or their crews, in consequence of our choosing the winter months for your operations. If, therefore, you and the

Admiralty should, upon considering the matter, think that it would be advisable to wait till the spring brings better weather, I shall be perfectly content to wait till then, and would much prefer doing so, rather than run any unnecessary risks. Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

The temporary cessation of long-continued south-westerly gales enabled the Channel fleet to leave Spithead about the middle of December, and Sir Charles Napier put into Lisbon on the 4th of January, 1849. Whilst there, he received the melancholy intelligence of Lord Auckland's death, together with the following letter on the subject from Captain Hamilton of the Admiralty, dated:—

“Admiralty, Jan. 4, 1849.

“MY DEAR NAPIER,—I condole with you personally, as well as publicly, on the most mournful and heavy loss with which this year has commenced. It will be difficult for you to find anything that will make up for the entire confidence subsisting between Lord Auckland and yourself, and the unreserve and friendliness of the valuable communications so regularly kept up. It must really be as the loss of the best and highest professional friend to you, and I quite feel for you. Amongst the admirals serving, and those employed on important service, there are none on whom the blow will fall more as a calamity than on yourself.

“Here it is difficult to realize the loss of the head and hand (and heart as well) that so gently, yet so admirably, conducted this great machine. It has, comparatively speaking, and for the moment, paralysed its working, and a heavy cloud accompanies this momentary want of action. Lord Auckland was universally beloved, and it was a feeling following upon a sincere respect.

“The year has begun heavily and mournfully for us—may it otherwise bring good to you, and brighter days!

“Believe me, yours truly,

“W. A. HAMILTON.”

Sir Charles Napier replied as follows:—

“‘St. Vincent,’ Lisbon, Jan. 16, 1849.

“MY DEAR HAMILTON,—The death of Lord Auckland is indeed a heavy blow to me privately, and to the service publicly; his successor will not have an easy task to perform. He was the first lord I ever was on such a confidential footing with, and I do not think it will ever be possible to be on such terms with another—who that other will be I have no idea.

“I sail to-morrow for Gibraltar, and shall despatch the ‘Stromboli’ with Mr. Hay’s despatches, and write him to come to me at Gibraltar, and you shall have the result of our consultation. By my orders I am only allowed to chastise the Reef pirates—that, I presume, can only be done by burning all their boats.

“The chastisement of the Emperor of Morocco is, I apprehend, an ulterior operation, when sanctioned by the Government, and probably will be in the spring; but I know nothing of the state of the coast or the weather as yet.”

After a short stay at Lisbon, the squadron left the Tagus for Gibraltar, which was reached after a rough and stormy passage.

From the small portion of the correspondence between Lord Auckland and Sir Charles Napier which the limited space available in this work has enabled me to give, the reader will perceive the friendly and confidential footing on which they were—and the Admiral wishing, no doubt, to be on the same amicable terms with Lord Auckland’s successor, wrote thus:—

“To the Right Hon. Sir Francis Baring,
First Lord of the Admiralty.

“‘St. Vincent,’ Gibraltar,
Jan. 31, 1849.

“MY DEAR SIR,—I have been so much accustomed to write confidentially to Lord Auckland, that I cannot let the opportunity pass without sending you a few lines. You will observe by my public letters what I have been doing, and

what I intend to do. The 'Sidon' is still at anchor at Tangier, but I hope Mr. Hay will get away to-day, and I hope in a week or less we shall prove what the Emperor of Morocco intends doing. I hope you approve of my keeping the 'Regent' here till an answer comes, as it might weaken our demands if she went, and I have taken care to let it be known that I expect two more line-of-battle ships: it is the opinion of Mr. Hay that he will give in, and it is also mine.

"Relative to the Reef gentry, I will see what is the best way of punishing them when Mr. Hay comes back.

"We had a very rough passage from Lisbon, but we are now all to rights, and fit for any service. I yesterday inspected the 'Regent,' and found her all I could wish. The 'Rifleman' did so much better in the last gale, since her ballast was taken out, that I shall keep her till I hear from the Admiralty.

"Believe me, my dear sir, yours very truly,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

The feeling which prompted him to write in this manner appears to have been mutual, for on the 6th of February he received at Gibraltar a letter from Sir Francis Baring, dated the 22nd of January, in an equally friendly tone, requesting Sir Charles Napier to communicate as confidentially with him as he had been in the habit of doing with Lord Auckland; at the same time expressing reliance on his prudence in not taking any hostile steps against the Moors without further instructions, and adding that his conduct would always meet with favourable construction and support at home.

Let us now endeavour briefly to sum up this "Moorish Question." The cause of our grievance, viz., the infraction of a commercial treaty by the Moorish Government, and the outrage committed by the Reef pirates on the British flag, has already been

adverted to. The former case, after a lengthened correspondence, was finally—in consequence of the presence of the British fleet—settled by Mr. Hay, our Consul-General at Tangiers, obtaining compensation on account of the English merchants for the losses it was proved they had sustained; but the "Reef" business was attended with less satisfactory results.

The British merchant ship "Three Sisters" had been captured and run ashore on the coast, at Cape Tres Forcas, near Tramontana Bay, on the 2nd of November, 1848; but Captain M'Cleverty, commanding the "Polyphemus" (which happened to be at Gibraltar at the time), succeeded in recapturing and getting off the vessel, though not without considerable resistance on the part of the inhabitants of the coast, who fired on his ship from behind the rocks, and wounded Lieutenant Waxey and three of his seamen before he could get his capture out of reach of their long-barrelled guns. Though most anxious to inflict a summary punishment on these people, Captain M'Cleverty, in consequence of the impracticable nature of the coast, refrained from attempting a landing, for which prudent conduct we find he was highly praised by Sir William Parker, his Commander-in-chief, and received—I believe—Post rank in consequence.

As a similar outrage had taken place in 1846, in the case of the "Ruth," which it was not convenient then to resent, Sir Charles Napier was anxious, if possible, to make an example of the Reef pirates, which might deter them from a repetition of the offence; and I have gathered from his correspondence of that time the fol-

lowing narrative of his proceedings on this occasion :—

“On the evening of the 17th of February,” writes Sir Charles Napier, “we embarked Her Majesty’s 34th regiment in the ‘Sidon,’ and the marines of the ‘St. Vincent,’ ‘Vanguard,’ and ‘Powerful,’ on board the steamers ‘Stromboli,’ ‘Gladiator,’ and ‘Polyphemus,’ accompanied by the ‘Reynard’ and ‘Plumper,’ and started at eight o’clock for Cape Tres Forcas, to see what could be done against the Reef pirates. On arriving off Cape Tres Forcas, the Admiral despatched the ‘Polyphemus’ to Melilla. She brought back a Spaniard, who, however, appeared to know very little about the pirates, or where their boats were to be found. At daylight the Admiral stood in for Tres Forcas, and ran down to the westward along shore. A few people here and there appeared on the cliffs, and lighted fires; and when they reached the spot where the ‘Three Sisters’ was captured, about forty or fifty men were seen high up among the mountains, as also a few miserable huts and two fishing-boats on the beach, but nothing that the Admiral thought worth attacking.

“After running some distance further to the westward, they saw three more fishing boats, but the country appeared thinly populated here, and only a few patches of cultivation were seen. The Admiral then returned to Tres Forcas, and went to Melilla to see what was in that neighbourhood. A few Moors were close to the lines, and fired musket shots at the ‘Sidon.’ The Governor informed the Admiral he had made two sorties, and that the Moors had immediately decamped to the mountains. When he stopped, they halted also, and as the Spaniards returned, took long shots at them. The same thing no doubt would have occurred to us had the English landed. The Governor also stated that in a couple of days they can collect 8,000 or 10,000 men, but they have seldom more than 200 or 300 in his neighbourhood. The fortification of Melilla is situated on the eastern side of the promontory, and is about three leagues distant from the sea on the west side. A landing on both sides might be made to cut off the inhabitants of Tres Forcas from the other part

of the country. This would be a long operation, and would require a great body of men, as they would take to the fastnesses, and retire from hill to hill, in a country of which we are totally ignorant; and even if we were not attacked in the rear, the success would be very questionable.

"The only way," continues Sir Charles Napier, "I see of properly punishing these people, is by landing in the long days, when the corn is ripe, and setting fire to it, and seizing their cattle (their houses are not worth destroying), taking care to let them know why we had done so.

"When I went to the Reef country, I did expect to find something tangible to attack, but whether, knowing we were at Gibraltar, they had taken the precaution to remove their boats into the country I cannot say, nor could I obtain any certain information as to the position of their large towns or villages, but presume, if they have any, they are inland."

Although strongly urged to make a descent on the coast by certain persons who had no responsibility to incur, Sir Charles Napier, in this case—as he subsequently did on a more important occasion—had sufficient moral courage to resist his own inclination to chastise those insolent barbarians. He knew there was little probability of succeeding in such an attempt against an enemy whom it would have been impossible to reach, and who—being admirable marksmen and long shots, and accustomed to scramble like goats among their rocky fastnesses—might have picked off our heavily armed and accoutred soldiers and marines, without any possibility of bringing such foes to close quarters, or making them feel the sharpness of British steel; whilst the consequences of a failure would have been injurious in the extreme.

These wild tribes of the clan called "Benoé-Bougaffir," although they appeared to have eluded the punishment they so richly deserved, did not, how-

ever, feel quite at ease. They communicated, through the Spanish governor of Melilla, by a flag of truce, their desire to compromise matters by the payment of 20,000 dollars for the capture of the "Three Sisters," should this meet with the sanction and approval of the Sultan of Morocco. Of this proposal—though probably merely an expedient in order to gain time—Sir Charles Napier thought right to inform the British Consul-General at Tangiers, that he might make the Sultan acquainted with it. The Consul, however, on the plea of not having had Lord Palmerston's instructions on the subject, declined any interference in the matter, which was therefore left in abeyance, and the Admiral, not deeming himself authorized to take any further steps, and seeing no occasion for the squadron to remain longer at Gibraltar, stated his intention—pursuant to orders received from the Admiralty—of sailing for England. He accordingly took his departure on the following day, the 16th of March, 1849; arrived, after a boisterous passage, at Spithead, on the 5th of April, and struck his flag on the 9th; having had the command of the Channel fleet for rather less than two years.

The ensuing month Sir Charles Napier was offered the command at Cork, which, however, he declined, and again retired to Merchiston, where his time was, as heretofore, divided between rural occupations and writing on professional topics. He had, both when on active service and on half-pay, pointed out many unpleasant truths to successive First Lords of the Admiralty; and these, in the course of the year 1850, were collected and published, with the title of "Letters

on the State of the Navy,” under the editorial care of his cousin, Sir William Napier, the historian of the Peninsular War. This step was highly resented in official quarters. The then First Lord, Sir Francis Baring, accused the Admiral of “want of discretion,” and averred that he “had set a most unfortunate example to the naval service, by attacking Her Majesty’s Ministers in the newspapers.” Sir Charles sent him the following answer, which appears to have concluded the correspondence, as no reply has been found amongst the Admiral’s papers :—

“How you could have formed such an opinion of me” (*i.e.* his alleged “want of discretion”) “I am at a loss to know, for it is not to be found in the records of the Admiralty. If you examine them, you will find no proof of want of discretion in the whole of my service, which, I am proud to say, will bear comparison with that of any officer, and no one can shew more scars and fewer favours. Yours was not the opinion of my esteemed friend, Lord Auckland, or of Lord Palmerston; neither was it the opinion of any one member of your Board; if there is truth in man, which the scurrilous articles in the *Morning Herald*—the organ of the Admiralty—since I hoisted my flag, sometimes make me doubt.”

The phrase, “want of discretion,” was, however, serviceable to the opponents of the Admiral when they could not controvert his facts; and I find Lord John Russell uses it in a letter to Sir Charles Napier, of the 25th January, 1850; to which the latter thus replied :—

“It is satisfactory to me to find, by your lordship’s letter, that, although you share in Sir Francis Baring’s doubts of my discretion, you confine those doubts to the publication of my letters.

“Had I consulted my own interest, I certainly would not have published these letters, for I knew full well they could

not be acceptable to men in office; but I had a public duty to perform, which I was determined to do at all risks."

This determination to perform a public duty, at all risks and sacrifices, was a point in the Admiral's character that his opponents either *could not* or *would not* perceive; and, viewed as affecting his self-interest, it must indeed be allowed that he was very "indiscreet." He never hesitated, either from fear or favour, to speak his mind—and thus he provoked the wrath of men in power. He spurned the "discretion" that would counsel him to be silent when the interests of his country and his profession were concerned, when glaring wrongs had to be redressed, or the sailors' rights required his advocacy and support; and it was for the furtherance of these objects that he again tried hard to obtain a seat in Parliament; but he did not succeed in this till his return from the Baltic campaign, when the electors of Southwark chose him as their representative—a distinction which he enjoyed until his death.

About the time that the Admiral retired once more to Merchiston, his cousin, General Sir Charles Napier, who had lately returned from India, purchased an estate, called Oaklands, situated in that neighbourhood; and the companionship of these two remarkable men was again renewed after a separation of many years, during which they had both fought well and successfully in their country's cause. They were now much together, and we find the following, amongst other amusing notices of the sailor, in the soldier Charles Napier's journal* :—

* From Sir W. Napier's "Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles Napier," vol. iv., p. 331-337.

"*July 11th, 1851.*—I have had fun with Black Charles: he told me to cut down some fine fir-trees, which he said looked like poles for monkeys; but liking trees, I told him I would buy monkeys for the poles. Then he ridiculed my new water-tank, saying my fish would be queer ones; I said I would put him in, and he would be the queerest fish there. It is surrounded by cherry-trees, and therefore I call it *pond-de-cherry*."

The General, alluding to a work on India that he was then preparing for publication, expresses the following opinion, which is given here, as applicable to those writings of the Admiral, who, by always omitting the *ifs* and *expletives* alluded to, so often raised a hornet's nest about his ears:—

"Men are now growing into such refinement, that to be indignant is wrong, is 'bad taste.' Sneaking hypocrisy is being well-bred—*refined*! Right and wrong are to be so shuffled together with *ifs* and *expletives*, and *doubts*, that a rascal comes out as clean as the best man. I suppose I must fall as much as possible into this tone."

It was not, however, in the nature of either General or Admiral Sir Charles Napier "to fall into this tone," and they both continued to speak and write their opinions freely on every subject; but scarcely two years elapsed after the General had penned the above remarks, when he was gathered to his rest, and the Admiral announced the fact in the following short note addressed to Lady Napier:—

"September 9th, 1853.

"The General was buried yesterday, and all Portsmouth were at his funeral. It was not a military one, but all the soldiers, and officers, and the Navy attended; it was a pleasing thing to see such respect shown to so good and great a man. He had suffered much and long, before he died; he fought a

battle with the Enemy with as much courage as he always did, but was beaten at last."

There is little in the life of Admiral Sir Charles Napier that would interest the general reader from the time he gave up the Channel fleet till the period of his appointment to the Baltic command, in the early spring of 1854. The intervening space was passed in his usual manner, between rural and literary pursuits; and he was constantly endeavouring, through the medium of the Press, to open the eyes of the authorities, and to put this country on its guard against the probable result of a war with either Russia or France; which, at the low ebb our naval means had been then reduced to, he considered we were not in a fit state to meet.

"The question is,"* he says, "can the French and Russians send a fleet to sea before Great Britain? As to Russia, there cannot be a doubt of it; she keeps up a large fleet of from forty to fifty sail-of-the-line in the Baltic and Black Sea; one is ready to act against Turkey, and the other against Great Britain; and when the Baltic is open, she can bring that fleet on our coast when she pleases.

"I have shown what France could have done, had she been so disposed; and most certainly, should a similar opportunity offer, she will not let it slip. . . .

"We have great reason to be afraid of France, because she possesses a large disposable army, and our arsenals are comparatively undefended—London entirely so, and we have no sufficient naval force at home. Of ships (with the exception of steamers) we have enough; but what is the use of them without men? They are only barracks, and are of no more use for defence than if we were to build batteries all over the country, without soldiers to put into them."

His remonstrances appear at last to have attracted

* "State of the Navy," p. 256.

attention, for in 1852, when there were serious apprehensions of a sudden outbreak with France, Sir Charles Napier received from the Duke of Northumberland, then First Lord of the Admiralty, a communication expressing the wish to have the Admiral's opinion on the state of our naval defences, and relative to their disposition in the event of an attack by the French.

The opinion thus asked for was no doubt given, but I can find no trace of it amongst the Admiral's papers. Nothing worthy of record appears in his correspondence during the year 1853, except a letter from Sir James Graham—at that time First Lord of the Admiralty—dated 6th July, 1853, informing him that an admiral's good service pension having become vacant by the death of Sir Charles Bullen, he considered Sir Charles Napier's claims to this distinction for gallant conduct on active service to be irresistible; that Sir James had, therefore, great pleasure in bestowing this reward upon him, and was glad to have the opportunity of thus recognizing his professional merits. Sir Charles Napier, in reply, thanked Sir James Graham for remembering him, and still more for the manner in which he had expressed himself regarding his services whilst conferring upon him the good service pension. The Admiral added, "I see the Russians have crossed the Pruth; if my services are wanted, I am quite ready for work, both in body and mind."

Some time elapsed before any notice was taken of this offer, but it seems to have eventually led to his command of the Baltic fleet.

CHAPTER VII.

THE RUSSIAN WAR—APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF
THE BALTIC FLEET—FEBRUARY TO JUNE, 1854.

WE are now about to describe that period of Sir Charles Napier's life which has caused more controversy than any former portion of his long and eventful career. Before entering on this part of my work, it may be necessary to premise, that it is not undertaken with any other feeling than a desire to shew, by a statement of facts, how unjust were the assertions and accusations of those who endeavoured to lay on innocent shoulders the responsibility of acts carried out by their own instructions, and of the consequent results, for which *they* alone were answerable to the British nation.

The gross injustice of the attacks to which Sir Charles Napier was so long exposed, both in Parliament, and through the medium of an adverse portion of the Press—the unfairness of censuring him for not accomplishing impossibilities at the risk of losing a magnificent fleet—the praise due to the moral courage which enabled him to resist being

“goaded” on, to attempt an act of insanity—and the merit of having effected successfully, in the Baltic campaign of 1854, all that in human possibility could have been done with the inadequate means at his command ; —all this is so clearly set forth, and his justification made so apparent, by the publication, in 1857, of the “History of the Baltic Campaign,”* (to which frequent reference will hereafter be made), that little more remains to be done, except to sketch briefly, with a few comments, the chief incidents of that campaign—allowing facts to speak for themselves—and these facts will be further corroborated by introducing rather more of Sir Charles Napier’s correspondence on the subject, than was thought advisable or expedient to give, at the time when that work was first brought before the public.

It is hoped that these letters may prove of some interest to the reader, as showing more clearly the great difficulties the Admiral had to contend with, during that arduous enterprise on which he had been sent by the unanimous voice of the British nation.

In setting forth these facts, and introducing as much of this correspondence as the limits of the present work will admit, the author’s sole motive is to do justice to the memory of the late Admiral Sir Charles Napier, in which endeavour, he hopes to avoid all controversy, or discussion, on a subject that may be considered as already settled.

If the reader will refer to Sir Charles Napier’s work on the “State of the Navy”—to his letters written at different periods to the various heads and

* “The History of the Baltic Campaign of 1854 ; from documents and other materials furnished by Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B. Edited by J. Butler Earp.” (1857.)

members of the Admiralty (of which we have given numerous extracts in the course of this memoir), to his speeches in Parliament, and his repeated communications to the Press—it will be found that his constant theme was the probability of a naval war between England, and either Russia or France—more particularly with the former power; an event he predicted ever since—nay, long before—the great Eastern question of 1840-41; a question he had himself so greatly contributed to bring to a satisfactory close. He had constantly endeavoured to put the country on its guard against what—despite our intentional blindness—could assuredly not be considered as very unlikely to occur; he had even written a strong letter to Lord Aberdeen on this subject;* and when the event, he had so long foreseen, did actually take place—when the overbearing conduct of the Autocrat at last forced us into a war—that war found our navy in the state of unpreparedness which he had so long and so often foretold.

True, we had in our harbours at that time many magnificent ships; but those ships were not of the proper description for the undertaking in view; and when, by the most strenuous efforts, they were at last made ready for sea, where, it might be asked, were the seamen with which that noble fleet was to be manned? They were the “empty barracks without soldiers,” to which, on a former occasion, they had been so aptly compared by Sir Charles Napier. But we are anticipating events.

Towards the close of the preceding year, the North

* *Vide* “Baltic Campaign,” p. 1.

American station became vacant. Sir Charles Napier had previously applied for employment, though not for this particular command ; but when, near the expiration of 1853, it became evident that a rupture with Russia could not be long deferred, Sir James Graham—then First Lord of the Admiralty—wrote unexpectedly to him, stating that he had not overlooked his just claims for employment ; that he gladly recognized his gallant services and distinguished merit, but that, with reference to the vacancy on the North American station, it was as well—under present circumstances—to have him near at hand and ready for any emergency, as in the course of the next six months a fitting opportunity might present itself of a vice-admiral's command becoming vacant—Sir Charles Napier having already attained that rank.

“This letter from Sir James Graham was very remarkable. Sir Charles Napier had not solicited the command of the North American station, nor would he have accepted it had it been offered to him. The letter, therefore, can only be regarded as a feeler, as to whether he would take the command of the Baltic Fleet in case of war.” *

Sir James Graham's letter elicited the following reply :—

“In the event of war, I conclude you intend sending me to the Baltic, and in the event of peace I fear you destine me for Sheerness. In the first case, I am ready and willing to serve my country as long as I have health and strength, even on that station, which will be an important and serious one. Had I been in the Mediterranean now, I could have rendered good service. I should have had considerable influence with the Turks, as having before led them to victory, and they have not forgotten me.”

* From “Campaign in the Baltic.”

Sir Charles Napier's wish was evidently then, what it always had been : to obtain the Mediterranean command ; and with the constant impression on his mind that a war with Russia must sooner or later take place, he had—even before the former settlement of the Eastern question, and when at Constantinople in 1839—always an eye on Sebastopol. But the choice did not rest with him ; and when, at the commencement of the year 1854, all doubts of an approaching war were removed, and he was pointed out by public opinion and common report, as the officer who was to command the Baltic Fleet, he wrote to the Admiralty requesting to know the decision of the Cabinet, in order that he might be kept no longer in suspense. It was not, however, till the 23rd of February, at an interview with the First Lord, that he was informed of the certainty of his appointment ; when it appears he took the opportunity of pointing out the deficiencies of the fleet which it was proposed to place under his command, with suggestions as to the best way of obtaining seamen in the limited time there would probably be to make arrangements. These observations were not taken kindly, and on the following day he received a letter to the effect that, “if dissatisfied with the preparations which had been made and were in progress, and if he had not entire confidence in the strength of the combined forces of France and England, he had better say so at once, and decline to accept a command which, in his opinion, would not redound to his honour or to the safety of his country.” To this communication Sir Charles Napier sent the following reply to Sir James Graham :—

“18, Albemarle-street, 24th February, 1854.

“MY DEAR SIR JAMES,—I thought it my duty to point out to you what I thought the best way of manning the fleet, to ensure a great, glorious, and speedy victory over the Russians.

“I never made difficulties when service was required, and, after a long life spent in honour, I am not going to make them now.

“I should consider myself a coward, and unworthy of holding Her Majesty’s commission, were I to decline any service, be it ever so desperate.

“Lord Nelson never declined service ; no more shall I—particularly after the confidence you placed in me—but, with means at my disposal, will do all I can for the honour and glory of my Queen and country, which shall not be tarnished in my hands. And I certainly have no apprehension of failing either in good will or hearty concurrence with the Board of Admiralty.—I am, my dear Sir James, yours very faithfully,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

This letter decided the question. On the 25th of February he received the official notification of his appointment to the command of the Baltic fleet, and that he was to hoist his flag on board the “Duke of Wellington,” a noble three-decker screw ship, of 130 guns. Commodore—now Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, was named Captain of the fleet ; Rear-Admirals Chads and Corry his second and third in command ; Captain Gordon his Flag-Captain ; Lieutenant Agnew his Flag-Lieutenant ; and Mr. Ozzard (who had been with him on board the “St. Vincent”) his Secretary.

The fleet that Sir Charles Napier was appointed to command—but which, it may be observed, was as yet neither assembled nor manned—consisted of the “Duke of Wellington,” the “St. Jean D’Acre,” the “Prince Regent,” “Princess Royal,” “Cæsar,” “Neptune,” “Edinburgh,” and “Blenheim,” of the line ; and of

the steam-frigates "Imperieuse," "Arrogant," "Tribune," "Amphion," "Odin," and "Valorous." Some of these vessels were at Lisbon, and others had to be collected from various parts.

"At Plymouth were the 'Royal George,' 'James Watt,' and 'Nile,' of the line, just commissioned; the 'Hogue,' block-ship, and the 'St. George,' ordinary guard-ship; at Sheerness were the 'Cressy' and 'Majestic' of the line, just commissioned, and the 'Monarch,' ordinary guard-ship; at Cork was the 'Ajax,' flag-ship; at Chatham the 'Boscawen,' which had been commissioned for the flag-ship in the West Indies. All these ships were intended for the Baltic fleet, leaving no reserve for the defence of the coasts of England but the 'St. Vincent' and 'Royal William,' ordinary guard-ships, at Portsmouth and Plymouth; and the 'Waterloo,' flag-ship, at Sheerness. The 'Hannibal' was commissioned at the latter port a week after the squadron had sailed. Such were our inadequate resources for defence, had the Russians been able to get out of the Baltic, and make an attempt on our unprotected shores."*

The great difficulty consisted in manning such a fleet. Impressment was no longer to be thought of; but, strange to say, the bill which had passed through Parliament, empowering, in case of war, the grant of an ample bounty to seamen, was not acted upon, and consequently most of the ships were very inefficiently manned—some of them chiefly with landsmen of the lowest class. Nothing had been done towards the training of the men, and no provision was even made to clothe them in a manner required by the climate to which they were about to be sent.

"Of such materials was the Baltic fleet composed. The Commander-in-chief, immediately on his appointment, sent orders to Admirals Chads and Corry to use their utmost ex-

* From the "Baltic Campaign of 1854."

ertions to bring the men on in gun-drill, &c., and not to limit the expenditure of powder and shot for exercise. These orders were zealously carried out ; and Admiral Chads, who had been appointed on the 6th of February, had been indefatigable in his exertions to discipline the crews."

An order was moreover issued, that as there were not sufficient officers for the ships, the number of mates and midshipmen should be increased.

Sir Charles Napier certainly did not, under these circumstances, enter with favourable auspices on his command ; but he nevertheless despaired not of making good, by energy and exertion, those manifold deficiencies and defects. In proof of this, I may here cite his directions to Commodore Sir Michael Seymour :—

"Merchiston, March 1st, 1854.

"MY DEAR SEYMOUR,—I am glad you have accepted my offer of Captain of the Fleet. It is a most arduous office, and I have no doubt you will fill it well. When Martin's pendant comes down, you had better hoist yours on board the 'Duke,' and set all the ships that are to be under my orders, at work at their guns without delay. They are to send to you powder and shot, if there is room. I have great doubts about the supply of powder ; so be sure the magazines are well worked, and give particular orders. Mind, in dumb exercise false cartridges are handed up from the magazines, put into the gun with a shot and wad, and rammed home ; and when the gun is nearly full, draw them and allow no other exercise, and use tubes every time ; but take care that one wad is kept in the gun, because the tube ignites the wad, and when it returns to the magazine it may be on fire. This happened twice—once in 'Powerful,' and again in 'St. Vincent.' Understand that the dumb exercise with tubes is only to be used by the ships who cannot fire shot. As it will be necessary to give orders to the ships, say it is the Commander-in-chief's directions, and sign 'Captain of the Fleet.' I suppose orders are given to take the ships under your orders that are in the Sound, and I suppose it

will be necessary to allow you to look after them in harbour. Get the 'St. George' into the Sound as soon as possible. I quite disapprove of taking the fore-cabin from the Admiral. With such a fleet, it is quite impossible to entertain the officers. You had better, therefore, restore the fore-cabin. I have spoken to both Dundas and Milne, and I suppose you can do it without any order; but don't let the ships be delayed on that account. Perhaps it would be best to exercise one watch in the forenoon and the other in the afternoon; but that I leave to you—but let the system be regular. I should think you will have captains of guns sufficient to instruct the men, and let the exercise be perfectly plain at first. Write to me in town, 18, Albemarle-street.—Yours very truly,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

“But,” remarks the editor of the “Baltic Campaign,” “the public, ignorant of these matters, and confident in that noble and favourite arm of defence, upon which the nation so especially relies for security—though too often without inquiring as to its real efficiency, upon which alone their security can be based—was greatly pleased at the appointment of Sir Charles Napier to the command; whilst, from his previous exploits, popular enthusiasm indulged in the most extravagant expectations as to what the squadron, under his command, would shortly accomplish. The utter insufficiency of his badly manned squadron, as compared with the Russian fleet and forts—some of the latter far superior in strength to Sebastopol—was not taken into account.” Nor, it might be added, was it taken into account that this fleet, though composed of such magnificent ships, was totally unprovided with gun-boats, smaller vessels of light draught, and mortars: accessories absolutely required for the success of any enterprise in the creeks and

shallows of the Baltic Sea,* where the very size of our noble line-of-battle ships—however formidable and efficient they might have elsewhere proved—rendered them of little use; since the Russian fleets wisely remained behind their forts, which the British vessels, from the draught of water they required, could not possibly approach.

“But,” as it is observed in the “Baltic Campaign,” “the British fleet was a British fleet; and as its Commander had formerly beaten all opponents, he could do the same again;—all this was regarded as a matter of course.”

The Reform Club, of which Sir Charles Napier had long been a member, entertained him at dinner on the 7th of March—when Viscount Palmerston, Sir James Graham, and several other Ministers attended. A good deal of boasting was indulged in by some of those present, but not by the Admiral, who honestly stated that steam was now to be tried in war for the first time on a large scale, and that no man could be sure of the result; but that he would do his best, and hoped to succeed.

On the 9th of March he received orders to proceed to sea, and for the fleet to “rendezvous” at Wingo Sound, on the coast of Sweden, near Gottenborg. He immediately went to Merchiston, took leave of his family, and hoisted his flag on board the “Duke of Wellington,” after receiving a flattering address from

* I find amongst Sir Charles Napier's papers a communication from the Admiralty, dated 12th March, 1854, with the suggestion that “it might be possible for him to *hire* some small vessels of the sort and size required!” Query—when, where, and how? It may be observed, that no pilots had been provided for the navigation of the Baltic Sea.

the Mayor and Corporation of Portsmouth, to which he made a suitable reply.

The following account of Sir Charles Napier's departure from Portsmouth is given in a letter from his daughter:—

“Yesterday we saw the last of our dear father. So hurried, so painfully hurried, you will scarcely believe me when I tell you he went to sea destitute of the common necessities of life, and his cabin totally unfurnished, with the exception of a table and chair! After meeting at the ‘George’ Hotel, we went with him to the Guildhall, where the Municipality presented him with an address, which he replied to in his usual straightforward, honest, unvarnished style, thanking them for the honour they did him, and for their good wishes, but at the same time reminded them not to expect *too much*, as he was going against no common enemy; and that such changes had taken place, that the introduction of steam had so completely altered the system of naval warfare, that it was impossible to say how much or how little might be achieved; but one thing he could answer for: that both officers and men would do everything in their power to help him, to the best of their ability, in upholding the honour of the country and its navy. He promised them that they would all do their duty, and he should ever remember with gratitude and pride the kindness and good wishes of the people of Portsmouth.

“After leaving the Guildhall, the crowd was so great, that it was with difficulty we reached the Victoria pier. The enthusiasm and warmth of good wishes, the hearty shakes of the hand as he passed along, the heartfelt ‘God speed him,’ and ‘God save him,’ were most affecting. At the end of the pier, another farewell address awaited him. An immense concourse of people had here collected; a large steamer, crowded to excess, had taken its station alongside, and with the greatest difficulty he succeeded in procuring a boat to take him to the ‘Lightning’ steamer. We embarked with him, and remained about three hours. A signal was now

made for the Admiral and Captains of the fleet to proceed on board the 'Fairy,' to be presented to her Majesty. It was a beautiful sight to see the ships weigh anchor and sail in line; the 'Duke of Wellington' majestically bringing up the rear. We followed in the 'Lightning,' and watched him to the last. The 'Fairy' hove-to until the 'Duke of Wellington' passed, when the Queen, who appeared to participate in the general enthusiasm, graciously waved her handkerchief in token of farewell. The men manned the rigging and tops, and gave her Majesty three hearty British cheers. At the last moment he wrote a few hasty parting lines to our mother. Admiral Berkeley accompanied him on board, and I could not refrain from remarking to him, 'that certainly no officer had ever been hurried off with so little time to prepare.'"

The squadron now consisted of the following ships:—

SCREW-SHIPS OF THE LINE.

"Duke of Wellington" (Flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier)	Capt. George T. Gordon.
"Royal George"	Capt. Henry J. Codrington.
"St. Jean d'Acre"	Capt. Hon. Henry Keppel.
"Princess Royal"	Capt. Lord C. Paget.

BLOCK-SHIPS.

"Edinburgh" (Flag of Rear- Admiral Chads)	Capt. R. S. Hewlett.
"Blenheim"	Capt. Hon. F. Pelham.
"Hogue"	Capt. William Ramsay
"Ajax"	Capt. Frederick Warden.

FRIGATES.

"Impérieuse"	Capt. Randle B. Watson.
"Arrogant"	Capt. H. R. Yelverton.
"Amphion"	Capt. Astley C. Key.
"Tribune"	Capt. Hon. S. T. Carnegie.

PADDLE STEAMERS.

"Leopard"	Capt. George Giffard.
"Dragon"	Capt. James Wilcox.
"Valorous"	Capt. Claude H. M. Buckle.

Total, {
 Four ships of the line.
 Four block-ships.
 Four frigates.
 Three steamers.

The fleet arrived at Wingo Sound on the 10th of March, when Sir Charles Napier addressed the following letter to the First Lord:—

“ ‘ Duke of Wellington,’ Wingo Sound, March 18th, 1854.

“MY DEAR SIR JAMES,—We arrived here at one, after a very favourable passage. Several of the ships parted in a thick fog, but we picked them all up here, except the ‘Royal George,’ who, I hope, will cast up to-morrow. We have had a good deal of exercise one way and another, and are making progress; and I hope in a short time we shall be fit for battle. With the exception of the ‘Edinburgh,’ ‘Leopard,’ and ‘St. Jean d’Acre,’ they are very bad company keepers, and it will require great drilling to keep them together—they have not the least idea of it. There are no pilots for the Belt here, but to-morrow I shall proceed to Copenhagen and see the Minister, and bring up pilots from Elsineur.

“I have picked up two colliers, and brought them in here, which will nearly fill us up. Their going to Elsineur was all wrong. I have a steamer outside looking out for them, and those I do not pick up I shall order to Kiel from Elsineur.

“I have no news, except that I believe that the Russian advanced ships are at Sweaborg. There are none in Revel, but I shall keep the paddle-steamers outside for fear of a surprise. The pilots here say this has been a mild winter, but ‘Miranda,’ I hope, will soon be here with information.

“I shall proceed with the utmost dispatch in the execution of my orders, and remain, my dear Sir James, yours very truly,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

“P.S.—I have opened the orders from the Secretary of State, which shall be punctually attended to as far as my means will admit. I shall get through the Belt as fast as I can; but you must be aware that should the Russian ships at Sweaborg get out, before I have passed the Belt, if they have a light draught of water, they may get through the Sound, for I must not divide my force.—C. N.”

Although there was no excuse for the Baltic fleet being in such an inefficient condition, when it was hurried off to sea on the 11th of March, there were good and sufficient reasons for its despatch with the utmost speed, as advices had been received that in January 1854 the Russian fleet in the Gulf of Finland had been increased to twenty-seven sail-of-the-line, and that in addition to these, it numbered eight or ten frigates, seven corvettes and brigs, nine paddle steamers, fifteen schooners and luggers, and fifty or sixty gunboats—according to one report received from Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British minister at St. Petersburg, *one hundred and eighty* gunboats; and there were, moreover, fifty more vessels of this description constructing in the ports of Finland—a proof how requisite the Russians considered them for warfare in these shallow waters; and along a coast so broken, dotted with shoals, and intersected by innumerable rocky inlets and creeks. This formidable fleet mounted 3160 guns, manned by 28,000 men. On the 10th of March eighteen of these ships, carrying from 84 to 120 guns, were in harbour at Cronstadt; whilst another division, usually stationed at Revel, was destined for Sweaborg,* and the Russians, anxious to get some of their best vessels from Cronstadt to Sweaborg, were de-

* *Vide* “Baltic Campaign,” p. 28.

vising means to break the ice, so as to form a channel for that purpose. Our Ambassador likewise warned the British Government that the navy of Russia could not with safety be under-estimated; and, moreover, the Russian gunners were all well trained, whilst those of the British squadron were most deficient in this respect. The object of the Russians, in wishing to get their best ships to Sweaborg, was the impression that Cronstadt would be first attacked; in which case, calculating on the strength of the forts to repel an assault, they would have fresh ships wherewith to assail our disabled and weakened fleet, should they be obliged to retreat. Sir Hamilton Seymour warned our Government of the great number of gunboats the Russians could bring out, eighty of which were to be manned by Finns—fifty men to each boat.

Whilst Russia had such powerful naval means at command, it is not to be wondered at, that both Sweden and Denmark should be wavering as to what course they were to adopt. It was, therefore, of vital importance that the British fleet should be in the Baltic, before the breaking up of the ice in the Gulf of Finland, enabled Russia not only to carry out her designs relative to the disposal of her own fleets at Cronstadt and Sweaborg, but likewise to prevent all chance of the escape of any portion of them through the Sound, or of their arrival at Copenhagen, which might probably have converted Denmark from a neutral power into an ally of Russia.

Such were the reasons, no doubt powerful enough, for hurrying off—even without pilots—the ill-appointed and undermanned squadron placed under

Sir Charles Napier's command, at this inclement season of the year, when the periodical gales of the vernal equinox might be daily expected. The squadron, on leaving Spithead, consisted of four sail-of-the line, four blockships, four frigates, and four steamers (not a single gunboat); and with this force, hastily got together, for the most part manned with the refuse of London and other towns, destitute even of clothing,* their best seamen consisting of dockyard riggers and a few coastguard men—and without the latter, it has been alleged, the squadron could not have put to sea†—with this inefficient force did Sir Charles Napier leave our shores, to offer battle to the Russian fleet, consisting of seven-and-twenty well-trained and well-appointed ships of the line, eight or ten frigates, seven corvettes and brigs, nine steamers; besides small craft and flotillas of gunboats, supposed in the aggregate to number one hundred and eighty.

Sir Charles Napier's instructions from the Foreign Office pointed out that, as the ports of the Baltic were represented to be in a great measure free from ice, he was to take up such a position at its entrance as would enable him to give prompt effect to any further orders he might receive.

He was moreover instructed, "that as the answer of the Emperor of Russia to the ultimatum of the allies had not been received—though it was expected not to be otherwise than unfavourable—the squadron was not to assume an attitude of positive hostility

* *Vide* "Baltic Campaign," pp. 12 and 13.

† *Ibid.*, p. 19.

against Russia, nor to seek occasion for a conflict with the Russian fleet in their own ports. Notwithstanding this, he was to take care that no Russian ship of war should pass by him into the North Sea, on account of the injury it might inflict on the British coast. At the same time, he was instructed that great disappointment would be felt, should overstrained forbearance on his part allow any portion of the Russian fleet to place itself in a position to inflict injury on British interests."

He was also further directed: "To take the most effectual means for the protection of Danish or Swedish ships and territory from any hostile attack by Russia, in the event of an application to him to that effect being made by the governments of Denmark and Sweden. He was to conform himself in all respects to their instructions, in the 'possible contingency of an attack being made by Russia,' either with or without a previous declaration of war, with the view of constraining either of these powers to adopt a course of policy favourable to Russian views, or of occupying a portion of their territory, so as to enable the fleets of Russia to resist with greater effect the attacks of the British fleet."

There was in this code of instructions ample scope for the use of that "discretion" in which Sir Charles Napier had been accused of being so deficient!

His first orders from the Admiralty had been to remain at Wingo Sound; these, however, he deemed to be cancelled by the sealed instructions, which he had received directions to open on reaching the 55th degree of north latitude. He accordingly determined upon

passing the Belt, and proceeding to Kioge Bay, in the neighbourhood of Copenhagen, as being the locality where he would most readily be able to carry out the spirit of his instructions. Sir Charles Napier, however, resolved first to visit the Danish capital in person, and, previous to his departure, communicated this intention to the Admiralty, making, at the same time, an urgent appeal for gun-boats and small steamers, as being absolutely requisite to carry on successfully any operations in the shallow waters of the Baltic sea.

The Admiral, after gaining all the information he could at Copenhagen, returned to Wingo Sound on the 21st of March, when he wrote to the Admiralty "that he would take the squadron to Kioge Bay," lest the Sweaborg division of the Russian fleet, on being freed from the ice, might slip through the Sound whilst he was traversing the Great Belt; as it would not have been prudent to divide the squadron, in order to prevent them from carrying such a probable design into effect; whereas, at Kioge Bay he could command the entrances of both the Sound and the Belt.

Having formed this resolution, he immediately carried it into effect. The squadron had not been able to procure any pilots at Wingo, nor were those already on board competent to take charge of it through the Belt. The passage of this intricate navigation, with line-of-battle ships of great draught of water, may, therefore, be classed among the remarkable events of modern navigation; and, it appears, was so regarded by Government: having been characterized by Sir James Graham as "a most successful

exploit." This "exploit," performed under such circumstances, amidst shoals, rocks, fogs, and gales of wind, did not betray that "want of nerve" of which he was subsequently accused; nay, it might have been considered rash in the extreme, had it not been justified by the Admiral having had, in making the attempt, an adequate object in view. That object was effected; as the safe arrival of the British squadron at Kiel, on the 27th, not only prevented the junction of the Russian fleets, but likewise checked the Sweaborg division in any design it might have had to coerce Denmark, by anchoring before Copenhagen,* and taking possession of the Danish fleet.

On the 26th—the day previous to the arrival of the squadron in Kiel Bay—it had been obliged, in consequence of encountering a severe gale, to anchor in Kallundborg and Vryborg bays, whence the Admiral wrote to Sir James Graham that some of his ships were in such a bad state, that he would much rather dispense with them, as their presence might lead to the supposition of his being stronger than was really the case; he added, "If service is to be performed, the force alone will be looked at, and not its efficiency—they are only a nominal force."

The squadron having thus reached Kiel Bay on the 27th March, a fortnight after its departure from England, Sir Charles Napier had, after a most dangerous and intricate navigation, amidst fogs and gales, succeeded in safely bringing his ships into a position whence he completely paralyzed the movements of Russia in the Baltic; whilst he had effectually pro-

* *Vide* "Baltic Campaign," p. 46.

tected the undefended coasts of England, by guarding both the Great Belt and the Sound, so as to prevent a single Russian vessel from getting into the North Sea. But even this favourable commencement of the campaign did not satisfy the British public: they had expected impossibilities; and although the Baltic was still nearly a solid mass of ice, they looked for the capture of the whole Russian fleet, and the blowing up of Sweaborg and Cronstadt—perhaps even the burning of St. Petersburg—as events not out of the common course of things! And yet at this very time, when Sir Charles Napier was writing home, urgently representing the inefficient state of his ships, and requesting an additional supply of seamen for the fleet, the Admiralty was recommending him to get Swedish and Norwegian sailors—if he could; to endeavour to hire small steamers at Stockholm; to spare, as much as possible, the expenditure in exercise of shot and shell; and in a letter from one of the Lords of the Admiralty, he is told to “hold-hard in the expenditure of shells for practice, as they, like everything else, are on the peace establishment.”

It is, probably, an unprecedented event in the annals of war—or at least in those of our history—that a fleet should be sent out, on a most momentous service, so ill manned that its Commander was directed to endeavour to “pick up,” if possible, foreign seamen in foreign ports, and so ill provided with munitions of war, that he was restricted in the use of what he most required, in order to render his inexperienced crews as efficient as possible. It is equally worthy of record, that “the Board of Admiralty, throughout

the whole campaign, never supplied the fleet with a single Congreve rocket, although it was no secret that great numbers had been made in London for the Russians, to whom they were of far less use than to the British fleet, which could not well undertake any bombardment without them."* The Board of Admiralty must have been perfectly aware of the condition, in these respects, of that fleet on whose efficiency so much depended, and from which so much was expected; for, in a letter to Sir Charles Napier, from a member of that Board, I find it recorded as his opinion, that the Emperor of Russia ought either to burn his fleet, or try his strength with the British squadron whilst he mustered double their numbers, and whilst our crews were "so miserably raw!"

Kiøge Bay, near Copenhagen, was the destination Sir Charles Napier had for the present proposed for the fleet; but he was detained by thick fogs, and only anchored there on the 1st of April.

Shortly after he reached Kiøge Bay, official intimation arrived of war having been declared against Russia, which was also announced to the Admiral in the following note from Lord Clarendon, dated Foreign Office, March 27, 1854:—

"Private.

"MY DEAR NAPIER,—Mr. Ker, attaché to the mission at Copenhagen, has some important information to give you, and I, therefore, send him straight to Kiel before he goes to his post.

"The Message from the Queen was sent to both Houses to-day. So we are at war.—Yours truly,

"CLARENDON."

* *Vide* "Baltic Campaign," pp. 50, 51.

Sir Charles Napier received, about this time, from the Admiralty, detailed information of all that Russia was planning against him; and—unprovided as was his fleet with the requisites for war—it must have given him but little consolation to learn that, “at Sweaborg, Cronstadt, and Revel they had laid down seventy mines and booms, for the purpose of destroying his ships; that all the forts were supplied with red-hot shot;” and as the Russians felt assured Cronstadt would be the object of attack, “their fleets were ordered to remain close in harbour and receive the attack, till our vessels were disabled. Whilst in this condition, the fire of the forts was to be seconded by that of the fleets, which would thus become an easy prey.* The Sweaborg division was then to be ordered, by telegraph, to come and support the Cronstadt fleet, and thus make sure of the whole of our ships.” Had Sir Charles been mad enough to have attacked Cronstadt with the inefficient means at his command, the Russians might perhaps have been successful in these plans. He was also informed “that the Russians were fitting their gun-boats with disc steam-engines, and that at Cronstadt they had two floating batteries, each armed with four 98-pounder mortars”—Sir Charles Napier not having a single mortar in the fleet! To add to those encouraging accounts, he was also told that one of the forts at Cronstadt mounted 128 guns, equally divided into four classes of 112-pounders, 98-pounders, 74-pounders, and 48-pounders!

The authorities at home did not, however,—as we

* This passage is obscure, but evidently implies the “British fleet.”—*Author's Note.*

shall shew,—*then* urge on Sir Charles Napier to make the attempt to surmount such formidable obstacles with the means at his command. No ; the time was not come for *that*. He was, however, censured for leaving Wingo Sound ; but on his representing that he had done so only in accordance with the spirit of his instructions, the *amende honorable* was made, and the advantage of his having gained so much precious time was acknowledged. But the state of the Baltic fleet, the communications between Sir Charles Napier and the Board of Admiralty at home, together with their refusal to furnish him with the requisite auxiliaries of gun-boats and troops, would almost tend to throw doubts as to whether it were ever the intention of our Government to strike an important blow in the Baltic ; it would rather appear that their object was merely to establish a blockade of the Russian fleet, in order to prevent any attack on the coasts of England in her then unprotected state.

“On the first of April,” writes the Editor of the “Baltic Campaign,” “the Board signified to the Admiral its approval of the new disposition he had made of his fleet. It had not, however, the candour to allude to the forgetfulness of its own previous orders when reprimanding him for making that new disposition of the fleet. A second letter from the Board of Admiralty, written on the same day, expressed the Board’s approbation of the satisfactory manner in which the fleet had passed the Belt. On the 8th of April, their lordships again expressed their entire approval of the Admiral’s proceedings.

“The approbation of the Foreign Minister, Lord Clarendon, was prompt and unqualified. He warmly approved all the Admiral’s movements ; told him ‘he knew how difficult it would be to strike an effective blow against impregnable forts, and in shallow waters ;’ and informed him

that the Russians, deeming him capable of anything, were 'fortifying St. Petersburg in an absurd manner, *as no ship* could approach them.'

"Admiral Berkeley also wrote that 'all the proceedings of the Admiral were highly approved of.' He told him that he hoped he would not find the 'Monarch's' crew so bad as he thought, though, 'if he found 300 able seamen on board each ship, he should be most agreeably surprised.' 'There is,' said Admiral Berkeley, 'a want of energy among the superior officers that must be noticed. If you have any want of energy, speak out, and you may rely on my backing you up, in a way that will make the rest open their eyes.' Yet afterwards Sir James Graham accused the Admiral of detracting from the professional reputation of his officers. Here we find a Lord of the Admiralty doing this, before the war had begun! Were we to extract Admiral Berkeley's opinions of some, by name, who hold high rank in the navy, they would indeed 'open their eyes,' and the nation scarcely less so!

"Notwithstanding this ample reparation for the censure which had been passed upon the Admiral, it was evident that an ill-feeling towards him existed in some quarter. The Board, though reluctantly compelled to recognize the importance of the moments for which it had so unaccountably censured him, shewed an utter want of cordiality by not replying to his private letters which related to remedies for the inefficiency of the fleet. On the 8th of April the Admiral, in very bitterness of spirit at this marked discourtesy, thus complained to Captain Milne, the junior Naval Lord:—"I have at last got a public approval of my conduct, which is preferable to reproof; but I do think the Admiralty ought to express their regret at writing to me as they did. It was most discouraging, when I was doing my best to fulfil their own orders. I never get the Board's letters I used to do when I was last employed. *My private letters are not answered, and I will write no more.*" All this, be it observed, occurred ere the war had begun, whilst Sir Charles could have done nothing to interrupt that 'cordial concurrence' with the Board upon which Sir James Graham had so strongly insisted—except, perhaps, the inconvenient zeal which he had

manifested with regard to the inefficient manning of the fleet.

“Yet this inefficiency was fully and frankly admitted by Sir James Graham, from whom frequent instructions arrived to supply the deficiency of good men by picking up foreign sailors in the Baltic. The anxiety of the First Lord upon this point was excessive. He was continually inquiring whether the Admiral had been able to ‘*pick up any Swedes or Norwegians, who were good sailors and quite trustworthy.*’ He was told to ‘enter them quietly.’ If he could not get Swedes and Norwegians, ‘even Danes would strengthen him, for they were hardy seamen, and brave. There was, it is true, a difficulty with their Governments, but if the men enlisted freely, and came off to the fleet, the First Lord did not see why the Admiral should be over-nice, and refuse good seamen without much inquiry as to the place from whence they came.’

“Admiral Berkeley, moreover, instructed the Admiral to the same effect. ‘Have any of your ships tried for men in a Norwegian port? *It is said that you might have any number of good seamen from that country.*’ On the 18th of March, the Admiral had been apprised that the ‘James Watt,’ the ‘Prince Regent,’ and ‘Majestic’ would now join him; ‘*but men are wanting,* and it is impossible to say how long it will be before they are completed.’ On the 4th of April, Admiral Berkeley stated, ‘Notwithstanding the number of landsmen entered, we are come nearly to a dead stand-still as to seamen; and after the “James Watt” and “Prince Regent” reach you, I do not know when we shall be able to send you a further reinforcement, *for want of men! Something must be done, and done speedily, or there will be a breakdown in our present ricketty system.*’

“No proofs of the inefficiency of the squadron, as regarded men, could be more complete than these repeated injunctions to enlist foreign seamen! To the public generally—accustomed to regard the British seaman as a model of perfection, which he is, when trained—such injunctions may seem strange; but there they are, forming an incontrovertible proof of the actual condition of the Baltic fleet—a condition

of such pressing moment as to render the Admiralty authorities most anxious that it should be rendered more efficient by the *enlistment of foreign seamen*!—Swedes, Norwegians, and Danes, or any of them that could be obtained.

“Nor was the First Lord less anxious about the officers of the fleet. He hoped that the Admiral would ‘keep his captains up to the mark. If there was any slackness, and the Admiral reported it, he would not hesitate to supersede.’ The same injunction was dwelt upon by other Admiralty authorities as highly necessary. The fact was, that very few of the captains had ever before commanded line-of-battle ships. The fleet had been got together, manned, and despatched with a degree of haste which amounted to precipitancy; not three weeks had elapsed between the appointment of the Admiral and his putting to sea. The fault was not in the captains, as the Admiralty authorities had assumed, but an opportunity had not been afforded them to acquire experience in time of peace, from a mistaken and destructive economy, which had prevented the formation of experimental squadrons.”*

On the 2nd of April Sir Charles Napier received a letter from Sir James Graham, dated 30th March, announcing the declaration of war, and forwarding to him instructions from the Admiralty to the following effect:—That it was important he should feel his way and advance to the edge of the Gulf of Finland, then to establish a close blockade, but taking care not to leave any Russian men-of-war in his rear.

“When you are sure,” continues these instructions, “that you have the whole of the enemy’s force in front of you, and within the Gulf of Finland, the first object is to keep them there, shut up, and to see if they are disposed to measure their strength with you. I am afraid that they will avoid an action in the open sea, and will await your attack under cover of their fortifications. I doubt the prudence of commencing with any such operation.”

* “Baltic Campaign,” pp. 78-82.

After giving instructions about reconnoitering Åland, this letter proceeds to state that Sir Charles Napier must have received an account, from St. Petersburg, of various devices that had been proposed to blow his ships into the air, should they venture to approach the forts; and that, although the writer did not attach much importance to such stories, yet they should not be altogether neglected, as the Admiral had to deal with an enemy "more crafty than bold—more unscrupulous than daring," and that he was to act accordingly, by being on his guard.

The Admiral replied:—

"To Sir James Graham.

"Kiøge Bay, April 4th.

"I think I can make head, even if the French do not come. The only thing I fear, is the weather: we have already had two very heavy gales, and the parting of cables is not pleasant."

The Baltic fleet again anchored in Kiøge Bay on the 1st of April, and was augmented, by the arrival of reinforcements from England, to twelve sail-of-the-line. With this force, and the few steamers attached to it, Sir Charles Napier's instructions from the Board of Admiralty required him to blockade all the ports of Russia; to watch the Åland Islands; to take care that the Russian fleet (amounting to 27 or 28 sail-of-the-line) did not slip past him and get into the North Sea; and, in addition to these orders, he was desired to hire steamers of a light draught of water, to "pick up" Danish pilots and Swedish and Norwegian seamen, wherewith to man his fleet, besides "being obliged to hunt up the characters of Prussian con-

signees, whilst his ships were hunting for unpatriotic British colliers,"* and the Duke of Newcastle, who had succeeded Lord Clarendon as head of the Foreign Office, directed him to proceed to the entrance of the Gulf of Finland, "so soon as the ice broke up, and he had a sufficient force to undertake hostile operations."

Admiral Plumridge had been despatched with a flying squadron of steamers to reconnoitre the entrance of the Gulf of Finland, and as soon as he reported it free from ice, Sir Charles Napier determined to put immediately to sea with the comparatively small squadron under his command, confident, as he says in a letter to Lady Napier, dated the 10th of April, "that if the Russian fleet would come out he would be a match for them." Had the Russian fleet made their appearance, as he hoped, out of port, he meant, according to his usual tactics, to have "put them by the board." If successful in effecting their capture by this means, his signal, "My lads, sharpen your cutlasses, and the day is your own!" instead of being subsequently turned into ridicule, would have become as popular as Nelson's watchword at Trafalgar. "It was not the Admiral's fault," very justly remarks the author of the "*Baltic Campaign*," "that the Russians would not come out to meet him; but it was decidedly the fault of the Government for not supplying the Admiral with the means of getting at them."

* * * * *

That the Admiral was well aware of the dangers

* "Pilots might have now been had at a proper rate of remuneration, but the Admiralty demurred at the expense, and the Admiral was to dispense with them and 'grope his way!'"—*Vide "Baltic Campaign,"* pp. 84, 86, 90.

and difficulties which were shortly to beset him, is shown by the following extract from a letter to Sir James Graham, dated Copenhagen, April 9th, 1854 :—

“MY DEAR SIR JAMES,—I am glad you approve of what I have done, and I have a letter from the Admiralty to the same effect.”

“It would, from the intricacy of the navigation, be impossible to prevent the evacuation of the Aland Islands, unless steam-vessels were supported by the boats of the fleet; but I hope to be there shortly.

“I have done all I can to get the ships ready for battle, but you must not suppose we are well prepared: ships are not got ready for action in a day.”

On the 16th, the squadron encountered a severe gale of wind, and on the 17th, Sir Charles Napier proceeded towards Hango Head, intending to make for Sweaborg the following day; but the increasing gales obliged him to postpone entering the gulf till more favourable weather. On the 19th of April he received a letter from Sir James Graham, dated the 10th of that month, of which the following extracts are given :—

“I am entirely satisfied with your proceedings. Neither Lord Clarendon nor I anticipated your movement inside the Belt, and believed that you would watch in the Cattogat, the entrance of the Sound and of the Belts, until you received orders to enter the Baltic. You judged, however, wisely, and the time which you have gained has been very precious, and the passage of the Belt in fine weather, and in safety, has been a successful exploit.”

“I rely on your prudence in not knocking your head against stone walls prematurely, or without the certainty of a great success, or the fair prospect of obtaining some most important object worthy of the risk and of the loss, which, when you attack fortresses with ships, are serious and inevitable.”

The contents of this letter are most important, as bearing materially on points subsequently discussed.

The Admiral, in reply, again urged the necessity of having pilots for the fleet, adding: "It should be remembered that the loss of one ship of the squadron would pay for a great number of pilots."

Sir James Graham's rejoinder to the above, dated Admiralty, 1st May, 1854, stated—

"That he had received his letter of the 19th, dated off the entrance of the Gulf of Finland, and was glad that Sir Charles had decided on not proceeding to Sweaborg, the weather being still broken, the channel not clear of ice, and his force not yet concentrated,

"The Admiral's force, he hoped and thought, would be large enough to render the escape of any Russian squadron from the Baltic impossible, and to leave them quite at ease in England, although they might have a large reserve ready on their own shores. The distribution of the force was to be left to his free judgment on the spot, the close blockade being the primary object, and all other operations to be secondary to this. He was directed to judge whether in the rear of his blockading squadron he could safely make any attack on Aland, and that much would depend on the strength, both of the fortress and of the garrison of Bomarsund, of which they yet were imperfectly informed.

"In the first instance," continued Sir James, "it will be best to feel your way, and make good your hold on the Gulf of Finland. When I say this, I by no means contemplate an attack either on Sweaborg or Cronstadt; I have a great respect for stone walls, and have no fancy for running even screw line-of-battle ships against them, because the public here may be impatient; you must not be rash because they at a distance from danger are foolhardy—you must not risk the loss of a fleet in an impossible enterprise. I believe both Sweaborg and Cronstadt to be all but impregnable from the sea, Sweaborg more especially, and none but a very large army could co-operate by land efficiently in the presence of such a

force as Russia could readily concentrate for the immediate defence of the approaches to her capital. If, then, you have no means except naval at your command, you must pause long and consider well before you attempt any attack on the Russian squadron or their strongholds; and I am afraid that they are much too cautious to come out to meet you—had you been weaker, they might have done so; now they will wait and watch an opportunity, in the hope that you will seriously cripple your fleet by knocking your head against their forts, and they may take you at a serious disadvantage and inflict a fatal blow. These considerations must not be overlooked by you—I recall them to your mind, lest in the eager desire to achieve a great exploit and satisfy the wild wishes of an impatient multitude at home, you should yield to some rash impulse, and fail in the discharge of one of the noblest of duties, which is: the moral courage to do what you know to be right, at the risk of being accused of having done wrong. It is enough to present this view to your deliberate consideration; you will reflect on it, and I am certain your judgment will not err.”*

Sir James Graham, in a letter dated the following day, refers also to the disgraceful fact of officers of the fleet being in the pay, as correspondents, of the London Press; and it was subsequently ascertained that a person on board the flag-ship itself was in communication with a daily paper.†

* “This masterly piece of writing, which has few superiors, even in a literary point of view, will long remain a monument of Sir James Graham’s administrative caution; but it will at the same time remain a monument shewing how great administrative ability can afterwards swallow its own injunctions, when it may become expedient that they should be forgotten. As far as the conduct of the war goes, no instructions could be more explicit; and, as we go on, it will be seen how well they were obeyed to the letter.”—*Vide “Baltic Campaign,”* p. 119.

† “The Admiral knew well enough who those newspaper correspondents were, though few among them occupied a position in the fleet which entitled them to form a judgment; the less so, as from want of experience they were incapable of comprehending what could or could not have been done. Not caring what they said of him, he did not think

In this same letter to Sir Charles Napier, it is stated, that the French Admiral had received instructions for attacking St. Petersburg, "if it be within the power of man;" but Sir Charles Napier is, at the same time, directed to observe that this was not an *instruction* to make an attack, but the statement of a wish that it were possible. To this was added the truism, that these two things were very different, and proceeded to state, that Sir Charles Napier's duty did not extend to the impossible, but was limited to the "possible and expedient."

In consequence of the difficulty of entering the Gulf of Finland at this early and tempestuous season of the year—a difficulty which had been increased to a tenfold degree by the want of pilots, and the removal of every mark in the shape of beacons and buoys, by the Russians—the Admiral took the squadron to the harbour of Elsgnabben, near Stockholm, where it was employed, until more favourable weather, in setting up rigging and equalising provisions and coals.

We find that Sir Charles Napier had requested the Admiralty to furnish him with the opinions of the Board upon the subject of entering the Gulf of Finland. They replied that he had better occupy such a position within the Gulf as might best enable him to intercept the movements of the enemy, and to watch the principal ports on both sides; but that he it worth his while to interfere in the matter. Before leaving England he himself had been applied to, to permit the presence of a newspaper correspondent on board his own ship, but had declined, as such a course would have been contrary to the injunctions of the Admiralty. It would, perhaps, have been better to have acceded to the request, as the public would have been saved no small amount of misrepresentation."—*From "The Baltic Campaign,"* pp. 135-136.

must not proceed to the upper part of the Gulf till the weather admitted, nor until his own judgment prompted his doing so. This opinion quite coincided with his own; and it was satisfactory to Sir Charles Napier that the Board approved of his not having entered the Gulf of Finland on his arrival, for the reasons before adduced.

Sir Charles arrived at Elsgnabben Roads on the 21st of April, and found the Swedish people much disposed towards the allied cause. Whilst here, the Admiral paid a visit to the King of Sweden, at Stockholm, and was very cordially received, but was not successful in eliciting from His Majesty any decided opinion on political questions, though he held out the inducement of probably possessing the Aland Islands. The king, however, cautiously replied, "that neither he nor his people required conquest, even of the Aland Isles, whilst the neutrality of Sweden was secured. His position was delicate, and he would remain as he was."

Although unsuccessful in this diplomatic attempt to bring over Sweden to our cause, it was worth making; principally on account of the numerous fleet of gun-boats belonging to that power (328 in number), whose assistance would have so greatly facilitated our subsequent undertakings, to say nothing of the effect this alliance would have had upon Finland; and it was these considerations which induced Sir Charles Napier to choose Elsgnabben as the place of anchorage for his squadron until the state of the weather should permit its entrance into the Gulf of Finland. It was of the utmost importance to secure the co-operation of

Sweden—who appears to have been in a state of preparation for immediate war—with her powerful fleet of ten ships of the line, sixteen frigates and corvettes, fourteen steamers, besides her large flotilla of gun-boats.

As to the movements of the Russians in the Aland Islands, they had kept their plans so secret, that nothing positive was known at Stockholm; but there was every reason to believe that, so far from abandoning these islands, it was their intention to defend them with vigour; and it was reported that “they had destroyed all buildings capable of being fortified by an enemy, taken the boats up the country, removed all the buoys and lighthouses, and even carried off all the coast-pilots to one village in the interior. The Admiral learnt also that the Russian garrison at Bomarsund consisted of 2,500 men, and that the Government was about to reinforce them—whilst it was evident that it would be difficult to prevent this without a fleet of gun-boats. The innumerable rocks and shoals, with which the Russians were well acquainted, gave them facilities which he had not; and it was too early in the year to send away boats and marines—nor would this have been prudent till he knew something more of the naval force with which he might have to contend in the Gulf.”*

“To Sir James Graham.

“‘Duke of Wellington,’ Elgsnabben Bay, 30th April, 1854.

“MY DEAR SIR JAMES,—It has blown a heavy gale with a snow-storm since I wrote to you, which kept me here. ‘Odin’ returned this morning; she went up the coast of Sweden as far as Griselhamn, and communicated with the

* From the “Baltic Campaign.”

Governor, who is very friendly to England, but, with all his exertions, it was impossible to get pilots for the Aland Islands; the Russians have removed them, and there is little communication between the Islands and Sweden.

"There is no doubt but gun-boats are building at Abo, and other ports on the coast of Finland, but it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get at them amongst the islands, even with steamboats, as they would be completely covered with riflemen in the islands, which are dotted as thick as you see them on the chart; if we are to operate here, it must be with steam-vessels, boats, and troops; the latter to occupy the islands as we go along.

"We want a much larger force of steam-vessels; we ought to have a force in Riga Bay, a force in the Gulf of Bothnia, and a force when I go into the Gulf of Finland; and I cannot have less than four from Libau to Dager-ort, as attempts will be made by neutrals to get contraband of war along that coast.

"*May 2nd.*—The weather still continues very foggy and unsettled."

The weather having moderated, the squadron left Elsgnabben on the 5th of May, but had scarcely quitted its anchorage when it was enveloped in a dense fog, whilst in the most dangerous part of the Channel—the passage being studded with innumerable rocks and shoals; it was then thought impossible to have saved the fleet from destruction—which, however, as the Admiral expressed himself, "we escaped as by a miracle;" and he described the night he passed, whilst so doubtful of their safety, as the most anxious of his life. Fortunately, however, no disaster occurred.

"The following afternoon," he observes, "my anxieties were removed, by the junction of eight ships. The rest did not make their appearance till the day after."

The Admiral, in the following letter to his family, thus alludes to the narrow escape of the fleet on this occasion :—

“ Off Gosha-Sando, May 14th, 1854.

“ We all had a narrow escape the other day, by being caught in a fog in a very narrow and dangerous passage; but we providentially escaped, and have now got fine weather, and I hope to be able to look about me. I have not yet seen the Russian fleet, as the weather has not been fit to go into the Gulf of Finland; I hope soon to get a look at them, but I don't know whether they will try their strength with us.”

The squadron, consisting of the “ Duke of Wellington,” “ Edinburgh,” “ St. Jean d'Acre,” “ Cæsar,” “ Cressy,” “ Princess Royal,” “ Hogue,” “ Blenheim,” “ Imperieuse,” “ Magicienne,” “ Gorgon,” and “ Dragon,” arrived off Hango Head, on the 20th of May; whilst Admiral Corry had been left off Dager-ort, with eight sail-of-the-line. Admiral Plumridge was with the flying squadron of steamers reconnoitering the Gulf of Bothnia, and the other steam frigates of the fleet were detached to different parts of the coast, enforcing the blockade, and capturing prizes with contraband of war.

“ The object of the Admiral,” observes the author of the “ Baltic Campaign,” “ in entering the Gulf of Finland with so small a force, was in the hope of drawing the Russian fleet out; but, failing in this, he stationed a squadron of frigates between Hango Head and Sweaborg, to watch the movements of the enemy, and communicate the same to him.”

Sir Charles Napier wrote from Hango Head, as follows, to Admiral Berkeley, on the 23rd of May :—

“ This is a good anchorage, but entirely exposed to southerly winds. I am lying nearly within range of their batteries. I long to knock them down, but I should lose a good

many men, and unless I could hold them, it would not do any good.

"The Admiralty wrote me a very unpleasant letter the other day. I hope you will approve of my answer; if you do not, pray say so. I was much hurt at it."

Admiral Berkeley, in reply to this communication, wrote, on June the 6th, that he did not approve of his letter to the Board; and after commenting upon it, added, "You cannot enact impossibilities, you cannot get at the Russian fleet, neither can you destroy Sweaborg or Cronstadt. The destruction of Hango is not, to my mind, worth the lives it would cost, and the risk and ruin to some of your best ships."

The letter here alluded to was probably one from Sir Charles Napier, of which the following extracts are given. It was written in reply to a communication he had received at Hango Head, from the Admiralty, urging him to enter the Gulf of Finland:—

"In their lordships' letter of the 2nd of May, commenting on a paragraph of my letter of the 19th of April, they appear to think I am *going too slow*. When I passed the Belt, their lordships thought I was going *too fast*.

"I am perfectly aware that steam makes a great difference in naval operations; but steam has *no effect on fogs*, and has not prevented two collisions, and very nearly a third, which might have disabled half-a-dozen ships. Their lordships will have observed, by my last letter, that fogs detained me ten days at Elsgnabben, and a fog was very nearly the cause of the loss of the fleet. It therefore behoves me to be careful, and act with judgment in operations with this fleet.

"Their lordships abstain from pressing me to proceed to the upper part of the Gulf of Finland, till the state of the weather, and my own judgment, may dictate. Their lordships may depend I shall go to the upper part of the Gulf

when I can ; but I must have a sufficient force off Sweaborg, where there are eight or nine sail-of-the-line ; and then I must have force enough to take care of twenty sail-of-the-line, besides frigates and steamers, in Cronstadt. How this is to be done with twenty sail-of-the-line, some of which are perfectly unfit to go into action, I really don't know ; but all that can be done I will do."

"The Board of Admiralty," observes the author of the "Baltic Campaign," "saw this on explanation, and replied that it had no intention of commenting on his proceedings, and was unwilling to limit the exercise of his judgment. Their lordships were satisfied that every exertion on his part had been used, and they continued to confide in his ability and judgment. As has already been stated, the First Lord had warmly approved of the Admiral's judgment in not going to Sweaborg, as had been at first intended, had the weather permitted."

Whilst at Hango Head, Sir Charles Napier received a letter from Admiral Parseval-Deschênes, announcing the arrival of the French fleet in the Baltic, and expressing a hope of soon joining the British fleet. The Admiralty also forwarded to Sir Charles the instructions that the French Admiral had received from the Minister of Marine, but distinctly stated that these instructions were not in any way intended to direct his judgment, or control his discretion. Their lordships concluded: "It is your duty not to undertake any operation which your own judgment does not entirely approve."

A reconnoitering squadron was sent forward from Hango, under the command of Captain Watson, in the direction of Helsingfors, with orders to observe the Russian fleet at Sweaborg, of whose movements, owing to the hazy state of the weather, little information could be obtained ; but some intelligence was received

relative to Cronstadt, to the effect that it contained 10,000 troops, besides the seamen attached to 20 line-of-battle ships, 3 steamers, and 16 small river boats ; and that the large ships were moored in couples, head and stern, across the narrow channels, under the works of Cronstadt.

Whilst the fleet lay off Hango Head, a daring exploit was performed, at Eckness, by the "Arrogant" and "Hecla" steam-frigates, commanded respectively by Captains Yelverton and Hall, who carried off a Russian vessel from under the protection of some batteries, twelve miles inland, but situated on the banks of a river into which they had penetrated.

The Admiral, before leaving this anchorage, received further prudential advice from Sir James Graham, whose letter, dated the 20th of May, contains the following paragraphs : "We hear a great deal of submarine barricades, by which the North Channel in Cronstadt is closed, and an entrance into Sweaborg out of reach of the defences." After suggesting some measures for attacking Cronstadt, one of which was to remove the impediments alluded to, by means of "diving bells, and blasting under water," Sir James concludes by saying, "If anything can be done, you will discover the best method of doing it ; but '*no rash experiments* must be tried,' which do not hold out a reasonable prospect of success."

Reliable information was now received from several quarters as to the immense strength of Cronstadt, which had, moreover, been increased ; the north passage being closed with a double row of piles, and granite rocks sunk between them. However,

the Admiral resolved to judge for himself—to lead his fleet to Cronstadt, and, if he could not get in, he hoped—by appearing before it with a much smaller force than their own—to entice the Russian fleet out of port, and induce them to measure their strength with his squadron. In respect to an attack on either Sweaborg or Cronstadt with the means then at his disposal, Sir Charles Napier (holding the same opinion as expressed by Admiral Berkeley in his letter of the 6th of June) considered it to be perfectly impossible, with any prospect of success.

Amongst the Admiral's papers is the copy of a letter to Sir Baldwin Walker, Surveyor of the Navy, dated Hango, May 30th, 1854, in which I find the following passage :—

“I have been lying here about ten days, and am now weighing, to go off Helsingfors. I have had half the fleet outside, to give the Russians a chance, if they choose to leave Cronstadt and form a junction with their advanced ships at Helsingfors ; but they have made no attempt to do so.”

In another communication to the same officer, dated Baro Sound, June 4th, he says :—

“I am looking for the Cronstadt fleet to try to surprise me, with my fires banked up. I wish they would try it.”

The Russians, however, chose not to avail themselves of the opportunity thus offered to them, and the British squadron—having previously been joined by the French screw line-of-battle ship “Austerlitz”—weighed anchor on the 9th of June, and proceeded up the Gulf of Finland, Sir Charles Napier sending orders, at the same time, to Admiral Corry to proceed to Baro Sound.

On the 12th of June, when off Helsingfors, he writes thus to Sir James Graham :—

“Admiral Corry anchored his squadron last night in Baro Sound, so that when I go back we shall all be together. I shall, I think, wait for the French Admiral, as I think it necessary to see him before I decide on future operations. If Cronstadt is as strong as it is represented, it will be impossible to touch it—therefore all I can do is to offer them battle, and, if they do not accept it, return and see what mischief I can do along shore. I think it unnecessary to send more large ships into the Baltic; the Russians will not come out to fight a large force, but they may come out to fight a small one; and unless you intend to send out troops to make an attack on Aland, I do not see what is the use of more ships.”

Sir Charles added, that he had anticipated Sir James Graham's wishes, in having caused a survey to be made of Bomarsund; and that, if troops could be spared, the fortress might be reduced; but that no time should be lost, as the Emperor of Russia would probably take measures to ensure its protection.

Sir James Graham's reply, dated the 20th of June, 1854, contains the following remarks :—

“I am well pleased with all your operations, and the concentration of your force at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland, in a safe harbour, where you can command fresh water, appears to me a judicious operation. I conclude that you will leave a squadron before Helsingfors, sufficiently strong to prevent the escape of the Russian squadron skulking within the harbour, and proceed with the rest of the combined fleet to the neighbourhood of Cronstadt, which, I am afraid, you will find unassailable.

“If the Russian fleet will not come out to meet you, and if you find that you cannot reach them, after having well reconnoitered the works, and having ascertained what it is possible and impossible to do, your return to the more open

sea below Helsingfors would appear to be a judicious measure, every necessary precaution being taken to prevent the reunion of the Russian force now divided at Cronstadt and at Helsingfors.

"I do not see any great advantage in the capture of Bomarsund, with a serious loss both of ships and men, if Sweden stands aloof from the contest and adheres to her neutrality. If she will take a part, with the aid of her troops and gunboats, the capture of the Aland Islands is an easy operation, and the principal benefit will fall to her share, for she alone can hold these islands, in defiance of Russia, during a Baltic winter.

"I am well aware of all the difficulties of your position, and of the impossibility of triumphing over an enemy who will not fight you on fair terms; but you will discipline our fleet, and make our officers and men fit and ready for any service. It is a disgrace to Russia that she dare not show a ship in her own waters, and that she is driven to seek for safety under the shelter of her fortresses. It would be madness to play her game and to rush headlong on her granite walls, risking our naval superiority, with all the fatal consequences of defeat, in an unequal contest with wood against stone, which in the long run cannot succeed."

This letter likewise contains the following passage, which, expressing, as it does, the high opinion entertained by the writer of Sir Charles Napier's professional qualifications, ought to be borne in mind:—

"I had reliance on your prudence, which was doubted; your brilliant courage was proved long ago; you will now show to the world that you possess a combination of those great virtues which are necessary to make a consummate Commander-in-chief."

Previously to leaving Hango, Sir Charles Napier informed Admiral Parseval,* the French Commander-

* In the "Baltic Campaign," and in Sir Charles Napier's official correspondence, he is thus usually denominated, although his name was "Parseval-Deschênes."—*Author's note.*

in-chief, that he would find a steamer at that station, and that, for his guidance, buoys had been laid down on the reefs; indeed, he did everything in his power to keep on the best of terms with our gallant allies, in which he entirely succeeded.

Commodore Seymour, the Captain of the Fleet, for whom Sir Charles always entertained the highest esteem and respect, was at this time promoted to the rank of Rear-Admiral—retaining, however, the position which he previously held.

The day before leaving Hango, Admiral Napier received from Admiral Plumridge a detailed and graphic account of his operations in the Gulf of Bothnia, which cannot be here inserted, for want of space, but it will be found on reference to the “Baltic Campaign.”

From his cousin, Lieutenant-General Sir William Napier, the Historian of the “Peninsular War,” the Admiral received the following letter:—

“Scinde House, May 25th, 1854.

“MY DEAR CHARLES,—Your situation is just what I expected, but the fogs and shallows are formidable; however, you will, I trust and believe, get over those in the Baltic, and over those at home also; the last I believe the worst.

“My notions of your operations is, that if you get plenty of *good gun-boats*, you will be able to do something by crossing the shallows, about their great works, and so getting at them behind; but more than that I fear will not be, unless their fleet becomes plucky, and—as you seem to hope—that the young Grand Duke will be rash, from a desire to distinguish himself.

“The two governments should send out 50,000, or 100,000 men, for you to land in Finland, and promise the Swedes that they will not make peace unless Finland is restored to them by treaty.

"I watch you with the greatest anxiety, and have a feeling that something glorious will happen to you. Fortune has carried you through all things to your present position, in despite of the enmity and power of our governments, Whig and Tory; and I do not think that has happened for nothing. This feeling should cheer you also; and it will do you good to hear that your avoiding boasts, and checking boasting, as you did at the dinner,* and at Portsmouth, has been well noted, and raised you in general esteem. The stupid boasting of the papers had created disgust, and your check was accepted as a proof that you were fit for command. Yours ever,
"W. NAPIER."

Colonel Jones, a British officer of Engineers, had joined the Baltic expedition with the local rank of Brigadier-General, and in a memorandum which he sent in, relative to a plan of attack on Sweaborg, thus corroborates Sir William Napier's opinion of the necessity of having both gun-boats and rockets, with neither of which had Sir Charles Napier been provided:—

"As the coasts of Finland are generally protected by gun-boats, any operation carried on against any of the Baltic ports by a naval force, should be accompanied by a large flotilla of that description.

"It may be permitted me to state, what made a great impression upon my mind, at the time I visited the Baltic ports, that every expedition operating against them should be furnished with a large supply of rockets; although not very accurate in their flight, they are very destructive in their effects, are easily transported, and can be taken to and fired from many situations where it would not be practicable to take up a gun of large calibre."

On the 12th of June, Sir Charles Napier anchored

* Allusion is here made to the dinner given to Sir Charles Napier at the Reform Club, on his appointment to the Baltic command. On this occasion, too much was said by some who had much better have been silent.

off Sweaborg, and lost no time in acquiring every possible information relative to the place. Seven or eight sail-of-the-line, one frigate, and some smaller vessels, were observed at anchor within the fortifications; they, however, showed no intention of coming out to molest him.

As there was not a pilot on board the British fleet acquainted with the anchorages of the Gulf of Finland, or with the intricate channels leading into Sweaborg, Mr. Biddlecombe, Master of the Fleet, was sent to survey the passage of Mjölö Roads, and the eastern channel leading into Sweaborg. He accomplished these duties in the most skilful manner, and his report on the subject is given in the "Baltic Campaign," in which will likewise be found the following comments:—

"Let us suppose," says the Editor of that work, "a Russian fleet off the Isle of Wight, as the British fleet was off Sweaborg—that all the buoys and marks were removed, as at Sweaborg—and that no pilots were to be had; what should we have thought had the Russian Government urged their Admiral to run his fleet into Portsmouth harbour; though this would have been an easier feat than to run the British fleet into Sweaborg. What, then, must the nation think of the Board of Admiralty goading on Sir Charles Napier to run thus madly on Sweaborg, after all along cautioning him 'not to run his head against stone walls.' Surely they must have been thought incapable of comprehending what ships could do, or of deliberately sacrificing the fleet to satisfy popular clamour. Yet these very men still direct the movements of British fleets [this was written in 1857]; and though, throughout the campaign in the Baltic, they highly eulogized the prudence and ability of Sir Charles Napier, some amongst them have since, individually and personally, been actively engaged in the endeavour to ruin his reputation, which they themselves had so materially enhanced."

On the 13th of June, the arrival of the French fleet, under Admiral Parseval, was announced at Baro Sound; when, out of compliment to our gallant allies, Sir Charles Napier weighed anchor and joined them. The French Admiral saluted the British squadron, which hoisted French colours, and returned the salute; after which, the combined fleets, consisting of the following ships, came to anchor in Baro Sound:—

FRENCH SQUADRON.—*Sailing-ships of the line*: “L’Inflexible,” (Flag of Vice-Admiral Parseval), “Hercule,” “Jemappes,” “Trident,” “Le Tage,” “Duguesclin,” (Flag of Rear-Admiral Pénaud), the “Duperré,” and the screw-ship of the line “Austerlitz.” *Sailing frigates*: “Sémillante,” “Andromaque,” “Vengeance,” “Poursuivante,” “Virginie,” and “Zénobie.” *Steam frigate*: “Darien.” *Steamers*: “Phlégéthon,” “Souffleur,” “Milan,” “Lucifer.” Total, 19 vessels.

BRITISH SQUADRON.—*Screw steamers of the line*: “Duke of Wellington,” “St. Jean d’Acre,” “Princess Royal,” “Royal George,” “James Watt,” “Nile,” “Cæsar,” “Majestic,” “Cressy,” “Edinburgh,” “Blenheim,” “Hogue,” and “Ajax.” *Sailing ships*: “Neptune,” (Flag of Rear-Admiral Corry,) “St. George,” “Prince Regent,” “Monarch,” “Boscawen,” and “Cumberland.” *Paddle steamers*: “Penelope,” “Magicienne,” “Basilisk,” “Driver,” “Porcupine,” “Pigmy.” *Surveying vessels*: “Alban,” and “Lightning.” *Hospital ship*: “Belleisle.” Total, 28 ships; the combined fleet amounting to forty-seven.

Sir Charles Napier received the following instructions from the First Lord, as to the line of conduct he

was to pursue with regard to our gallant allies : "The French fleet will have joined you in large force, and I hope that the most friendly and confidential relation will have been established between you and the French Admiral. The conjoint service of the allied fleet cannot be conducted on any other footing. The supreme command not being vested in either of you, mutual confidence and forbearance must be the rule, and the general plan of operations must be the result of previous concert and deliberation." Hence there was a divided command—a system which, however cordial the co-operation of both parties, has never been known to succeed.

In obedience to their respective instructions, the British and French Commanders-in-chief carefully examined all the charts they could procure of Sweaborg, and also the able reports of Rear-Admiral Chads* and Mr. Biddlecombe. The result was, a unanimous opinion that, without gun-boats and mortar-vessels, an attack on Sweaborg would be perfectly impracticable. Sir Charles Napier, therefore, decided on reconnoitering Cronstadt, expressing, at the same time, the hope that Admiral Parseval would, meanwhile, allow the the French fleet to remain, for the purpose of guarding Sweaborg ; but the latter demurred at this proposal, and it was consequently decided that the combined fleets should proceed together to the head of the Gulf.

It has already been mentioned that Sir Charles Napier resented the censure passed on him by the Admiralty for quitting Wingo Sound—a step he took in accordance with the instructions he had received

* *Vide* Appendix to this vol.

from the Foreign Office. Admiral Berkeley considered—as we have seen—the language used on this occasion by Sir Charles Napier as being too strong, which opinion elicited the following explanation:—

“ ‘Duke of Wellington,’ Baro Sound, June 15th.

“MY DEAR BERKELEY,—I am sorry for having used the expression I did, but I was hurt at the check I got for following closely the orders of the Secretary of State; and then I thought you hinted that I had been dilatory.

“I assure you I am not peevish, but I had much on my mind at the time, and the weight is sometimes very heavy; but now all is right. I have got all my ships collected. The French fleet have joined, and though we are in the middle of rocks and shoals, we have a safe anchorage. I am filled up with coals, have cleared the ‘Resistance,’ got in our water, and we are fit for any work, and the only thing we want is to know what we are to do with this splendid fleet. I do not think the Russians will move, and I do not think we can either get at Sweaborg or Cronstadt.

“The fortifications of Sweaborg, as you will see by the detailed plans I sent you, are very strong. The only entrance is very narrow, and across it lies a three-decker, I understand, ready to sink and bar the passage.

“The French fleet appeared off Bomarsund the day before yesterday. I had notice of their approach the evening before, and I weighed at four in the morning and joined them off the entrance of the Sound—the wind was out—we were under steam, they under sail—7 sail-of-the-line, 7 frigates, and 5 steamers. I sent the Captain of the fleet on board to compliment them and offer assistance. They accepted three steamers, and I am happy to say they were all towed in, in safety, and are now lying here—and a splendid sight it is!

“The following day I paid my visit of ceremony to the Admiral, and was presented to the Rear-Admiral and captains; and the next day he returned the visit, was received with great state, and was much pleased. We both agreed that for the future all ceremony should cease, and I

resigned the 'Austerlitz' to his flag, and wrote a complimentary letter to her captain, with which he was delighted, and asked to remain in my squadron. So much for the reports in England that he was not treated with sufficient attention!

"They are now busy watering and putting their fleet to rights. I have sent him all the plans, and have had some general conversation with him on my views for the future; and I suppose by next mail I shall be able to inform you of our plans. He has brought 2,000 troops. If we had about as many more, I think I could do something with them and our marines."

On the 27th of June Sir James Graham wrote to Sir Charles Napier, acknowledging the receipt of his letter of the 20th, saying he was glad that Sir Charles had gone up to Cronstadt to see with his own eyes what it might be possible to accomplish there. He was certain the Admiral would do whatever man could do, and that if he were not restrained by a sense of duty from embarking in any desperate enterprise, on his return to Baro Sound he should receive full instructions from him (Sir James) respecting an attack on the Aland Islands.

Sir James Graham also added, that the Admiral judged quite rightly in taking some of the French squadron with him to Cronstadt, when he found that the French Admiral was bent on this arrangement—that his policy was to keep our ally in good humour, and to obtain from him as much assistance as he was willing to give.

CHAPTER VIII.

CRONSTADT, BOMARSUND—JUNE-AUGUST, 1854.

■ DID my limits permit, I would gladly detail the exploits of Sir Charles's gallant comrades in the Baltic. I would speak of Admiral Plumridge's indefatigable activity when in command of the flying squadron in the Gulf of Bothnia—of Captain Hall's attack on Bomarsund with the three steamers under his command—of Captain Wilcox's brush with the batteries at Hango—of Captain Key's dashing affair in the "Amphion," which led to the surrender of the town of Libau and the shipping in its port; but for an account of these and other proceedings of single and detached vessels, during the summer of 1854, I must again refer the reader to the "Baltic Campaign," and confine myself to the immediate movements of the subject of my memoir.

On the 22nd of June, 1854, the allied fleet got under weigh and proceeded towards Cronstadt, leaving Admiral Corry to continue the blockade of Sweaborg with nine sail-of-the-line, one frigate, and five or six steamers, during the absence of the main body of

the fleet; and, at the request of Sir Charles Napier, the French Admiral added two frigates to Admiral Corry's squadron.

The combined French and English force which went to reconnoitre Cronstadt and offer battle to the Russian fleet, consisted of twelve British and six French ships-of-the-line, with nine steamers. At this time the Russians had within the harbour, and under the protection of their forts—armed with nearly 1000 guns—no less than thirty-four line-of-battle ships, besides smaller vessels and steamers, and an immense flotilla of gunboats.

The following communication from Sir Charles Napier to Sir James Graham, details his proceedings at this date:—

“ ‘Duke of Wellington,’ Baro Sound, 28th June, 1854.

“MY DEAR SIR JAMES,—The French fleet arrived on the 13th, as I related to the Secretary of the Admiralty; how they were received, it is unnecessary to repeat it to you.

“I have now before me the Duke of Newcastle's instructions, and all your letters, and I have carefully studied them, and I think I have accomplished all you pointed out in your letter of the 16th May, which is the last that treats of our operations.

“You say, ‘a complete blockade of the Gulf of Finland must be my first operation, and the occupation of an anchorage within the gulf, where I can command a supply of water.’ That is done. You then wish me to look at Aland, and see what can be done there; that is accomplished also, and I send by this mail the plans and soundings, and Captain Sullivan's report, and Mr. Nugent, the engineer officer's also.

“I have also been and sounded up to Sweaborg, and I can take the fleet up to Miolo Roads, but as for going into Sweaborg it is quite impossible. The entrance into the harbour I understand, from several captains of colliers, and from the pilot of the ‘Majestic,’ is not much wider than the length of

this ship, and across the passage a three-decker is placed ready to be sunk; besides this, all the beacons are removed, and the smoke alone, without guns, would defend the harbour. The only way to take, or rather to destroy Sweaborg, would be by a large military force, occupying the islands and throwing shells into it, and I send Admiral Chad's report on the subject.*

"I now come to our future operations; we have three courses to follow, as Sir Robert Peel used to say.

"The first is to lie here all summer, and be content with the blockade of the Gulf of Finland—that won't please the people of England.

"The second is to go to Cronstadt, offer battle to the Russian fleet, which they won't accept, or attempt the harbour; I look on the latter to be impossible, the channel is narrow, very shallow, and the batteries would destroy you, if you succeeded in getting into the channel, as only one ship can enter at a time; this information I have got from the captain of the collier here, who has frequently been to Cronstadt, and this agrees with the plans.

"The third is to attempt the Aland islands: to do this (as we have no troops) it would be necessary for the whole fleet to proceed to the anchorage pointed out in Captain Sullivan's chart, leaving vessels in the entrance of the gulf, only to watch the Helsingfors squadron, land all the marines, and the French troops (which would amount to 5000 men), a great number of heavy guns, and lay siege to Bomarsund, attacking at the same time in front, if found practicable—if not, land 10,000 seamen and make soldiers of them. I lean to this, and I shall propose it to the French Admiral; if we succeed it will be a great *coup*, if we fail we cannot have much loss; and if the Russian fleet come out to raise the siege, we shall be sure of taking them. Whether you would like this plan in England, I cannot tell; if it is not decided on, which I do not expect it will be, we shall probably go up to Cronstadt, and that will give the Government time to send us a few troops, if possible; if not, either to sanction or forbid the operation. At all events, I will desire Plumridge

* See Appendix.

to endeavour to hinder reinforcements being thrown into Bomarsund. I hope you have settled about the blockade, as we do not make captures, but only warn them off. I have no vessels to blockade higher up the gulf. I have stationed six from Libau to Odensholm, and across to Hango; four steamers in the Gulf of Bothnia, which is not half enough, as the whole trade will be carried on from Sweden; it takes one to do the duty between this and Dantzic, two frigates and a steamer across from Helsingfors to Revel, and I must always keep three with the sailing fleet, besides the surveying vessels. The French are going to send two frigates off Revel, at my request; but he will not part with any steamer from the fleet.

"I think I shall get on with the French Admiral He is a very gentlemanly man.

"Since writing so far, I have been on board with the French Admiral—he has some doubts about the policy of attacking Bomarsund, as well as the propriety of doing it without troops, and he thinks it better to go to Cronstadt first, as it would be of little use going there (Bomarsund) unless we attacked it. I have fallen into his views, and it is decided to go to Cronstadt. I shall leave Admiral Corry off here with his squadron, and two French line-of-battle ships and two frigates and the 'Ajax,' and I will go off Cronstadt with the screws—six French ships and one or two frigates. I would much sooner have left the French to guard Helsingfors; but when I hinted as much, I saw that would never do; and as I am ordered to keep up a friendly communication with the Admiral, it would not do to differ at the first going off.

"I shall come back as soon as possible, and I hope to find some troops here, or that Sweden has consented to assist; for if we do not attack the Aland Islands, I do not see what else we can do. I have not heard from you by the two last mails. I should like to hear from you every mail. I am in the middle of perplexities, and hardly know whether I go right or wrong. Lord Clarendon never answered my letter, giving an account of my interview with the King of Sweden, so I do not know whether I was right or wrong, or even if

*he received it. Believe me, my dear Sir James, yours very truly,

“CHARLES NAPIER.

“P.S. I have sent a duplicate of my letter about the blockade.”

“C. N.”

On the 24th of June the allied fleets anchored off Seskar, a small island near the end of the Gulf, where they remained till the 26th.

On that day the combined fleets again advanced, whilst the steamers “Arrogant” and “Imperieuse” were sent forward in search of those “infernal machines” with which it was said the approaches to Cronstadt were thickly studded. The advanced ships soon descried the Russian fleet at anchor. It lay in three columns within the harbour, and, from what could be seen, appeared to consist of thirty sail.

The combined fleet anchored about eight miles from Tolboukin lighthouse, whilst a flying squadron of steamers was despatched to reconnoitre Cronstadt, of which Captain Sullivan made an able report.

The Admiral wrote thus to Sir James Graham, acquainting him with the results of his personal observation :—

“ ‘Duke of Wellington,’ off Cronstadt, July 1st, 1854.

“MY DEAR SIR JAMES,—The French Admiral and myself had yesterday a close reconnoissance of Cronstadt, and I send you the drawings made by Messrs. Nugent and Cowell, which are very correct, and quite agree with the different plans sent me at various times by the Admiralty.

“You will see by them that any attack on Cronstadt by ships is entirely impracticable. In going in to the south, the batteries are most formidable—all constructed of solid masonry: they are three and four-deckers of stone instead of wood, and ships going in would be raked by them the moment they came under fire, and would be sunk before they reached

the ships, which are placed with their broadsides bearing also on the passage. The channel is narrow, and we had in running in a quarter less five, four miles from the ships, hardly enough for the 'Duke of Wellington.' I conclude there would be less, higher up, and it is most probable that there is only room for one ship, so that the chances are they would be sunk one after the other, or, if the smoke from the guns and from the funnels were dense, they would miss the channel, and go ashore. All attack from the southward by ships is, therefore, out of the question; and it does not appear to me necessary to lay down infernal machines, which by all accounts they have done. The first day it was examined, something was seen under water, which was swept for, and Chads hooked it; at first we thought we had one, but it turned out to be a beacon that had got adrift.

"In addition to the drawings, I send you a chart with the distances set off in circles, to show the possibility of an attack by gun-boats throwing shells 5,000 yards, provided the enemy let you alone."

A description of the drawings and plans accompanied this letter, which it would be useless to insert in this memoir without the diagrams themselves.

"I now turn to the north side of Cronstadt; that is certainly the weakest point. A landing might be made on the island of any number of men, and the town besieged; but you must expect the Russians will always outnumber you—if you fail, your army would be lost, and if you succeed it would probably be starved during the long winter. I presume, therefore, that will not be thought of. It may, however, be bombarded.

* * * * *

"Our fleet would be in good anchorage to the north of the island, and both parties would employ the boats of the fleet.

"Besides shells, we must be supplied with a great number of rockets of the largest size.

"I have drawn up this statement with great care, and I think you may depend upon it. I took Chads in with me,

and he quite agrees with me. I have thought it best to send this and all the drawings to you privately. The engineer officers deserve credit for the drawings, and the assistance they have given me. I send Sullivan's report to the Admiralty, on which you may rely.

"I am sorry to say the cholera is increasing; and as I presume it is of no use staying here any longer, we shall move probably to Aspo.

"I shall have that part of the coast examined, and I think the French Admiral will take the south.

"Believe me, my dear Sir James, yours very truly,

"CHARLES NAPIER.

"P.S.—The best plan of attacking Cronstadt would be by beginning with St. Petersburg. You might land an army either to the north or south, and march on it; but it must be an army that they could not meet, and you must not have a reverse, or it would become a campaign as disastrous as Buonaparte's.—C. N."

In reply to the above, Sir James Graham wrote as follows on the 11th of July:—

"Your report, together with Captain Sullivan's plan, is a clear and very able exposition of the strength of the arsenal, and of the extreme difficulty and uncertainty of an attack, even if sustained by a large force of gunboats and of troops, which are not at present at your disposal. I had anticipated your return to the westward, after an offer of battle, which I felt certain the enemy would decline; and it now remains for you to blockade the Gulf of Finland, to keep the fleets at Cronstadt and Helsingfors disunited, and to await the arrival of the French troops, when you and the French Admiral and General must deliberate on the operations to be undertaken by the combined forces.

"Bomarsund will clearly be within your reach. Sweaborg, if it were possible, would be a noble prize, but on no account be led into any desperate attempt,† and, above all things, avoid the least risk of the Russian fleet slipping out of the

* Unfortunately these drawings are not to be found.

† The Reader's attention is called to this passage.

Gulf of Finland when your back is turned ; and be slow to land your marines, without whom your line-of-battle is disabled. These Russians, though shy, are crafty, and if they can catch you at a disadvantage they will be down upon you."

In this letter was enclosed a memorandum from Captain —, and, continues Sir James,

"I fulfil my promise in sending it to you. I told him that the use of fire-ships had not been overlooked by you from the first hour of your appointment to your present command."

This letter contained the further information, that Sir James Graham was afraid that he should not be able to send the whole of the 9,000 French troops to the Baltic so soon as he had hoped a day or two before, in consequence of the transports not being quite ready ; but he still felt confident that the whole number would be assembled at Faro by the 6th of August. He also stated that Sweden would not move unless Austria went to war with Russia, and that Austria still hesitated and hung back ; and concluded with the observation that, with 50,000 Swedes and 200 Swedish gunboats, Sir Charles Napier might still do something great and decisive before the end of September.

The 50,000 troops and 200 gunboats here admitted to be requisite for doing "something" were not forthcoming, and, on the capture of Bomarsund, France withdrew her army from the Baltic, and the French fleet was shortly afterwards recalled.

Letters very similar in tone to the one from which the above extracts are taken, were received, about this time, by Sir Charles Napier, from Admirals Berkeley

and Milne, as well as from Lord Clarendon, who thus concluded a letter to the Admiral, dated July 4th, 1854:—

“We have watched all your proceedings with the deepest anxiety, and everybody rejoices that you have had the moral courage to resist impossibilities, that could only have been attempted to satisfy the home public, which, however, upon the whole, has behaved well, and has not been too impatient. If, with the French troops that will join you at the end of the month, you can make Aland change masters, it will be a right good deed.”

Both Admiral Parseval and Sir Charles Napier had decided that, with the means at their command, nothing could be effected against either Cronstadt or Sweaborg, and at that time the Admiralty approved of this decision. Whilst, however, the British Admiral was earnestly applying for the requisite means, viz.: mortar-vessels, gunboats, steamers of a light draught of water, and troops, he received, in reply to his application, the advice to *hire* steamers if *he could*, together with impracticable suggestions and visionary schemes for removing the obstructions placed by the Russians in the passage of the north entrance to Cronstadt, which consisted of double rows of immense piles embedded in masses of granite; which it was proposed to remove with the aid of “diving-bells and divers;” whilst the entrance to Sweaborg was to be cleared by “four steam dredges of 25 horse power each.” Admiral Napier, in reply to these proposals, aptly remarked that such plans might perhaps succeed, *if the Russians would only allow them to be carried out!*

As suggestions appeared then to be so much in vogue, the author of these pages submitted a plan to

the Admiralty, to the effect that, as our fleet could not get *into* Cronstadt, we, perhaps, might prevent the Russian ships from getting *out*, by loading with stones, and then sinking opposite the entrance of the harbour, and out of range of their guns, all the old vessels then, and still, rotting in Porchester harbour, which might by this means have been turned to some useful account. Sir Charles Napier, to whom this scheme was likewise submitted, replied that it was practicable, if the country chose to incur the requisite expense.

The plan and description of the defences of Cronstadt, which are given at length in chapter ix. of the "Baltic Campaign," will serve to corroborate what has been said of the utter impracticability of an attack upon that fortress by the combined English and French fleets, during the summer of 1854—unprovided, as they were, with the requisite means to effect that object—and cannot fail, in the judgment of every impartial person, not only to exonerate from all blame, but to ensure due praise to both Admirals Parseval and Napier, for the resolution they then came to, of leaving the pestiferous waters of Cronstadt, where cholera had made its appearance in the combined fleets, and had already carried off upwards of a hundred men, whilst numbers were daily crowding the sick list.

In consequence of this state of affairs, both the Commanders-in-chief of the allied fleets determined on retracing their steps without further delay, and awaiting at Baro Sound (a little to the westward of Sweaborg) further instructions from their respective governments. On the 6th of July they arrived at

their anchorage, when, unfortunately, the French line-of-battle ship "Duguesclin" got ashore, but, by the prompt assistance of the British vessels, she was soon afloat again. Writing, shortly afterwards, to Admiral Berkeley, Sir Charles remarked, "It would have done your heart good to have seen how quickly a launch and a barge from each ship were alongside her." The English crews had, by that time, been brought into a much improved, or—as the Admiral termed it—a "respectable state."

Much time was lost in waiting for these expected instructions. Sir Charles Napier, however, turned this delay to account, by diligently exercising his fleet in every possible way; boats were daily manned and exercised in divisions; the marines and seamen were landed and practised in various evolutions and in the use of scaling-ladders; whilst sham-fights frequently took place—in short, every exercise and practice was gone through which might be of use, should orders arrive, directing an attack upon Bomarsund.

The long-expected instructions were at length received, when Sir Charles despatched two more steamers to Admiral Plumridge, with orders to endeavour, by every means, to prevent succours from being thrown into Bomarsund, and especially to gain all the information he could, respecting the north passage.

It had been decided that a French army should be sent to the Baltic, which was expected to leave the Downs in the middle of July, so as to join the allied fleet by the 1st of August; and on the 4th of July, Sir James Graham directed the Admiral to send one

or two of his surveying vessels to guide the line-of-battle ships which were to convey these troops through the Belt; adding, that "if he could appoint an officer to accompany them who *"knows your own way of threading dangers, which has been so successful, it would be of great service."* Sir Charles Napier was also informed that Colonel Jones, of the Royal Engineers, would shortly proceed to the Baltic, with the rank of Brigadier-General, to aid him in communicating with the French military authorities; and that this officer would be ready to serve in different ships, and in concert with the Admirals, as the exigencies of the service might require. •

We find the following copies of letters amongst Sir Charles Napier's correspondence whilst waiting at Baro Sound.

Extracts from a letter to Captain Milne:—

"'Duke of Wellington,' Baro Sound, July 17th, 1854.

"We are all getting on very well; the fleet is respectable, not quite so smart as we used to be in St. Vincent's squadron, because we have been obliged to give more attention to gunnery—but still they are very well, and everything done by the watch. I believe the men are very happy and contented."

"I am pleased at the public and private expression of satisfaction at the *nothing* I have been able to do. I hope something will now be done, but these combined things are bad, but I hope ours will succeed. I cannot answer for the Cronstadt fleet not coming to Sweaborg, but I don't see what harm it would do; any move would do good, for we might then get at them, and I shall take very good care they do not get out of the Baltic. We ought to have been at Aland long ago, but I cannot always do what I wish. I hope to arrange everything to get the troops on shore as fast as possible. You must have your hands full."

Extracts of letter to Admiral Berkeley, dated Baro Sound, July 18th, 1854:—

“I am glad you all approve of my proceedings; it is hard that hitherto it has not been in my power to do anything with this powerful fleet, but attacking either Cronstadt or Sweaborg would have been certain destruction.

“I do not well know how to act at this present moment. I am told to prevent a junction with the Cronstadt and Helsingfors fleet, but I don't see how I am to do so. I wanted the French Admiral to leave ships here, and I should leave some also, but he was averse to that, and, in fact, would not do it. There was, therefore, nothing left for me to do but to go down with the whole fleet, leaving vessels to watch the entrance of the Gulf. Had I stayed here with all my fleet, which at least it would have required to prevent a junction if they wanted it, and left the place to the French alone, there would have been an outcry against me. I don't believe they will move, but if they do it will give us a chance of getting hold of them; and as for their slipping out of the Gulf of Finland, there is no chance of that—had they been inclined that way they would have come down on me when Corry was off Gottska Sando.

“Let me hear from you by every mail, for it is a great comfort to me. Believe me, my dear Berkeley, yours very truly,

“CHARLES NAPIER.

“P.S.—Two French ships got on shore coming in, but we got them off.”

According to preconcerted arrangements between the English and French Admirals, the combined fleets weighed anchor on the 18th of July, in order to rendezvous at Ledsund, for the purpose of attacking Bomarsund as soon as the French troops should arrive. Sir Charles Napier safely reached the anchorage at Ledsund, on the 21st, and wrote next day to Vice-Admiral Parseval. The letter is worthy

of record, as shewing Sir Charles Napier's anxious desire to mitigate the horrors of war:—

“ ‘ Duke of Wellington,’ Ledsund Bay, Aland, July 22nd, 1854.

“ MY DEAR ADMIRAL,—I am glad to see you safe in—I was uneasy about you last night, and I sent you a steamer, and another this morning. I have sent all my steamers to blockade the passages from Abo to Bomarsund, and the small ships are gone up as far as they can. I have given positive orders to allow nobody to go on shore, and I hope the inhabitants will not be annoyed in any way—hitherto they have not. If you approve of what I have done, perhaps you will take the same steps; if men once get on shore, there will be no preventing mischief. Believe me, my dear Admiral, yours very truly,

“ CHARLES NAPIER.”

The French military force intended to act against Bomarsund amounted to 10,000 men, under the separate command of General Baraguay d'Hilliers. The expedition was thus placed under three different Commanders-in-chief, each independent of the other; and supposing success attended this divided command, it would remain to be settled what was to be done with that fortress when captured, and also with the Aland Islands; for Sir Charles Napier had received intimation from Stockholm (where he kept up a communication with the British Chargé d'Affaires) that Sweden would not run the risk of being compromised by either assisting in attacking these places, or accepting them if taken possession of, until Austria had declared herself; a step which the cautious policy of the latter power, combined with the doubtful intentions of Prussia, rendered her averse to take. Sweden at that moment had 15,000 troops in readiness to act; her large flotilla of gun-boats could be prepared for action

in three weeks ; and in six weeks she would have been able to muster an efficient army of 60,000 men.

Sir Charles Napier appears, from his correspondence, to have made, through our minister at Stockholm, every effort to induce Sweden to enlist in our cause. On the other hand, Russia had sent large bodies of troops into Finland, for the purpose of reinforcing Bomarsund, but, owing to the precautions taken, their object was defeated.

On the 28th of July, Sir Charles Napier communicated to the French Admiral the instructions he had received from our Government, relative to Bomarsund ; and they unanimously determined on the course they were to pursue whenever the troops should arrive ; but the loss of so much time caused great annoyance and anxiety, as the season for operations was rapidly passing away. A portion of the French army, however, at last arrived on the 30th of July, to the number of 5000 men, followed, on the 31st, by General Baraguay d'Hilliers, who visited Sir Charles Napier on board the "Duke of Wellington," when yards were manned, and he was saluted with fifteen guns. The French ships, with the stores, material, &c., for the siege, had not yet arrived—nothing could be done without these supplies ; and on the 31st of July, as likewise on the 3rd of August, the Admiral wrote, representing the state of affairs, to Sir James Graham. The following are extracts from his letter :—

"Ledsund, Aland, July 31, 1854.

"The season is far advanced, and we must be quick ; and as for ulterior operations, that is quite out of the question. Sweaborg is not to be taken with a handful of men, were we

to begin in June instead of the beginning of August, and about the middle of September we must be pointing south. These seas cannot be played with, with fleets of large ships."

Sir Charles's letter of the 3rd of August contains the following passages :—

"The two French line-of-battle ships, with the stores, 'matériel,' &c., for a siege, are not come, and the last I heard of them they were at Kiel; what they are doing there, I don't know, or how long they will remain, but it is most serious; the summer is passing, and every hour is precious. The French General will not land and occupy a position till the 'matériel' arrives;—I think he is wrong.

* * * * *

"This delay causes me the greatest anxiety; if they can hold out till the weather gets bad, we shall be in a mess.

* * * * *

"All that can be done I will do, but this delay kills me; what the transports were ordered to Kiel for, having all the stores on board, God only knows; but they appear to have forgotten that this is August, and we are in latitude 60° 10'!"

Sir Charles Napier wished Admiral Parseval to undertake the charge of watching the Russian squadron at Sweaborg; but as the expeditionary force intended to act against Bomarsund was to be composed entirely of French troops, Admiral Parseval declined this proposal, as he wished to have as many of his ships as possible present at the attack: and thus it chiefly devolved on the British squadron to keep guard and watch over the Russian fleets at Cronstadt and Sweaborg. In consequence of Admiral Corry having been obliged to return to England on account of ill-health, Commodore Martin—as we have already seen—was placed in command of his squadron, and proceeded

to the entrance of the Gulf of Finland with nine ships of the line, and as many steamers as could be spared; the latter being detached in order to bring the earliest intelligence of the movements of the Russian fleet; and it was hoped that the smallness of this force would induce the enemy to come out of port and try the fortune of war. They were, however, too cautious to attempt this. The British Commander-in-chief then took to Bomarsund the block-ships, and that class of line-of-battle ships of the least draught of water; Admiral Chads having been previously detached with a portion of the fleet to commence the investment of the place. The larger ships—much to the disappointment and annoyance of their officers and crews—were kept at Ledsund, in order to support Commodore Martin, in the event of an attack on his squadron by the combined Sweaborg and Cronstadt Russian fleets, whose junction it would not, under existing circumstances, have been possible to prevent. It was, moreover, requisite to intercept any reinforcements the Russians might send from Finland to Bomarsund, which the intricate navigation of the numberless channels forming the labyrinth of the Aland Islands gave them great facilities for doing with their small craft, whilst it was of no less importance to procure an accurate survey of all the approaches to that fortress. Admiral Plumridge, with his flying squadron, was entrusted with the former duty, whilst the latter devolved on Captain Sullivan; and Sir Charles Napier speaks in the highest terms of the manner in which these able officers accomplished their respective tasks—though, with all Admiral Plumridge's energetic activity, such

were the difficulties with which he had to contend, that he could not prevent a small body of Russian troops from evading his vigilance, and effecting a landing to the north of Bomarsund.

The Aland Islands consist of a group of 280 rocks and islets, 200 of which are uninhabited, and enclose a perfect labyrinth of channels of the most difficult navigation. These islands had belonged to Sweden until 1809, when they were taken possession of by Russia; and the Emperor Nicholas, no doubt to further his designs upon the former power, constructed on the largest island the fortress of Bomarsund—so called from the Bomar *Sund*, or strait, which separates Aland from Presto.

“The fortress itself formed the segment of a circle, being a chord about a quarter of a mile in length, and presenting to the roadstead a casemated battery of 120 guns, in two tiers. The system of defence was made complete by a series of works commencing on the heights behind, and continued across the water by a chain of small islands to the island of Presto, which forms the other side of the channel. The fort to the north was called Fort Nottich, and that to the south the Tzee Fort.” *

The difficulties presented to an attack on Bomarsund by large ships of war are well elucidated in the subjoined article published in the *Times* of the 16th August, 1854:—

“It is clear that in the shallow waters and difficult passes of that inland sea, our three-deckers can hardly ever be brought sufficiently near to the enemy’s works to bear upon them with effect. The block-ships and heavy frigates are alone able to go into harbours of this description; and it was

* From the “Baltic Campaign,” p. 338.

not without reason that, on the occasion of the Baltic expedition of 1800 and 1807, *all the ships selected for that service were second or third rates.* The use of such ships as the ‘Duke of Wellington,’ the ‘St. Jean d’Acre,’ and the ‘Neptune,’ in the Baltic, is to keep the Russian fleet in check; and the manner in which these huge vessels have been handled by our masters and pilots, is such as to call forth the highest eulogiums from the Russians themselves. But Admiral Napier has very wisely abstained from measuring the broadsides of any of his ships *against the batteries of a granite fortress*; and in spite of all that has been said on the subject, the result of the experiments made in this war, is decidedly favourable to land fortifications against marine artillery.”

The difficulties and anxieties of his command weighed heavily at this period on Sir Charles Napier, and it was with much gratification he received a most cordial and friendly letter from Admiral Berkeley, dated Admiralty, July 31, 1854.

The Admiral replied as follows:—

“Ledsund, 7th August, 1854.

“MY DEAR BERKELEY,—I thank you sincerely for standing up for me. I don’t much care about the public—I am satisfied in my own mind that I have done all I can. . . .

“If the British public have taken the trouble to look at the drawings of Cronstadt and Sweaborg, and have not discerned that a fleet would be annihilated if they attempted to go in, I cannot help it. I think we have been lucky to preserve our ships in this difficult navigation, and we are not out of the wood yet. I have not been well this last fortnight, worried at the delay; but I am better, and am now beginning to work. The French line-of-battle ships arrived on Friday, and they went up yesterday; the French General would not begin till they came, and we lost much time in consequence. We ought to have begun the moment the troops arrived, and got

into our position, and been ready when the *matériel* came.

“We all start after dinner, and land to-morrow morning; we have lost much time, and there is none to spare.”

On the 1st of August, the allied Admirals, in company with General Baraguay d’Hilliers, made a reconnoissance on Bomarsund; but notwithstanding the ardent desire of Sir Charles Napier to commence operations—for in such a climate he well knew the value of time—his movements were impeded, in consequence of the non-arrival of the remainder of the French troops. This unfortunate delay, as the Admiral had represented to Sir James Graham, was “hourly becoming most serious;” the more so, as he had received intimation that the Russians had got 300 gun-boats in readiness, with which they hoped to cause great annoyance to our fleet; but the French General would not land without his reinforcements and *matériel*, and these did not arrive till the 5th. The French army now amounted to 10,000 men, with every requisite for the siege.

On the 6th, Mr. Biddlecombe, the Master of the Fleet, was, with the masters of the other ships, despatched to reconnoitre the approaches to Bomarsund, which they accomplished to within 600 yards of the great fort, and succeeded in placing buoys on the extremity of a shoal extending from the west shore.

The landing of the troops was effected on the 8th. Besides General Baraguay’s force, there were 2000 French marines, a battalion of our marines, and 90 British sappers and miners; all placed under the orders of Brigadier-General Jones.

"The fleet was anchored below in Lumpar Bay. Sir Charles Napier shifted his flag on board the 'Bulldog,' and went up with the troops. When the landing was completed, he pushed the 'Bulldog' and 'Stromboli' up a creek, where he could get a full view of all that was going on.

"The landing of the troops had been effected with the greatest cordiality between the two nations, each vying with the other in energy. The Admirals and Generals commanding, were unanimous in opinion, as in action; and when reporting the proceedings to the Admiralty, Sir Charles warmly eulogised Admiral Plumridge and General Jones, who had conducted the landing to the north, as well as Admiral Chads and Admiral Penaud, who had directed it on the south. He paid an equally warm tribute to Rear-Admiral Seymour, for the assistance received from him.

"The next operation was the landing of guns, to complete the batteries, and this devolved on Admiral Chads. The distance they had to be dragged, from the landing-place to the battery, was four miles and a half, over what Admiral Chads termed 'execrable ground, the greater portion of which was steep rocky hills and ploughed fields.'

"The disembarkation of the guns took place on the morning of the 10th, each ship having previously prepared two sledges, after a pattern made by Captain Ramsay, of the 'Hogue.' Upon these sledges were placed the guns, with their carriages and gear, and 150 men were attached to each sledge, under their respective senior lieutenants, the whole under the command of Captain Hewlett, of the 'Edinburgh.'

"The operation was commenced at five o'clock in the morning, and by ten o'clock the first batch of guns was in the English camp. The exertion of the seamen and officers caused no small astonishment in the French encampment, the French loudly cheering the blue-jackets in passing; and, in some of the more difficult ascents, voluntarily seizing on the drag ropes, and lending a hand with a will not second to that of the seamen themselves.

"On arriving in camp, the men were much exhausted by the great amount of fatigue they had undergone, and the ma-

majority lay down on the ground to rest, whilst others prepared their dinner. Their rest was of short duration, for an order arrived to embark immediately, the 'Penelope' having got on shore under the guns of the great fort, and the services of the men were required on board their respective ships, in case their aid should become necessary.

"Fatigued as were the men, the order was received with loud cheers, and forgetting both their previous exertions and their dinners, they, disdaining the comparatively safe way they had come, took a short cut within range of the fire of the port, which they happily escaped, and reached their boats in three quarters of an hour."*

In passing the large fort, the "Penelope" steamer having—as above observed—run ashore, was obliged to throw her guns overboard before she could be floated off; but while thus disabled she was severely plied with the enemy's red-hot shot; her hull was thereby considerably damaged, and two or three of her crew, together with a French officer, were killed. No blame could be attached to her Commander, Captain Caffin, but the accident was entirely attributable to the difficulties and intricacy of the navigation; dangers to which the other ships were equally exposed.

On the 11th, more guns were conveyed to the same position by our seamen, directed by Admiral Chads. On the former occasion, the "Edinburgh," "Hogue," "Blenheim," and "Ajax," had each furnished parties of 150 men, under their respective officers, Lieutenants Donald McLeod, Mackenzie, Davies, Clarke, and Walter Pollard. These parties were now increased to 200 each, by whom Captain Ramsay's "sledges" were manned; and duly to appreciate the services of

* From the "Baltic Campaign."

our gallant tars, it must be remembered that they had to drag the guns—bare-footed*—over nearly five miles of execrable ground ; their guns however were in camp by half-past ten in the morning. The bands of the ships attended the working parties ; so that this extraordinary march resembled a triumphal procession—which indeed it was—over difficulties that had been considered almost insurmountable, but now overcome with such astonishing rapidity and success ; the spirits of the men, whilst on this duty, being not unfrequently excited by a dropping shot from the enemy. The zeal and perseverance displayed were such as British seamen only can show ; and the Admiral, when complimenting Admiral Chads, his officers and men, on their work, bore testimony that, “in the course of his service, he had seen guns moved in different places, but never on such roads, and to such a distance, as in the present instance ; the cheerfulness and exertions of the men were wonderful.”

The French, having brought with them an immense amount of ordnance stores, did not require the portion of ships' guns destined for their use. The siege artillery and *matériel* were moved up with great celerity, as they had no less than 80 artillery horses on board the transports, together with about 500 engineers.

It was decided that the French should attack Fort Tzee, leaving Fort Nottich to the English. Sir Charles Napier wished the town of Presto also to be invested, but was overruled by his colleagues. A

* As in the Crimea, the shoes that had been sent out for the use of the squadron were nearly all unserviceable, from being too small.

detailed relation of the operations preceding the capture of Bomarsund is given in "The Baltic Campaign," but we are obliged to limit ourselves here to the substance of the Admiral's official account, and to a few of his private letters on this event. The following communication to the Admiralty has reference to the fall of forts Tzee and Nottich, which preceded the surrender of the larger and principal fortress of Bomarsund:—

"'Bulldog,' off Bomarsund, August 16, 1854.

"At 4 o'clock in the morning of the 13th inst., the French battery, of four 16-pounders and four mortars, opened a splendid fire on the western tower, which commands the fortress of Bomarsund and the anchorage; a white flag was displayed in the afternoon, which led to nothing: but on the morning of the 14th the tower was surprised by the Chasseurs. General Jones's battery of 32-pounders was finished in the night, and ready to open, but not being wanted, was turned against the eastern tower, and on the morning of the 15th he opened his fire. The battery was manned by seamen and marine artillery from the four ships 'Edinburgh,' 'Hogue,' 'Ajax,' and 'Blenheim,' under the direction of Captain Ramsay, of the 'Hogue,' assisted by Commander Preedy, Lieutenant Somerset of the 'Duke of Wellington,' and the officers named below.* Their fire was beautiful.

"2. At 6 P.M. one side was knocked in, and the tower surrendered.

* "EDINBURGH":—Lieut. G. F. Burgess, R.N.; Capt. Delacombe, R.M.; A. Tait, Lieut. R.M.; G. J. Giles, Passed Clerk. "HOGUE":—Lieut. M. Singer, R.N.; Chas. Smith, Mate; Captain Fosbroke, R.M.; A. R. Bradford, Surgeon. "AJAX":—Capt. W. C. Sayer, R.M.; Thos. Bent, 1st Lieut.; H. L. Robinson, Mate. "BLENHEIM":—Lieut. F. A. Close, R.M.; T. J. Ball, Master; L. Weldman, Acting Mate; F. L. Ward; Davie Orr, Acting Mate; P. B. Nolloth, Brevet-Major, R.M.; Wm. Sanders, 1st Lieut., R.M.; Seaton Wade, Assistant Surgeon.

"In the attack on the western tower, the Chasseurs, armed with Minié rifles, were employed so successfully that it was difficult for the enemy to load their guns. In the attack on the eastern tower we had no Chasseurs, and they were enabled to load their guns with more facility.

"3. Our loss has been trifling: one man killed, and one wounded; but I have to lament the death of Lieutenant the Hon. Cameron Wrottesley, R.E., who was mortally wounded by a cannon ball, and died twenty minutes after he had been sent to the 'Belleisle.'

"4. The enemy had 6 men killed, 7 wounded, and 125 were taken prisoners. I have sent the latter to the 'Termagant.'

"5. The loss of the French at the western tower was also trifling.

"6. Both batteries were admirably constructed, and admirably fought, which accounts for the small loss. General Jones speaks in high terms of the conduct of the seamen and marine artillery, and the precision of their fire.

"7. During the time the operations were going on, General Baraguay d'Hilliers was employed in establishing his breaching batteries against the great fortress; the French and English steamers, 'Asmodée,' 'Phlégéthon,' 'Darrien,' 'Arrogant,' 'Amphion,' 'Valorous,' 'Driver,' 'Bulldog,' and 'Hecla,' supported by 'Trident' (bearing the flag of Admiral Penaud), the 'Duperré,' 'Edinburgh,' and 'Ajax,' kept up a well-directed fire from their shell-guns, and very much damaged the fortress; whilst Captain the Hon. F. T. Pelham of the 'Blenheim,' kept up a beautiful fire from a ten-inch gun, landed in the battery we had driven the enemy out of a few days before. His position was one of great danger, but the battery was put in such good order by Captain Pelham, that the men were well covered, and he had no loss.

"8. The General's breaching batteries will be ready by to-morrow, and they shall be well supported by the ships of the line of both nations, and by the steamers. The narrowness of the ground on which the General has established his breaching battery very much circumscribing the space, the greatest caution will be necessary to prevent our firing on his

troops. The little space in the anchorage before Bomarsund, and the intricacy of the navigation, will prevent ships from approaching the main fortress so near as could be wished—but when the batteries are established to act in the rear of the fort, and supported by the shell-guns in front, it cannot hold out more than a few hours.

“9. I have put off to the last moment the departure of the mail, but I shall send an extra courier the moment the fort surrenders.

“10. The western tower was fired, either by accident or design, I do not know which, and blew up at 11 A.M. yesterday.

“11. I am sorry to add, that Lieutenant Cowell, R.E., Aide-de-camp to Brigadier-General Jones, was unfortunately wounded in the leg by the accidental discharge of his pistol. He is now on board the ‘Belleisle,’ doing well, but the loss of his services is much to be regretted.

“CHARLES NAPIER,
“ *Vice-Admiral.*”

The surrender of the great fort is thus narrated:—

“‘Bulldog,’ off Bomarsund, August 16, 1854.

“After sending away the mail, the fortress opened a heavy fire on Captain Pelham’s battery, which had annoyed them much, and which he maintained all yesterday and to-day, and it is wonderful how he and his men escaped. He had with him Lieut. Close, and Mr. Wildman, acting mate, of whom he speaks highly. Seeing his position, I immediately ordered the steamships and steamers, ‘Edinburgh,’ ‘Ajax,’ ‘Arrogant,’ ‘Amphion,’ ‘Valorous,’ ‘Sphinx,’ and ‘Driver,’ who were within range with their ten-inch guns, to give them a shot and shell every five minutes; and they were so well-directed, as well as the French mortars on shore, which had been playing on them for some time, that the enemy held out a flag of truce. I sent Captain Hall of the ‘Bulldog’ on shore, who was shortly joined by Admiral Parseval’s Aide-de-camp, and two of General Baraguay d’Hilliers’s staff, and the troops in the fortress agreed to lay down their arms and march out.

"After I landed I was joined by the French Admiral, and the Commander-in-chief of the army. The men marched out and embarked in steamers, and proceeded to Ledsund to Commodore Grey, who will conduct them to the Downs, to wait for further orders."

The allied Admirals and the French General visited Bomarsund immediately after its surrender. The garrison, which amounted to 2,255, were sent to England as prisoners of war, but the casualties which occurred to the enemy during the siege were never correctly ascertained; and the Russians appear to have been so anxious to conceal their losses, that some of their killed were actually found headed up in casks, which on being opened—notwithstanding the use of quick-lime—filled the surrounding air with an intolerable effluvium.

It is remarkable that, in the account given in the "Baltic Campaign" of the operations before Bomarsund, the name of the Russian officer in command does not appear. Sir Charles Napier, however, bears honourable testimony in his despatches to the conduct of General Bodisco, the Governor of the fortress, who, he says, "behaved like a brave man, and did everything that was possible to be done." He also speaks in terms of the highest admiration of Admirals Chads and Plumridge, and in one of his letters expatiates largely on their merits." Captains Ramsay and Pelham also met with his unqualified praise, as, indeed, did all those under his command; and he took occasion to notice a gallant exploit performed by Commander Warren, then present as an amateur, and who did good service by swimming through a storm of shot and shell to the island of Presto, for

the purpose of obtaining some requisite important information.

"To Sir James Graham.

"'Bulldog,' Bomarsund, August 18th, 1854.

"MY DEAR SIR JAMES,—The Generals and Admirals met to-day to decide what is to be done with Bomarsund. They wanted to blow it up at once, but I would not consent. I send the report of the engineers and the *procès verbal*, and my reasons for signing it—which I hope you will approve.

"The works preparing here are gigantic, but you will see my memorandum. I have sent Grey away with his ships and steamers, and part of the prisoners; I wanted to send them all, but they preferred sending two frigates with half, which I begged they would not do, as their own troops are to be embarked. Believe me yours very truly,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

The following was Sir James Graham's reply :

"Devonport, August 25th.

"MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—I am more than satisfied with your proceedings. I am delighted with the prudence and sound judgment which you have evinced. It would have been a miserable want of firmness had you yielded to clamour, and risked your ships, and sacrificed many valuable lives, in an attempt to destroy by naval means works which were certain to fall to an attack by land.

"Your reasoning also in favour of the immediate and entire destruction of the forts at Bomarsund is irresistible, and I hope that you will take care that the destruction is complete, and that not one stone is left upon another.

"I am well pleased with the promptitude with which you have sent back the line-of-battle ships and steamers. The work has been well done, and I gladly give you the utmost credit for it.

"I write in great haste, but that which presses is the order for destroying Bomarsund. At greater leisure, and in a few days, I will write to you on the subject of your ulterior operations, and of the preparations for an early retreat from the Baltic before winter. I am yours very sincerely,

"J. G. GRAHAM."

The Admiral also wrote as follows to Lord Palmerston relative to the capture of Bomarsund:—

“Bomarsund, August 22, 1854.

“MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,—I hope you will be pleased with the taking of Bomarsund; it has had nothing brilliant in it, but it has been well done.

“It was very strong against ships; the batteries mounted upwards of 100 guns, and the approaches are very difficult. All our steamers have been on shore, and some of them half a dozen times over, but I have escaped so far without losing a ship, and we have been in the middle of rocks and shoals ever since we came into the Baltic.

“Bomarsund possesses a very excellent outer road, Led-sund, and from thence it is a continuous harbour—very intricate till known, but when buoyed, quite safe. At the head of the harbour there is a beautiful bay, where a fleet may be manœuvred. The defences consisted of a large round fortress, commanded by three very heavy towers, which rendered it unassailable by ships; but the works in existence are trifling to those in progress; it is evident the Emperor of Russia intended it for a great naval port, commanding the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland, and overawing Sweden. I am of opinion it ought to be entirely destroyed; and if the islands remain in the possession of Russia, she should be prohibited from reconstructing the fortifications. My opinion and my reasons will no doubt be laid before the Cabinet, so I shall not repeat them now.

“I regret the Emperor has not given us a turn with his fleet; but when I first came to the Gulf of Finland, I offered him battle with half my fleet, before the French joined, and we have taken this place under his nose, and he has not offered to relieve it. I defied all his gun-boats with our steamers, which were so stationed that two Russian Admirals came down to examine whether it were possible to throw in reinforcements, and returned to Sweaborg in despair. There was no necessity for such a large army; if I had had 2,000 or 3,000 marines, we could have done it ourselves; but all is well that ends well, and the loss of this fortress will throw

back his advances on the north for years. Sweden neither could finish the works nor maintain a garrison, and if she obtained possession of it, would lose it again. . . . I remain, my dear Lord, yours very truly,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

Lord Palmerston replied from Broadlands, 5th September, 1854 :—

“MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—Many thanks for your letter of the 22nd of last month, and many more for the taking of Bomarsund, which has proved to be a most important achievement, and the more honourable to you, because accomplished with so little loss. I trust that what has happened there, may lead to the conclusion that our Lancaster gun may be able to reach the works of Sweaborg from distances at which the Russian guns cannot do us much mischief. It would be a grand finish for the season if we could knock down some of those works, but we trust both to your enterprise to do what is possible, and to your prudence not to attempt that which would be too difficult. We must, however, clip the Czar's wings before we have done with him. Yours sincerely,

“PALMERSTON.”

As the following letter is a sequel to the foregoing correspondence, it is inserted here, although rather out of place with respect to date :—

“ ‘ Duke of Wellington,’ Nargen, Sept. 26, 1854.

“MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,—The weather has been so bad this last month that, even had the French fleet and army been here, no operation was practicable but an attack on Abo, where we should have been among islands and the fleet safe—but that the French General would not do.

“I closely reconnoitered Sweaborg the other day, and nearly got on shore, which would have led probably to my passing the winter at St. Petersburg. The navigation among these islands is very dangerous. You will probably see my report on Sweaborg. The councils of war I was ordered to hold were most annoying, caused by the report

of two engineers who knew nothing about it. I am going to move to the south, as the Gulf is no longer safe. With best regards to Lady Palmerston, believe me, my dear Lord Palmerston, yours very faithfully,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

Even as early as the 15th of August, Admiral Berkeley, began to contemplate the feasibility of withdrawing the “big ships” from—as he expressed it—“that infernal gulf” (of Finland); and on the 22nd of the same month he wrote again to Sir Charles a most friendly letter of congratulation, in which he says:—

“Your work and the work of your fellow-labourers has been done admirably. Some of the newspapers are not satisfied because you have not had a sufficient number killed and wounded, whilst the whole Government are pleased beyond measure at your trifling loss, and may well praise your skill and *discretion* in having succeeded in striking the first blow at so small a sacrifice.

“John Bull, never content, expects more than is possible. I trust you will not be goaded on, or beaten out of your own determinations. I have every confidence that you will attempt all that is feasible, and that you will succeed in all you attempt.”

On the same day Sir James Graham wrote to the Admiral from Portsmouth as follows:—

“I congratulate you sincerely on the success of your operations against Bomarsund, and I highly commend your prudence and wisdom in effecting the capture of this stronghold of the enemy, without the loss of a ship or of many lives.

“You have judged well in every respect, both in detaining the line-of-battle ships and steamers until Bomarsund had fallen, and then in sending them home laden with prisoners.

“We can decide nothing as to the disposal of Bomarsund until we have ascertained the wishes and intentions of the French Government. If the Swedes refuse to accept it, and

if the French are unwilling to garrison it during the winter, it must be blown up and levelled with the ground."

Sir Charles Napier replied thus to Admiral Berkeley :—

" 'Duke of Wellington,' Ledsund, August 28th, 1854.

"MY DEAR BERKELEY,—I am glad you are pleased. It has been an easy task, and not blood enough to satisfy the people in England. United as I was with the French by land and sea, we were obliged to go with them, and not create jealousies; and an army having been sent, we were obliged to go with them, but the vigour and smartness with which our men went to work was most praiseworthy; but they did not publish my two first letters, which showed off the seamen well. I hope you will get them made public. They have blown up the batteries at Hango. I have proposed to the French General to try Abo, but I don't think he will. It is becoming too late here; the navigation is very intricate—Scott got on shore nine times. The cholera is raging, and all the Frenchmen want to get home: people have not an idea of the difficulty of getting on with combined expeditions.

"I have managed to keep on good terms with the French. You must give me your notions about going south after September—keeping up a blockade without risking the ships is impossible. I shall soon begin sending home the sailing ships. The blockade of the Gulf of Bothnia is an awkward affair; we were obliged to draw our ships in, to blockade Bomarsund, which is contrary to law, but I have sent them back again, which is contrary to law also, without a fresh notification, which is not worth while. Believe me, my dear Berkeley, yours very truly,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

CHAPTER IX.

RECONNOISSANCE ON SWEABORG—WITHDRAWAL OF THE
FRENCH—RETURN OF THE FLEET TO ENGLAND.
SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1854.

AFTER the capture of Bomarsund, it became rather a puzzling question to know what was to be done with so great a prize. Sweden, afraid of compromising herself with Russia, would not accept the proffered gift, but “discounselled” its destruction, wishing to watch and await the chapter of events. This would have entailed the necessity of a French garrison, with the unpleasant prospect of being iced up for eight or nine months in Aland, and the chance of an attack by an overwhelming Russian force from Finland, across the gulf when frozen over—prospects which so little pleased the French General, that he wished to blow up the forts immediately. To this, however, Sir Charles Napier would not consent until he had received instructions from home, which he shortly did, in a letter from Sir James Graham, dated August 25th, in which he says :—

“I am more than satisfied with your proceedings. I am delighted with the prudence and sound judgment you have

evinced. It would have been a miserable want of firmness had you yielded to clamor, and risked your ships, and sacrificed many valuable lives, in an attempt to destroy, by naval means, works which were certain to fall to an attack by land."

Sir James Graham concludes this letter by giving directions for the immediate destruction of Bomarsund, which was accordingly effected, after Admiral Chads had experimentalized with his guns upon its walls.*

On the 29th of August Sir James Graham again wrote to the Admiral, to say that the *fleet must now be withdrawn from the Baltic*, adding :—

"When we know what arrangement is to be made with respect to the French army, we will concert measures with France for the *gradual withdrawal of the fleet from the Baltic*. You should begin by sending home, *without much delay*, the sailing three-deckers, the least weatherly of the sailing line-of-battle ships, and the slowest and worst of the block-ships. This will do for a beginning. By degrees you must withdraw to the southward, leaving the Gulf of Bothnia open, and watching only the Gulf of Finland, with a squadron of observation."

These instructions formed a startling contrast to those which followed shortly after, when it was deemed "expedient" to issue orders of a very different tenor, as to the proceedings of the Baltic fleet.

Admiral Parseval likewise received an official communication from Paris, dated the 30th of August, intimating that the operations of the Baltic campaign were finished for that season. Sir Charles Napier being, however, of opinion that something more might be done, despatched Captain Scott with the "Odin," "Alban," "Gorgon," and "Driver," steamers, to reconnoitre Abo; and considering from this offi-

* For these details *vide* "Baltic Campaign," p. 395, *et seq.*

cer's report that it could be successfully attacked, he proposed this enterprise to his French colleagues. They would not, however, enter into his plan, as the weather was becoming so changeable, and heavy gales so frequent, that they were fearful of endangering either their ships or troops.

Sir Charles Napier, having been frequently enjoined to do everything in his power to preserve the utmost cordiality with our gallant allies, relinquished—though with reluctance—this design ; yet he was afterwards blamed for doing so, as if he had possessed the supreme command—instead of having only *one* voice in their councils.

The French General and the allied Admirals, however, unanimously agreed on one point, viz., that nothing could be done this season against Sweaborg, in consequence of the want of gun and mortar boats, and other materials for a siege, as well as from the advanced period of the year. They had acquainted their respective Governments with their opinions on this head ; but General Baraguay d'Hilliers, not having at this time seen Sweaborg, went thither, accompanied by the French Admiral, and by General Niel, a French officer of Engineers—Brigadier-General Jones likewise joined this expedition. The latter, on his return, sent in a report to Sir Charles Napier, to the purport that an erroneous opinion had been formed of the strength of Sweaborg, and that he thought it might be attacked with a prospect of success, by a heavy bombardment from a combined operation by land and sea, and by throwing a force of 5000 men on the island of Bakholmen, with the addition of heavy bat-

teries of guns and mortars; and that "large rockets" would be found very efficacious in the attack; but, unfortunately, there was not a single mortar or rocket in the British fleet; and although the French army had four mortars, General Baraguay d'Hilliers was too wise to allow them to be used at this advanced season, for the purpose suggested by General Jones, whose report, however, was immediately forwarded by Sir Charles Napier to the French military and naval Commanders-in-chief. This was done before the departure of the troops, but both the French General and French Admiral declined making the attempt; and General Baraguay d'Hilliers, in a letter to Sir Charles Napier, dated 2nd of September, pronounced that General Jones's plan of attacking Sweaborg, as regarded the combined operation of the fleet and army at this dangerous season of the year, appeared to Admiral Parseval and himself *equally impossible*.* General Baraguay d'Hilliers submitted to General Niel the report of Brigadier-General Jones, whose plan of landing 5000 men at Bakholmen he (General Niel) disapproved of; whilst in the letter he wrote on the subject, which was forwarded to Sir

* The following are General Baraguay d'Hilliers' own words: "Sans doute, l'action des troupes de terre, débarquées sur Bakholmen, pourrait contribuer au succès, mais cette action qui nécessiterait un débarquement à cette époque dangereuse de l'année, paraît à Monsieur L'Amiral Parseval comme à moi, également impossible." It is a strange circumstance, that in a former paragraph of this letter it would appear General Baraguay d'Hilliers imagined that General Jones's plan was also to destroy Sweaborg with the ships alone. This was General Niel's proposal, as will be found in the "History of the Baltic Campaign," in which, at p. 416, *et seq.*, is given at length the correspondence that took place relative to Brigadier-General Jones's proposed attack on Sweaborg; but the limits of this work will not admit of its insertion here.—*Author's note.*

Charles Napier, General Niel expresses the opinion, that "*with the fleets alone, the fortifications of Sweaborg might be made untenable in less than two hours!*"*

"But," adds the French General of Engineers, "*les vaisseaux sont des machines bien compliquées, bien faciles à incendier, une telle operation est hardie, elle n'à jamais été faite que je sache, et ce n'est pas à moi qu'il appartient de la conseiller.*"

"General Niel," observes the author of the "Baltic Campaign," "as a brother engineer officer, does not dispute General Jones's plan—he only demolishes it thoroughly and completely, both as to means and season!—which General Jones says is best, and General Niel says is worst. Were it not that General Jones's plan was afterwards made so much of, those comments of General Niel would scarcely leave room for remark."

General Baraguay d'Hilliers was of General Niel's opinion as to this plan of attack; and had the allied Admirals (who were probably far more competent judges of what ships could do against stone walls) also been of this opinion, Sweaborg would have been attacked as General Niel suggested, but would not take upon himself to advise. It would appear that Admiral R. S. Dundas—even with the additional means he had at his command the following year—must have coincided on this subject with the opinions of Admiral Parseval, and Sir Charles Napier, otherwise he would no doubt have made an attempt with his fleet, in the manner proposed by General Niel.

Had the allied Admirals been guided by the advice of Brigadier-General Jones, they would have acted contrary to the opinions and counsel of both the French Generals; had they followed the suggestion of General

* See "Baltic Campaign," p. 419.

Niel, it would have been in opposition to the previous reiterated instructions of the Admiralty, and of Sir James Graham; and they would have endeavoured to do what their own knowledge of ships and granite walls told them was contrary to common sense. General Niel would probably have been less ready to suggest his plan had he then known the result of the attack of the Black Sea fleet on Fort Constantine, which is said to be built of far more vulnerable materials than the forts at Sweaborg. It will shortly be shewn what was the unanimous opinion of two councils of war, composed of the Admirals of the fleet, as to the projected encounter of wood against granite walls.

We shall conclude this account of Brigadier-General Jones's proposed attack on Sweaborg, with the following quotation from the "History of the Baltic Campaign":—

"The Russians, if wise—and they are quite as great adepts in military service as General Jones—would no doubt have allowed him to advance to the centre of the island. They would then have crossed over 10,000 men from Sweaborg—they could have spared even more—and 4000 or 5000 more from Kung's Holmër and Sandhamm, on their flank; and General Jones, with his army of 5000 Frenchmen, would have been obliged to lay down their arms without firing a shot, and in forty-eight hours they would have been conveyed to St. Petersburg, troops and guns together, through the inner navigation, where no ships could have come to their rescue. When there, he would perhaps have received the thanks of the Emperor, in the great square of the Russian metropolis, which he would have richly merited; whilst the French General, and the allied Admirals, would have been ordered home, tried by a Court-Martial, and shot, as they, too, would have richly merited."

The chapter from whence this extract is taken con-

cludes with the masterly suggestions of the French Emperor for the capture of the Russian fortresses in the Baltic,* which the Admiralty received on the 16th of May. Brigadier-General Jones's recommendation of gun-boats and rockets was dated on the 1st of May, and Sir Charles Napier urged the necessity of these auxiliaries from the first opening of the campaign.

On the 12th of September, Sir Charles Napier received a communication, dated the 4th, from the Board of Admiralty, to the purport that, as the season during which so large a combined fleet could remain in the Baltic was drawing to a close, "he was to consult with his French colleagues, and the Admirals on whom he had reliance, as to what operations remained to be undertaken this year." He was told, "any object to be gained must be worth the attempt, and that useless expenditure of life, with destruction of ships, should not be hazarded for any object unworthy of the risk, and the cause in which he was engaged." The French Admiral was immediately apprised of this communication, and on the same day—the 12th Sept.—a council of war was assembled, consisting of the two naval Commanders-in-chief, Admiral Penaud (the French second in command), and Admirals Chads and Seymour—Admirals Plumridge and Martin were on detached commands, and General Baraguay d'Hilliers was gone—when it was unanimously resolved, that, "in consequence of the advanced season of the year, nothing could be undertaken against Sweaborg, or any fortified part of

* P. 427, *et seq.*, of "Baltic Campaign."

the coast of Russia, with a chance of success, with the resources at present at our disposition, without the loss of a great many men, and seriously compromising the ships."

This unanimous opinion ought to have settled the matter, but such was far from being the case. Unfortunately for Sir Charles Napier, in transmitting this report he accompanied it with a straightforward letter to the Board, which apparently gave great offence. He told them that there was no doubt great dissatisfaction at home that more had not been done with so large an army; but that the troops had come out too late, and had been hurried to return home—that he had wished to have gone to Abo, but had been opposed in this wish—that gales of wind had already set in, and that they had had narrow escapes from serious disasters—that, relative to General Jones' plan of attacking Sweaborg, had it been carried out, the troops would have been made prisoners of war, with probably the loss of half-a-dozen ships; and the Admiral thus concludes his letter:—

"If their Lordships will read with attention Admiral Chads's report, my own, and General Jones's* (with the exception of what I stated), they would find us all pretty well agreed as to the proper mode of attacking Sweaborg, a strong fortification, that either ought to be attacked in a proper manner, or not at all. I have received many propositions for attacking both Sweaborg and Cronstadt; but I never will lend myself to any absurd project, or be driven to attempt what is not practicable, by newspaper writers, who, I am sorry to say, I have reason to believe are in correspondence with officers of the fleet, who ought to know better."

The communications above alluded to seemingly gave great offence, and were apparently never forgiven.

We gather from the Admiral's further correspondence of this period a pleasing instance of chivalrous courtesy on the part of our enemies, which deserves to be recorded to their credit:—The British war-steamer "Alban," Commander Otter, having been despatched with a flag of truce and some Russian prisoners to Abo, unfortunately run upon a rock off the coast, in the vicinity of that town, where Captain Akunoff, the Russian officer, commanded a flotilla of gun-boats; that officer immediately put off and afforded every assistance in his power to get the "Alban" afloat, which was effected the following day; General Wendt, the commanding officer of the forces at Abo, having meanwhile sent off to the "Alban", a handsome present of a bullock, several sheep, butter, wine, vegetables, and likewise a Russian steamer towing a water-tank. Such actions illumine the dark pages of a narrative of war, and the names of those who perform them deserve to be remembered with gratitude and respect.

On the 17th of September the French Admiral, pursuant to his instructions, commenced sending his ships home; and Sir Charles Napier received another letter from the Admiralty, wishing for a second council of war, to decide on General Niel's proposed mode of attacking Sweaborg by ships alone. Admiral Parseval, to whom this was communicated, replied that, having already given his opinion on the subject, and seeing no reason for its modification, he begged to decline attending any further councils of war.

At "the eleventh hour," and on the eve of the departure of the French fleet, *one gunboat* was sent out as a reinforcement to Sir Charles Napier's squadron!

The reports of the French and English engineer officers, which had been forwarded to the Admiralty by Sir Charles Napier, elicited, amongst other correspondence, a letter from Admiral Berkeley, dated the 5th of September, 1854, of which the following is an extract. This letter was received by Sir Charles on the 12th of September.

"John Bull is getting uproarious, because nobody is killed and wounded. Meetings are being called to condemn the Government, because Cronstadt and Sebastopol have not been captured."

There was evidently a coming storm, of which Sir Charles Napier was duly apprised in the following words, by Admiral Berkeley, whom he had always considered as a sincere friend:—

"We shall have blue-books and Parliamentary questions without end. *The attack failing against you, will be levelled at the Board; or, failing against the Board, will be levelled against you.*"

This passage should be borne in mind, as it will account for much of what subsequently took place.

From the time when this remarkable admission was made that either the Board of Admiralty or Sir Charles Napier must stand the brunt of public indignation, because the performances of the allied Baltic fleets had not realized the unreasonable expectations of the people of England—from that moment nothing was left untried in endeavouring to turn the disappointed feelings of the nation from its legitimate

objects, to the man who had done all that mortal man could do, with the inefficient means at his command.

Henceforth the account of the Baltic campaign of 1854 consists chiefly of a series of attacks and recriminations of the Admiralty on Sir Charles Napier.

On the departure of the French fleet, the Admiral—determined to remain at his post to the last—proceeded to Nargen, where he anchored on the 21st of September; thus re-entering what Admiral Berkeley termed that “infernal gulf,” which more than a month before he (Admiral Berkeley) had stated he was “seriously thinking” it would be time for the fleet to leave. The bad weather had, however, now fairly set in, and added greatly to Sir Charles Napier’s previous difficulties; and Sir James Graham could not fail to have been aware that this might be expected in the Gulf of Finland towards the end of September, because on the 17th of September the Admiral had received a letter from Sir James Graham, enclosing a meteorological report from Sir Hamilton Seymour of the state of the weather at St. Petersburg in September and October, 1853, by which it appears that “on the 28th September the morning was fine, followed by a sudden change, and ‘not a gale, but a tornado;’ the 29th, violent rain and wind all day.” 2nd Oct.—“Awful gale from the west all night.” “The weather had been so violent as to damage some of the bridges, and to twist some of the iron columns of the bridge lamps.”

With such antecedents, the Gulf of Finland did not offer a pleasant prospect for a fleet, during the latter end of September and in October; and, in a letter to

Lady Napier, Admiral Napier, so far back as the 5th of September, had written as follows on the subject:—

“ It was a good thing to take Bomarsund. It pleased the people of England, but there was not bloodshed enough for them. *The weather is getting very unsettled*, and we shall soon be going to the south; this coast is not fit for the winter. Kiel will be our first halting-place. I suppose we shall be home by the beginning of November. Nothing more will be done this winter; all the French troops are gone home, and the fleet will follow.”

But even before this period the Admiralty were aware the fleet could not remain much longer with safety, in those latitudes, as may be gathered from the following paragraph, taken from a letter of Admiral Berkeley, written to Sir Charles Napier on the 5th of September:— •

“I suppose we may now as well begin sending for the ships home, but we wait for the positive assurance that nothing more is to be attempted.”

This assurance must have been received about the 20th of September, for it was on the 12th that the Council of War of the English and French Admirals came to that decision, which was of course immediately forwarded home.

In the same letter Admiral Berkeley adds, “that it was the first intimation they had received that the French troops were actually on their way home, and that he supposed all operations in the Baltic for that year were at an end, as a matter of course.” •

The main body of the fleet was now at Nargen, awaiting instructions to be withdrawn from the Gulf of Finland. The weather was becoming worse and

worse, the anchorage was bad, and every day might be expected to bring some irretrievable disaster upon the fleet. Still no order had yet arrived to withdraw from the Gulf, and on the 23rd of September Sir Charles Napier made another reconnoissance on Sweaborg, of which he sent a report to the Admiralty, with the view to facilitate any operations that might be undertaken the *following year*, and assuredly not to imply the possibility of anything being done at so advanced a period of 1854. This report was, however, eagerly laid hold of and misconstrued into an intimation that Sweaborg could be attacked *at once*, whereas this last report was only intended as an appendage to one that Sir Charles Napier had sent to Sir James Graham on the 18th July—(and which it was subsequently discovered had never been laid before the Board)—in which—supported by the opinion of Admiral Chads—probably, from his experience, one of the first naval authorities—he pointed out that *a great number of gun-boats* and 13-inch mortars were requisite for such a proposed plan of attack, to attempt which, even then (on the 18th of July) he says, *it is too late this year, but be prepared next, now we know the anchorage—and be early.*”

The author of the “Baltic Campaign” remarks, “that for not attacking the fortifications of Sweaborg with 109 ships at his command, in the month of August, Admiral Dundas received the thanks of the Admiralty. For not attacking the fortifications of Sweaborg, with thirty-one ships, at the beginning of winter, Sir Charles Napier was bitterly censured by the Admiralty, and finally dismissed from his command.” Be

it also remembered that Admiral Dundas had gun-boats and mortar-boats, which Sir Charles Napier had not, besides having the advantage afforded by Admiral Napier's experience of the preceding year.

Seeing it no longer safe for the sailing vessels to remain in the Gulf of Finland, on the 27th of September Sir Charles Napier, on his own responsibility, ordered Admiral Plumridge to proceed to Kiel, with the "Neptune," "Prince Regent," "Royal George," and "Monarch," accompanied by the "Hecla" and "Driver," and the French steamers "La Place," and "Phlégéthon;" and in communicating this order to the Board, he informed them that he considered it his duty to notice the great exertions made by Captain Watson, and the officers under his orders, in maintaining the blockade of Sweaborg, as entitling them to the warmest thanks. These officers were: Captain Watson, C.B., of the "Imperieuse;" Captain Ramsay, of the "Euryalus;" Captain Yelverton, of the "Arrogant;" Captain Fisher, of the "Magicienne;" Captain D'Eyncourt, of the "Desperate;" Captain Wilcox, of the "Dragon;" and Commander Wodehouse, of the "Rosamond."

Amongst other letters addressed to Sir Charles Napier, at this period, we find one from Her Royal Highness the Duchess of Kent, thanking him for his kindness in recommending her grandson, Prince Victor, to the Admiralty.

The young Prince had conducted himself well the first time he was under fire, and Sir Charles Napier always recognised and applauded merit, from the admirals down to the youngest midshipman of his fleet. Admirals Chads and Plumridge he had re-

peatedly mentioned with approbation. We have recorded the praises he bestowed on some of his captains, and take this opportunity of noticing the gallant deed of a young midshipman of the name of Lucas, in seizing and throwing overboard an enemy's shell, that had fallen on the deck and was about to explode, for which, at the Admiral's recommendation, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant, and then received the congratulations of his Chief.

Sir Charles Napier received about this time the following handsome letter, addressed to him by Lord Ellenborough, which, however, contained anticipations that were not destined to be realized :—

“Southam, September 19th, 1854.

“MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—I got to-day your letter of the 9th, and I am glad to have the excuse of writing to thank you for it, that I may at the same time congratulate you on your success at Bomarsund, where everything seems to have been done in the most satisfactory manner.

“I congratulate you, too, on the approaching termination of the campaign for it must have been most trying to the mind, as well as the body, and has demanded, I know, the exercise of much more ability than would have sufficed to gain more than one decisive victory in open sea; next year your anxiety will be much less, as you will begin, knowing your ground, and provided at an earlier period with all the requisite means.

“I cannot but think that with such means, military and naval, as you may demand (and all you ask may be given to you) you will next year take Sweaborg. You could have done it of course this year with smaller means, and at a smaller cost than will be necessary next year; but still I feel that the thing can be done, and I am sure if it can be done, it should be done, and you are the man to do it.

"I hope this time next year I may address my letters to Lord Napier of Sweaborg. Yours ever very sincerely,

"ELLENBOROUGH.

"To Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B."

Sir Charles Napier, amidst all his anxieties, and the extensive official correspondence which his position entailed, always found time to keep up his private correspondence—he wrote constantly to his family, from the youngest members of which he never allowed a note or letter to remain without a reply, for his mind could embrace the most trifling as well as the most momentous affairs.

The following letter is an instance in point. It is addressed to his adopted grandson, Charles Elers Napier, then a child eight or nine years old:—

"September 30th, 1854.

"MY DEAR CHARLIE,—I am much obliged to you for your pretty letter, and the picture of the 'Duke of Wellington.' I am glad to hear everything is going on so well at Merchiston, and when I come home I hope to see everything thriving. With best regards to your papa, and love to mamma and your grandmamma, believe me, yours, very affectionately,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

This boy was also his godson, and the Admiral subsequently launched him in his own profession.

It is related that Sully one day took the great "Henri Quatre" by surprise, and found him playing on "all-fours" with his children. A fondness for young people was one of Sir Charles Napier's characteristics; and nothing delighted him more than to be surrounded by his grand-children. He would enter into their plans and amusements, and even their games at romps; and whilst seated by his fireside,

he often had two or three of them clambering on his knees, which he invariably bore with pleasure and kindness.

It would be impossible to give even extracts from all the voluminous correspondence which took place between Sir Charles Napier, Sir James Graham, and the Board of Admiralty, whilst he remained at Nargen, which was until the 19th of October, 1854. So numerous and lengthy are the letters which were exchanged, that they would fill chapters in themselves. Such portions of this correspondence as are given in the "History of the Baltic Campaign," will show how vexatious and contradictory were the orders Sir Charles Napier then received, and that the evident object of some of these documents was to throw the whole blame upon him for not having effected—owing to the want of those means for which he had applied—all that the public demanded, whether reasonably or not.

This state of affairs was brought to its climax by the arrival in England, on the 4th of October, of the news that Sebastopol had been captured by a *coup de main*. On the same day—the 4th of October—the Admiralty sent to Sir Charles Napier the order to make the desperate attempt of attacking Sweaborg, recommending him "to choose his day and opportunity."

"You anticipate," continues this remarkable document, "an attack by the Russian fleet if many of your vessels are crippled or destroyed. We are always reminded that the Russians are most unwilling to navigate the Gulf of Finland in line-of-battle ships when autumn has commenced; and Cronstadt is always locked up by ice fourteen days before Sweaborg is closed. The attack, therefore, on Sweaborg

might be made *towards the end of October*, with least danger of attack from the Cronstadt portion of the Russian fleet."

That is to say, when the Gulf of Finland became unnavigable from bad weather, Sir Charles Napier was to choose his opportunity, and a *fine day*—the latter an indispensable requisite—to attack one of the strongest fortresses in the world!

The document in question thus proceeds:—

"This *order* is founded on your own last report. The final decision must rest entirely on yourself. If the attack on Sweaborg, in present circumstances, be desperate, it must on no account be undertaken by you. If, calculating the ordinary chances of war, and on full consideration of the strength of the enemy's fortress and fleets, you shall be of opinion that Sweaborg can be laid in ruins, it will be your duty, with the concurrence of the French Admiral, not to omit the opportunity."

Here then was an *order*, throwing the whole responsibility of its execution on Sir Charles Napier; for it might have been reasonably concluded that the French Admiral—to all appearance prematurely driven away by the importunities of Sir James Graham—would probably, ere this order reached its destination, be at anchor with his fleet at Cherbourg, or some other port of France.

On the same day that these instructions were sent, Admiral Berkeley wrote as follows to Sir Charles Napier:—

"Through good or evil report, you must act with firmness, and according to your own judgment. The public will do you justice in the long run, as I firmly believe that you will do all that can be done, or attempted, with propriety."

In this "*order*" to attack Sweaborg, "Sir James Graham," most appropriately remarks the author of

the "Baltic Campaign," "had entirely forgotten his former strong desire for the '200 Swedish gun-boats and 50,000 Swedes,' without which 'nothing great or decisive' could be effected."

On the 9th of October—five days after Sir Charles Napier had been *ordered* to attack Sweaborg—the astounding intelligence arrived that Sebastopol was *not* taken—that the report of its capture was all a hoax—but a hoax that had completely taken in the British people, the British Government, the British Press, and the Admiralty to boot! What was now to be done should Sir Charles Napier—goaded on as he had been—run his head against the granite of Sweaborg, and lose his fleet? What a dilemma Sir James Graham and the Admiralty, who had so spurred him on, were likely to be in! Not a moment was to be lost; and on the 9th it was considered so "inexpedient" to do what was considered so requisite on the 4th, that Admiral Plumridge was forthwith ordered home by telegraph, and Sir Charles Napier was told not to make any attack, and to use his own discretion in leaving the Gulf of Finland! At the same time, the orders which had been so hurriedly sent out to Admiral Parseval, by the French Government, for his immediate return thither, were now as hurriedly countermanded.

The alarm entertained by the Admiralty officials of Sir Charles Napier committing so rash an act as, under existing circumstances, the attack upon Sweaborg would have been, was, however, without foundation. He had resolved not to be driven, either by public clamour or official fears, to act against his own

judgment; and the following is the dignified reply he sent on the same day that he received from the Board of Admiralty their "order" of the 4th of October. Whatever may have been the idea of "responsibility" entertained by the officials at Whitehall, Sir Charles Napier showed that he cared as little for responsibility as in former days, when he thus took upon himself to disobey an order, the compliance with which, he felt, would have probably been attended with the loss of the greater portion of his fleet. We give the whole of his reply; it deserves to be recorded at full length:—

“ ‘Duke of Wellington,’ Nargen, 10th October, 1854.

“SIR,—Before I received your letter of the 4th October, I had written the accompanying letter, No. 558, giving my reasons for withdrawing from this anchorage; and, notwithstanding their Lordships’ letter of the 4th instant, I still think it my duty to persist in my intention.

“2. I have already given my reasons for withdrawing the sailing-ships, and I thought I was following up Sir James Graham’s wishes. Neither this anchorage nor Baro Sound is fit for a fleet in the winter. My letter will clearly point out my reasons; their Lordships will see that we are losing anchors and cables every day, and we shall soon be losing ships.

“3. Their Lordships ask me, if I think Sweaborg can be laid in ruins, why I do not attack it. I reply, that before the ships should go alongside the batteries, my plan was to have it first bombarded with mortars, shells, and rockets from the island, and gun-boats for a day or two, Lancaster’s guns, &c.; and then, when well bombarded, the ships should go alongside and finish the work. The want of means is one obstacle, the weather the next, why I do not attack it.

“4. Their Lordships tell me to choose my day—there has not been a day since I have been here in which it was possible to attack Sweaborg. It requires many days; the channels

are studded with sunken rocks, they must be all sounded and buoyed, and if it came on to blow, the fleet would be inevitably lost, and I should be unworthy of the command I hold if I risked it. It would be a long operation; their Lordships have not the most distant idea of the dangers. Whether the Russian fleet in Cronstadt would venture out if we were disabled, I know not, but the Sweaborg fleet would.

"5. I have never altered my opinion that Sweaborg must be first attacked by mortars, shells, and gun-boats, &c.; but I never would have advised them to be sent here at this season.

"6. My second reconnoissance was never intended to open a new view—the view I first took, and the last, were the same.

"7. Their Lordships say the final decision must rest with me, and if the attack be desperate, it must on no account be undertaken. I look upon it that no man in his senses would undertake to attack Sweaborg at this season of the year; and even in a fine season I doubt much the success, without the means I have pointed out.

"8. A telegraphic message has stopped the French Admiral, which I am glad of—his presence would be useless, and I have directed Admiral Plumridge not to come here for the same reason.

"9. When a Council of War, composed of five Admirals, viz., Vice-Admiral Parseval and myself, and Rear-Admirals Pénaud, Chads, and Seymour, and in which a sixth (Rear-Admiral Martin) concurred in giving the opinion that neither our resources nor the season would permit an attack on Sweaborg, I should have thought that both their Lordships and the public would have been satisfied; and I beg further to tell their Lordships that there is not an Admiral in the British service that would have ventured to attack such a fortress at this season of the year. And as their Lordships have so frequently returned to this question, it leads me to believe that notwithstanding the praises they have heaped upon me for my conduct in the Baltic, and judging from the altered tone of their letters, I have reason to think I have lost the confidence of their Lordships. If that is the case, I

shall be perfectly ready to resign my command; but as long as I hold it, I will do what I think is best for the good of Her Majesty's service, and for the safety of the fleet I command, which I think is greatly endangered by our present position; and we are risking our ships for no adequate purpose.

"I have, &c.

"CHARLES NAPIER, *Vice-Admiral*.

"To the Secretary of the Admiralty."

Reference to history will shew that there are no precedents that would have justified Sir Charles Napier, under the circumstances in which he was placed, in making the attack on Sweaborg, to which he had been so injudiciously urged. During the former great European war there is no instance on record of any of our Admirals—not even Nelson—having attacked in this manner any of the fortified towns of France or Spain, though infinitely inferior in strength to either Cronstadt or Sweaborg. They were content with keeping up a blockade; and the failure of the "ship" attack upon the forts at the entrance of the port of Sebastopol proves how correct was the judgment of Sir Charles Napier in the course he thought proper to pursue. An instance still more in point is the conduct of Sir James Saumarez at Rogerswick (Port Baltic), in the early part of October, 1808; but in this case the Russian fleet got out, and reached Cronstadt in safety.*

Sir Charles Napier having now received discre-

* "The advanced season of the year rendering the situation of the blockading fleet extremely critical, Sir James Saumarez and the Swedish Admiral, early in October, retired from before the harbour of Rogerswick, leaving only a small reconnoitering force. Soon afterwards the Russian fleet also made sail, and reached Cronstadt in safety."—*From James's "Naval History,"* vol. v., p. 24.

tionary power to quit the Gulf of Finland, he left Nargo with the line-of-battle ships and the remainder of the fleet on the 19th of October, and anchored at Kiel on the 22nd, from whence on the 27th he wrote at length to Sir James Graham. Of this letter there is only space for the following extracts:—

“The people in England are dissatisfied; and as some one must be blamed, the Government want to throw it on me. But I will not accept it.

“You were angry with me because I made use of the word ‘mad,’ but, on my conscience, I believe it to be the only word applicable to such an operation. You say ‘General Jones’s report made a great impression.’ I have no doubt it did. It is very easy to make a report. General Jones knew that the French Admiral would not land a man. We all knew it. And I am quite certain that after the continuation of bad weather which General Jones saw on board the ‘Duke of Wellington,’ he himself would not have landed a man.

“Had people considered one moment, they would have seen the impracticability of the attempt; but they thought Sebastopol was taken, and that, of course, I must take Sweaborg, Revel, and Cronstadt.

“I know that war is not conducted without risks and dangers, and am as ready to encounter them as any man; but I will not be driven by clamour to act against my judgment.

“All the summer, Sir James, you were cautioning me—and so was the Government—not to risk my ships against stone walls, for which you had a great respect; and you praised me for the manner in which I had conducted the fleet. Now winter is come, you are dissatisfied at my not doing impossibilities. As the people are not satisfied, the Government are preparing to abandon me, because I will not follow the advice of a French General, contrary to that of my own Admirals, and diametrically opposite to the opinion of their own General of Engineers, and attack a fortress at a season of the year when it is more than probable I should have lost half my fleet.

"I have gone into this explanation at great length. It has given me much pain. I am conscious of having done my duty, and if you are dissatisfied, you can bring me to a court-martial, or remove me—as I have before mentioned to the Admiralty.

"I am very far from well, and I assure you this correspondence has not improved my health."

Sir Charles Napier was, indeed, "far from well"—he was, as we have been assured by those around him, utterly *cast down*—prostrated in spirit as well as in strength; and the reader must ere this have obtained a sufficient insight into the state of affairs, to be enabled to judge whether he had not sufficient cause to be in the state of depression I have described. However, as he expressed himself, "resolved not to be crushed," he roused himself up to do battle in a cause dearer to him than life, for it involved his professional reputation and his honour as a man.

Sir James Graham replied on the 31st of October to the foregoing communication. His letter begins by deprecating all wish to enter into any personal controversy, and ends by justifying the order to attack Sweaborg with all the means of *vertical fire* (from ships' guns), at the Admiral's command!

Sir Charles Napier had for years considered Admiral Berkeley as his real friend. Their mutual communications had been most unreserved, and to him he now freely expressed his mind. On the 22nd of October, Admiral Berkeley wrote a reply to Sir Charles Napier, in his usual cordial and friendly tone; in which he did all in his power to console him for not having been able to effect anything against Cron-

stadt; and to this communication the Admiral answered as follows, on the 6th of November:—

“MY DEAR BERKELEY,—I cannot afford to growl at you, though you have much mistaken the last letter to which you allude. I have written another, and all I ask at your hands is not to let it be turned, twisted, and falsified. I don't believe you have been in London lately—indeed, your letter is dated ‘Berkeley Lodge.’ I don't care for the papers abusing me, it is their trade; but I do care for a different impression being given to my letter that I did not mean, and the Admiralty countenance the people in expecting me to do impossibilities.

“Between ourselves, Graham has behaved very ill to me, and I have told him so. I hope to hear from you soon. Believe me, my dear Berkeley, yours very truly,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

Admiral Berkeley's soothing and encouraging letters were then a great source of consolation to Sir Charles Napier. He, nevertheless, felt broken-spirited and sick at heart, and went for a few days to Hamburgh, to see his old friend and former companion-in-arms, Colonel Sir George Hodges; when he thus wrote to his daughter, on the 31st of October:—

“You will know of our arrival at Kiel. I have not been well, but am better since I came here. I have had much annoyance; they seem to wish to throw the blame upon me, for not doing impossibilities, and Graham has behaved very ill. I have written him a very sharp letter, and to the Admiralty also, and told them if they are not satisfied with me, they had better remove me; so I suppose they will. Four of the ships have been on shore here, but, thank God, are not damaged.

“I have not heard from the Admiralty since my arrival, so I cannot tell you what my future movements are to be, but I hope home. I long to see you all, after this long and

wearisome blockade. God bless you, my dearest child. Your affectionate father,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

The Admiral thus replied to Sir James Graham's letter of the 31st of October, in which the First Lord recommended the use of “vertical fire” for the reduction of Sweaborg:—

“‘Duke of Wellington,’ Kiel, November 6th, 1854.

“I can assure you, Sir James, it is far from my wish to enter into a controversy with you, but I will not admit that I have brought it on myself; there is not a word in either my public or private letters that justifies the construction that you and the Admiralty have thought proper to put on them. My letter, in answer to their Lordships' last dispatch, is plain enough, but if their Lordships think proper to deliberate on one part of my letter, and ignore another part, I can only protest against it; and I am quite prepared to defend myself against any unjust attacks that are made against me.

“I have documents enough in my possession to justify my conduct. Enough has not been done to satisfy an impatient public, as you called them; some one must be blamed, and I am the chosen one; but I will not allow myself to be crushed, because I could not do impossibilities.

“All this stir has been caused by the reports of two engineers (one French, and the other English, diametrically opposed to each other) because they suited the public taste; in addition to which, was the report of the capture of Sebastopol, *not yet taken*, though the fleet there is assisted by an army of 70,000 men, in a fine climate, and I have been expected to take places much stronger, with a fleet alone; and the same people who so often warned me against unnecessarily risking my fleet, are now dissatisfied because I did not expose them to certain destruction.

“I presume you have seen Captain Sullivan by this time; he is capable of opening the eyes of the Government, if they are not hermetically sealed.

“I have gone through the world with honour and credit to myself, and just as I am about to leave it, unworthy

attempts are being made to ruin my reputation ; but they will fail, and recoil on themselves."

When the Admiralty and public opinion were raising their voice against Sir Charles Napier, he had the gratification to receive from Admiral Berkeley another friendly letter, written on the 25th of December, 1854, highly approving of all that he had done ; and it is much to Admiral Berkeley's credit that he thus supported Sir Charles Napier in his struggles against those enemies who were endeavouring to sacrifice him, in order to save themselves. Would that he had persisted in such a manly and generous course to the last !

Whilst at Hamburgh, Sir Charles Napier received a gracious invitation to dine with the King of Denmark, who was then at Altona. The Admiral was most favourably received, and told His Majesty that he expected next spring to see the Danish squadron united to the British fleet. The King replied that he would remain neutral as long as possible—that war was an expensive thing, but that, if compelled to go to war, he should certainly "not be against us."

As Sir Charles Napier, in the following letter to myself, freely discloses what he felt at the treatment to which he was then exposed, I trust that its insertion here may not be deemed out of place.

"To Colonel E. Napier.

"Kiel, Nov. 15, 1854.

"I suppose people have now found out stone walls are not so easily knocked down. I have seen letters from Dundas's fleet ; they are singing small, and some of our wiseacres

here are beginning to open their eyes. Had I allowed myself to be goaded on, as Dundas appears to have been, I should have lost half my fleet in the Gulf of Finland; and if the Crimean business fails, which I fear it will, we should have been in a fine mess. Depend upon it, this attack on me, fanned, I have no doubt, by some of the ministers, will not end here. I have accused them of perverting my letters, and I got a letter yesterday from the Admiralty, saying they could not permit an officer to accuse them of deliberately perverting letters; but not a word more—there it rests. I wrote Graham such a tickler that he has not ventured to answer, and he ought to have superseded me if he durst: however, I shall wait quietly till I see how the cat jumps.

“I got your letter of the 7th only yesterday—it had been sent back for postage; direct your letters simply to Kiel. The ships were all surrounded by ice this morning: a couple more days of hard frost, and we shall be frozen in.”

On the 20th of November, Admiral Seymour, the Captain of the Fleet, was ordered home by the Admiralty, who did not even apprise Admiral Napier of their intention. This was an unusual proceeding; but in the manner in which Sir Charles Napier was now treated many unusual things were done!

The Admiral thus again addressed me from Kiel on the 21st of November:—

“To Colonel E. Napier.

“The praise of the public or their abuse is very indifferent to me—I neither deserve the one nor the other.

“I don’t like conciliating people when they are wrong; you don’t know the trouble I at first had to lick them into shape, and am obliged to give them some sharp signals—but they talk such nonsense. Sebastopol has, however, opened their eyes.

"I gave Graham such a severe letter, that he never dared to answer it, and the Admiralty got another—and there it shall rest for the present. I never now hear from them except in the common routine. I do not know when we shall go home. I had a telegraphic message to-day to say that Seymour was to go home in 'Princess Charlotte,' if sent home. I replied, I had no orders to send any ship home. The 'Euryalus,' at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland, ran into the 'Imperieuse,' carried away her bow-sprit head, and otherwise injured herself. 'Imperieuse' lost her main rigging-chain, &c., and was also injured—it was a wonder they did not go down. So much for keeping ships so late in the Gulf of Finland: it was in a snow-storm."

He wrote much to the same effect to Lady Napier:—

"Nov. 25.

"We are still here, and no sign of being ordered home. The Admiralty are very wrong keeping ships here so late—it never was done before. I trust they are not going to keep us here all the winter. They have behaved very ill to me, and I believe they are annoying me on purpose, because I have been obliged to give them some home-truths. The weather is very cold, and will be much colder. I, however, keep my health.

* * * * *

"We seem to have been making a mess of it at Sebastopol: we should have done the same here had I acted as the Admiralty wished—half my fleet would have been lost. The Russians, I hear, are making great preparations for next spring, and so ought we; and instead of being here we had better be at home, recruiting our strength."

On the 27th of November, the Admiral sent orders to Captain Watson, to withdraw from the blockade of the Gulf of Finland, where the weather had become fearful, with constant heavy gales, accompanied by storms of snow, and great intensity of cold—the

ships and rigging presenting the appearance of masses of ice, the decks being frequently covered two feet deep in snow, whilst many of their crews were severely frost-bitten. Sir Charles Napier made the following report of this blockade:—

“I have not words to express my approval of the persevering conduct of Captain Watson and all his squadron; and I do hope that their Lordships will note their approval of his conduct by the promotion of his first lieutenant (Cockcroft), or in any other manner they may think fit. Captain Watson began the blockade of Sweaborg early in the spring, and has continued there, ever since, with little intermission; and I do not believe, in the height of the last war, a stricter or more dangerous blockade was ever kept up.”

The following correspondence between Captain Watson and Sir Charles Napier, will show the dangerous state of the weather in the Gulf of Finland at this period:—

“H.M.S. ‘Imperieuse,’ Gulf of Finland, Nov. 17, 1854.

“MY DEAR SIR CHARLES NAPIER,—I am sorry I have not been sooner able to give you an account of my proceedings since 28th October.

“All has been going on most satisfactorily with my squadron, except the accident to the ‘Euryalus,’ full particulars of which I inclose. I am happy to say she is now all right, and ready for any work. I am particularly annoyed at the whole affair, but these casualties will occur.

“There are still all sorts of reports of a Russian squadron coming out, lighthouses lit—I know Dager-Ort is—but I think, this is for their trade, which they are carrying on; I am, however, quite ready for them whenever they may venture out; but this weather is against both friends and foes. I pity the poor Russian Admiral, who has a squadron to look after.

“You will see by my returns, that we have plenty of

everything to last us much longer than we can possibly remain here if the weather that is to come equals what we have at present; for we have daylight at 8 A.M., and no signal can be made out after 4 P.M.

“ ‘Odin’ is off Bogskaren; ‘Cruiser’ will be near her.

“I keep the squadron as much as I can together, but I assure you wearing at night, which we are obliged to do, tries all their nerves. You may rest assured I will do everything in my power to remain here till the last.

“ ‘Vulture’ has not yet made her appearance. I hope you will send me some steamers, if not ‘Magicienne.’

“ ‘Penelope’ is at Faro; she is coaling, and will bring in the remains of provisions. I have plenty of coal. Believe me, my dear sir, very faithfully yours,

“ R. BURGESS WATSON.”

“ H.M.S. ‘Imperieuse,’ off Dager-Ort, Nov. 25, 1854.

“ MY DEAR SIR,—My letter by ‘Magicienne’ will have prepared you for the arrival of ‘Euryalus,’ which I send to Kiel.

“The winter has set in most severely, which obliges me to think of withdrawing the advance squadron.

“So strong are the gales, so thick the weather, accompanied with a current setting strong on the Swedish coast, that steam alone can keep the ships on their cruising ground; for days without any sort of sights makes it dangerous to remain any longer than the first week of next month.

“Several reports from Faro say the Russian squadron is frozen in. I can only go by my own judgment on the subject, for even if off Sweaborg I could not approach sufficiently close to decide the question. I conclude, therefore, it is the case, for the land covered with snow, the bays lined with ice, a thermometer at sea down to 20, the ship one mass of ice, and several men frost-bitten: all this gives me the idea that they are now hard and fast; and if not so, no one in their senses would venture to take out a ship unless they wished to remain frozen up all the winter; for one night I understand closes everything.

“The squadron have seen nothing, for nothing could pos-

sibly have faced these gales with the intention of running up the Gulf, without strong steam power, which I think I should have seen; and as nothing in the shape of capture could compensate for the loss of one of our squadron, I have decided, much against my inclination, that it could not be kept here with safety longer than the time I mention.

"I trust you will approve of my determination, although I feel I am taking much on myself by so doing, but I should be unworthy of the trust you have honoured me with, if I hesitated to act by my own judgment, independent of anything that may be thought of raising the blockade. If there were a hope or a chance of the enemy venturing out, nothing should induce me to leave; but as all chance of that is now gone, I consider the object of the blockade is accomplished. I have the honour to be, my dear Sir Charles Napier, very faithfully yours,

"W. BURGESS WATSON."

This was acting as Sir Charles Napier would have done himself, and it is but just to mention the ships and their commanders who participated in the arduous duties which Captain Watson so ably and so zealously performed. These were the "Imperieuse," Captain Watson; "Euryalus," Captain Ramsay; "Arrogant," Captain Yelverton; "Penelope," Captain Coffin; "Amphion," Captain Key (on the Courland coast); "Magicienne," Captain Fisher; "Conflict," Captain Cumming; "Desperate," Captain D'Eyncourt; "Odin," Captain Scott; "Dragon," Captain Wilcox; "Archer," Captain Heathcote (on the Courland coast); and "Cruiser," Commander Douglas.

In further corroboration of the dreadful state of the weather in the Gulf of Finland, when the blockade was raised, we may state that shortly afterwards Sir Charles Napier was informed, from an official quarter

at Berlin, that on the news being received at St. Petersburg of the arrival of his large ships at Kiel, the Russian fleet had left Cronstadt with the intention of taking up their winter quarters at Sweaborg. They had not, however, proceeded far, when it began to blow. Three of their large ships got on shore, and the Admiral's vessel lost her rudder. All were obliged to be towed back to Cronstadt; and the Russian Admiral—it is said—remarked: "How odd it was that the Allied fleets had been moving up and down the whole summer without any accidents of the kind—whereas the Russian fleet, in their *own waters*, had got on shore immediately."

Rather unfavourable weather for Sir Charles Napier to have "chosen his opportunity," and "a fine day," for an attack on Sweaborg!

It was not till the 4th of December—when there was every probability of their being frozen in—that Sir Charles Napier was directed to return to England with the fleet. He had previously been solicited to become a candidate for the representation of the metropolitan borough of Marylebone, and, on receiving the order for the fleet to return home, he applied for permission to proceed, in anticipation, to England, on urgent private affairs. It was, probably, conjectured what those private affairs were, and might have ill-suited certain parties to see the man who had been so cruelly injured and defamed returned then to Parliament, where he could have exposed so many shortcomings. His leave of absence was refused, and this refusal was accompanied with the observation: "That if obliged to vacate his command, Admiral Chads must shift his

flag to the 'Duke of Wellington,' and execute the orders of the Admiralty."

Sir Charles Napier, however, declined to strike his flag. He left Kiel for England on the 7th of December, and anchored on the night of the 16th at Spithead, with the proud satisfaction of having brought back in safety—well disciplined and efficient—the whole of the Baltic fleet, without the loss of a single ship.

I met him on landing, and was shocked at the great change in his appearance. The last few weeks of persecution had, seemingly, added many years to what was before a hale and vigorous old age. Sir Charles Napier had indeed become a completely altered man; and, although he eventually rallied to a certain degree, he never wholly recovered from the effects of those unjust and ungenerous attacks on his professional reputation and character, which nearly broke his proud spirit, undermined his iron constitution, and, no doubt, tended to shorten his days. His powerful frame might otherwise have endured to the great age which his friend and brother officer, Lord Dundonald, lived to attain. They died nearly within a week of each other, but there was a difference of many years between them.

On the 18th of December, Sir Charles Napier repaired to London, and obtained an interview with Sir James Graham. He had been cautioned by a friend "to keep his temper, and fight the devil with his own weapons." But his spirit was of too impetuous and too honest a nature to enable him to follow such counsel, and on the 20th he wrote to me thus:—

“I have seen Graham, and gave him my mind. — thinks I have been shamefully treated. I am to see Lord Ellenborough, and I think I shall be down on Friday. My leave is out, and I intend having no communication with them whatever. They want me to throw up my command, but Lord —, advises me to do nothing as yet; he says that is what they want.”

He left London to return home on the 22nd of December. On his arrival at the Portsmouth railway station, I handed him an official letter that had preceded him from town. This he immediately opened: it was from the Admiralty, and to the following effect:—

“The Baltic fleet, on its return to port, being now dispersed in different harbours of Great Britain, and several of the ships which composed this fleet being under orders for service in the Black Sea and Mediterranean, you are hereby required and directed to strike your flag and come on shore.”

And thus, without thanks to himself, to his officers, or ships' crews, was dismissed from his command, the man whose every act had, a short time previously, met with the most unqualified approbation—who had been pronounced, by the head of the naval administration of Great Britain, a “consummate Commander-in-chief;” who, since then, had performed services, and surmounted difficulties and dangers, entitling him to be considered still more in that light; but who was now thus degraded and disgraced, because the nation was dissatisfied that impossibilities had not been performed.

The following correspondence was the result of an interview that Sir Charles Napier had with Lord Ellenborough, shortly after his return to England:—

" Southam House, Cheltenham, December 24th, 1854.

" MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—I received your papers this morning, and have read them carefully.

" No Board of Admiralty would have been justified in expecting you to attack Sweaborg with ships alone, or even with ships aided by the military force you thought might be most usefully employed, without previously furnishing you with all the means enumerated by you in your plan of attack; for the reasoning in the early part of your letter of the 25th of September, with respect to the loss of ships by fire, which you calculate upon in the attack, and to the ships not being afterwards in a condition to meet the Russian fleet, seems to me to apply to any attack of Sweaborg by ships. Whatever the result to the fortress, that would most probably be the result to the fleet attacking it. . . .

" I think, that in your position I should draw up a report of the proceedings of the Baltic fleet, referring in the margin to the several papers.

" In that report you would state your case, without going, beyond absolute necessity, into any controversial matter. This report you could transmit, as soon as it was completed, to the Admiralty, whether your flag remains flying or not.

" You would thus place on record, in a compact form, a statement of your proceedings—the reasons for what you did, and did not, and your defence upon any point on which your conduct may have been questioned. Believe me, my dear Sir Charles, ever very sincerely yours,

" ELLENBOROUGH."

" Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K. C. B."

" Merchiston, 27th December, 1854.

" MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,—I have received the papers all safe, and I am much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken, and for your opinions, which are most valuable to me.

" What I stated, would probably happen to the ships if they had attacked alone, was to shew the necessity of more means to ensure success—my great complaint is, that they perverted the meaning of my letter, to get up a case against me.

" I don't know how I well can make another appeal to the

Admiralty—three times have I asked for redress in vain, and when I went to Graham to state my grievance, he told me, in the most insolent manner, that he would not speak; and so we parted, after I had given him my opinion of how I had been treated. I hauled my flag down, agreeable to their orders, instantly; and I merely wrote to inform them I had done so, and begged to be informed if I was to consider my command at an end. I have had a sort of advance made to me, but I said I would write to them no more—the only reparation they could give me is by withdrawing their offensive letters.

“The Queen sent me an invitation to come to Windsor Castle. It was too late. I could not have gone had it been in time, and I should have written to the Lord Steward to say, I could not have appeared in Her Majesty’s presence in the state of degradation I was in.

“I shall do nothing till they take some step, then I shall write to your Lordship. Believe me, my dear Lord, yours very faithfully,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

“Southam, Cheltenham, December 29th, 1854.

“MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,—I saw that you and Sir J. Graham were both invited to Windsor on the same day. This you cannot have known when you received your invitation.

“Of course the Queen is not dissatisfied with your conduct.

“But her inviting you to meet Sir J. Graham, shews that she was never made acquainted with the differences between you and him; and if she should ever hear of them, she will be very much displeased at not having been apprised of them at the time.

“The Queen would not have asked you to meet Sir J. Graham, in order to make it up between you. You must take care to go to the first levee. Properly, an officer returning from a naval command is presented by the First Lord of the Admiralty. If all is made up between you before the first levee, of course you would be presented by Sir J. Graham; if not, you would not ask him to present you,

unless you did so with the view of forcing him to a decision as to your conduct ; and if you should not think fit to ask him, which would apparently be the more dignified course—you holding yourself to be aggrieved by him—either Lord —— or I would be the best person to present you. Believe me, my dear Sir Charles, very sincerely yours,

“ELLENBOROUGH.”

CHAPTER X.

CONTROVERSY WITH THE ADMIRALTY—AGAIN IN
PARLIAMENT, 1855.

FOR no one of the achievements of his long and brilliant career does Admiral Sir Charles Napier deserve more the praises and gratitude of his country than for what he did, and what he wisely refrained from doing, during the memorable Baltic campaign of 1854; and never did an officer receive more unmerited contumely, and unjustifiable censure, than he did on his return. To cover the sins of others, and allay factious clamour, was he thus sacrificed; and, but for the altered spirit of the times, he might probably have shared the fate of the unfortunate Admiral Byng.

My chief object in relating at such length the events of the Baltic campaign of 1854, is to do justice to the memory of one who, it is now generally allowed, deserved well of his country, for the tact, the judgment, and, above all, for the moral courage he then displayed, under the most embarrassing circumstances in which a naval commander could be placed.

The task has been difficult, owing to the necessity

of selecting from a voluminous mass of documents—all of interest and importance—such portions only, as would most conduce to the object in view, in order to condense the subject within the limited space assigned to this work; and the difficulty has been further increased by the seal of "private and confidential," which guards much of this correspondence from the public eye, and which the writers, for reasons best known to themselves, refuse permission to disclose to the world.

The endorsement of "private and confidential" on any document relating solely to *private* matters, is, of course, sacred; but when these "private and confidential" letters discuss *public* matters, and contain official instructions, combined with praises and approval of conduct and proceedings, surely it cannot be considered a breach of confidence to give publicity to such correspondence, if a man should in after years be censured, and serious accusations brought against him for the identical actions and proceedings which had *privately* elicited from the same sources, approbation and praise.

This is Sir Charles Napier's case; and it is one of the sins laid to his charge, that in 1856 he employed such "semi-official confidential" letters to exonerate himself from the unmerited imputations cast publicly upon him by Sir James Graham and the Admiralty Board, whose charges he thus and then completely refuted.

A public man, it is true, is public property; but is it just—is it honourable or fair—to extol him in *private* letters, and condemn him *publicly*, and through

official channels? Most assuredly not; and it must be allowed that Sir Charles Napier, in his own defence, was perfectly justified in setting aside a conventional rule, and breaking the seals of "private and confidential," in order to expose the unscrupulous conduct of the writers—and more particularly so when his accusers used the very same weapons when it suited their purpose to do so.

"Are, then," says Sir Charles Napier to the Admiralty, in a letter dated the 20th of January, 1855, "are, then, the (private) letters of the First Lord of the Admiralty informal? Were they to be of force for stimulating, goading an Admiral, against his judgment, to risk the destruction of a noble fleet amidst fogs, sunken rocks, stone fortresses, and ice and fire, and yet to be of no authenticity or weight in justification of an injured and insulted man?"

It has already been stated that I delivered to Sir Charles Napier, on his arrival at Portsmouth, the official document announcing his unceremonious dismissal from the command of the Baltic fleet. He shewed me the insulting letter, without making a remark, and shortly afterwards we reached Merchiston Hall, where the greater part of the Admiral's family were assembled to greet him on his return—but it was a sad greeting, and aught save a "merry Christmas" that we then passed.

The Admiral, who appeared at first stunned by the blow he had received, soon rallied his energies, and prepared to do good battle in self-defence; but to make sure of the position in which he stood—for the case was without parallel—he wrote to the Admiralty to know if by their last communication he was to consider his command as at an end?

The following was the reply he received, dated the 26th of January, 1855 :—

“With reference to yours of yesterday’s date, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that the order which you have received, agreeably to custom, to strike your flag and come on shore, is always the termination of a flag-officer’s command; and I am directed by my Lords to take this opportunity to express to you the sense their Lordships entertain of your exertions during the period of your service in command of the Baltic fleet.”

Thus terminated Sir Charles Napier’s command of the Baltic fleet; but, although his services were so little appreciated and so ill requited, he was not the man to allow those who had served under his orders to be left unnoticed for all that *they* had done, without saying a word in their behalf. He accordingly addressed as follows the Secretary of the Admiralty on this unmerited neglect :—

“Merchiston, Horndean, January 5th, 1855.

“SIR,—I have to acknowledge your letter of the 26th of December, acquainting me that the order which I have received, agreeably to custom, to strike my flag and come on shore, is always the termination of an officer’s command; and adding, that you are directed by my Lords to take this opportunity to express to me the sense they entertain of my exertions during the period of my service in command of the Baltic fleet.

“I regret that their Lordships should not have taken the opportunity of the dispersion of the Baltic fleet to recognise in any manner the services of the several Admirals, officers, and ships’ companies lately under my command. I am not aware that their services were inferior to those of the Admirals, officers, and ships’ companies of the French fleet, during the period of our acting together—and they were extended over a much longer period of time; for their Lordships know that the British fleet was sent to the Baltic at a very inle-

ment season, long before it was joined by the French squadron—and that it remained in the Baltic far into another very inclement season, long after the French squadron had gone home; yet, while the French Emperor, in his speech to the Chambers, pays a just tribute of praise to his fleet, as well as to his army, for their devotion and discipline in the North, as well as in the South, and records a success in the Baltic in which the fleet under my command participated, the Queen was not advised to advert in her speech to Parliament to the services of her Baltic fleet, nor do their Lordships now notice them. It would have been gratifying to me certainly to have been directed, on hauling down my flag, to communicate to all those lately under my command their Lordships' satisfaction with their conduct.

“I took to the Baltic, a fleet, splendid and magnificent no doubt in the size of the vessels of which it was composed; but their Lordships cannot be ignorant of the defects in the composition and quality of the crews hastily put on board. That fleet was not manned like the fleets of Lord Nelson and Lord St. Vincent, nor, with the exception of a few ships which had been off Lisbon, was it then fit to go into action; but I brought back a fleet really magnificent, not in vessels only, but in the crews (without which vessels are nothing), perfect in gunnery, in seamanship, and in discipline. These results were obtained by the unremitting exertions of the officers, and through the willing obedience of the seamen, many of whom had necessarily been compelled to serve on their return from foreign stations, when they had expected their discharge, or a long run of leave on shore.

“I consider the country to be greatly indebted to those officers and to those seamen; and it would indeed be a subject of regret to me to think that, on account of any dissatisfaction their Lordships may entertain with respect to any part of my conduct, they should abstain from signifying to the Admirals, officers, and seamen of the late Baltic fleet their grateful sense of their services.

“As regards my own conduct, it would be most gratifying to me, if their Lordships would afford me the opportunity of justifying every part of it before any tribunal of officers com-

petent to form a judgment upon naval questions ; but I cannot but feel that, in the consideration of my conduct, more than naval questions are involved.

“As long as we have a superior fleet, in the Baltic, we protect the shores of England from insult and desolation; our commerce from ruin ; and we retain Sweden and Denmark in their neutrality.

“Behind that fleet there is nothing—no naval, no military reserve at home to defend our coasts, no fortifications adequate to protect our ports. If at any time—through any disaster arising out of a most dangerous and little known navigation, or out of the accidents of treacherous and tempestuous weather, or out of an attack on forts, which, with whatever caution and judgment it might be conducted, and whatever more or less of success might attend it, must be expected to result in the crippling of many of the ships engaged—our Baltic fleet should, under circumstances of great temporary disadvantage, be brought into action with the very powerful fleet of the enemy, and in that action should sustain defeat ; in three weeks from that time, a Russian fleet, full of troops, might be on our coasts, and even—as the Dutch once were—in the Thames.

“I did not think, and I do not think, that for any chances of success which were ever within my reach, I should have been justified in incurring that risk. I afforded the enemy frequent opportunities of engaging the fleet in open sea ; there, I knew that the chances of war were equal, and that even if not fully successful (but I justly expected full success) I must so cripple the enemy’s fleet as to make it incapable of further enterprise. These opportunities of equal battle the enemy declined, and many I gave them of unequal battle they declined also. I did not think myself justified in engaging, with such means as I had at my disposal, forts first, and a fleet afterwards ; and it was not so easy, as their Lordships seemed to think, to choose a fine day at the end of October, when the Cronstadt fleet would be frozen up, and Sweaborg open ; and I say deliberately, that I do not think that anything short of a reasonable expectation of complete success, not against the forts only, but against the fleet within them,

would justify an attack by ships upon such forts as Sweaborg. So thought the French Admiral, whom their Lordships have necessarily included in their censure; and had the Marshal of France not sailed with his army, he also must have been included in their dissatisfaction that Sweaborg was not attacked before he sailed. I never would, under pressure from without, and against my own better judgment, advise an attack upon forts, like that which lately failed at Sebastopol.

"If their Lordships should be of opinion that, with the means at our disposal, we ought to have made an attack on Sweaborg, it is for them to test the correctness of their opinion by submitting my conduct, for not advising it, to the judgment of a Court-Martial. I repeat that it would be most gratifying to me to explain and justify all my proceedings; and I can truly say that, on reflection, I am more satisfied with myself for having resisted the instigations I received to do what I felt to be wrong, than for the various measures in which I succeeded, and for what I had their Lordships' approbation.

"I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient humble servant,

"CHARLES NAPIER, *Vice-Admiral*.

"To the Secretary of the Admiralty." •

This letter, written "off-hand" by Sir Charles Napier, is in itself a sufficient disapproval of the imputation of "failing intellect" made some time afterwards, at a public meeting, by a young Admiralty official, who whilst—like Hotspur's friend—glibly talking of "ships, and guns, and forts," of Sir Charles Napier's "failing intellect and shattered nerves," stated that there was "but one opinion from the Grand Duke Constantine down to the youngest Russian midshipman, that but from want of energy and spirit in the British Admiral, Cronstadt would have been crumbled to the dust."

Had this young orator, who talked so bravely after

dinner, ever been amidst the rocks and shoals of the Baltic during a fog, a snow-storm, or a gale of wind ; had he been with Sir Charles Napier on board the "Bulldog," under fire at Bomarsund, he might perhaps, from personal experience, have been enabled to expatiate on "shattered nerves." He who wrote, impromptu, the foregoing letter, did not show much symptoms of "failing intellect ;" though a little "failing of memory" may justly be attributed to him who used the authority of the Grand Duke Constantine in making an assertion, the accuracy of which the Grand Duke—as will be hereafter shewn—denied.

The Admiralty briefly answered, under date of January 8th, that they had already awarded promotions and rewards to such as seemed to have deserved them ; had expressed their sense of his own exertions ; and had "conveyed no censure on any point requiring further investigation." As no notice had been taken of his demand for a Court-Martial, Sir Charles Napier again wrote to the Admiralty, as follows :—

"18, Albemarle Street, January 12th, 1855.

"To the Secretary of the Admiralty.

"SIR,—I have received your letter of the 8th of January, and I beg respectfully to observe that their Lordships have evaded, but not replied, to my letter. I did not complain that my officers had not been promoted, and I know very well that the French army and navy bore a conspicuous part in the capture of Bomarsund.

"I know also that their chiefs were promoted, and the army and navy thanked by the Chambers ; while the only chief on our side promoted has been Brigadier Jones, who proposed a plan of attack on Sweaborg, which was condemned and rejected by the French Marshal, the French General of Engineers, the French Admiral, and myself, as impracticable."

and dangerous—whereas I have been deprived of my command, and Her Majesty has not been advised to express her approbation.

“I did not complain of any neglect of Captain Watson, or his officers and men; and I am glad their Lordships have at last promoted his first lieutenant, and no reward is too great for his bold and successful blockade of the Gulf of Finland, after I retired with the fleet to Kiel—and it is most providential that some of his ships were not lost; it is probable that such would have been the fate of my fleet had I remained at Nargen, as ordered by their Lordships, until the ice came, and at all hazards; and it is singular, also, the dates of my letter announcing my intended retirement, and the date of their Lordships’ letter withdrawing the order to remain at all hazards, were the same.

“Their Lordships conclude their letter by saying they had already expressed their sense of my exertions during my command of the Baltic fleet, but they forgot to do so when they ordered me to haul down my flag; and they also forgot to promote my flag-lieutenant, agreeably to the custom of the service.

“I was not desired to thank the junior admirals, the officers, and men, without whose exertions and willing obedience, under the most trying circumstances, the wretchedly manned and inefficient fleet could not have been brought into the state of discipline it was in when I brought it home, after having for nine months conducted them through all the dangers of the Baltic and Gulf of Finland—conducted them safely into anchorages that no fleet had visited before, without pilots, without lights, and without buoys or beacons, except those placed to mislead us—and all this with a fleet of such a size and magnitude as had never been before seen; and after having repeatedly offered battle with only one-third of the Russian force, and blockaded Bomarsund amidst a labyrinth of sunken rocks and islands, and finally, in conjunction with a French army and fleet, took it.

“Their Lordships say no censure has been conveyed on any point requiring further investigation. I beg to differ from their Lordships. I will not enter on the fact of Sir

James Graham having, in his capacity of First Lord, written to me to begin to withdraw the fleet, and then, in his capacity of one of the Board, reproving me for so doing. The points on which an investigation of my conduct is necessary, are, whether I was right or wrong in agreeing with a Marshal of France, a General of Engineers, and a French Admiral, in rejecting the impracticable plan of an English Brigadier-General of Engineers for attacking Sweaborg, with which decision the Admiralty have expressed their discontent. Whether the report of my second reconnoissance of Sweaborg deserves the construction their Lordships thought fit to give it, and, indeed, changed the sense and meaning of it altogether, to make out a case against me, at the same time using language to goad me to attack Sweaborg contrary to my judgment, contrary to the judgment of the French Admiral, and contrary to the judgment of my own Admirals, whom I was ordered to consult—this was to the imminent risk of Her Majesty's fleet, either from the fire of a fortress of the first order, or from tempestuous weather, or from both, unless, indeed, I could hit on a fine day in the latter end of October, when the Cronstadt fleet should be frozen and that of Sweaborg open. These were their Lordships' instructions, and they showed that they were totally ignorant of the state of the Baltic.

“Had their Lordships consulted Sir Byam Martin, who was then alive—or, indeed, any captain of a Baltic trader—they would have told them whether a fine day was likely to be found at that season of the year, and whether any sane man would push a fleet amongst sunken rocks, without beacons or buoys, to attack one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, when he could not depend on the weather for two hours.

“Notwithstanding all the explanations I gave to their Lordships in public letters, and to Sir James Graham in private letters, they persisted in writing to me in a style that might have done for a man who either did not know his duty or was afraid to do it, but not to a man of my character and services.

“If enough was not done in the Baltic to satisfy the

public, and if blame was to attach to anyone, it should attach to the Government, for not sending out a sufficient number of troops at a proper season of the year; and if that was not practicable, for not sending out the appliances pointed out in my report of the 12th of June, and which differed little from my report of the 25th of September. Their Lordships thought proper to interpret the last, as an assurance that I could attack Sweaborg with ships alone, and that I meant to do so; though I most distinctly said, after giving a detailed account of how it should be attacked, if by ships alone, 'whether this attack would succeed or not, it is impossible to say, but we must calculate on ships being set on fire by red-hot shot and shells, of which they would have abundance; and whether successful or not, it is evident the ships would be in no state to meet the Russian fleet afterwards; and if the attack were made at this season of the year, when you cannot depend on the weather for two hours, I do not know how many would be lost.'

"I then proceeded to say, 'I beg their Lordships will not suppose for a moment that Sweaborg cannot be attacked—I think it can, but it must be done with *caution and judgment*.'

"Then followed a complete detail of the manner it should be attacked to ensure success; and I should have thought that their Lordships really misunderstood my letter, had they not persisted in addressing me in the same style after my explanations.

"During the whole of the summer, Sir James Graham was cautioning me against risking the fleet against stone walls, and complimenting me for having proved myself a consummate Commander-in-chief—praised me for all my arrangements—for the capture of Bomarsund, with which he was more than pleased; but then, because two engineers proposed plans diametrically opposite to each other, he forgot his former cautions and all his former praises—forgot his consummate Commander-in-chief, and urged me to attack Sweaborg, contrary to my own judgment and that of my colleagues, and risk Her Majesty's fleet amongst sunken rocks, against heavy batteries, and at a season of the year

which any man who knew his business would have positively forbid, instead of goading to attempt.

“In Sir James Graham’s letter to me of the 17th of October, he makes use of the following expression—it is the French General who writes—‘We partake of the opinion of General Jones: Sweaborg may be attacked and taken by the fleets, if they think fit to make on that fortress a serious attack.’

“Now, there is no such thing in General Jones’s report—the French General meant General Niel’s report, and Sir James Graham either never read General Jones’s report, or thought proper to forget it; General Niel, after stating that he thought the fleets could lay Sweaborg in ruins, added, ‘*mais les vaisseaux sont des machines bien compliquées, bien faciles à incendier; une telle operation est hardie, elle n’a jamais été faite que je sache, et ce n’est pas à moi qu’il appartient de la conseiller.*’* This Sir James thinks proper to interpret in his letter to me, ‘General Niel intimated very distinctly an opinion that the attack ought to be made;’ and then goes on to say, alluding, I suppose, to General Jones’s report, ‘that report made a great impression here, and raised a strong presumption that, with the aid of the military force then present, with the fleet, in seven or eight days the works at Sweaborg might be destroyed, and that the month of September was the proper time for the operation.’ Whatever impression it made on Sir James Graham (whom I do not think a good judge,) that report made none on the French Marshal, none on the French Admiral, the French engineer, or myself; we all considered it impracticable; and, as the weather turned out, had it been put in course of execution, the communication with the fleet would have been cut off, and the troops and stores in possession of the enemy before sunset; a portion of the fleet would most probably also have been lost—it would have been worse than Sebastopol! Sir James then continues thus: ‘Then came your second reconnaissance of Sweaborg, and plan of naval attack, which you considered practicable.’

* General Niel acted like a man of sense and honour, in qualifying his opinion.

"I gave two plans : one with the fleet alone—the success of which I doubted, and thought dangerous; the second I thought certain of success; their Lordships thought proper to deliberate on one, and to ignore the other, which differed, however, little from the one I gave on the 12th of June; and then Sir James Graham tells me an opportunity was lost—adding words about risks and dangers, and telling me that prudence consists in weighing them, and firmness in encountering them. Had their Lordships weighed these things, they would not have written me such letters.

"Sir James, in another letter, tells me he is unwilling to be involved in a written controversy with me, but that I had brought it on myself by my report of the 25th of September: that report appeared to him to be entirely at variance with the opinions previously expressed by me, and he certainly understood me to say, that if I had mortars, rockets, and Lancaster guns, I considered Sweaborg assailable by sea. Now, in May, I declared it to be unassailable by sea or land; and the Admiralty did not send to me the appliances which, in September, I declared to be wanting, because they believed from my account they would be useless against a place which, in the first instance, I pronounced to be impregnable.'

"Sir James then continues thus: 'I could not bring myself to believe that the want of Lancaster guns, or even mortars, rendered a sea attack, on your plan of the 25th of September, impossible, if you had twenty-five sail-of-the line re-assembled before the place, with all their means of *vertical fire*.*' But Sir James forgot that my report in May was made before I had seen Sweaborg, but the report of the 12th of June was after I had seen it, and it differs little from that of the 25th of September.

"I wonder whether Sir James, when he wrote this, had forgotten his great respect for stone walls, and his warnings to avoid them, and had he forgot his consummate Commander-in-chief?

"I have now again well weighed and considered this painful subject. I have consulted friends, and I am of opinion, and

* Where was the vertical fire to come from? We had no mortars. Did he mean the ships to be heeled over, and act with the ports caulked in?

so are they, that my character has been attacked by the First Lord of the Admiralty and by the Board; and coupling that with my dismissal from command, I have nothing left but to demand that my conduct be investigated before a Court-Martial.

"I can quite understand that their Lordships wish to avoid an investigation; for they are quite aware that my conduct will be proved creditable to me, and very different to their Lordships'. I have the honour to remain, your obedient, humble servant,
 . "CHARLES NAPIER."

A reply came the next day from the Admiralty, stating that no censure had been passed on his conduct in reference to the operations of the Baltic fleet, but accusing him of a disrespectful tone in his correspondence, and saying that their Lordships' decision was to be "considered as final." The Admiral by no means acquiesced in this. He wrote again, at considerable length, on the 20th of January,* commenting freely on various letters that he had received from the Board, and attributing some "strong language" in his own recent letters to "provocations" almost past endurance. He also assured them that, though their decision might be final for themselves, it should not be final for him, until he obtained satisfaction for their injurious imputations on his character and conduct. The only reply was a formal announcement from the Secretary, that his "letter had been received and laid before their Lordships." And thus closed for the time a controversy which I have endeavoured to state as briefly as is consistent with enabling the reader to form an opinion on this subject for himself. The whole of the papers referred to may be found in "The Baltic Campaign."

* *Vide* Appendix to this volume.

Having failed to obtain redress from the Admiralty, and his application for a court-martial remaining unheeded, Sir Charles Napier next applied to Lord Aberdeen—then Prime-Minister—for an investigation into his conduct whilst in command of the Baltic fleet. Lord Aberdeen replied that, being about to retire from office, he could not accede to his request; and on a similar application being made to the Duke of Newcastle, as Secretary at War, he likewise declined all interference in the matter, on the plea that the conduct of our fleets was solely under the control of the Board of Admiralty.

Defeated thus in every quarter, in his attempt to obtain justice, but feeling convinced that, on the accession of his friend Lord Palmerston to the Premiership, it would then be refused—more particularly as that Minister had before warmly eulogised his conduct during the Baltic campaign—he thus addressed his Lordship, and the following correspondence ensued:—

“18, Albemarle Street, Feb. 8, 1855.

“MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,—Before Lord Aberdeen left office, I sent him an account of the manner Sir James Graham had treated me; as he is gone, I beg to send it to your Lordship.

“I have long served you, and in different places, and I believe I always carried out your views, and you never had cause to regret my being under your orders.

“From the time it was reported Sebastopol was taken, I have received nothing but insult and injury from Sir James Graham.

“If he had wished to replace me he might have done it in a straightforward manner, and not have followed the tortuous path he has.

“I beg your Lordship will call for the papers and lay them

before the Cabinet. Surely, in this free country a man who held the high command of the Baltic fleet is not to be thrown off with ignominy and contempt.

"I remain your Lordship's obedient servant,

"CHARLES NAPIER.

"The Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston."

"Merchiston Hall, Horndean, Feb. 11, 1855.

"MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,—I beg first to congratulate your Lordship on your becoming first minister of the empire, and I feel certain we shall soon see your master-hand.

"I am sorry to be obliged to request you will lay the accompanying statement before your colleagues. It was sent to Lord Aberdeen, but he had resigned office, and I now send it to your Lordship.

"Little did I think when you presided at the dinner at the Reform Club, I should have to appeal to you for redress from the treatment of Sir James Graham and the Admiralty.

"I have been grievously wounded, and I beg your Lordship will call for the correspondence and submit it to the Cabinet.

"I should have called upon your Lordship before, but as I believed I had been deprived of my command by the Cabinet, I thought it indelicate to come before your Lordship; and it was only on Thursday last that I learnt from Lord Aberdeen that my dismissal was not the act of the Cabinet.

"Believe me, my dear Lord Palmerston, yours very faithfully,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

"18, Albemarle Street, March 6, 1855.

"To Lord Palmerston.

"MY LORD,—I hope, when my case comes before the House of Commons, you will not refuse the papers to enable me to justify my conduct, and to shew Sir James Graham's infamous treatment of me.

"If it is true what he said in the House of Commons, that I was not dismissed, then I must have been dismissed, or any

other name your Lordship chooses to give it, by your Cabinet; and it was your first act—a poor reward for all my services.

“I sent your Lordship my case, which I requested you to lay before the Cabinet, but you have not favoured me with a reply.

“I am aware of the various occupations of your Lordship, but still there ought to be some consideration for an old officer, who has served his country faithfully, and who has held an important command..

“Had my papers been examined by your Cabinet, and justice done, instead of dismissing me, and appointing one of the lords of the Admiralty my successor, you would have dismissed Sir James Graham and his Admiralty, for treachery to me.

“I remain your Lordship’s obedient servant.

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

The Admiral, in addition to this correspondence, sent to Lord Palmerston a statement of his services in the Baltic;* but all these letters remained unnoticed; and Sir Charles Napier, like the hare in the fable, deserted by his many “friends,” in the hour of need, was thus placed in the most unpleasant position that an officer and an honourable man could be. The censures that had been passed upon him by the Admiralty, and the insulting manner in which he had been deprived of his command, stung him to the very soul; and, determined to leave nothing untried to bring about that investigation, which should either condemn or clear him in the eyes of the world, and remove the stigma now cast on his professional reputation, as a last resource he forwarded a petition to Parliament, which concludes in the following manner:—

* *Vide* No. 6, Appendix to this volume.

"Had the right honourable baronet remained First Lord of the Admiralty—which it is fortunate he has not done—your petitioner would not have felt the least aggrieved, for he would not on any consideration have served under such a chief, in whose keeping neither his honour nor his character were safe.

"Your petitioner has served his country, under four sovereigns, fifty-five years, with honour and credit to himself. There has never been a slur on his character—he has performed some exploits that have been called brilliant—his health and strength are still good, and the blood of his family still runs strong in his veins; and certainly he would have wished to have retained the command of the Baltic fleet, to have carried out the plans he had submitted to the Admiralty; but it remained for the late First Lord of the Admiralty to degrade him, to make way for one of his own Board.

"Your petitioner has been informed there were two candidates for the command, with seats at the Admiralty. One was refused the command, the other got it. Surely they could not be impartial judges of the conduct of your petitioner.

"Your petitioner has looked over his letter-books with great care, and there was only one occasion where he made use of a hasty expression, and he expressed his regret to Admiral Berkeley for having done so; and how came it that, if this was true, their Lordships had never pointed it out to your petitioner? Quite the contrary, they were loud in the praise of him till after the capture of Bomarsund.

"Your petitioner does not deny, that after their Lordships thought proper to treat your petitioner in the cruel and unjust manner they did, he used strong expressions; but it is not in the power of man not to resent injuries and injustice; but your petitioner is not aware that he used stronger language than the case required.

"Your petitioner, as late Commander of the Baltic fleet, accuses Sir James Graham, late First Lord of the Admiralty, and his Board, of having perverted the report he made of the survey of the Russian fortress, and of having urged him, in

language that could not be misunderstood, to undertake an operation, which, if carried into execution, would have probably caused the loss of Her Majesty's fleet.

“And your petitioner prays that your honourable House will cause an investigation to be made into the conduct of the war in the Baltic, when the fleet was under the orders of your petitioner, and call for such papers as may be necessary to substantiate the inquiry, and make good your petitioner's accusations.

“5th March, 1855.”

These were grave accusations to bring against a Minister of the Crown, and it might have been imagined that the late First Lord of the Admiralty would have been desirous to promote the investigation so earnestly desired by Sir Charles Napier. Such appears not, however, to have been the case, and the matter remained in abeyance, until the Admiral, on being returned Member for Southwark, was enabled to make his own statement before the House.

“The worst feature in the case,” says the author of the “Baltic Campaign,” “is yet to come. Though censured, degraded, and dismissed from his command, in July, 1855, the Board of Admiralty nevertheless intimated that it had recommended the Admiral to the honour of the *highest class of the Order of the Bath*—thereby annulling all their previous imputations against him, on account of which he had been deprived of his command. To have accepted the honour without investigation would have been impossible. The deprivation of command had been conveyed to the Admiral under circumstances of marked insult, and this, unexplained, rendered honours out of the question.”

The following correspondence, relative to conferring the Order of the Grand Cross of the Bath upon Sir Charles Napier, took place between him and Sir Charles Wood, who had succeeded Sir James Graham as First Lord of the Admiralty:—

"Admiralty, July 4th, 1855.

"DEAR SIR,—I have recommended to Her Majesty to promote you to the highest class of the Bath—G. C. B.—and Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to approve of this recommendation. I have the honour to be, dear Sir, yours faithfully,

"CHARLES WOOD.

"Vice-Admiral Sir C. Napier, K C. B."

"July 5th, 1855.

"DEAR SIR,—Lord Collingwood, for the battle of the 1st of June, did not receive the medal. On the 14th of February he was offered one, which he declined, as he had done his duty as well on the 1st of June as he did on the 14th of February.

"During the time I served in the Baltic I did my duty, and did not deserve the treatment I met with, and must therefore decline the Grand Cross.

"I am, however, much obliged to you for having brought my name before the Queen.

"I have been expecting every day to hear of Sweaborg being attacked; but I suppose Admiral Dundas—who was one of the Board that gave me such sage advice—is waiting to the end of October to choose his day when Cronstadt is frozen up and Sweaborg is open. Together with your letter I received one from the Usher of the Order, desiring me to be at Buckingham Palace to-morrow, to be invested.

"I have written to Prince Albert, as Grand Master of the Order, to state my reasons for declining it, and requesting him to lay them before the Queen. Yours truly,

"CHARLES NAPIER.

"To the Right Hon. Sir C. Wood, &c. &c.,
Admiralty."

"To His Royal Highness Prince Albert.

"SIR,—I have received your Royal Highness's commands to attend Her Majesty on the 7th of July, to be invested with the insignia of a Knight Grand Cross of the order of the Bath. I beg your Royal Highness will convey to Her Majesty my humble duty and sincere thanks for the honour Her Majesty contemplated conferring on me, and I beg most

respectfully your Royal Highness will convey to Her Majesty my regret that I do not think I can, consistently with my own honour, accept it. I beg to assure your Royal Highness that I mean no disrespect to Her Majesty; she has not a more devoted subject than myself, and I am ready to lay down my life in her service. •

“I have served Her Majesty’s family with honour and credit for fifty-five years, and at the end of my career have been grossly insulted, and false interpretations put upon my despatches by the Admiralty, and been degraded and dismissed, because I resented, as became a man of honour, injuries wounding to my character. Her Majesty last year confided to me the command of the finest fleet that ever left these shores, as far as ships were concerned, but badly manned and totally unorganized. I led that fleet to the Baltic and the Gulf of Finland, much earlier than usual, with imperfect charts and ignorant pilots, and conducted them safely through all the dangers and intricacies of that little-known sea; and, in conjunction with Her Majesty’s allies, took and destroyed the western bulwark of the Emperor of Russia’s dominions, and, because I would not attempt impossibilities, suggested by an English Brigadier-General, and recommended by the Admiralty, though disapproved of by myself, by my Admirals, by the French Marshal, and by the French Admirals, in Councils of War, I received insulting letters, and was deprived of my command because I resisted, as a British Admiral ought to do, such unworthy treatment.

“I have no hesitation in saying, had I followed the insane suggestions of Sir James Graham and his Admiralty, the Allied army would have been made prisoners, and the greater part of Her Majesty’s fleet lost. I stated this to the Admiralty, and I demanded a court-martial to investigate my conduct, which was refused, and I do not think I can accept an honour until my character is cleared.

“Your Royal Highness is a soldier, and you know what is due to a soldier’s honour; and I feel satisfied your Royal Highness will pardon the unusual course I have taken to convey my feelings to Her Majesty. I am, &c.,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

The enemies of Sir Charles Napier endeavoured to construe his refusal of the Grand Cross of the Bath into a mark of disrespect towards Her Most Gracious Majesty, than whom—as the Admiral truly stated—Her Majesty had not a more devoted subject ; one who had often exposed his life in her service, and was ready at any moment to do so again, as was proved by his anxious desire to lead a second time to the Baltic that fleet which had now been entrusted to Vice-Admiral Richard Saunders Dundas, one of the former Lords of the Admiralty.

That Sir Charles Napier's conduct in the Baltic was not disapproved of by the Queen, is manifest from his having been honoured by Her Majesty's command to dine at Windsor Castle on returning to England. That Her Majesty had not been made acquainted with the proceedings of the Admiralty towards Sir Charles, is also evident from the circumstance (as asserted in the papers) of Sir James Graham having likewise received orders to attend upon the same occasion.

Had Her Majesty been cognizant of what had occurred, it is only reasonable to suppose that this gracious command would not have summoned both Sir James Graham and Sir Charles Napier to attend at the Palace on the same day.

A member of the same Board of Admiralty that had deprived Sir Charles Napier of his command had meanwhile been appointed to succeed him as Commander-in-chief of the Baltic fleet ; and on the 3rd of April, 1855, Admiral Dundas led forth that fleet to try its fortunes in the North, with the following “

valedictory remarks from the leading journal of the day :—*

“The Baltic fleet of this year is, in all respects, much stronger than the last; it has more steam power, more guns, a new class of gunboats and floating batteries, adapted for creeks and shoals, and, what more than anything marks a resolution to do something—a new commander. Sir Charles Napier has ceased to command the Baltic fleet, not from any deficiency in skill, courage, or temper, but simply because he did less than the British people expected to see done. We have ourselves been ever ready to do justice to his actual achievements, which are not to be denied or depreciated; but, when we send out the finest fleet in the world, we naturally expect it to do more than shut in a third-rate naval power, and assist an army to destroy an unfinished fort. The new commander, Admiral Dundas, has before him the services of Admiral Napier, and, whatever his instructions, if any, no doubt he knows that he has to do more than Admiral Napier. If he does not accomplish more, he will certainly find himself next November under orders to lower his flag, with small prospect of ever hoisting it again. Such is the mission of the fleet the Queen sends this day on its fatal errand. It is to attempt more, to run more risk, to follow further and closer, to care rather less for losing ships and men, and rather more for inflicting losses and disgraces on the enemy. In a word, the force is stronger and the duty more terrible than last year; and, if the scene to-day should attract a smaller crowd of gazers than last year, they will doubtless see it less as a holiday spectacle, and more as an operation of war.

“No doubt we have improved on last year, but unless there is a large supply of the smaller craft adapted for the shallow waters of the Baltic, we shall only reiterate an inglorious campaign, with even less glory than before. Therefore it is that we still urge the necessity of adapting our means of warfare to the nature of the war.”

The manner in which Admiral Dundas thought it

* *Vide* leading article of the *Times*, April 3rd, 1855.

advisable to carry on operations against Sweaborg, and the result of that attack, constitute the strongest justification that could be adduced in favour of Sir Charles Napier not attacking the fortress the preceding year. He had been censured and vilified, almost accused of cowardice, for not attempting the destruction of its granite walls with ships *alone*. Yet Admiral Dundas, in making that attempt, employed *only* mortar-boats and gun-boats (with which, it will be remembered, Sir Charles Napier was totally unprovided) but never made, with his ships, a general attack on the defences of the place—an operation which appears not to have formed any part of his plan against Sweaborg.

The close of the Baltic campaign of 1855 saw Sweaborg still untaken, and Cronstadt unattacked, notwithstanding the much superior appliances at command to those of the preceding year; but was Admiral Dundas therefore ordered—as Sir Charles Napier had been—to “lower his flag, with small prospect of ever hoisting it again?”

We do not wish to make comparisons between the performances of these gallant officers, both of whom are now, alas! no more; but the treatment they respectively received would lead to the conclusion, that justice was assuredly not awarded to Sir Charles Napier, on *his* return from the Baltic campaign of 1854.

Among the few private letters that I find in the Admiral's portfolio for the year 1855, is the rough *draft of one addressed to Lord Palmerston, dated July 29th, 1855. I lay it before the reader to shew,*

that whether smiled upon by officials, or under the shadow of their displeasure, he never refrained—as I have often before had occasion to observe—from advocating the cause of those who had served with him, and who he thought had not been rewarded as they deserved. He always entertained and expressed the highest opinion of Admiral Chads, his second in command during the Baltic campaign of 1854, and thus addressed the Prime Minister in his behalf:—

“ July 29th, 1855.

“ MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,—I believe you to be a just man. No officer within my recollection has been so cruelly and so unjustly treated as Admiral Chads; if I did not do my duty in the Baltic to the satisfaction of the Government, surely Admiral Chads was not to blame; but he was turned adrift by Sir James Graham.

“ The Lieutenant-Governorship of Greenwich Hospital is now vacant; it is in your Lordship's gift, and you would do yourself honour by appointing Admiral Chads to it.

“ I remain, your Lordship's obedient servant,

“ CHARLES NAPIER.”

Popular opinion, swayed by recent events of the war, had in the autumn of 1855 assumed a different turn. Neither Sebastopol nor Sweaborg was yet taken or destroyed, and the British public began at last to admit a vague idea that Russian fortresses were too solidly constructed to crumble at the mere sight of our soldiers or of our ships; and the very slender results of the Baltic campaign of 1855 began to place Sir Charles Napier in the light of an injured man. All his efforts had hitherto failed to procure an investigation into his conduct whilst commanding the Baltic fleet; but at last the moment arrived,

which would afford him the opportunity of obtaining for himself that redress, hitherto denied from every quarter to which he had made application.

In October, 1855, a vacancy occurred in the representation of the Metropolitan borough of Southwark, for which Sir Charles Napier was invited to stand by a large body of the electors. He was not backward in responding to this appeal, and a subscription was immediately set on foot to defray the expenses which he might consequently incur. The vacancy in question was occasioned by the death of Sir William Molesworth, and the Admiral's opponent was Mr. Scovell, an opulent and influential inhabitant of the Borough.

Sir Charles Napier is said to have displayed as much energy in the usual electioneering proceedings which ensued, as in the first attempt he made to be returned for Portsmouth, in 1832; and his political creed remained unchanged. On the 29th of October, a monster meeting was held at Rotherhithe in favour of the Admiral, when the greatest enthusiasm was evinced, and an immense concourse of people stood in the open air, amidst torrents of rain—there being no building large enough to accommodate the number—to hear the expression of his political sentiments; and he thus concluded his address:—

“I shall give my general support to Lord Palmerston, but will not commit myself to any man or ministry. I will support them when they are right, and will oppose them when they are wrong. At my time of life I have nothing to desire from anyone, and shall therefore go into Parliament for the benefit of the country, and not to receive favours from any

government. I am not the man to seek such things, after having refused a high honour, because I could not accept it with a clear conscience. In doing this, I never meant any disrespect to Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen ; for there is not a man in Her Majesty's dominions more devoted to Her Majesty than I am. For the service and for the honour of her Majesty I am ready to sacrifice my life, but after the manner in which I have been treated by Her Majesty's ministers, I could not have acted otherwise than I have done. I am not the man to be bought ; I have acted independently all my life, and will continue to do so till my dying day."

The result of the contest is known : the Admiral was returned, and represented—with his usual energy and zeal—the borough of Southwark until the period of his death.

CHAPTER XI.

IN PARLIAMENT—VISIT TO ST. PETERSBURGH—SIR ROBERT
PEEL'S SPEECH—CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE GRAND
DUKE—SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S DEATH, 1856-1860.

By offering the Grand Cross of the Bath to Sir Charles Napier, ministers might perhaps have thought to obtain his silent acquiescence in the blame they had imputed to him, but which appertained exclusively to themselves. They had, however, utterly mistaken his character; for, desirous as he may have been to deserve such a mark of approbation from his Sovereign and from the British nation, he valued not "honours," when his own honour was at stake. He had publicly proclaimed his wrongs and the unjust treatment he had received; and the wish to give him an opportunity of obtaining redress, by advocating his own cause, was one great inducement with the electors of Southwark to bring the Admiral into Parliament; nor was he slow in availing himself of his new position; and, soon after taking his seat in the House, he moved for a select committee to inquire into the operations of the British fleet in the Baltic, during the years 1854 and 1855.

In his speech, which was delivered on the 13th of March, 1856, he recapitulated the chief events of his campaign, and justified himself for using, in self-defence, so-called *private* letters, written on *public* service—an example, which, as he said, had been set to him by Admiral Berkeley and Sir James Graham themselves. He pointed out how smoothly everything had at first gone on between the Admiralty and himself; how his proceedings had been approved of, how he had been warned not to “run his head against stone walls;” how a revolution took place in the tone of Sir James Graham’s correspondence, when the English people began to show signs of disapprobation and impatience, because they considered sufficient had not been done; how—to pander to this feeling, and to divert attention from the real delinquents, he had been—even after the departure of the French troops and fleet—urged to do, at the approach of winter, what he had been warned against attempting during the summer months; how his report on Sweaborg had been ignored, and the true meaning of his letters perverted and misconstrued.

Sir Charles Napier added, that when the Admiralty began almost to accuse him of cowardice, it was perfectly impossible for him to refrain from returning them a severe answer; that he did not find fault with the Government for not sending him out again to the Baltic, as Her Majesty had a right to choose whoever she thought proper to command her fleets; but he complained of the manner in which he had been treated, and of the attempt of the Admiralty to throw upon him the blame due to their own acts, though

happily they had not succeeded in the attempt. He concluded his address by moving, "That a select committee be appointed to inquire into the operations of the British fleet in the Baltic, in the years 1854 and 1855."

The motion was opposed by Sir Charles Wood, then First Lord of the Admiralty; whilst Sir James Graham, in a clever, though sophistical speech, endeavoured to make the "worse appear the better cause." In this attempt he was supported by Admiral Berkeley, who, in defending the Admiralty, endeavoured to damage the reputation of his former friend and companion-in-arms, not only for his conduct in the Baltic, but for alleged mismanagement at the capture of Acre, sixteen years before!

Captain Scobell then rose, and entered into a manly and straightforward speech in defence of his brother officer. Admiral Napier, he said, had been in Her Majesty's service fifty or sixty years, and until that night there had never been a whisper against his honour; that he was old was not his fault—but if so old, so infirm, and weak of nerve, why had the Admiralty appointed him to the command of the Baltic fleet? They had for months considered the question, and he was at last selected as the man most fitted for that post. Sir Charles Napier had certainly not proved himself so able an orator as Sir James Graham, who had made on that occasion a very clever and *expert* speech—its only fault being that it was *too clever*, as the attention of the house had been engaged by the language, and been thus led away from the real subject under discussion.

Mr. Lindsay, in the course of the debate, remarked, that, in making these attacks on the gallant Admiral, it seemed to have escaped the recollection of Sir James Graham, that Sir Charles Napier was not alone in the Baltic, but was acting in concert with an ally on whom must fall with equal severity any censure passed upon the gallant Admiral for not attacking Sweaborg.

Mr. Malins, another supporter of Sir Charles Napier, remarked on the singular inconsistency of Sir James Graham and Admiral Berkeley, in attacking, with such unmeasured bitterness, the professional reputation of an officer in whose nomination to the command of the Baltic fleet they had themselves been mainly instrumental. In ransacking the previous career of Sir Charles Napier, they had made a collection of charges, which, if founded on facts, must have had quite as much point and significance in 1854 as in 1856. Yet, in the former year, Sir James Graham had plumed himself on the appointment of Sir Charles Napier; and, at the famous dinner at the Reform Club, took infinite credit for having selected from the whole Navy List, the man most qualified to uphold the dignity of the British flag. "This," he added, "was strangely inconsistent; but still more unaccountable," he observed, "was the conduct of Admiral Berkeley, who had volunteered a personal attack on one who had been long his personal friend! "It must," continued Mr. Malins, "be still fresh in the memory of many hon. members, that, a year ago, the hon. and gallant gentleman came down to that House, and surprised them all, by declaring, that it

had been the proudest object of his own ambition to command the Baltic fleet, but he felt it to be a duty to his country to withdraw his own claims, in favour of the man who was on all hands admitted to possess the highest qualifications for the post!" Mr. Malins concluded by stating, that Sir Charles Napier was not likely to obtain his committee, and that it would, therefore, be wiser to withdraw his motion; which, after some further discussion, Sir Charles Napier accordingly did.

These extracts from the proceedings in the House of Commons, on the Baltic question of 1854, are taken from the report given in the *Times* of the 14th March, 1856. Probably never did an assembly in the House of Commons listen to a more unjust and bitter attack on the professional character and reputation of an officer than that made on Sir Charles Napier during the course of this debate; and probably never were groundless accusations more completely rebutted and disproved—never was treachery more completely unmasked, or former protestations of friendship proved to have been so hollow and insincere.

Both Sir James Graham and Admiral Berkeley had, on this occasion, left nothing untried to crush their opponent, and ruin his professional reputation. There was, however, this difference in their conduct—Sir James Graham professed himself an enemy; but Sir Charles Napier had always considered Admiral Berkeley as his friend!

The debate of the 13th of March did not, however, bring this long-vexed controversy to an end; the

statements raked up about Acre, after so long a period had elapsed, were so totally void of fact—Sir Charles Napier's professional reputation, nay, even his personal courage, had been so seriously impugned, that he was induced to publish the following letter :—

"TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.

" March 15th, 1856.

"SIR,—Sir James Graham stated in his speech that I advised Sir Robert Stopford not to attack Acre; and Admiral Berkeley went further, and said that the night before I told Sir Robert Stopford that if he sent him into the position marked out for him his ships would not swim for half an hour. My reply is not correctly reported, and I have to request you will give insertion to this letter.

"I stated in my reply that upon my honour I did no such thing; and I now beg to say, that there is not one word of truth, or even a shadow of truth, in those statements; they were got up to damage me. I remain your obedient servant,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

This led, on the 4th of April, to what Sir Charles Napier termed a "second field-day in the House of Commons," to which the belligerents came armed and prepared for a duel *à outrance*. Admiral Berkeley and Sir James Graham, backed by the powerful weapons which the official position of the former placed at their disposal, commenced the attack with those forensic resources that Sir James Graham had at such complete command, and which on this occasion he wielded with the utmost dexterity and skill; whilst Sir Charles Napier, supported only by the written evidence of a few honest men, who had the courage to brave official displeasure in the cause of innocence and truth, manfully maintained his ground, in defence of what was far more dear to him than

life.* The odds against him were however great, and the weapons of eloquence, handled with all the skill and cunning of so practised an orator as Sir James Graham, nearly struck a death-blow to his cause.

“He (Sir James Graham) had brought,” wrote Sir Charles Napier to me, on the 5th of April, 1855, “such a string of apparent evidence against me, that I at first considered myself a lost man.” The Admiral, however, made a straightforward, unvarnished statement of facts, as they had occurred on the occasion of the attack upon Acre. He next read the letters, written in corroboration of what he had said, by the few brave and honest men before alluded to; but in order to drag from the brink of that abyss, into which his assailants were pitilessly endeavouring to hurl his honour and reputation—the honour of a whole life—the reputation earned during services extending over six-and-fifty years—in order to effect this, one single link was wanting in the chain of justification, requisite to rescue him from ignominy and disgrace. That link was the letter from Sir Robert Stopford, given in a former portion of this work, exculpating him from censure for his conduct, during the attack of the British fleet on the fortress of Acre.

In vain did he search amongst his papers for this invaluable document; it was not to be found. There

* The names of these honourable men deserve to be recorded—they were, Captain Liardet, R.N., Commander of the “Powerful,” in 1840; Captain Hastings, R.N., Commander of the “Edinburgh,” at the same date; Captain Pearn, R.N., Master of the “Powerful,” at the siege of Acre, and whose name has so often been mentioned in this work; and the late Rev. J. L. Hodgson, chaplain of the “Vanguard,” in 1840.

was, for some instants, a dead pause in the House. His very existence—for what were existence without honour?—seemed to hang upon a thread; and the veteran, who had so often recklessly braved the “battle and the breeze,” now stood silent, motionless, and aghast! Once more he searched for the missing letter, when, from a corner of his pocket, the small and crumpled, but, to him, priceless paper, was produced, and the brave old sailor’s feelings may be more readily imagined than described, when, on his reading its contents, the House instantly rang with a deafening cheer of applause.

His enemies were defeated, and the day was won.

“Graham,” Sir Charles Napier wrote to me, “abandoned by the Government, and even by the Secretary of the Admiralty, was only supported by the feeble Cowper,” in an unavailing attempt at defence.

In continuation of the debate, Mr. Roebuck said:—

“That when he found the right honourable Baronet, the member for Carlisle, coming down with his practised oratory to prefer and support charges against the honourable and gallant member for Southwark, he felt satisfied that, however much at home the latter might feel on his own element, he was in no position to cope with the right honourable Baronet in that House. When the right honourable Baronet rose, his (Mr. Roebuck’s) first impression was, that he was in the right, but after hearing the plain and unadorned reply of the gallant Admiral, he confessed that his feelings underwent an entire change. He saw that the consummate rhetorician had been foiled, and the unpractised disputant victorious.”

Mr. Malins asked:—

“If it was to be tolerated that our leading statesmen should come down to that house and insinuate cowardice, or at least a total want of judgment, against the men to whom,

in critical times, they had themselves confided the destinies of England, and whom they had prided themselves on having selected for the highest commands? Never," continued he, "never was there inconsistency like that of the right honourable gentleman, the member for Gloucester (Admiral Berkeley, now Lord Fitzhardinge); not only had that gallant officer declared in his place in Parliament, that, though it would have been the fondest object of his ambition to have himself commanded the Baltic fleet, he waived his own claims in favour of the man whom the voice of the nation pronounced best qualified for the duty, but he even expressed his willingness to serve, as second in command, under the honourable and gallant member for Southwark. Forgetting all this, he subsequently took up a position of the bitterest antagonism towards the gallant officer, cast the most grievous imputations on him, urged the right honourable gentleman, the member for Carlisle, to the most hostile courses in his regard: If a reputation of fifty-six years' standing were to be tainted by such proceedings as they had that night witnessed, the most brilliant services would be unavailing, and no man's honour would be safe. But, happily, the gallant Admiral had passed with triumph through the ordeal. He had proved the charges against him to be utterly groundless, and it was now quite time that the angry controversy should cease."

But enough of this discreditable attempt to ruin a veteran officer's reputation, founded on the services of nearly sixty years. The attempt proved abortive, and, with its authors, may now be consigned to oblivion.

* * * * *

Although Sir Charles Napier originally possessed an uncommon amount of mental and bodily vigour, the persecutions and annoyances he had lately undergone told severely on his health, and he therefore resolved, in the summer of 1856, to make a voyage to St. Petersburg, where—whilst deriving the benefit of

change of air and scene—he might at the same time be enabled to judge for himself of the actual strength of Cronstadt, and of the possibility of its capture, had he made the attempt.

In the month of July, he accordingly proceeded to St. Petersburg, where he was remarkably well received ; the Grand Duke Constantine—whom he describes as a fine, frank, open-hearted sailor—showed him every attention ; his application to be allowed to visit Cronstadt was immediately acceded to, all facilities were afforded him for visiting that place, and he wrote a detailed account of the defences of Cronstadt, which appears in the “ Baltic Campaign.”

Sir Charles Napier found it to be one of the strongest fortresses in the world, which might well have been termed “ impregnable,” and he felt convinced that it would have been madness to have attacked such a place with line-of-battle ships alone, unaided by gunboats or troops. Yet the Admiral, on his return to England, was *again* taunted for not having done so, and this taunt proceeded from a quarter that, under ordinary circumstances, would merely have elicited from him a smile of silent contempt ; but which, in the irritated state of his feelings at that period, caused him excessive annoyance, and led to a correspondence with Lord Palmerston and the Grand Duke Constantine. The particulars of this occurrence are as follows :—

Sir Robert Peel (a son of the great statesman of that name) then occupied a seat at the Board of Admiralty, and had accompanied Lord Granville’s embassy to Russia, at the coronation of the Emperor Alexander.

No doubt proud of such a distinction, he, on returning to England, took the opportunity of a public dinner to give an account of all the wonders he had beheld during his travels in this little known part of the world. He had even visited Cronstadt, and his description of that place was so graphic, as to elicit the attention of Sir Charles Napier, who addressed the following letter to Sir Robert Peel :—

“ Merchiston, Oct. 29.

“ SIR,—In your after-dinner speech at Stafford the other day, you returned thanks for the health of Her Majesty's Ministers, on doing which, you stated that you ‘ had visited the fortress of Cronstadt, and there was but one opinion, from the Grand Duke Constantine down to the youngest midly on board the ‘ Vladimir,’ that had the energy of the Commander equalled the pluck of the British Navy, that fortress at the present time would have been crumbled in the dust. Sir Charles Napier had been through the whole of the fleet and fortress, and he gave it as his opinion, that it was impossible to destroy the fortress. It was certainly very clear at this moment, that it was impossible to attack Cronstadt with success now, but when the war commenced the case was very different; and if the man who commanded the fleet at Copenhagen had commanded the Baltic fleet, or if a man possessed of the spirit and capacity of a Nelson had commanded that fleet, he had not the slightest doubt that, as the fortress of Copenhagen yielded, so would Cronstadt have fallen.’

“ You appear, Sir, not to know that there were two commanders in the Baltic fleet—viz., myself and my respected colleague, Admiral Parseval, a man whose courage and judgment will bear criticism even from you. But let that pass; I am quite willing to take his responsibility on my shoulders, as we agreed in everything as regards Cronstadt. Like myself, Admiral Parseval may in your estimation have been wanting in energy and spirit; but we can both afford to bear the imputation from you.

“As regards myself, if the Grand Duke Constantine told you what you state, he told me a very different story.

“His Imperial Highness went over with me the plan of the south of Cronstadt, and he himself showed me the total impossibility of succeeding against Cronstadt by ships.

“If you formed your judgment from what you saw, it shows your ignorance of Naval matters, and your want of generosity in attacking the character of a man who has faithfully served his country for so many years.

“If the Grand Duke told you that the north of Cronstadt might have been attacked, this was quite true. But whose fault was it that it was not attacked, but that of the Board of Admiralty, which did not furnish the means by which alone it could have been successfully attacked—viz., gun and mortar-boats, and rockets, of which the allied fleets were altogether destitute? And sufficient means, moreover, were not supplied to Admiral Dundas in the following year, so that he could no more attack it than Admiral Parseval and myself could.

“If you have been put forward by the Admiralty to insult me, you have acted an unworthy part; and if you have put yourself forward, you have acted a foolish one.

“You say, if Lord Nelson, who commanded the fleet at Copenhagen, or any man of spirit, had commanded the fleet at Cronstadt, it would have fallen as Copenhagen did. Now, Sir, I tell you that there was no comparison between Copenhagen and Cronstadt; and neither Lord Nelson, nor any other admiral of ancient or modern times, would have touched it with the force I had at my command.—I remain, your obedient servant,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

“To Sir Robert Peel.”

Sir Charles Napier, not receiving any apology or explanation from Sir Robert Peel, wrote next to Lord Palmerston, to inquire whether his lordship had sanctioned this wanton attack, and demanding an investigation. Lord Palmerston was rather dilatory in

answering the Admiral's letter, but at last, on the 1st of December, he replied, that there was no occasion for any investigation, as everybody knew that he had acted with sound judgment in not attacking Cronstadt with the means at his command. Sir Charles Napier, however, returned to the charge. His letter is subjoined, together with a brief correspondence that ensued on the subject with the Grand Duke Constantine.

"To Lord Palmerston.

"Merchiston, Dec. 5th, 1856.

"MY LORD,—Your Lordship tells me that you have witnessed with great pain 'the discussions that have taken place between me and the Board of Admiralty, both in and out of Parliament, as well as the attacks made by me upon Sir James Graham on a public occasion.' But, my Lord, if you have felt pain on that occasion—provoked as I was by Sir James Graham and his Board—how much more pained must you have been to witness the unprovoked attacks made upon me by a member of your Lordship's Government on two public occasions.

"Your Lordship tells me that 'you have always maintained, when professionally employed in executing instructions under your department, that you had full reason to be satisfied with my judgment and discretion; and you are bound to say that you estimate the great services which professionally I had performed. You highly respect the noble qualities, of which, in my professional career, I have given such frequent proofs. But you have seen with sincere grief in my conduct on shore, things which my best friends (and you claim to be one of them) could not witness without deep regret.'

"How much more poignant, then, my Lord, must have been your 'grief,' and how much more deep your 'regret,' to witness the conduct of Sir Robert Peel—a Lord of the Admiralty, a member of your Government—in attacking an old officer, double his age, who had served his country honourably for upwards of 50 years, had several times received the

thanks of Parliament, and had even been highly lauded in Parliament by the hon. Baronet's own father.

"Your Lordship must also remember, that in attacking me, he attacked the French Admiral, my colleague; and in so doing must have given offence to the French nation—our ally."

"Your Lordship will permit me to observe, that you do not put the case sufficiently strong. The attacks were made at public meetings, it is true; but they were made by Sir Robert Peel, a Lord of the Admiralty, a member of your Lordship's Government, and in the presence of one of your colleagues!

"Your Lordship thinks no investigation necessary, because 'you consider my conduct to have been judicious and proper, and to have been founded on a correct sense of my public duty in the very responsible situation in which I was placed, as Commander-in chief of the Baltic fleet.'

"The fleet I commanded, your Lordship observes, 'was perfectly sufficient, when reinforced by the French squadron, to have enabled me to give a good account of the Russian fleet, if it had come out to give me battle.' But the fleet under my command was not sufficient for the double purpose of attacking the stone batteries of Cronstadt, and afterwards encountering with success the Russian fleet.

"Your Lordship further observes, that 'if I had attacked Cronstadt, whatever the result might have been to the Russian batteries, my ships would have been so seriously damaged, and my fleet, after such an action with the batteries, would probably not have been in a situation to encounter the Russian fleet. The consequence of such a state of things might have been a naval disaster, or the temporary ascendancy of the Russian fleet, not only in the Baltic, but in the North Sea, and on the coasts of England.'

"You therefore think that, 'in the then existing state of things, I acted with sound judgment in refraining from attacking the batteries of Cronstadt with the fleet under my command; and that, in pursuing this course, I best performed the important and responsible duty which I had undertaken.'

"This, your Lordship says, 'is your opinion now—was your opinion at the time—and it was so expressed in a private letter to me when I was still in command of the Baltic fleet; and that this is the opinion you have invariably expressed to all with whom you have communicated at any time on the subject.'

"I feel highly gratified that you entertain so high an opinion of my public services in general, and particularly of my conduct before Cronstadt. But I do not think, after what has passed, that even your good opinion will clear me in the eyes of the world.

"It was stated by Admiral Berkeley, in 1856, that it was my fault that Cronstadt was not attacked.

"It has been stated at one public meeting, in presence of one of your colleagues, by Sir Robert Peel, another Lord of the Admiralty, that, 'had I done my duty, Cronstadt would have been crumbled to dust.'

"This was confirmed at another public meeting; and it was stated by Sir R. Peel, that 'what he had said at Stafford was approved by the highest authority.' This has gone forth to the remotest corners of the earth.

"The 'highest authority' could not have been your Lordships', after what you have written to me. It could not have been Her Majesty. Therefore I think the country has a right to know who this 'highest authority' is.

"Sir Robert Peel's opinion, my Lord, on naval matters is not worth much; nor, indeed, on any other. His want of judgment is proverbial, but his position gives him weight.

"The course he has pursued reflects little credit on your Lordship's Government; and be assured, my Lord, that he is not the Samson to pull down the pillars of the State, and crush the Administration beneath its ruins.

"I therefore trust your Lordship will reconsider your decision, and grant me the investigation I request.

"I have, &c.,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

On the 29th of October, the date of Sir Charles Napier's first communication to Lord Palmerston, he

likewise wrote as follows, to the Grand Duke Constantine :—

“Merchiston, Oct. 29th, 1856.

“SIR,—I beg to send to your Imperial Highness a speech of Sir R. Peel—a Lord of the Admiralty—in which he accuses me of not doing my duty before Cronstadt.

“I also send your Highness my letter to him, and two to Lord Palmerston.

“I think I have distinctly stated what passed between your Imperial Highness and myself relative to Cronstadt; which certainly does not agree with what Sir R. Peel states.

“I shall make no apology to your Imperial Highness for writing to you. Your Highness is a frank, open-hearted sailor. I therefore request you will be pleased to inform me whether I have correctly stated what passed between your Highness and myself when you honoured me with an interview, and whether, as stated by Sir R. Peel, if I had attacked Cronstadt, I would have crumbled it into dust? I have the honour, &c.,

“CHARLES NAPIER, *Vice-Admiral*.

“His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Constantine.”

A courteous and most satisfactory reply was received to this letter, which Sir Charles forwarded with the following note to Lord Palmerston.

“Merchiston, Dec. 7th, 1856.

“MY LORD,—Since writing to your Lordship, on the 5th of December, I have received the Grand Duke’s reply to me, of which I beg to send you a copy.

“It is for your Lordship to judge whether a member of your Lordship’s Government, who has endeavoured to ruin the reputation of an old officer, is fit to be one of his masters; and your Lordship may perhaps be able to ascertain who the ‘highest authority’ is to whom Sir R. Peel alluded in his speech. I have, &c.,

“CHARLES NAPIER.

“The Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston.”

From H.I.H. the Grand Duke Constantine to Admiral Sir Charles Napier.

“St. Petersburg, Nov. 13th (25th), 1856.

“MY DEAR ADMIRAL,—In answer to your letter of the 29th of October, I willingly affirm that you have quite exactly reported the conversation I had with you concerning Cronstadt.

“With regard to Sir R. Peel's statement, I consider it necessary to say that I spoke with him but once, viz., at his official presentation in Moscow; and that not a word concerning Cronstadt—not even the name itself—was mentioned by either of us. Yours affectionately,

“CONSTANTINE.

“Sir Charles Napier, Vice-Admiral.”

Little comment is requisite on *this* discreditable transaction, the chief actor in which is now older—perhaps wiser—than at the period when he thus gratuitously insulted a veteran of so advanced an age, and but for the official position the young man then happened to hold, and his excited feelings at the time, Sir Charles Napier would no doubt have treated this ungenerous attack with the contemptuous silence it deserved.

The year 1857 was chiefly devoted by Sir Charles Napier to arduous duty in the House of Commons. He continued strenuously to advocate the interests of his profession, and when not called upon to attend to Parliamentary affairs, his time was mostly passed in retirement, and engaged in agricultural pursuits.

The Admiral was now in his seventy-first year, but age had not appeared to have seriously impaired either his bodily powers or mental energy; and when not employed in his study, he might be seen, in all weathers,

superintending the arrangements of his farm. Nor should the mention of Sir Charles Napier's charitable acts be omitted in this record of his life; for he always befriended the poor; gave occupation on his estate to as many labourers as he could employ; provided comfortable cottages for their families; and the wayworn sailor, on the road to join his ship at Portsmouth or Spithead, never applied in vain for relief at the good old Admiral's door. He was indeed the sailors' true and steadfast friend; he loved them as he did his profession, with which they were ever identified in his mind. He would talk to them, advise them, question them as to their services and their wants; and they generally on such occasions spoke freely and without reserve to "Old Charley," as he was familiarly called by them; nor was it an unusual occurrence to see him standing for half an hour together at his gate on the Portsmouth road, listening attentively to the "yarn" of some weather-beaten old "tar"—the conference usually ending with "Well, my man, I will see what can be done for you," and generally accompanying his promise with something wherewith to speed the poor fellow—often bare-footed—on his way. "It is seamen, not ships, that constitute a navy," was a maxim which he would frequently repeat; and for the real sailor he always entertained the greatest love and respect; a feeling which I believe was sincerely reciprocated by most of those who had been under his command, and also by many who had not—a feeling so strongly manifested at his death by the movement which took place among the sailors at the different ports, to raise a

subscription, for the purpose of testifying by some memorial, the reverence they bore to the memory of the man who, throughout the vicissitudes of a long and arduous career, had constantly proved their staunch and unflinching friend.

Sir Charles Napier was the means—through the most untiring exertions—of having many benefits conferred on the British sailor; and it is with much pleasure I transcribe the following account, from an officer of high rank in the Navy, in a letter addressed to me on the subject:—

“We all believe that, through the instrumentality of the good, patriotic old Admiral, the following advantages both to the service and seamen were obtained:—Monthly payments—Allotments to wives and others—Pensions—Inquiry into Greenwich Hospital*—Long leave to seamen and others, with ships being put into winter quarters—Ships being paid off ‘all standing,’ so as to enable their crews to be *at once* discharged, and of having an opportunity of returning to their friends before their coming pay was swallowed up by those wretched harpies who always, under such circumstances, prey upon poor Jack.”

Another naval correspondent writes as follows to the same effect:—

“In 1844, the Masters in the Navy were fighting hard to be placed in a better position, and Sir Charles advocated our cause in the House in very strong terms. I cannot say that he was the direct means of gaining the little we did, but he did all he could for us.

“It would be impossible to give a list of all the good he

* “The late Admiral Sir Charles Napier boldly asserted the claims of these veterans and their distressed families to better treatment; and had he been spared a few years longer we have no doubt he would have continued his advocacy until every wrong or neglect had been fully redressed.”—*From the United Service Magazine, August, 1861.*

effected—you know he was always fighting the Admiralty, and they were too strong for him; yet he was always working them up to something, and it was his agitation that was the means of getting all the good that has been done for the last twenty years. He certainly might be justly styled the sailors' friend, the sailors' advocate, and the sailors' defender—for he was always at his post when there was any move on the board about them, and always looking out sharply after their interest."

It may not be here out of place to remark, that Sir Charles Napier warmly supported that excellent institution, the "Sailors' Home"; and that one of the wards of the establishment at Portsea still bears his name.

His feeling towards the sailor—whom he always considered as a comrade-in-arms—as not only England's best defence, but as the means which had raised him to the position which he then held—this noble feeling reminds one of similar sentiments thus expressed by the Admiral's cousin, General Sir Charles Napier, as recorded in his journal, and written shortly before that glorious old soldier's death:—

"My pride and happiness through life has been, that the soldiers loved me. They did not like my rigid discipline and drill, because no mortal likes labour; but I never yet neglected duty to please soldiers. I sought their goodwill, and won it, by justice and kindness of feeling towards them, not by improper indulgence. I treated every soldier as my friend and comrade, whatever his rank was. My feeling is that of love towards every man with a red coat that I meet, and a blue one either, for it is the same towards sailors. The feeling is difficult to express, but it is as if I had known them all my life, and only forgotten their names. It makes me, when I go to Portsmouth, inclined to take the first soldier or sailor by the arm and walk with him,

certain of knowing how to talk to him of matters with which he is familiar, and which would interest him." *

Those lines of the veteran General are equally applicable to the veteran Admiral, as they accurately describe his corresponding sentiments towards the sister service; for he also loved the soldier as well as the sailor; and "soldiering,"—as we have often had occasion to see—was his greatest delight. He was, moreover, a great favourite with the army, who on several occasions gave him their warmest support. As regards sailors, he almost considered every "blue-jacket" as his personal friend, and never passed one without stopping to ask to what "port" he was bound. He would listen patiently to all their grievances; generally promising, if in his power, to obtain the required redress.

On the dissolution of Parliament in 1857, Sir Charles Napier was again returned, by a large majority, for the Borough of Southwark, when he issued the following address:—

"TO THE ELECTORS OF THE BOROUGH OF SOUTHWARK.

"GENTLEMEN,—I sincerely thank you for having twice sent me to Parliament as your representative.

"When the men of Southwark took me by the hand, I was nearly crushed by a faction, who to save themselves from ignominy, tried to sacrifice me; but you, men of Southwark, took the advantage of an election, and, by returning me as your representative, showed that Englishmen love fair play; and again, at this general election, you have returned me at the head of the poll.

"I again thank you for your kindness, and, as long as I have health and strength, you will always find me at my

* From Sir W. Napier's "Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles Napier," vol. ii., p. 324.

post, looking after the interests of the country, as well as your local affairs.

“I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,

“CHARLES NAPIER.

“March 31, 1857.”

We find him expressing the same political opinions from the hustings, on this occasion, he had as heretofore entertained: viz., those of a staunch reformer; though, as usual, disdaining to adopt the opinions of a “party,” or to truckle to the Manchester policy of “peace at any price!” For he still advocated—at any price—the principle of efficiently keeping up the defences of the country, and more particularly that of maintaining our navy on a footing worthy of this great nation, which, in his opinion, would promote the continuance of peace, by not presenting the temptation of weakness to provoke an attack. His health and spirits were now gradually recovering from the state of depression consequent on the unworthy treatment he had received; and in addressing his electors on the occasion of being a second time returned for Southwark, he indulged again in his old vein of humour: eliciting from the pen of the well-known French author, Alexander Dumas—who was present on the occasion—the remark, that Admiral Napier’s speech was listened to with expressions of hilarity, which proved that merry England was still “*la joyeuse Angleterre*.” Indeed, he always had, during his happier moods, some ready joke wherewith to season the gravest topics; whilst his good-humoured, concise nautical eloquence, ensured a hearing both on the hustings and in the House,

where he seldom broached a subject which he did not thoroughly understand; and as these subjects were chiefly on naval questions, his opinions were generally listened to with as much attention and respect as party spirit would permit.

With the exception of the continued attacks occasionally made on him by his enemies, through an adverse portion of the Press—to which he had become so accustomed, that he treated them with the indifference they deserved, and considered them almost as a matter of course—we find little worthy of notice during the remainder of 1857, until, towards the close of that year, the family sustained an irreparable loss in the death of Lady Napier, who, after a short illness, expired without pain or suffering, at an advanced age. Nature had been worn out and exhausted by long-continued and unceasing sorrow; as this tenderest and most affectionate of mothers had, for ten long years, never ceased to mourn the death of her gallant son, Captain Charles Elers Napier, whose untimely end has been recorded, with that of the ill-fated “Avenger,” of which he had the command.

* * * * *

The opening of the year 1858 found Sir Charles Napier wholly engrossed with his Parliamentary avocations: he seldom missed a division, and was indefatigable in bringing matters of naval reform, as well as existing naval abuses, to the notice of the House. He had been long universally considered by our sailors as their avowed champion—the staunch supporter of their rights; and on the appointment of a commission for an inquiry into the state of the

Navy, he was overwhelmed with applications and representations from sailors and petty officers of the fleet. Many of these letters have been preserved, and one is selected at random, from the petty officers of H.M. ships at Portsmouth, as a general specimen of their contents:—

“To Admiral Sir Charles Napier.

“SIR,—We, the petty officers of Her Majesty’s ships at Portsmouth, in consequence of a meeting held amongst us concerning this subject, have decided on submitting these facts to your notice, as our known champion, from your well-known zeal in anything to improve our condition. Sir, the subject is the mode of paying petty officers for their good conduct badges, which we are convinced is an oversight of those in authority. In the first instance, a man who may have been a petty officer before these badges were introduced derives no benefit from his having any number of badges, as the system is, that no petty officer shall receive pay for such badges that was not in possession of them previous to his being rated a petty officer. In the next instance, a young man who by superior merit or ability attains that rating previous to his becoming entitled to a badge is also excluded. This in reality (whilst he ought to be considered more eligible for this encouragement) is made a loss to him. Again, sir, a man having the rate of leading, and having two badges, receives 1*d.* per day more than a second-class petty officer; and if he has three badges, his pay is the same as a first-class petty officer; and there are many instances in the service of men of inferior ability who have not been considered (during the greater portion of their service) competent to hold a petty officer’s rating, but accidentally drop across it at a later day, and thus receive 3*d.* per day more than a man who, by his ability and personal exertion, attains that rating in his younger days—thus rewarding the least merit with the most pay. This, sir, is the subject we earnestly recommend to your notice, trusting it will meet your approbation. And again, sir, in the case of pensions, it

appears to be no benefit to a petty officer; as a chief petty officer, of 18 *years' petty officer's time*, and having three of these badges (for which he has never received any pay), was pensioned last week on 29*l.* per annum; whilst a serjeant of marines claims his 2*s.* a day, after 10 *years' service* as a serjeant; and we cannot see how they deserve it more than us, who could (and do) do serjeant's duty; but you know, sir, in your own professional knowledge, how they would look at our duty."

On the 6th of March, 1858—the day when Sir Charles Napier attained his seventy-second year—he was promoted, in the course of seniority, from the rank of Vice-Admiral of the Red to Admiral of the Blue. He thus writes, on his anniversary, to his daughter; and this letter shows how much he continued to be engaged with naval affairs:—

"I received your letter and all the children's, congratulating me on my birthday. I am glad to find they are all well. I have been much engaged on naval matters. I have at last driven them into getting up a channel fleet of ten sail-of-the-line, and I trust I shall drive them to relieve the block ships with good ships, and we shall then be safe. I don't know what they are going to do with the Reform Bill, for all the Liberal party are split. Lord John and Palmerston have made friends, but how it is arranged we don't know. I think a dissolution must take place, and I fear two, which will be a great bore.

"I was home yesterday, and everything looking well. God bless you, my dearest child. Your affectionate father,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

During this recess, he chiefly passed his time as usual, in farming at Merchiston; but went in August to be present at the inauguration of opening the port at Cherbourg, which he thus mentions in a letter, to his daughter, dated August 8, 1858, of which the following is an extract:—

"I received your letter yesterday, on my return from Cherbourg, where I went with 100 Members of the House of Commons, in the 'Pera' steamer, which was placed at our disposal by the P. O. Company, and I was much pleased with everything I saw, which you will see described in the *Times* better than I could. As the Emperor was leaving his tent to walk round the dock-yard, he sent for me, shook hands very kindly, and asked me to accompany him round the yard, which I did for a considerable way. It is a tremendous place, very strong, and I think it will at last open our eyes. We have now six sail-of-the-line at Spithead, but I shall not be satisfied till we have ten."

Kind and provident as ever towards all the members of his family, Sir Charles Napier had obtained the promise of a naval cadetship for his adopted grandson, Charles Elers Napier, to whom he thus communicated this pleasing intelligence, towards the end of 1858:—

"Dec. 14, 1858.

"MY DEAR CHARLEY,—You will have your nomination in March. Study hard. Yours affectionately,

"CHARLES NAPIER."

He took great interest in his godson, young "Charley," and promised—should he prove deserving—to advance him in his profession, if he lived. Alas! the hand of death has deprived the boy of a powerful protector and kind friend!

During the whole of 1859—the year preceding his death—we find Sir Charles Napier, if possible, more actively engaged than ever, both in and out of Parliament, with naval affairs. Amongst other papers on naval subjects, written by him in this year, is a letter addressed to the Duke of Somerset, the First Lord of the Admiralty, suggesting many improvements in the mode of manning the Navy. This was published in a

pamphlet; and contains many useful suggestions, but is too lengthy for insertion in this memoir.

Sir Charles Napier spent his last Christmas—that of 1859—at Gisleham Rectory, Suffolk, the residence of his daughter, who thus recalls the recollection of that final visit:—

“I like to think of, and picture my dearest father when last here, distributing to the children of our village school the usual toys and presents from off a ‘Christmas tree.’ I can see him now, with that benignant smile he always wore when well pleased; I can see him at this moment, marshalling in order before him all those little children, according to their respective sizes, whilst they looked up at him with wonder and delight, on receiving the proffered gifts, which were in each case bestowed with some joke or good-natured remark.”

His fondness for children has been repeatedly alluded to in these pages; and nothing could have been more pleasurable to the gallant and worthy old Admiral, than the part he performed on the occasion of this festivity, which took place in the village school.

The session of 1860 found Sir Charles Napier again at his post in the House of Commons, battling as usual for the Navy; and a mass of his correspondence about this period shews how unceasingly he worked for the welfare of his profession. These papers, chiefly on the important subjects of manning the Navy, on the formation of a Board of Admiralty, and the suggestion of uniting all the departments of the Admiralty under one roof at Somerset House, evince a vigor of intellect hardly to be expected at the age of seventy-five; whilst the following correspondence with General Garibaldi indicate an elasticity of spirit and

strength of nerve still unsubdued by the hand of time. Like the old war-horse, he could not hear the blast of the trumpet, or the distant boom of the cannon, without wishing to be engaged in the fray; and, moreover, the cause was a just one—it was again the cause of constitutional freedom and of liberty.

The following is the rough copy of a letter found amongst Sir Charles Napier's papers, which would appear to have been addressed about this time to General Garibaldi—(it has no date):—

“GENERAL,—I sent your Excellency a telegram about a month ago, and, as I have received no reply, I conclude it never reached you. I also sent you a message through Admiral Munro. The purport of both was, that I admired your cause, and would assist you if I could.

“You are no doubt aware, that I took an active part in dethroning Don Miguel of Portugal, and am much disposed to do the same with the King of Naples, if in my power. I have seen your aide-de-camp, Captain Styles: there appears to me no difficulty in upsetting the King of Naples, if your Excellency is furnished with the sinews of war.

“I, from my position, cannot take an active part in raising money, but I think it might be done by some of the rich houses in the city by way of loan. That is the first difficulty; but that overcome, I think the other difficulties could be got over. The King of Naples has a fleet; your Excellency must appropriate his fleet to your use. Steamers are easily bought, but they are not so easily manned—raising men is contrary to law; but as the steamers would not be armed, men might be obtained; if I don't appear, I could get plenty, but I daresay some means may be found, if money were forthcoming. It would be necessary to pay the men well; and if naval officers were engaged, their pay, in the event of being dismissed the service, must be secured to them.

“I beg to conclude this letter by telling your Excellency, that if I could appear off the coast of Naples with a few ships,

manned with British officers and seamen, I should be proud to join your Excellency's noble cause, and do my best to bring the Neapolitan fleet to Palermo. I know the coast well, having served on it; if the fleet is secured, the nearer a landing is made to Naples the better; the march from Calabria is long and difficult, and the country strong; a blow at the capital would be the shortest and surest road to success. I have the honour to remain, your Excellency's obedient servant,

“CARLOS DE PONZA.”

This signature was his favourite *nom de guerre*, under which, as may be remembered, he had already fought in the cause of constitutional liberty.

Sir Charles Napier's advice on this occasion was in accordance with the system of tactics he had followed in Portugal, but he was not destined to carry it into effect. His iron constitution had—as already stated—been much shaken by the consequences of the Baltic campaign; and overwork in attending to his Parliamentary duties had also greatly undermined his system. These causes, combined with advanced age, were fast completing the work of destruction originated in the severe mental trials to which he had been exposed.

The Admiral's state of health, at this period, may be inferred from the following note I received from him; it is dated:

“London, August 9, 1860.

“I have seen your friend the Chevalier —, but have not been able to attend to him. I am so knocked up, that my doctor has desired me to give up business—so I am going into the country on Saturday; and except a speech I have to make on the fortifications, I shall give up all business, as my head is not equal to it, and the doctor says I must be quiet.

I find even writing a letter confuses me. With love to all, believe me, yours affectionately,

“CHARLES NAPIER.

“To Major-General E. Napier.”

About the same time he wrote to his daughter, Mrs. Jodrell: “I am all right again, having had a large blister on my back; I leave town to-morrow for Merchiston. I made a long speech on the fortifications. The people are all mad. After spending twenty millions they will recover their senses. I cannot come to you yet, for I must attend to my harvest, which will be ruined if we have not some rain.”

On the 26th of August he again addressed his daughter, and wrote:—

“I am better, but still my head has not recovered the fatigue of Parliament.

“It is quite possible that I may join Garibaldi. If he can get a fleet, and offers it to me, I shall go. His Aide-de-Camp called on me, and I told him so.”

Sir Charles Napier had considerably rallied under severe medical treatment; and, having determined to make a speech in the House of Commons on the projected fortifications of our coasts, he replied to the remonstrances of Dr. Hastings, “I will make my speech, if I die on the boards of the House of Commons!” The Admiral *did* make this speech, and it was one of the best he had ever uttered. Shortly after this—on the 28th of August—he wrote to me as follows, in reply to an invitation to come to my residence in the Isle of Wight, for change of air and scene.

“August 28th, 1860.

“I was not well, and had the doctor not been at hand I

might have been worse. I am now all right. I have had too much work, too little exercise, too late hours, and too little food and drink—so says the doctor. I cannot move till the harvest is over. Lord Palmerston ought to have sent me to Lebanon instead of Lord Duffrein; but now he and the French are there, I could be of no use. There is a committee in London who will receive money for the Syrians, but perhaps sending it yourself is better. I am in correspondence with Garibaldi, whose aide-de-camp has been with me. If he can procure two or three well-armed steamers, I will go out and do my best to take the Neapolitan squadron. With love to your wife and Sybil, believe me, yours affectionately,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

This project—had he been permitted to carry it into effect—would indeed have been a glorious termination to a glorious career; but that career was now fast drawing to a close. On the adjournment of Parliament Sir Charles Napier went back to Merchiston, and apparently derived so much benefit from country air and occupation, together with perfect mental repose, that he seemed to have regained his usual state of health.

On Thursday, the 25th of October, he went to Portsmouth; passed a couple of days on board the “Asia,” with his old friend, Captain Gordon, and returned home in the evening of the 27th, to dine with Rear-Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, his former Captain of the Baltic fleet. Next day Lady Napier (the widow of his cousin, General Sir Charles Napier) came to see him, and was much surprised to find him on a bed of sickness. On the following Tuesday, intimation was sent to me of the Admiral’s alarming

indisposition. I hastened to Merchiston, and, on my arrival, found many of the family assembled there.

A great alteration was already visible in his appearance. The first symptoms of his illness indicated paralysis of the brain; but, this subsiding, was followed by an exhausting attack of diarrhœa, unattended, however, with suffering. Seeing those around him much affected, he said, "What is the matter? I am better." Still the progress of the disease could not be arrested, and his weakness greatly increased. Dr. Hastings, his London medical attendant, was, for the second time, summoned by telegraph, and on arriving at Merchiston, held out some faint hopes of recovery; but a change for the worse shortly afterwards took place, and it became evident that Sir Charles Napier's end was fast approaching. Happily, however, he continued free from suffering, and gradually sunk from weakness and the complete exhaustion of nature. Never was there a greater example of patience and resignation than he evinced; for, during the whole course of his illness, not the slightest murmur or complaint ever escaped his lips.

His daughter, Mrs. Jodrell, remarking to him how resigned and patient he was, he replied, "When a strong man is down, he must be patient." His affection for children prevailed to the last. He expressed the wish to see two little girls, Sybil and Sarah Napier—his adopted granddaughter and the granddaughter of General Sir Charles Napier—and, when they came to his bedside, he affectionately embraced them both. He likewise desired to see some of his oldest and most valued friends, amongst whom Dr. Jones, who lived

at some distance, on being summoned, instantly responded to the call. His friends, Admiral Sir Michael Seymour and Captain Gordon—the latter his flag-captain in the *Baltic*—came likewise to bid him a last farewell—for he was now, after a week's illness, rapidly sinking, and gradually losing his faculties. It became now evident, even to those who had been most sanguine, that hope could no longer be entertained, and—without a struggle, without a groan or sigh—between five and six o'clock on the morning of the 6th of November, 1860, the great man expired, who had been a glory to England, an ornament to his profession, and so long a devoted servant to the Crown.

Thus sank, at its moorings in harbour, the noble old vessel that had so often weathered the storm, and encountered the enemy's broadside, during the long and eventful voyage of life.

Thus died Admiral Sir Charles Napier, at the age of seventy-five, after having faithfully served his sovereign and his country during the lengthened period of sixty-two years. He was, at the express desire of his daughter, carried to his last resting-place by British sailors; and the banner of England drooped over his remains as they were lowered into the vault containing those of his departed wife.

The funeral was private and unostentatious, attended only by a few relatives and esteemed friends. The chief mourners were, the Reverend Henry Jodrell, his son-in-law, and Major-General Elers Napier—his adopted son, and the author of this Record of his life. His relatives Colonel William Napier and the Hon. W. Napier; Admirals Sir Michael Seymour and

John Elphinstone Erskine, Captains Gordon and Hay of the Royal Navy, Charles Hellard, Esq., the Mayor of Portsmouth, and William Grant, Esq., one of Sir Charles Napier's oldest friends, paid him the last tribute of sorrow and respect by following his remains to the grave.

* * * * *

Within a mile of Merchiston Hall, on the summit of a long undulating sweep of down, stands the ancient church and rural churchyard of the village of Catherington, in Hants. Here, on a sunny slope, commanding a beautiful prospect for miles and miles around; from whence is beheld the British Channel, the Solent, and Spithead, of nautical renown—on this appropriate site, under the evergreen foliage of a noble pine—emblematic of a reputation that can never fade—o'ershadowed with laurels and yew trees—symbols adapted likewise to the scene—stands a plain and unassuming tomb, bearing an inscription to the following effect:—

S A C R E D

T O T H E M E M O R Y O F

A D M I R A L S I R C H A R L E S N A P I E R, K. C. B.,

B O R N,

M A R C H 6 T H, 1786;

D I E D,

N O V E M B E R 6 T H, 1860;

A G E D 74 Y E A R S.

A P P E N D I X.

No. I.

THE following letter from Commodore Napier to Lord Ponsonby ought to have formed part of Chapter IV. of this volume, and been placed before the reply of the latter, as given at pages 120 and 122; it was, however, apprehended, when that part of the work was printed, that there would not have been room for its insertion, and it was consequently omitted, with several other letters, some of which are hereafter given in this Appendix :—

“H.M.S. ‘Powerful,’ Beyrout, Nov. 14, 1840.

“MY LORD,—Things are going on here just as badly as possible. I do not mean as to military affairs, for I know nothing about them, except that the troops are divided between Beyrout, Sidon, Tyre, and Acre; but the Pasha is disgusting everybody. The troops of the Grand Prince are left sometimes without provisions, or anything else, for days. I send you the last letter I had from him. The appointments to the different places are made without judgment; and I verily believe, if the war lasts, Ibrahim Pasha will get a party in his favour. I understand, Izzet openly says, when Ibrahim is put down, the next thing to do is to disarm the moun-

taineers. This, I suspect, will be no easy matter, and I see no prospect of any good coming to the Sultan out of all this. He ought at once to give them the same government they have at Samos.

"I before mentioned to your Lordship that Sidon, Beyrout, and Tripoli should be added to the government of the Grand Prince; and as the mountaineers have land in the Bekaa, if that and Anti-Lebanon could be also added to their government, they would be quite content, and be the best supporters the Sultan could have. If Mehemet Ali were to offer it, even now, and they could depend upon him, I verily believe he would be supported.

"The Turks in Beyrout treat the mountaineers very ill, and the latter are beginning to find they will not be a bit better off than they were. At present I have great influence over them, and can make them do just as I like; but I am unfortunately going to Alexandria, where I do not believe anything can be done without troops, and there will be no one here to look after their interests. My son is come out to join me; he is a Major in the 46th Regiment. I have some idea of sending him to the Emir, but he ought to have Turkish rank; he has talent, great application, knows a little Arabic, and will soon know more. If you could get him Turkish rank, as Major-General, he would be most useful. There is another thing that ought to be done immediately, viz., to send one who could be *trusted*, with a sum of money, say 5000*l.*, to distribute amongst the mountaineers whose houses have been burnt. I was yesterday at Beckfaïa; there is a town near it entirely destroyed; the inhabitants are without shelter and provisions, and the winter is coming on; they cannot go into the plain to cultivate their lands, and there will certainly be a famine if magazines are not formed to provide against it.

"The garrison of Jaffa marched into Acre the other day, and 500 irregular horse are come in from Marash; I believe if Ibrahim were attacked with vigour, we should get all the Egyptian army; after another fortnight nothing more can be done, because the rains will set in. Should anything turn up at Alexandria, I shall not fail to keep your Lordship in-

formed. It is generally believed here that the French squadron are gone to Toulon—in that case, we shall probably go to Malta; they are, I daresay, about something—at least, it looks like it—or they may have determined on war, and are concentrating their squadron, which will be stronger than ours, till the arrival of the ‘*Britannia*’ and ‘*Howe*.’ The Admiral, for the present, talks of going to Marmorice Bay, and the ships from home are ordered to rendezvous there.

“Believe me, &c.,

“CHARLES NAPIER.”

NO. II.

The following correspondence with Lord Minto properly belongs to Chapter IV. of this volume, from which it was omitted for the same reasons as those already given:—

“‘Powerful,’ off Alexandria, Nov. 28th, 1840.

“MY LORD,—I have completed the affair here; well, I hope, but that depends on how affairs are at home; all I can say is, that everybody in Alexandria, Frank, Turk, and Egyptian, is satisfied, with the exception of the French, who are furious, because they had no hand in it. I have been received with the greatest civility by the Pasha, and Boghos Bey told me he was delighted to renew his intercourse with the English. The Pasha is an astonishing man, and it would have been a thousand pities had he been upset, it would have thrown Egypt back a century. Alexandria in ten years hence, if the old man will turn his attention to peaceful pursuits, will be a beautiful city, and become the richest in the Levant. If the old man is managed with frankness and kindness, you may do anything with him, but he won’t be bullied. As I am anxious not to detain the steamer, I shall conclude this, and I hope to hear the Government are pleased with what I have done.

"I have the honour to remain, your Lordship's obedient servant,

"CHARLES NAPIER.

"To the Right Honourable the Earl of Minto."

Subjoined is Lord Minto's reply :—

"Admiralty, Dec. 15th, 1840.

"SIR,—I have but time for a few lines by this messenger, to acknowledge the receipt of your letters down to the 28th of November, and to say that we entirely approve of your conduct in having undertaken on your own responsibility to give effect to the intentions of the Government by negotiation with Mehemet Ali. I assure you that we all do you justice, in appreciating the zeal and talent displayed by you on this occasion. There is, however, one condition to which we feel it impossible to accede—I mean the *guarantee* of the four Powers demanded by the viceroy; our good offices he may reckon upon, but a guarantee is out of the question. Full instructions on the point, however, go to Sir Robert Stopford by this messenger, and you will of course be made acquainted with them. I do not, indeed, apprehend that any difficulty can arise on such a question. We send out a large promotion, and some honours. The official approbation of your proceedings has been sent to the Admiral. I must end, and remain yours faithfully,

"MINTO.

"To Commodore Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B."

No. III.

The following extract from a letter written by Lord Dundonald to Sir Charles Napier, will show how fully *he* appreciated all the difficulties the latter had to contend with in the Baltic, during the campaign of 1854. Lord Dundonald's letter bears no date, but is superscribed: 5, Osnaburg Terrace, Regent's Park, London :—

"Those only who are acquainted with the difficulties you have had to surmount, and the nature of the obstacles assigned you to encounter, can appreciate the perseverance and moral courage requisite to overcome the one and endure the other.

"My anxiety lest your zeal should induce you to yield your judgment to the notions of the uninitiated, is now quite relieved, and the noble fleet you command is safe from the consequences of red-hot shot and incendiary missiles, propelled from granite fortresses, situated out of point-blank range of combustible ships. Believe me, that I sympathize with you, but do not envy the exalted position in which you have been placed, knowing that my remaining energies are incapable of effecting objects which you *have* already accomplished."

No. IV.

ADMIRAL CHAD'S OBSERVATIONS ON ATTACKING SWEABORG.*

" 'Edinburgh,' Baro Sound, 14th June, 1854.

"SIR,—I trust it will be acceptable to you, after your reconnoissance yesterday with your fleet off Sweaborg, and the Russian squadron lying there, to receive such observations as may have occurred to me, with a view to ulterior operations that may be undertaken for assailing them. I have, &c.

"H. D. CHADS, *Rear-Admiral*.

"To Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B."

"Observations and Propositions for the Destruction of the Russian Fleet and Arsenal in Sweaborg, and Annoyance of the Forts :—

"1st. The fortifications of Sweaborg are built of blocks of granite on several small rocks and islands, connected together by bridges; they are of large extent, armed with about

* *Vide* p. 255 of vol. ii.

2000 guns of the largest calibre, and altogether are of enormous strength.

“2nd. These fortifications are surrounded by deep water, commanding the entrance of the harbour, which is only from 200 to 300 yards wide; the ships lie for mutual support in a line close up to the forts at the entrance, and under the small islands of Bak Holmen and King’s Holmen, on which there does not appear to be any large fortifications.

“3rd. From the position and strength of these fortifications they must be considered as unassailable, but at immense sacrifice of life and loss of ships; and even then an attack would be of very doubtful success, as all attacks on them must be made by ships.

“4th. As no attack can therefore be made on these forts with a fair hope of capture, it remains to be considered what operations can be undertaken, for the destruction of the enemy’s ships lying there, the arsenal, and the buildings within the forts, and thus rendering the port, with its immense defences, of no further importance.

“5th. For the above purpose, ‘the destruction of the enemy’s fleet, &c.,’ I should propose a combined land and sea force, to occupy very strongly the Island of Sandhamur, on the eastern side of the harbour, to be assisted and supported by the fleet lying outside the island, with their boats, and a steam flotilla within, to guard the various passages against annoyance from the enemy’s gun-boats. This force to consist of 6000 troops and 3000 or 4000 seamen and marines.

“6th. It will be seen by the map of Sweaborg, that the nearest part of Sandhamur lies upwards of 2500 yards from the fortifications, consequently too distant for any serious interruption to works that may be thrown up on it; and from this point it will also be seen that guns ranging 5000 yards will cover every part of the harbour; and, consequently, the fleet would no longer be secure, and might be destroyed.

“7th. Such guns being now constructing of large calibre, throwing shells with the heavy charges of bursting powder of 11 and 5lbs., I should propose that 40 of them should be prepared and placed in battery on Sandhamur, with a large

supply of ammunition, 250 or 300 rounds per gun, which probably would be as many as the guns could stand with safety. Some of the steamers, also, having similar guns on board, to increase the annoyance to the forts.

“H. D. CHADS, *Rear-Admiral*.

“‘Edinburgh,’ Baro Sound, 14th June, 1854.”

V.

The following letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty is alluded to in page 343 of this volume, where it ought, by rights, to have been placed; but it was imagined, when this work was going through the press, that there would not have been sufficient space for its insertion:—

“Merchiston Hall, Horndean, Jan. 20th, 1855.

“SIR,—I have received your letter of the 13th instant, in which you state, that ‘although my Lords upon some occasions have not been enabled to express the same satisfaction on receiving my reports which they have done on others, that they never passed censure on me in reference to the operations of the fleet under my command.’ This communication leaves me at a loss to understand why their Lordships’ letter of the 4th of October, No. 744, was written; and I shall therefore take that letter, paragraph by paragraph, and reply to it.

LETTER.

“1st. ‘Your renewed reconnaissance of Sweaborg gives rise to more pressing and serious considerations.

“2nd. ‘You desire us not for a minute to suppose that Sweaborg cannot be attacked, and you proceed to point out

REPLY.

“1st. My opinion since I first saw Sweaborg has never changed.

“2nd. Certainly. I pointed out the precise mode of attack. *One with ships alone*; but saying success would be

in detail the precise mode in which the operation ought to be conducted.

“3rd. ‘You express your opinion that if your plan of attack by the ships were adopted, you are quite certain the fortress would be laid in ruins, and most probably an entrance opened to the ships.

“4th. ‘What, then, are the obstacles to the immediate attempt? Admiral Plumridge and the French Admiral are ordered to rejoin you.”

doubtful, and many ships would be lost. One ‘*with ships’ guns, gunboats, Lancaster guns, rockets, thirteen-inch mortars on the islands, and a vast supply of shot, shells, and rockets, in addition to the ships;*’ this mode I thought certain, and do still think so, notwithstanding the disaster at Sebastopol.

“3rd. I never said anything of the sort! I said if attacked by the ships alone, success would be very doubtful. The ships would be set on fire by red-hot shot and shells, and be left in no condition to meet the Russian fleet afterwards; and if attempted at that season of the year, I did not know how many would be lost.

“4th. The want of the means I pointed out to insure success. Had Admiral Plumridge and the French squadron rejoined with the months’ provisions he was ordered to take in, it would have been nearly expended before he got back, and could have done us no good without the appliances I asked for. Neither could he have come until the end of October—the period their Lordships *thought most favourable for attack, but which I knew to be most unfavourable.*

"5th. 'Recent events in the Black Sea will not encourage the Russians to attempt any enterprise of more than usual hazard and daring at this present moment.

"6. 'Your second reconnoissance of Sweaborg opens a new view, and the presence or absence of a few guns of an improved construction, or even of mortar vessels, cannot make the whole difference between a *possible* and an *impossible* attack.'

"Any man reading the foregoing letter would say that nothing more goading could have been written to one in my position; nothing short of a positive order more urgent and imperative: it was to say, if you don't act it will be a disgraceful backwardness! It is a letter which will remain at the Admiralty on record; and if hereafter my life should be written, posterity will perhaps take it as a proof that Sir Charles Napier was a cowardly commander!

"This injurious letter was followed up by another from their Lordships, 17th October, No. 779, which I will now dissect as I have done the first.

"1st. 'Their Lordships *might* also have been satisfied with the decision adopted by you on the joint report of the flag-officers referred to, if the reports of the French and English military officers had not contained adverse opinions; and if your own letter

"5th. Recent events in the Black Sea were a miserable deception: more recent events showed that the British fleet was nearly destroyed. And had that been known at the Admiralty, Sir J. Graham's cautions to me would have been repeated instead of his goadings.

"6th. My second reconnoissance opened no new view *to me*, and the presence or absence of a '*few guns*,' as their Lordships are pleased to call what I asked for, just makes all the difference between the *possible* and the *impossible*.

"1st. If this is not censure, what is it?

"It might be thought the opinions of the naval flag-officers were of more worth than those of the French and English military officers on naval affairs. It is probably the first time that soldiers

of September 25th had not afterwards expressly informed their Lordships that they were not to suppose for a moment that Sweaborg could not be attacked.'

were considered better judges of naval warfare than sailors ! And those soldiers announced opinions directly at variance with each other. But how was it to be attacked ? *Not by ships alone !* And that was well known to their Lordships, though they thought fit to ignore it.

"In their next letter, October 31st, No. 796, their Lordships told me plainly they cannot express satisfaction with the decision taken not to attack Sweaborg, after the fall of Bomarsund. That was not only a censure on me, but on a Marshal of France, a French Admiral, and on my own Admirals. The French Chamber, however, did not agree with their Lordships ; they gave thanks to their officers, and the Emperor promoted them. But I have been removed from my command by the English Admiralty !

"Their Lordships speak of *informal documents*, which they will not recognise. Are these the letters of the First Lord of the Admiralty, official and momentous of meaning, informal ? Were they to be of force for stimulating, goading an Admiral against his judgment to risk the destruction of a noble fleet, amidst fogs, sunken rocks, stone fortresses, and ice and fire ; and yet to be of no authenticity or weight in justification of an injured and insulted man !

"Their Lordships say no inquiry into my conduct is necessary, and decline submitting a controversy, raised by an officer under their orders, to the decision of a Court-Martial. But it was not I who raised the controversy. It was their Lordships, by misinterpreting my letters.

"But they further direct you to inform me, that while they are unwilling to pass censure on any part of my conduct, they have not failed to observe, that from the moment 'I first quitted Wingo Sound *without orders*,' down to the present time, I have repeatedly thought fit to adopt a tone in my correspondence which is not respectful to their authority !

"This passage is to me surprising. For, first, *I did not quit*

Wingo Sound without orders. Their Lordships, by letter of the 8th of March, ordered me to proceed to Wingo Sound. On the 10th of March they sent me Lord Clarendon's instructions, to dispose of my fleet so as to prevent the Russian ships passing out of the Baltic.

"Acting on those instructions, I left Wingo Sound, proceeding to Kiøge Bay, as a better station for effecting the object of Lord Clarendon's communication. I arrived there the 1st of April, and was immediately *reproved by the Admiralty for obeying Lord Clarendon's orders, transmitted to me by the Admiralty!*

"On the 2nd of April I received orders from the Duke of Newcastle, also forwarded by the Admiralty, to proceed to the entrance of the Gulf of Finland from Kiel as soon as possible.

"On the 3rd of May, I received a letter from their Lordships, dated 8th of April, *approving of my proceedings in leaving Wingo Sound!* Also came a letter from Sir James Graham, dated 10th of April, from which the following is an extract:—

"*'I am entirely satisfied with your proceedings.* Neither Lord Clarendon nor I anticipated your movement inside the Belt, and believed that you would watch in the Cattogat, the entrance of the Sound, and of the Belt, until you received orders to enter the Baltic. You judged, however, very wisely, and the time which you have gained has been very precious; and the passage of the Belt in fine weather, and in safety, has been a most successful exploit.

"*'You will also have been enabled to exercise your officers and men to great advantage, with the certainty that the enemy is in front of you, blocked up in ice for some time to come; and that your reinforcements will arrive, and that your discipline will be improved, before he can move, even if he were so disposed.'*"

"On the 5th of April, Sir J. Graham also wrote thus:—

"*'I am highly satisfied with your movements, and with the position which you have taken up for the present. Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Gray can readily communicate with you*

where you are now, and most useful information from Stockholm reaches you without loss of time.

“‘Considering the state of the ice in front of you, I rejoice in the belief that you are on the ground in time, and that you will be strong and well prepared before the critical moment arrives.’

“Now, on the 14th of January, 1855, I received a letter from their Lordships, again accusing me of leaving Wingo Sound without orders, and also remarking that down to the present time, from that period, I have repeatedly thought fit to adopt a tone in my correspondence which is not respectful to their Lordships’ authority.

“I believe in one instance only, up to the 4th of October, I did write hastily to their Lordships; and I afterwards expressed my regret to Admiral Berkeley for having done so. Up to that date, also, I received nothing but praise from their Lordships. Since then, I admit the use of strong language, but I was goaded to it by their Lordships’ public letters, which were almost past endurance.

“Their Lordships have directed you to add, that this, their decision, is to be considered by me as final. It may be final for their Lordships, but certainly will not be final for me, until I receive complete satisfaction for the injurious imputations on my character and conduct.

“Her Majesty was certainly not displeased with my conduct in the Baltic, for she invited me to Windsor on my return. The invitation reached me too late to obey Her Majesty’s command; and as it has not been repeated, my hope is that Sir James Graham’s misrepresentations to myself, of my opinions and conduct, have not been extended so as to affect Her Majesty’s sentiments. But I have been deprived of my command—an unusual act, save when an officer has misconducted himself. I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

“CHARLES NAPIER.

“The Secretary of the Admiralty.”

No. VI.

The following letter written by Sir Charles Napier, in the early part of 1855, to Lord Palmerston, is alluded to at page 346 of this volume, and contains a summary of his proceedings during the Baltic campaign of 1854 :—

“MY LORD,—The command of the Baltic fleet was conferred on me last February by the Cabinet, which measure, I believe, was approved of by the nation at large.

“Such a magnificent fleet had not been got together for many years, and no fleet was ever composed of ships of the same magnitude, and with the same means of propulsion.

“I took that fleet to the Baltic, wretchedly manned, and worse disciplined, and brought it back to the shores of this country in as perfect order as the materials of which it was composed would admit.

“During the time I was there, I had great difficulties to contend with—beacons and buoys were removed, and others placed to mislead, and all the lights were extinguished.

“We went there earlier than a fleet had ever gone before, and stayed later, exposed to the gales and fogs usual at those seasons, without pilots and with imperfect charts. Admirals, captains, and officers ignorant of the navigation; the weather cold and the men imperfectly clad; many too old to go aloft and the young ones quite inexperienced; nevertheless, I managed to get them into Wingo Sound, where I opened Lord Clarendon’s orders, delivered to me by the Admiralty.

“Acting on those orders, I left Wingo Sound and passed the Belt, notwithstanding the gales and fogs, and anchored in Kiøge Bay on the 1st of April, where I, on the following day, received the declaration of war, and a letter from the Admiralty, disapproving of my leaving Wingo Sound, and subsequently one approving of my having done so; and highly complimentary letters from Sir James Graham, for having pushed on to Kiøge; there I assembled fourteen sail-of-the-line, declared the blockade, despatched Admiral Plum-

ridge to the Gulf of Finland, and cruisers on the coast of Courland.

“On the 12th, after coaling and watering, I took the fleet off Faro; there I left seven sail-of-the-line under Admiral Corry, and proceeded to the Gulf of Finland with the rest.

“The weather proved unfavourable for entering the gulf, and I rejoined Admiral Corry. I then proceeded to Elsnabben Bay to set up rigging, and I paid a visit to the King of Sweden, with whom I had a long conference.

“There Admiral Plumridge joined me, bringing much useful information on the state of the Gulf, which was still closed, as far as Revel and Helsingfors.

“He was next despatched to the Aland Islands, to penetrate, if possible, to Bomarsund.

“We had nothing but gales and fogs in this anchorage, where we were detained ten or twelve days; and, on leaving, we were surprised by the fog in the narrowest part of the channel, amongst sunken rocks, and the fleet was in imminent danger; some returned, some anchored, and others pushed on, and, by the blessing of Providence, they all escaped.

“After remaining a few days off Gottska Sando, I again proceeded to the Gulf of Finland, with nine screw line-of-battle ships, and anchored in Hango Bay for a few days; from thence I proceeded to Baro Sound, which we were obliged to buoy; from the lighthouse we had a good view of the Russian squadron at Sweaborg, and I did hope they would have given me an opportunity of trying the metal of my men. I hoped the Cronstadt squadron would have taken advantage of the separation of my fleet. Had I caught them amongst the rocks of Baro Sound, I think I should have driven one-half of them on shore, and taken the other half.

“Seeing no prospect of their moving, I ordered Admiral Corry to Baro Sound, and I proceeded off Sweaborg; and on the 12th of June I sent to Sir James Graham, Admiral Chad’s report (which I approved of), and which I presume your Lordship has seen. I then returned to Baro Sound, and was joined by the French squadron of nine sail-of-the-

line, making in all twenty-eight sail-of-the-line, besides frigates.

“Much was expected from this fleet; but after deliberating and consulting with the French Admiral, we were of opinion that Sweaborg could not be attacked with success.

“Captain Sullivan joined here from Bomarsund, having surveyed the various passages leading to the fortifications. I at once proposed to the French Admiral to attack that important fortress with the fleet, which he declined; first, because he doubted the policy of the measure; and secondly, because he was anxious to examine Cronstadt, and offer battle to the Russian fleet.

“I wrote to Sir James Graham, announcing our intention of going to Cronstadt, and, if unassailable, to attack Bomarsund on our return. I asked for one or two thousand men, if possible; if not, I thought we could do without.

“We found Cronstadt unassailable, as we expected—first, from want of water for the large ships; and secondly, from the strength of the fortifications. We, therefore, returned to Baro Sound, and found despatches announcing that an army of 10,000 men were on their road to join us. We did not want them, and they would have been much better employed at Sebastopol. They were much too large a force for Bomarsund, and much too small for Sweaborg; and too late in the season for the latter place.

“I immediately reinforced Admiral Plumfidge with all the small vessels I could spare, and closely blockaded Bomarsund. Nine sail-of-the-line were left at Nargen to watch Helsingfors, and the body of the fleet proceeded to Ledsund.

“It is needless to detail the attack on Bomarsund; your Lordship knows the particulars. It was taken, and promptly done; and the greatest cordiality subsisted between the allied forces, by sea and land.

“Up to that time, I had received the most unqualified praise from the Admiralty, Sir James Graham, and several of the Cabinet Ministers. Sir James complimented me on being a consummate Commander-in-chief, and approved of all my conduct as being most judicious.

“Bomarsund being taken, the French Admiral and General,

accompanied by the French and English Engineers, proceeded to reconnoitre Sweaborg, and they brought back their reports, which your Lordship has no doubt seen. Suffice it to say, General Jones's was rejected by the Admirals and the General, and General Niel's was approved of by the General and rejected by the Admirals as impracticable and dangerous.

"The only thing within our reach was an attack on Abo; this the French General declined, on account of the cholera having broken out among the troops, and the tempestuous weather, which had already begun. He decided on taking the army back to France; they sailed on the 5th; and on that night the second heavy gale came on—fortunately it was fair.

"When it was known in England that nothing more was to be done, the people got dissatisfied, and the Government became alarmed. Something must be done, and some one must be blamed; and on the 12th of September out came a letter, dated the 4th, to hold a council of war with my French colleagues and the Admirals I had confidence in, to decide whether any further operations could be undertaken, and trusting we should be unanimous.

"We were unanimous, that nothing more could be done, with the means we had, at this boisterous season.

"The French General and the army had sailed; but he had already rejected General Jones's plan of landing 5,000 men, and the Admirals had rejected General Niel's plan of attacking Sweaborg with the ships alone.

"The Admiralty did not wait for the report of the council; for, on the 16th, out came another order, dated the 9th, to lay General Jones's report before the French General-in-chief and Admirals, in a council of war, and decide whether General Jones's report had so far altered their opinion as to induce them to undertake the operation.

"Fortunately the French General (now a Marshal of France) had sailed, and I was saved the pain of asking him to alter the decision he had already taken on General Jones's report, which he most decidedly would have taken as an insult.

"The Admiralty, seemingly enamoured with councils of

war, had not yet received our report when I received, on the 17th of September, a letter dated the 12th (they then knew the army was withdrawn) desiring me to confer with the French Admiral on the feasibility of knocking down Sweaborg (the Gibraltar of the north) in two hours, which was the report of General Niel.

"The French Admiral felt indignant at being asked to alter an opinion he had already given, and (before that opinion had arrived in London) refused to attend the conference, and decided on withdrawing his fleet, according to the order he had received, dated 29th August (and which was known to our Government on the 1st of September), though he had previously decided on remaining with his screw-ships till I left the Gulf of Finland.

"The French Admiral having refused to attend the conference, I called a council of my own Admirals, agreeably to my orders, and they unanimously agreed, after reading General Niel's report, that they saw no reason to change their opinions; and Admiral Martin, who was not present at the first council, after being made acquainted with it, coincided in opinion.

"I now hoped the Admiralty would have been satisfied, but the sequel will shew they were not.

"A few days after this, the French Admiral sailed for France, with all his squadron, and I returned to the Gulf of Finland, and joined Admiral Plumridge at Nargen, where I assembled sixteen sail-of-the-line, including four sailing ships, on the 23rd of September.

"On the 24th I reconnoitered Revel, and made a report to the Admiralty, with which they were perfectly satisfied; and the following day I reconnoitered Sweaborg, and I made as clear a report as it was possible to make—giving two distinct plans of attack: one with ships alone, which I thought very doubtful of success, and dangerous at this season of the year; and the other which I thought sure of success, if undertaken at a proper time.

"I felt quite confident their Lordships would have been perfectly satisfied, as they had been with my report on Cronstadt and Revel, but I was mistaken.

"My report on Sweaborg reached the Admiralty on the

4th of October—two days after the news arrived that Sebastopol was taken, and the very day that the full details appeared in the *Times*. The nation lost their head—they were mad with joy, and so were the Admiralty.

“The French squadron was stopped at Kiel, and so was Admiral Plumridge’s squadron of sailing ships, whom I had sent home by the wishes of Sir James Graham, and they were ordered to hold themselves ready to rejoin me; and out came a thundering letter to me, perverting my report on Sweaborg, and pretending that I had told their Lordships that I could take Sweaborg with the fleet alone, and goading me on to do it.

“I was surprised—I could not believe it possible that my letter could have been misunderstood. My feelings were outraged, and I wrote a full explanation to their Lordships.

“Their Lordships did not wait to know the effects of their goading letter (and my explanation), whether it had had the effect of driving me to risk Her Majesty’s fleet; but the news of the taking of Sebastopol being contradicted, they ordered home Admiral Plumridge’s squadron by telegraph—the French squadron being ordered home at the same time forthwith. So that, had I been disposed to have risked the fleet, which I was not, they deprived me of the means of so doing; but yet they had not the frankness to acknowledge their mistake, but wrote me a letter, which would have been much fitter for a special pleader than for a Board to write, and finished by expressing their want of satisfaction that Sweaborg was not attacked after the capture of Bomarsund.

“It is needless to trouble your Lordship, further or to comment on Sir James Graham’s private letters, which were more insulting than the public ones; or on the insulting reception he gave me—suffice it to say, my flag was ordered to be hauled down, and I was informed my command had terminated.

“Your Lordship will feel that no officer could submit to such treatment. I, in consequence, applied for a court-martial to investigate my conduct, which has been twice refused; and I am desired to consider their decision final—adding that, from the moment I quitted Winge Sound with-

out orders (which I did not do, but quitted it in obedience to Lord Clarendon's orders), down to the present moment, I have treated their Lordships with disrespect. It is singular enough that, after having reproved me for quitting Wingo Sound without orders, they repented, and approved of what I had done; and on the 15th January, 1855, they again return to that charge.

"I admit, that I once wrote a hasty letter to their Lordships, which I regretted having done, and I wrote to Admiral Berkeley to that effect; and up to the taking of Bomarsund I received nothing but praise.

"I admit that after the controversy began I have used strong language, but I have been goaded and insulted almost past endurance.

"When I came home, the Queen could not have been dissatisfied with my conduct, for I was invited to Windsor; the invitation came too late, but, as it has not been repeated, I hope the same misinterpretations of my conduct that have been made to me have not been made to Her Majesty—and what representations have been made to your Lordship I do not know.

"I appeal to your Lordship, now at the head of Her Majesty's Government, for redress; and I beg you will call for all the correspondence, and lay it before the Cabinet; and what the Admiralty do not choose to supply I can furnish your Lordship with.

"I think it right to add, that this appeal was sent to Lord Aberdeen, but his Lordship had resigned office before he received it. I have, &c.,

"CHARLES NAPIER,

"Vice-Admiral, late Commander-in-chief of the Baltic fleet.

No. VII.

The following extract is given from a sketch of Sir Charles Napier's character which was lately trans-

mitted to the author of this memoir, by Rear-Admiral Ramsay, who had known Sir Charles Napier for many years; having served with him in the Channel fleet, and during the Baltic Campaign :—

“I had the pleasure of being acquainted with the late Admiral Sir Charles Napier for several years, and served under him when I was in command of H.M. steam-ship ‘Terrible,’ on the Lisbon station, and afterwards in the ‘Hogue,’ when he was Commander-in-chief in the Baltic. As I have often thought that some traits of his character are not very generally known, or fully understood, I would beg permission to make here a few remarks regarding them.

“Sir Charles was a man of great humanity, and although eager for fame and renown, was much averse to the idea of the least unnecessary loss of human life. In 1854, when up the Baltic, he did me the honour of entrusting to my command the sailors who were landed to assist at the siege of Bomarsund; and I remember well his last injunctions. ‘Recollect,’ he said, ‘that in warfare, the less expenditure of human life by which an object is attained, confers the greater credit on those who command; and I would also add, that there is still a higher motive for care and prudence in regard to the saving of life. Remember, the officer commanding is at all events answerable to his conscience, for the safety of those whom he rashly or wantonly exposes to unnecessary danger.’ He then shook me by the hand, wishing me success.

“No officer could have surpassed him in his care for the men under his command, or for attention to their health; and when Commander-in-chief, he spared no pains to have the fleet well supplied with provisions, and the best fresh beef and vegetables that could be obtained. Notwithstanding his strictness and assiduity as an Admiral, in having the different ships’ companies regularly drilled to the use of both great guns and small arms, as well as trained to the different naval manœuvres, such as shifting spars, making and shortening sail, &c., Sir Charles was very popular with the sailors and

marines; more so than any commander-in-chief I was ever under, excepting the present Admiral, Sir William Parker, who was still stricter, but who, I might almost say, was beloved by the men. A plain proof that an easy negligence, is not the road to popularity, with those who man our ships of war.

“There was another trait in Sir Charles Napier’s character which ought to be noticed: whilst in the Baltic he had considerable patronage, and in its distribution he entirely put aside his private feelings, and used his best exertions to find out those officers who had the greatest claims. I need scarcely add, that had such a system been generally adopted by the Admiralty and the Commanders-in-chief on foreign stations, the state of our navy would have been more efficient than, we fear, it has lately been under a different system.

“Sir Charles, with all his strictness, was no niggard of praise when he thought it deserved; and although he could be stern enough when he suspected negligence in duty, he was easily pleased with those who showed that they were using every exertion in their power to forward the service; no doubt his natural tendency was to act too much from impulse, but in his official capacity, that was always tempered by his desire to test all new plans by actual experiment; and I must add that, before undertaking any enterprise of war, he carefully weighed all the circumstances, and took every precaution to guard against reverse that prudence could suggest.

“Sir Charles Napier, when engaged in dispute, could show strong resentment; at the same time, it ought to be noted, this was only the case when he thought his opponent attacked him personally. He never for one moment harboured any bad feelings against those whom he considered opposed to any of his projects or professional opinions, fairly and openly. As an example of the above, I may allude to my own intercourse with Sir Charles. During the time that I commanded the ‘Terrible,’ the ‘Sidon,’ planned by him, was pitched against her. As his own child, he considered the ‘Sidon’ a superior man-of-war, and attacked the ‘Terrible’ on various points. From knowing the good qualities of the ship under my command, I defended her; and although the

contest sometimes waged hot, he not only abstained from showing the least bad feeling towards me, but he never relaxed his personal kindness. He delighted in making trials of the ships under his orders, and his official reports of the trials of the 'Terrible' with other ships were most fairly given. Indeed, being himself aware of his bias, he was particularly careful; and at least in one case, in trial with H.M. steam-ship 'Scourge,' gave a greater advantage to the 'Terrible,' than was assigned to her by myself and her officers.

"He looked upon those who belonged to his own profession, of whatever grade and rank, who took a real interest in their calling, with an ardent affection. For the good and advancement of the Navy he was quite willing to devote his life, and for that purpose only, was he desirous of a seat in the House of Commons."

No. VIII.

The subjoined letter from an old friend in Lisbon (in reply to one from the author, announcing Sir Charles Napier's death) will show the respect in which his memory was held in that part of the world, where one of his most brilliant achievements had been performed. It may be added that, besides the compliment which is here mentioned as having been paid to the memory of Sir Charles Napier by the Portuguese Government, His Most Faithful Majesty ordered, as a further mark of respect, that a vessel of war which had been recently launched should bear the name of "Admiral Napier":—

"Lisbon, 16th February, 1861.

"MY DEAR GENERAL NAPIER,—I am quite ashamed at not having acknowledged the receipt of your very kind letter of November 9th of the last year; but I gave it to the Duke

of Saldanha for his information, and it was with some trouble I had it returned to me.

“As for the loss you and your country have suffered by the ever-lamented death of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, I need not tell you that it caused a very great impression here and all over the country.

“By the express order from His Majesty the King of Portugal, the Portuguese navy went into mourning for eight days, and all the men-of-war in port had their yards across, and fired their guns every quarter of an hour.

“Personally, you know better than any person how great was my admiration and full devotion for his gallantry, as well as my gratitude for the confidence and particular kindness with which he treated me here, and while I was in London ten years ago.

“Not only the late Admiral had me several times at his table in Dover Street, but he presented me at the Reform Club, and once at Lady Palmerston’s *soirée*, and said to your present Premier everything most flattering of me. Believe me to remain very truly yours,

“DOM^{OS}. DE SERPA AZEVEDO.”

No. IX.

Allusion having been made in the course of this work* to the blind Syrian Prince, the Emir Abbas Kémý Shehab, of Mount Lebanon—who fell from his horse into Sir Charles Napier’s arms when the sad accident happened which deprived him of sight—we give place to the following letter, addressed by the Prince to the author of this memoir, on the occasion of the Admiral’s death, in order to shew that the affection and gratitude he entertained towards the “Commodore-el-Keeber” had not been weakened by a separation

* See p. 85 of this volume.

of more than twenty years. The author received likewise on the same occasion other letters of condolence from the coast of Syria—amongst them one from the Princess Zuleïka Shehab (a near relation of the late Grand Prince of the Lebanon), expressive of her sorrow, and that of her family, at the loss of the Commodore, who had always been their steadfast friend.

LETTER FROM PRINCE ABBAS KÉMY SHEHAB TO
MAJOR-GENERAL ELMERS NAPIER.

“Beyrout, January 5th, 1861.

“SIR,—After wishing you every health and long life, I cannot express to you how deeply I am distressed by the intelligence which has reached me of the death of your late most honoured and much esteemed relative, Sir Charles Napier; and, indeed, all the people in this country are deeply grieved at the sad event, for all are under obligations to him, especially myself, who mourn over his loss most sincerely, as my tried and sincere friend, and, I may say, as my parent, from his great kindness and affection for me. We were in constant correspondence, and he was always inquiring after my health, and the state of my affairs; and these, his letters, are carefully preserved by me as a precious treasure.

“I pray God that your health may be long preserved as a compensation for your loss, and that you may long enjoy the confidence and the favour of your Government.

“It is my hope that, in the same manner in which there existed a sincere friendship between me and Sir Charles Napier, and a pleasing and cordial correspondence between us, so there may exist the same between you and me. I have taken the liberty to address you this letter of inquiry and salutation, in the belief that the bond of friendship and esteem will be thus cemented between us; and praying ever for your health, happiness and success, I remain, your sincere friend.

“ABBAS KÉMY SHEHAB.”

No. X.

THE NAPIER MONUMENT FUND.

*To the Seamen, Marine Artillery, and Marines, of
Her Majesty's Navy.*

NAVAL MONUMENTS TO THE MEMORY OF THE LATE
ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER, K.C.B.

The Petty Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Seamen, and Marines, of her Majesty's ships at Devonport, have heard with deep regret of the death of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B., and in Committee have proposed to raise (with the fleet), a subscription of a day's pay (or less), for the purpose of erecting a monument or monuments to his memory, as a mark of esteem and respect for his person, and of gratitude for the manner in which he has laboured for the bettering of the social condition of the Seamen and Marines.

Committee of Management—composed of Petty and Non-Commissioned Officers of H.M. ships “Cambridge,” “Implacable,” “Jason,” “Nautilus,” “Spiteful,” “Royal Adelaide,” “Wellington,” “Sylph.”

Chairman . . . Sergt. JAMES HANDFORD.

Vice-Chairman JNO. H. BROOKSHAW.

Sub-Treasurer . JNO. BROWN.

Secretary . . . CHARLES T. OLIVER.

Ships' companies are respectfully requested to forward their subscriptions to Messrs. Hodge & Co., Bankers, Devonport.

All communications to be addressed to the “Secretary of the Napier Monument Fund, Royal Sailors' Home, Devonport.”

A similar movement took place at Portsmouth, and likewise, as we understand, at the other naval ports in the kingdom.

THE END.

